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Abstract 
This thesis aims to identify aspects of Luce Irigaray's work which 
are of significance for feminist discourses of art, including art 
practices and critical analyses of art works by women. Her 
writings have been analyzed and employed in academic fields, such 
as Literature, Philosophy, and Theology, but rarely to date from 
within art history, criticism or theory. This thesis establishes the 
wide-ranging implications of her work for these disciplines. 
The thesis is in two parts. Part 1 outlines Luce Irigaray's analyses 
of phallocentrism's representational structures, and her arguments 
for developing representational structures appropriate for women. 
It aims to outline Luce Irigaray's philosophy of sexual difference in 
so far as it impacts upon the production of meaning in the realm of 
the visual, and visual aesthetics. The first two chapters focus upon 
mimetic practices, including mimesis, masquerade and hysteria. 
They identify the maintenance mimesis in phallocentrism, and the 
productive mimesis which develops structures of resistance. 
Chapters 3 and 4 attend to Luce Irigaray's analyses of the visual, 
including phallocentric structures of sight and visible 
representation. The possibility of a syntax in the Symbolic 
appropriate to women is explored. 
Building upon this, Part 2 engages moments of contemporary art 
practice by women with further aspects of Luce Irigaray's thinking. 
Her concept of morphology is explored in relation to work by Laura 
Godfrey-Isaacs, Jenny Saville, Bridget Reilly and Rachel Whiteread, 
in order to establish possible mediative function of art works. Luce 
Irigaray's understandings of gesture are read in conjunction with 
work by Louise Bourgeois. Finally, Luce Irigaray's arguments about 
women's genealogies, and concepts of the divine, the universal, and 
the transcendental appropriate to women, are tested against the 
representation, `woman', in Irish visual culture, and moments of 
resistance in works by Irish artists Rita Duffy, Louise Walsh, 
Pauline Cummins, and Fran Hegarty. 
The thesis concludes that, through careful attention to the 
structures and use of terminology developed by her, it is possible 
to identify areas where Luce Irigaray's work can be productively 
juxtaposed with and interrogated by current feminist theories of 
art in order to develop those practices, increase the legibility of 
art works by women, and provide spaces of discourse in which 
artists can work in the future. 
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Introduction. 
What I am going to try and talk about today, often in the form of questions, 
stands at the meeting point of the properties of physical matter and an 
elaboration of sexualized subjective identity that has still to be thought 
through and put into practice. 1 
At once with this statement by Luce Irigaray we could be in a 
woman artist's studio. We could be contemplating her practice. We 
could be at a site - the meeting point of the properties of physical 
matter and an elaboration of sexualized subjective identity - which 
is the site of her enunciation through that practice. This thesis 
aims to propose that certain key concepts and arguments in the 
work of Luce Irigaray are productive in the search for feminist 
critical analyses of contemporary art practices by women. The 
challenge for feminist artists and critics is to find means to 
articulate their difference as women engaged with those practices. 
Present art critical discourse being theoretically and structurally 
wanting, it is necessary to build feminist analyses and terminology 
which can not only be brought to bear upon present theoretical and 
critical discourse but also facilitate the legibility of artworks by 
women in ways which have not been possible to date. This thesis, 
then, is necessarily strategic and political. My arguments are 
informed by my training as a painter and subsequent work as an 
artist, and by my work in art criticism, arts administration, and as 
an educator in studio-led Fine Art courses. Some of the ideas which 
emerge from it will find their way back, as questions, into that 
possible place of a woman artist's studio, her practice, and the 
1 Luce Irigaray, 'Flesh Colours', in Sexes and Genealogies, trans. by Gillian C. Gill (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 151-165 (p. 153)/'Les couleurs de la chair', in Sexes et parentes 
(Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1987), pp. 165-179 (p. 167). 
2 
site of her enunciation. 
Two main impulses shaped the focus for the thesis. The first was 
concern about the state of feminist art criticism and about the 
status of feminist art practice in the 1990s; the second was the 
conflict between my pleasure and interest in reading some of Luce 
Irigaray's philosophical writings and my confusion when reading 
her essays on art. My initial concern was that artists such as Mona 
Hatoum, Rachel Whiteread, Louise Bourgeois, Jana Sterbak, Janine 
Antoni, Rebecca Horn, and many others - artists working in diverse 
media with diverse aims, but with clear recognition of themselves 
as gendered female - may have had critical appraisal by feminists, 
but they have not, by and large, seen' deeper shifts within theories 
of art produced by feminism which can accommodate (or are 
provoked by) their practices. Additionally, a number of younger 
women artists in Britain have emerged onto the national and 
international art scene who appear to have nothing to say, in their 
work or beyond, about feminism (even though the surface style of 
much of this work relies heavily upon feminist work of the 1970s) 
and about whom feminist criticism has appeared to say nothing. A 
malaise begins to be delineated. 2 
Turning to the writings of Luce Irigaray is not a direct response to 
2 At least in part this is a result of (and helps to perpetuate) very real problems. For example, the 
continuing low employment rates of women in art schools creates problems for feminist practitioners and 
critics, and perpetuates the isolation of women students from knowledge, analyses, and theories of their 
history and present context as women. In publishing, a crisis in our only feminist art magazine, and, in 
other journals and in books, a lack of reflection upon the history and progress of the work of feminists 
involved with art practice and criticism, has left those of us who would identify amongst that number with 
little clarity about our tasks and strategies for the coming years, while being aware that there is still so 
much work to be done. Feminist activity among tutors in universities and art schools, possibly as a result 
of the pressure to publish, is increasingly focused on theoretical and academic production, often it seems 
at the expense of activist and practical strategies to deal with these issues in day to day interaction with 
colleagues and students, or by such simple strategies as supporting women artists by writing short 
reviews of their work for art magazines. 
3 
this malaise, and in doing so I am not suggesting that her work 
contains in any transparent form the solution to these problems. It 
is rather that there are elements in her thinking concerning 
women's subjectivity, the enunciation of that sexed subjectivity, 
and mediation between subjects, which are not only exciting 
philosophically, but are also important for theoretical and critical 
discussions of contemporary art. It is my contention that, although 
it does not engage with it directly, much of Luce Irigaray's work 
cuts across many of the tired areas in present day art criticism 
and could reconfigure the discussion among feminist theorists 
about how to develop ways of reading the practices of 
contemporary women artists. 
Such possibilities were not at all apparent to me in my initial 
reading of two articles which are among the few instances where 
Luce Irigaray discusses visual art. Having read sections and essays 
in This Sex Which is Not One, Speculum Of the Other Woman, and 
The Irigaray Reader 3 with great interest and pleasure, my reaction 
to `A Natal Lacuna' (with a commentary by Margaret Whitford, 
`Woman with Attitude') and `How Can We Create Our Beauty? ' was 
one of disappointment and confusion. 4 In `A Natal Lacuna' Luce 
Irigaray considers the work of artist Unica Zürn as a "failure". She 
says that Zürn, in her desire to produce a "descriptive reality" of 
3 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One, trans. by Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985)/Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1977); 
Speculum Of The Other Woman, trans. by Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985)/Speculum 
de l'autre femme (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1974); The Irigaray Reader, ed. by Margaret Whitford 
(Oxford: Blackwells, 1991). 
4 Luce Irigaray, 'A Natal Lacuna', trans. by Margaret Whitford, Women's Art Magazine, 58 
(May/June 1994), 11-13; 'How Can We Create Our Beauty? ', in Je, Tu, Nous: Toward a Culture of 
Difference, trans. by Alison Martin (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 107-111/'Comment creer notre 
beautL? ', in Je, tu, nous: pour une culture de la difference (Paris: Grasset, 1990), pp. 121-126 (hereafter 
cited as 'How Can We Create Our Beauty? '/ 'Comment creer notre beaut8? '); Margaret Whitford, Woman 
with Attitude', Women's Art Magazine, 60 (September/October 1994), 15-17. 
4 
her "psychic truth", has produced an art which is "ugly", a 
symptom of her own fragmented psyche. This, argues Luce Irigaray, 
is a result of Zürn's failure to "give birth to herself" as a woman. 
She uses this "failure" to argue that "it is difficult for a woman to 
be born", and for the importance for women of producing wholeness 
and "beauty", particularly through "her own morphology". Margaret 
Whitford's commentary concentrates on the aspects of Luce 
Irigaray's essay which touch upon visual art, and includes an 
explanation of Irigaray's understanding of the death drives and 
their relationship to creativity. She suggests that Luce Irigaray's 
concept of "beauty" is woman's identity for herself, and reads 
Irigaray to be calling for women to create figurative, idealised 
representations of women. She then states that Luce Irigaray has, 
therefore, a conservative approach to art. In referencing Luce 
Irigaray's work beyond `A Natal Lacuna', 5 Margaret Whitford finds 
material to reinforce this thesis. 
My confusion was immense. I had certainly not thought of Luce 
Irigaray as potentially conservative in her understanding of art; 
indeed, my initial reading (albeit on an intuitive, rather than 
considered level) found that her work would have much to offer in 
its discussion of language and representation. Key to the project 
was realising the difficulties of inter-disciplinary work. Neither 
Luce Irigaray nor Margaret Whitford have a background in the visual 
arts. Luce Irigaray is a psychoanalyst and philosopher, and Margaret 
Whitford a philosopher. In her writings Luce Irigaray, in particular, 
has worked in a richly interdisciplinary way, and, in writing about 
her, Margaret Whitford has had to follow suit. Yet the underlying 
5 Including Speculum; Je, tu, nous, and essays in Sexes and Genealogies, trans. by Gillian C. Gill 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)/Sexes et parentds (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1987). 
5 
problem of 'A Natal Lacuna' for an audience of artists and critics (a 
problem perpetuated by Margaret Whitford's article also) is 
precisely the failure to understand or show knowledge of the 
practices of visual art in general and the necessary corollary, 
feminist analyses and developments of visual art as manifested 
through practices, histories and theories. Thus neither of these 
articles provide the interdisciplinary reading necessary to 
facilitate access - and thus the construction of models of practice 
- for contemporary practitioners and critics. My criticisms 
identified particular problem areas: the prioritising of the literary 
arts over the visual arts; the lack of attention to the specificities 
of visual art practices; and the stress upon the artwork as product 
only, without consideration of the processes involved in its 
making. 6 
When I read `How Can We Create Our Beauty? ' shortly afterwards, I 
could begin to identify the source of my difficulties as twofold: 
terminology, and politics. Luce Irigaray was using terminology 
which either was not used in contemporary criticism or, if it was, 
then with a different meaning. Her politics, too, were unfamiliar, 
different from the politics of the women's movement (either 
activist or theoretical) with which I was familiar in Britain and 
Ireland. `How Can We Create Our Beauty? ' is published in Je, Tu, 
Nous: Toward a Culture of Difference, a book of short polemic 
essays, each designed to focus on a particular aspect of Luce 
Irigaray's thinking in order to introduce it to a wider audience and 
demonstrate its politics. I realised that it could work as an 
indicative reading, pointing to areas in Luce Irigaray's broader 
6 These were written up as a short, polemic response to the two articles. Hilary Robinson, 
'Irigaray's Imaginings', Women's Art Magazine, 61 (November/December 1994), 20. 
6 
work which would be of importance for developing radical 
discourses and practices of art. 
Luce Irigaray begins `How Can We Create Our Beauty? ' by positing 
her argument in words which are a challenge to many of us who are 
involved with contemporary art practices. This terminology can 
even appear naive for a number of reasons. Most of us making or 
working with art will have taken on board, for instance, Adorno's 
discussion about the impossibility of lyricism after Auschwitz; or 
the way an avant garde-ist principle of `epater les bourgeois' has 
disintegrated into post-modernist horror-chic; or a feminist- 
realist impulse to `tell it like it is'; or possibly even the desire for 
catharsis which can only be achieved at the resolution of a certain 
order of narrative. At first, Luce Irigaray appears either to ignore 
or be unaware of the impact of each of these for contemporary art 
practice. She writes: 
Very often, when looking at women's works of art, I have been saddened by 
the sense of anguish they express, an anguish so strong it approaches horror. 
Having wanted to contemplate beauty created by women, I would find myself 
faced instead with distress, suffering, irritation, sometimes ugliness. The 
experience of art, which I expected to offer a moment of happiness and repose, 
of compensation for the fragmentary nature of daily life, of unity and 
communication or communion, would become yet another source of pain, a 
burden.? 
Luce Irigaray uses the rest of the essay to outline in four main 
points why she thinks women make images of pain, and how women 
could create beauty. First, she puts herself into the discussion by 
pointing out that she too deals with pain in her work, but states 
that she attempts to do so in what she calls "a literary style" to 
cushion any potential sense of dereliction in the reader. At the 
7 Luce Irigaray, 'How Can We Create Our Beauty? ', p. 107/'Comment creer notre beaute? ', p. 121. 
7 
same time she will look for a positive - something which women, 
"who have a tendency to identify only with what they lack, their 
shortcomings"8, sometimes criticize her for. She says that showing 
the negative: 
... is positive and necessary given that it was meant to stay hidden. The 
portrayal of suffering is, then, for women an act of truthfulness. It's also akin 
to an individual and collective catharsis. [.... ] Daring to manifest publicly 
individual and collective pain has a therapeutic effect, bringing relief to the 
body and enabling them to accede to another time. This doesn't come as a 
matter of course, but it may be the case for some women. 9 
She likens the effect of this representation of anguish to the 
masked figures subjected to fate in Greek tragedy. 
Luce Irigaray's second point is that having children is a most 
wonderful creativity. However, within the "male social order" 
there is a particular obligation to do it; and further, a distinction 
is made between creation, which is reserved for men, and 
procreation, which is deemed of a lesser order. She suggests that 
"there would seem to be confusion now between the beauty of the 
work [of childbirth] and its definition within a between-men 
civilization in which women no longer have a recognized right to 
engender spiritual values". 10 
The third point is stated bluntly: "as women, we have thus been 
enclosed in an order of forms inappropriate to us. In order to exist, 
we must break out of these forms. "11 This may have one of three 
consequences: first, it may destroy us: "instead of being reborn, we 
annihilate ourselves". Second, it may show us what flesh, and 
8 Luce Irigaray, 'How Can We Create Our Beauty? ', p. 108/'Comment creer notre beaute? ', p. 122. 
9 Luce Irigaray, 'How Can We Create Our Beauty? ', p. 108PComment cr8er notre beaute? ', p. 122. 
10 Luce Irigaray, 'How Can We Create Our Beauty? ', p. 109/'Comment creer notre beaute? ', p. 123. 
11 Luce Irigaray, 'How Can We Create Our Beauty? ', p. 109/'Comment creer notre beaute? ', p. 123. 
8 
therefore what colours, we have left: "I think colour is what's left 
of life beyond forms, beyond truth or beliefs, beyond accepted joys 
and sorrows. Colour also expresses our sexuate nature, that 
irreducible dimension of our incarnation. "12 The third possible 
consequence of breaking out of the inappropriate order of forms 
which encloses us is that women may re-discover their identity 
and forms, forms which are "always incomplete, in perpetual 
growth, because a woman grows, blossoms and fertilizes (herself) 
within her own body". 13 
The fourth and final main point of `How Can We Create Our Beauty? ' 
concerns the representation of a "female divine". The between-men 
culture disallows women's expression of meaning. Just as a child 
is not an abstract or arbitrary sign, so too for women "meaning 
remains concrete, close, related to what is natural, to perceptible 
forms. "14 In what is called pre-history, women participated in civil 
and religious life and were represented as woman goddesses (not 
only mother goddesses). Today, lack of divine representation leaves 
women in a state of dereliction, without means of designating or 
expressing self, identifying and respecting mother-daughter 
genealogies. 
From this essay, then, there are three salient points for discussion: 
1) the very broad issue of flesh, body, their representation, and 
female morphology; 2) the nature of female creativity, and in close 
relation, subjectivity; and 3) the representation of what Luce 
12 Luce Irigaray, 'How Can We Create Our Beauty? ', p. 109/'Comment creer notre beautg? ', pp. 123- 
124. 
13 Luce Irigaray, 'How Can We Create Our Beauty? ', p. 110/'Comment creer notre beaute? ', p. 124. 
14 Luce Irigaray, 'How Can We Create Our Beauty? ', p. 110/'Comment creer notre beaute? ', p. 125. 
9 
Irigaray terms the "female divine" and its inevitable adjuncts, 
"universality" and "transcendence". Running through these 
discussions, as they fold out into Luce Irigaray's wider writings, 
are two others: 4) the necessity for productive acknowledgement of 
female genealogies (two-way interchange between mother and 
daughter, and its concomitant, exchange between women) and, 5) in 
very close relation to this, a notion of fulfilment or "becoming" for 
women. Without any of these, women's beauty is not possible: 
indeed, these in conjunction would be productive of and allow for 
the performativity of women's beauty. It is thus clear that 
anything approaching `an Irigarayan aesthetic' will not be found in 
the reproduction of certain methodologies in the studio, or 
adherence to one or another `style' of imagery. Luce Irigaray's 
discussion of beauty therefore, and my discussion here, is not 
about defining a new aesthetic, nor is it an essentialist notion of a 
female aesthetic which has been overshadowed by a male 
aesthetic, and which only requires a light to be shone on it in order 
to become visible. For Luce Irigaray, "beauty" for women is a 
potential state of being which can only come about as a result of 
rethinking political and cultural discourse. Her discussion of 
beauty is about making possible an order of discourse which would 
in and of itself, and inevitably, be productive of beauty. It is a 
discussion which requires the reader to think differently: to 
rethink what might be productive of beauty, and what might 
constitute the transcendental and the universal. 
In trying to identify the threads in Luce Irigaray's work which can 
help us rethink the political and cultural discourse of contemporary 
art practice and criticism, there are a number of things that this 
thesis will not do. Three in particular should be mentioned. First, it 
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will not relate her work to that of other philosophers and 
psychoanalysts, nor map out her indebtedness to them. Second, it 
will not chart the detailed chronology of the development of her 
thinking. There are others who are far more qualified to do both of 
these jobs than I, and I acknowledge the importance of their work 
for my own. 15 The third thing I shall not be doing is using Luce 
Irigaray's work to `explain' women's art works; nor shall I be using 
art works to `illustrate' Luce Irigaray's writing. I hope to avoid 
these two simplifications by instead firstly outlining the analyses, 
structures, and strategies which she teases out as conducive to the 
development of representational structures which are appropriate 
for women, rather than those which maintain the languages of 
patriarchy; and secondly by looking for moments in contemporary 
practices and works which can be read through an understanding of 
strategies that Luce Irigaray identifies as manifested by women in 
patriarchal culture. In doing this I aim to avoid proscribing or 
prescribing particular practices (whether representational, 
contextual, or of media); but rather to open up discourses of 
possibility of and for contemporary art practices. 
To date, most of the analyses and applications of Luce Irigaray's 
work - from the major studies to short reviews - have been carried 
out within the disciplines of philosophy, theology, and literature. 
Margaret Whitford's Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine is 
still the key introduction to the writings of Luce Irigaray. 16 It 
outlines the breadth of Luce Irigaray's thinking in terms of its 
concepts and its philosophical contexts, and demonstrates how her 
15 The major publications I have used will be outlined below. The many other publications I have 
used will be found in the bibliography, and are footnoted as appropriate. 
16 Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (London: Routledge, 1991). 
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work has moved beyond that of those who have informed her work. 
Published in 1991, it suffers only from its lack of comment on Luce 
Irigaray's on-going publications and from the developing subtlety 
of Irigarayan scholarship - to which Margaret Whitford herself is 
contributing. Tina Chanter's book Ethics of Eros: Irigaray's 
Rewriting of the Philosophers is the only other single author book 
in English devoted to Luce Irigaray's work. 17 Its aim is to sift 
through Luce Irigaray's difference from the position of De Beauvoir 
and her explicit engagement with works by Hegel, Heidegger, 
Levinas, and Derrida. As such, Ethics of Eros has a philosophico- 
historical framework and focus. The final book-length text on Luce 
Irigaray's work is the invaluable anthology Engaging With Irigaray: 
Feminist Philosophy and Modern European Thought, which as a 
whole demonstrates the radical breadth of its effect. 18 While a few 
essays here had previously been published elsewhere, most had not. 
I found those by Elizabeth Weed, Naomi Schor, Rosi Braidotti, 
Philippa Berry, Carolyn Burke, Dianna Chisholm, Elizabeth Hirsch 
and Luisa Muraro particularly interesting and useful for stretching 
my own thinking, whether in agreement or not. 
While these texts and others will be footnoted as appropriate 
through the thesis, I would like to mention some analyses of Luce 
Irigaray's work which have been helpful or challenging. Elizabeth 
Grosz's incisive work upon Irigaray (and upon her critics) has been 
useful, as has her unravelling of the relations between mimicry, 
17 Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros: Irigaray's Rewriting of the Philosophers (London: Routledge, 1995). 
18 Engaging With Irigaray: Feminist Philosophy and Modern European Thought, ed. by Carolyn 
Burke, Naomi Schor and Margaret Whitford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
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hysteria, camouflage, anorexia, and the visual. 19 Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak's comments on essentialism, and the 
possibility of a strategic essentialism have been invaluable for 
offering a grounded approach to reconsidering this contentious 
area. Her insistence upon noting the historical and geographical 
significance of academic texts even as they assume a 
transcendence, and her inter-testing of theory and strategy, are 
also liberatory. 20 While a search through any humanities database 
will supply many articles referring to Luce Irigaray, many of these 
I have found to be either highly focused towards a particular 
academic field, or relatively narrow in their reading of Irigaray's 
work. A substantial number of articles or chapters have been very 
interesting in their reading of Luce Irigaray, but tangential to my 
own purposes here. Such articles have however been important in 
helping me put together an overview not only of Luce Irigaray's 
work, but of strategies for reading her. I could mention here two 
very different examples of this: Henry Louis Gates, jr., 'Significant 
Others', exploring the tensions between her analysis of the 
'otherness' of women in patriarchy and other forms of 'otherness' - 
in particular the gay male gaze, and the gaze of a white man upon a 
black man; and Christine Delphy, 'The Invention of French 
Feminism', which exposes that category as a construction of 
Anglo-American academia. 21 Cathryn Vasseleu's 'Illuminating 
Passion: Irigaray's Transfiguration of Night', while not concerning 
19 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists, (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 
1989); Space, Time, and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies, (London: Routledge, 1995); 
Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). 
20 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'In a Word: Interview', Interview by Ellen Rooney, In The Essential 
Difference, ed. by Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 
151-185. 
21 Henry Louis Gates, jr., 'Significant Others', Contemporary Literature, 29.4 (1988), 606-623; 
Christine Delphy, 'The Invention of French Feminism: An Essential Move', Yale French Studies, 87 (1995), 
190-221. 
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itself with visual art, was important in helping me retrieve Luce 
Irigaray from the tag of being `anti-visual'. 22 Very few works 
indeed have attended to the visual or to visual arts - and it is 
notable that two which instantly come to mind are both written by 
philosophers rather than art theorists: Margaret Whitford's `Woman 
with Attitude' (which I have already mentioned above), and 
Christine Battersby's `Just Jamming: Irigaray, Painting and 
Psychoanalysis', which is very useful in differentiating Luce 
Irigaray's structuring of the subject/image relation from that of 
Jacques Lacan. 23 It is located in an anthology of feminist art 
criticism from diverse positions; and while it is supportive of Luce 
Irigaray's project, it nonetheless wants to take her arguments 
further as a result of looking at the evidence of actual artworks. A 
third, Rosemary Betterton's An Intimate Distance, does come from 
an art critical context. 24 Luce Irigaray's writings are referenced at 
particular points through the book, but while this is useful as a 
pointer, it does not engage with sifting through the work, but takes 
a more restricted reading. I could find few others. It was this lack 
of engagement from within art theory that convinced me of the 
importance of undertaking the project in this form. 
One thing that emerged clearly (if negatively) from the work on 
Luce Irigaray was how few of the commentators had read further 
than This Sex and Speculum, and how many relied upon the 
22 Cathryn Vasseleu's 'Illuminating Passion: Irigaray's Transfiguration of Night', In Vision in 
Context: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Sight, ed. by Teresa Brennan and Martin Jay 
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 129-137. 
23 Christine Battersby, 'Just Jamming: Irigaray, Painting and Psychoanalysis', in New Feminist Art 
Criticism: Critical Strategies, ed. by Katy Deepwell (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 
128-137. 
24 Rosemary Betterton's An Intimate Distance: Women, Artists and the Body, (London: Routledge, 
1996) is useful as a pointer, it does not engage with sifting through Luce Irigaray's writings, but takes a 
more restricted reading. 
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comments of others in a manner that became more confusing than 
enlightening, with even basic terminology and concepts being 
misused. This approach is summed up in one recent book, whose 
author seems to make a virtue out of not reading Luce Irigaray's 
actual work: "In what follows I shall refer rather more to the 
writings of those feminists who see themselves as broadly 
propagating Irigaray's ideas than to her own works, which are 
generally found to be too obscure to interpret with confidence. It 
is, in any case, the kind of theoretical moves being made in 
feminist theory which are my concern more than the accuracy with 
which these may be attributed to certain theorists". 25 Because this 
approach seemed common (if seldom explicitly stated), I resolved 
to read Luce Irigaray's own works as closely as possible in order to 
fathom her meanings and use of terminology. Her work is `a- 
academic' and highly resistant to academic procedures. I found it 
necessary to trace her use of particular terms across different 
works in order to determine her use of them - not a project which 
would be feasible for writers of shorter articles as her writing is 
never indexed. 
This has influenced the structure of the thesis, which is in two 
parts. The first part (Chapters 1-4) aims to reach an understanding 
of Luce Irigaray's philosophy of sexual difference in so far as it 
impacts upon the production of meaning in the realm of the visual, 
and, consequently, the visual aesthetic. Therefore it comprises a 
close reading of Luce Irigaray's work as it relates to the practices 
and structures which inform the production and reception of visual 
representation. The second part (Chapters 5-7) aims to determine 
25 Jean Curthoys, Feminist Amnesia: The Wake of Women's Liberation (London: Routledge, 1997), 
p. 143. 
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possibilities for feminist art criticism to increase the legibility 
of contemporary art by moving into a space distinct from critical 
spaces prevalent today (for example, those which hold that meaning 
resides in the artist's biography; or in the medium of the work; or 
in the overt image). This is a site of interchange between the 
structural properties of formal procedures and the structural 
processes of subjectivity. The second part of the thesis therefore 
offers greater focus on a resonance between, on the one hand, 
particular structures and arguments within Luce Irigaray's writing, 
and on the other hand, particular art practices and art works. This 
is not because Luce Irigaray offers prescriptions for art practice, 
but rather that each contains moments which, when read in 
partnership with the other, can aid the legibility of both. 
The first two chapters are linked, and explore in turn Luce 
Irigaray's analysis and practice of mimesis. Mimesis, and related 
terms, are crucial concepts for analyzing how we learn to behave in 
a manner appropriate for our social structures, and how we create 
art. These chapters identify two aspects of mimesis: non- 
productive, and productive. The first is discussed in relation to 
mimicry and mime, which maintain patriarchal structures as they 
are through generations. "Masquerade" is identified as the practice 
of femininity as constructed by patriarchy. It maintains women as 
"other of man's same" within patriarchal structures. Luce 
Irigaray's use of the term is contrasted with that of recent 
commentators in cultural studies, interpreting Joan Riviere's 1929 
outline of masquerade. Hysteria is discussed here also, as the mark 
of a site of resistance to the masquerade which is femininity; 
ultimately however it is non-productive, as its strategy to achieve 
the power of self determination is one of mimeticizing femininity 
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to the extreme of paralysis, muteness, or even death. 
Sites of resistance or "reserve" other than hysteria, mark what I 
call a "productive mimesis". In Chapter 2 this is identified as a 
practice, rather than a disembodied theoretical position. In order to 
(re)gain the site of their subjectivity (which in a phallocentric 
economy can only yet be hypothesized), women have to retraverse 
the site of their exploitation knowingly and strategically. Luce 
Irigaray's work is identified here as both practice and analysis of 
productive mimesis. A model from Paul Ricoeur helps us to see how 
productive mimesis is a praxis, moving constantly between social 
prefiguration, textual configuration, and (in the act of reading and 
interpreting) practical transfiguration. This retrieves Luce 
Irigaray's work from being regarded in purely academic, textual 
terms, and repoliticizes its analysis. 
Chapters 3 and 4 are also linked, in that they both follow Luce 
Irigaray's analyses of the realm of the visual and visible 
representation. Phallocentric structures are predicated upon the 
visibility or non-visibility of the penis; phallocentric ways of 
seeing thus hinge on seeing it or not seeing it, not upon seeing it or 
seeing the vulva (seeing difference). Phallocentric representations 
are built upon the site of this partial sight and its blind spots. I 
argue that within what I call "phalloculogocentrism" women are 
thus confirmed not as ontologically different, but, once again, as 
other of the same. They are thus configured not as subjects, but as 
representations, with no access to appropriate significatory 
systems in the Symbolic. Luce Irigaray's use of the term "syntax" 
is introduced. This enables the distinguishing of inflections, 
significations, and sites of enunciation in the Symbolic. These are 
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presently phallocentric; but the term `syntax' marks the possibility 
of appropriate significatory structures for women. 
In Chapter 4 the possible re-configuration of the structures 
informing our practices of sight and seeing are discussed. The 
notion of the reserve is re-introduced. If phallocentric structures 
allow man to use his representation of woman to reflect himself 
back to himself, he can only do it firstly if he employs the 
structure of a flat mirror; and secondly (because he prioritizes 
sight) as a result of not realizing that touch underlies all other 
senses. The mirror has a silvery backing touching the glass - the 
reserve of the mirror. The movement through the surface of a flat 
mirror to its backing disrupts the illusion of the frozen surface and 
evokes the concave space of the mirror more suited to woman - the 
`burning mirror' of the female mystics. For women, the prioritizing 
of sight by phalloculogocentrism deprives them of a sense of their 
own beauty, replacing it with the 'beauty' supplied by the 
representation, 'woman'. Women do not have their own sense of a 
divine beauty, a corresponding ideal representation that is theirs. I 
argue through these chapters that Luce Irigaray is not anti-visual, 
but that she is anti-phalloculogocentric, and as such wishes to 
restore a relationship of interdependence between sight and touch. 
She also stresses a revaluing of other senses. Listening becomes 
important in establishing relationships between subjects. 
Phallocentric structures allow men who looking only for their 
same, and reduce all else to object status, to value sight- 
dependent subject-object relations. Insistence upon sexual 
difference (rather than only upon relations to the same) means that 
subjects realize they are limited by other subjects: therefore, 
structures of inter-subjective relationships are needed. For 
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women, if they are not to remain in relationships of immediacy, 
gift-objects of communication and practices of listening have to 
be developed in order that these relationships may be mediated. 
This has great implications for the role and function of the art 
object, its presentation, and for its consideration of an attentive 
audience of subjects (I return to this term in preference to 
`viewer'). Buddhist models of attentiveness, drawn to our notice by 
Luce Irigaray, are explored in relation to this. 
Part 2 (Chapters 5,6, and 7) identifies areas of contemporary 
practice by women which are little or poorly served by the 
discourses of art, and which are made legible only in problematic 
terms. Chapter 5 argues that a consideration of Luce Irigaray's 
understanding of "morphology" could help us re-negotiate the 
functions of media in practices of art. I argue that some critics 
have misread this term as referring to anatomy, whereas it is a 
means of understanding the relationships between forms - for 
example, between subjectivity, body, and language. Thus, although 
each subject will have her or his own morphology, each gender will 
also have a morphologic appropriate to it. I then offer a reading of 
Luce Irigaray's use of the terms "the lips" and "the mucous" as an 
engagement with a morphologic of mediation appropriate to women. 
The emphasis in developing this as a theoretical structure for the 
analysis of art practices is not to employ any media as metaphors 
for mucus, but to consider them as sites of mediation which could 
possibly reveal a morphologic appropriate to women. An article by 
Joan Key on works by Bridget Riley and Rachel Whiteread, and one 
by Alison Rowley focusing on Jenny Saville, are identified as 
moments of present critical practice which demonstrate why such 
a theoretical development is timely. Reconfiguring their arguments 
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in Irigarayan terms, Key and Rowley are seen to identify uses of 
media which can be read as informed by a morphologic of the 
mucous, and moments where instead they collapse back into 
mimeticizing a phallic morphologic. 
In Chapter 6I look at the practice of gesture in the making of 
artworks. The focus is upon Louise Bourgeois's recent work and the 
way in which her processes have been accounted for by critics. 
Many critics have read into her work the influence of her childhood 
experience of emotional betrayal by her father and her continuing 
anger about this into her old age. Luce Irigaray's paper `Gesture in 
Psychoanalysis' outlines the suppressed, but gendered, practices of 
gesture in the practice of psychoanalysis, before moving on to 
consider Freud's main analysis of gesture in childhood, which was 
of a boy trying to master the absence of his mother - little Ernst 
playing with a cotton reel. Luce Irigaray argues that girls make 
different gestures when they miss their mothers: not the throwing 
and retrieving of an object like little Ernst, but intersubjective 
games with dolls, or the marking out of subjective space with their 
bodies, with whirling or spinning `dances'. I argue that in Louise 
Bourgeois's work we may see, instead of anger at her father, grief 
at the trauma of her mothers' displacement. I draw upon her own 
comments about her mother to inform this reading of her interest 
in spinning and her delineation of space in the recent Cell series. 
The final Chapter attends to Luce Irigaray's argument that we will 
only fully "become women" - attain our subjectivity - once we 
have a "transcendent", including notions of a female "divine" and 
of a "universal" appropriate to the morphologic informing it. Once 
again, the subject "woman" that one might become is distinct from 
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the representation "woman" constructed by phallocentrism. This is 
tested against discussion of the cultural context in Ireland, where 
women have been reduced to mother status in different levels of 
representation, and where symbolic representations of nation and 
of woman have been to a large extent conflated through 
configurations such as, for example, Mother Ireland. I then identify 
a structure within the Irish use of the English language which, I 
argue, allows for a constant flow between the body and person of a 
woman who is a mother, and the transcendent, definitive, Mother. 
Luce Irigaray's arguments about the necessity of honouring mothers 
as women without reducing women to their relationship to 
mothering are explored. There is an urgent need to honour and 
represent female genealogies in order to aid the achievement of 
"becoming woman", and Luce Irigaray offers pragmatic and 
strategic advice about the psychic and symbolic representation of 
the mother-daughter couple. Finally, moments in particular 
artworks by contemporary Irish women artists are indicated where 
this may be discerned in the representation of women's genealogies 
and a female universal. 
Each chapter will develop terminology from an understanding of 
Luce Irigaray's use of terms. These will then be carried forward in 
subsequent chapters to be used in the development of other terms 
or further refined. A key example of this is the term `woman', use 
of which will be explicitly developed throughout the first part of 
the thesis. `Feminine' has been avoided for two reasons. Firstly, the 
lack of equivalent usage in French and in English means that to use 
it as understood here would complicate rather than clarify - see 
for example Margaret Whitford's glossary note for `feminin': 
"translated as feminine or female, depending on the translator. [.... ] 
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The question of nature or culture is an interpretive one, and 
accordingly the interpretation has been left to the reader". 26 My 
second reason for avoiding the term explains why I find this degree 
of openness unhelpful. `Feminine' has frequently been used to name 
qualities which are not only constructs, but which can be adopted 
by both sexes. Thus for example, Helene Cixous's exemplars of 
writers of the `feminine' include James Joyce and Jean Genet. 27 In 
avoiding the term I am also following the example of most of Luce 
Irigaray's translators after Speculum and This Sex. To reconfigure 
the gap left, Luce Irigaray's use of the term `syntax' is introduced 
in Chapter 3. This accounts not only for uses of language, but 
indeed for the production and understanding of all significatory 
systems in the Symbolic (gestural, political, visual... ). At present 
the dominant syntax is phallocentric, but there is the potential for 
the development of a syntax appropriate for women. Additionally 
(as will be described in the main body of the text) I have restricted 
use of the term 'femininity': its use by Freud is outlined by Luce 
Irigaray as a product of a phallocentric syntax, and is not a quality 
of women's making. 
Translation: a note. 
Translation is a politically and culturally creative practice, and 
one which may be constructive and destructive to the textual 
26 Margaret Whitford, 'Glossary', in The Irigaray Reader(p. 17). 
27 Helene Cixous, 'The Laugh of the Medusa', in New French Feminisms: An Anthology, ed. by 
Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981), pp. 245-264 (p. 255). See also 
Judith Still, 'Feminine Economy', in Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary, ed. by Elizabeth Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 90-92. 
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intention of the writer whose work is being translated. 28 Luce 
Irigaray's work with its significant and diverse textual strategies 
"represents difficulties of translation", as she has said, both of 
its thinking and also of its use of language. 29 Anyone who is not 
fluently - bi-culturally - bi-lingual is at the mercy of/indebted to 
the translators of the texts almost as much as to Luce Irigaray 
herself: the translation can affect to a huge extent the reception of 
a work, and thus the development of thinking in the second 
language. 
In writing this thesis I have depended upon the standard 
translations of Luce Irigaray's work. Wherever it has been possible, 
I have cross-read the original French, checking translations (a few 
interviews and essays have been inaccessible in French). 
References to both English language and French language 
publication are included as a matter of course. Where I have felt 
unsure about the translation, I have either included the French in 
brackets, or modified the translation. The aim in modification has 
always been to provide the more literal translation, rather than an 
interpretive version; and/or to honour Luce Irigaray's repetition, 
28 See for example, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'The Politics of Translation', in Destabilizing 
Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates, ed. by Michble Barrett and Anne Phillips (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1992), pp. 177-200; Sherry Simon, Gender in Translation: Cultural Identity and the Politics of 
Transmission (London: Routledge, 1996), particularly pp. 101-107 on the translation of Luce Irigaray's 
work; and Carolyn Burke, 'Translation Modified: Irigaray in English', in Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor and 
Margaret Whitford, pp. 249-261. 
29 Luce Irigaray, '"Je - Luce Irigaray": A Meeting with Luce Irigaray', interview by Elizabeth Hirsh and 
Gary A. Olson, trans. by Elizabeth Hirsh and Gaetan Brulotte, in Women Writing Culture, ed. by Gary A. 
Olson and Elizabeth Hirsh (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 141-166 (p. 146). For 
other comments of hers upon translation in general and of her work in particular, see Je, Tu, Nous, pp. 54, 
57,58,72; /Je, tu, nous, pp. 63,66-67,67-68; I Love To You. Sketch of a Possible Felicity in History, 
trans. by Alison Martin (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 60/J'aime ä to!: esquise d'une felicitd dans I'histoire 
(Paris: Grasset), p. 102; Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution, trans. by Karin Montin 
(London: Athlone Press, 1994), p. 58/Le temps de fa difference: pour une revolution pacifique (Paris: Le 
Livre du Poche, 1989); 'Questions to Emmanuel Levinas', in The Irigaray Reader, pp. 179-189 (p. 186). 
Marion Gentillehomme, who helped me with the translation of one article, exclaimed 'But she's not even 
writing French! '. 
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echoing, or fidelity to particular terminology. Modification is 
always footnoted. In sections where I am attending to particular 
terminology, I include the original terms in French throughout. 
Style: a note. 
This thesis follows to a large extent the style of the MHRA style 
book. 30 In particular, I have followed their advice on the layout and 
style of footnotes and bibliography, including their recomendation 
of `ibid. ' but not of `op. cit. '. Four exceptions to the MHRA style need 
noting. Firstly, as so many texts by Luce Irigaray are cited, giving 
(where possible) both the original French and the English 
translation, I have not used 'ibid. ', in order to allay any potential 
confusion. Secondly, Luce Irigaray has expressed her dislike of 
being referred to as 'Irigaray'31: it is her given name, Luce, which 
marks her gender, rather than the supposed neuter of her family 
(i. e., father's) name. I have respected this in referring to her by her 
full name throughout, and have extended this to other women to 
whom I refer. Thirdly, Luce lrigaray's own writing is full of 
particularities of punctuation which add to the text, including 
ellipses, parentheses, and italics. Because of this, in quoted 
passages, my own ellipses are marked thus: [.... ] leaving her ellipses 
as:.... ; and insertions of the original French are bracketed thus: {}. I 
have ensured that all words in italics in the translated passages 
correspond to Luce Irigaray's own italicizing. For clarity's sake I 
have sacrificed these stresses in any French language insertions, 
30 MHRA Style Book: Notes for Authors, Editors, and Writers of Theses, ed. by Derek Brown and 
others, 5th edn (London: Modern Humanities Research Association, 1996). 
31 Luce Irigaray, 'Je - Luce Irigaray', particularly p. 151. 
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placing all French in italics. Finally, where I have developed new 
terminology, I have underlined the word or phrase in its first usage. 
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Part 1 
26 
Chapter 1 
Mimesis Part One: Mimicry, Masquerade, 
Hysteria. 
I search for myself, as if I had been assimilated into maleness. I ought to 
reconstitute myself on the basis of a disassimilation.... Rise again from the 
traces of a culture, of works already produced by the other. Searching through 
what is in them - for what is not there. What allowed them to be, for what is 
not there. Their conditions of possibility, for what is not there. 
Woman ought to be able to find herself, among other things, through the 
images of herself already deposited in history and the conditions of production 
of the work of man, and not on the basis of his work, his genealogy. 1 
Within Luce Irigaray's writing a cluster of terms implying some 
form of repetition are used: mime, masquerade, mask, mimicry, 
hysterical mimeticism, mimesis, reproduction, representation, and 
the phrase "as if" (usually placed in quotation marks or in italics) 
are among the most prominent. They appear strongly in This Sex 
Which Is Not One (1977; 1985) and Speculum: Of the Other Woman 
(1974; 1985), and are scattered through later publications such as 
Je, Tu, Nous (1990; 1993). Reading Luce Irigaray critically with 
these terms in mind, one can see how embedded these concepts are 
in her work - not only as topics for investigation, but also in her 
practice as a writer and philosopher. Some commentators on Luce 
Irigaray have attended to these terms. Because of their overlapping 
definitions of the words, however (and the subsequent effect 
concerning in which instances each o ne might be appropriate, and 
how they ca n be used), some confusion emanates from the 
1 Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. by Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. 
Gill (London: Athlone Press, 1993), pp. 9-10/Ethique do la difference sexuelle, (Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit, 1984), p. 17. 
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collection of these texts. For example, Elizabeth Grosz comments 
"Irigaray mimics the hysteric's mimicry. She mimes mime itself; "2 
Margaret Whitford says "Irigaray adopts the strategy of mimicry or 
mimesis; "3 Naomi Schor talks of "the old mimesis, sometimes 
referred to a masquerade, "4 and Judith Butler uses the word `mime' 
in a way that could be interchangeable with `mimesis': "Through 
miming Irigaray transgresses the prohibition against resemblance 
at the same time that she refuses the notion of resemblance as a 
copy. [.... ] Her miming has the effect of repeating the origin only to 
displace that origin as an origin. "5 
Evidently, this cluster of concepts is of the utmost importance for 
visual art, not only for the making of resemblances within the art 
object, but also when considering art as a set of practices with 
traditions and histories from which practitioners learn and within 
which they situate themselves. My aim here is to sift through this 
varied terminology and its deployment by Luce Irigaray as 
investigation and as practice. Starting from Luce Irigaray's 
indication of Plato's dual definition of mimesis as both non- 
productive and productive, my discussion will involve a definition 
of mime as non-productive (mimesis); of mimicry as having short- 
term potential, but ultimately self-defeating (this will include 
attention to hysteria); and then, in the second part, mimesis as 
2 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists (St. Leonards: Allen & 
Unwin, 1989), p. 136. 
3 Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (London: Routledge, 
1991), p. 70. Henceforth cited as Luce Irigaray. 
4 Naomi Schor, 'This Essentialism Which is Not One: Coming to Grips with Irigaray', In 
Engaging With Irigaray, ed. by Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor and Margaret Whitford (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 57-78 (p. 67). 
5 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (London: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 45. 
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productive strategy. In a new move I will make use of Paul 
Ricoeur's investigation of Aristotle's triple-stranded 
understanding of the concept of productive mimesis within the 
aesthetic realm, and present it as an aid to understanding the 
productive nature of Luce Irigaray's writing, her own aesthetic, and 
her understanding of visual representation. 
`Mimesis': a polysemic term. 
As Paul Ricoeur indicates6 and Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf 
admirably demonstrate at length7, `mimesis' is polysemic. Gebauer 
and Wulf provide an historical reading of this: 
A spectrum of meanings of mimesis has unfolded over the course of its 
historical development, including the act of resembling, of presenting the self, 
and expression as well as mimicry, imitation, representation, and nonsensuous 
similarity. The accent may lie in similarity in sensuous terms, on a 
nonsensuous correspondence, or on an intentional construction of a correlation. 
Some writers have emphasized the intermediary character of mimesis; they 
locate it in medial images, which occupy the space between the inner and the 
outer worlds. 8 
They refer to "the vagueness of the concept" which "has been 
turned to advantage" by writers such as Benjamin, Adorno, and 
Derrida, and state that: 
It is not arbitrariness that has characterised the use of the concept, but a 
peculiar intuition, which often appears in the form of an adaptation to broader 
historical changes. There is less a lack of conceptual discipline in the history of 
mimesis than a resistance to theory building. As a concept, mimesis betrays a 
distrust of the instrumentalities and procedures of theory kept 'pure' of the 
contamination of human practice. 9 
6 Paul Ricoeur, 'Mimesis and Representation', Annals of Scholarship, 2 (1981), 15-32. 
7 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis: Culture Art Society, trans. by Don 
Reneau (London: University of California Press, 1995). 
8 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, ibid., p. 1. 
9 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, ibid., p. 2. 
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Throughout their book, Gebauer and Wulf treat mimesis not as an 
hermetic philosophical theory with a discrete history and 
development, but as an activity where theory and practice are in 
such proximity as to be virtually inextricable. Thus, each 
philosopher to whom they grant substantive space can be seen as 
using mimesis strategically. While they do not mention Luce 
Irigaray's work (indeed, none of their substantive discussion is 
devoted to women philosophers - let alone feminist ones), as will 
become clear this is an appropriate framework through which to 
begin an understanding of Luce Irigaray's use of mimesis. 
Mimesis in Plato 
In the space of four pages of This Sex, Luce Irigaray offers her 
contrasting understandings of `mimesis' and `masquerade'. For 
`mimesis' she draws her understanding from Plato, stating quite 
clearly that `mimesis' is (at least) two: 
In Plato, there are two mimeses {mimesis}. To simplify: there is mimesis {1a 
mimesis) as production, which would lie more in the realm of music, and there 
is the mimesis {1a mimesis) that would be already caught up in a process of 
imitation, specularization, adequation, and reproduction. It is the second form 
that is privileged throughout the history of philosophy and whose 
effects/symptoms, such as latency, suffering, paralysis of desire, are 
encountered in hysteria. The first form seems always to have been repressed, 
if only because it was constituted as an enclave within a 'dominant' discourse. 
Yet it is doubtless in the direction of, and on the basis of, that first mimesis 
{mimesis} that the possibility of a woman's writing {une ecriture de femme) 
may come about. lo 
The "second form" of mimesis - for which I shall coin the terms 
non-productive mimesis or maintenance mimesis - is thus bound up 
10 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. by Catherine Porter with Carolyn 
Burke (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 131/Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un (Paris: 
Les Editions de Minuit, 1977), pp. 129-130. Henceforth cited as This Sex/Ce sexe. 
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with verisimilitude, investigation of original truth, repetition, 
replication. The first form of mimesis - which I shall call 
productive mimesis - involves a subtle double movement, which is 
here touched upon in the reference to "the realm of music": just as 
the musician reads the piece of music they play, so too he or she 
will give their reading of that piece of music - their interpretation 
of it, imbued with particular nuances (this is precisely the area of 
the Radio 3 series Building a Library, where differing 
interpretations of `the same' piece of music are painstakingly 
compared). New meanings emerge from this process; and indeed it 
is here that Luce Irigaray locates "the possibility of a woman's 
writing". Luce Irigaray does not expand upon this Platonic model of 
mimesis as a model, but she does, as I shall be demonstrating 
below, expand (upon) it through her practice. 
Adding to the significance of the Platonic model for Luce Irigaray, 
Gebauer and Wulf situate it within cultural history: 
In Plato, mimesis is bound to the transition from oral to literary culture. His 
assessment, in that context, is ambivalent: on the one hand, he recognizes its 
significance; on the other, he fears its power, which is difficult to calculate. In 
any case, the widespread notion that Plato developed only a critical view of 
mimesis attends too narrowly to the facts. In his conception, mimesis is also 
the force that creates images and therefore underlies aesthetics. Plato 
sometimes designates even the works of philosophers as mimetic and calls for 
the creation of a society related mimetically to the eternal world of the 
Ideas. 11 
This reading of Plato, complementary to Luce Irigaray's reading, is 
significant here because of its placing of Platonic mimesis at a 
transitional cultural moment, the moment of shift from oral to 
literary culture. This is a crucial historical moment for Luce 
Irigaray, as it is linked to three related transitions: to our present 
11 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis, p. 6. 
31 
differentiation of history (as that which is recorded in writing) 
from pre-history (as that which was transmitted orally); to the 
separations of the realms of body from mind, nature from culture; 
and to the imposition of patriarchy upon cultures where female 
genealogies had integrity: 
At one time mother and daughter formed a natural and social model. The 
mother-daughter couple was the guardian of the fertility of nature in general, 
and of the relationship with the divine. [.... ] This couple preserved the memory 
of the past, and thus the daughter respected her mother, her ancestry. This 
couple was also concerned with the present: the earth produced food in peace 
and quiet. It was possible to foresee the future thanks to women's relationship 
with the divine, with oracular speech. [.... ] The beginnings of patriarchal 
power as we know it - which means the power of the man as the legal head of 
the family, tribe, people, state and so on - coincided with the separation of 
women from each other and especially the separation of daughters from their 
mothers. 12 
The disregard for what is termed, rather vaguely, Prehistory can be explained 
by the way in which patriarchy is mistaken for the only History possible. In 
examining Prehistory, specialists group very diverse facts and periods 
together and often reduce these historical expressions to the current function 
of myths (viewed as hidden in History) or that of fairy tales and legends. To 
consider the meaning of mythical representations of reality as merely 
incidental is concomitant to repressing and destroying certain cultural 
dimensions that relate to the economy of difference between the sexes. Such 
an approach leads to a partial, reductive, and fruitless conception of 
History. l 3 
It is in this context interesting to note Plato's view that mimetic 
processes could proliferate beyond control and deviate from `truth' 
into `illusion'; and that "his attack is aimed primarily at the 
12 Luce Irigaray, Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution, trans. by Karin 
Montin (London: Athlone Press, 1994), pp. 12-13/Le temps de la difference: pour une 
revolution pacifique (Paris: Le Livre de Poche/Librairie Generale Frangaise, 1989), pp. 30- 
31. 
13 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous: Toward a Culture of Difference, trans. by Alison Martin 
(London: Routledge, 1993), p. 24/Je, tu, nous: pour une culture do la difference (Paris: 
Grasset, 1990), p. 24. Henceforth cited as Je, Tu, Nous/Je, tu, nous. Irigaray Is also 
scathing about a similar model in the history of psychoanalysis, where history is regarded as 
that which is written (always referring back to the "Father", Freud), and publishing is given 
priority over an ethical relation of speech and attentive listening with the analysand. See 'The 
Poverty of Psychoanalysis', trans. by David Macey, in The Irigaray Reader, ed. by Margaret 
Whitford (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 79-104/'Misere do la psychanalyse', in Parlor 
nest jamais neutre (Paris: Les Editions do Minuit, 1985), pp. 253-279. 
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performative mimesis of oral recitals, with their religious roots 
and educational aspirations. "14 This is not to suggest any clear-cut 
binary oppositional mapping of the patriarchal and pre-patriarchal 
onto Plato's main distinction of two forms of mimesis, but rather 
to indicate a recognition of the power of mimesis at transitional 
moments in cultural history, a power which Luce Irigaray wishes to 
utilize. 
Non-productive mimesis 
Although Luce Irigaray does not expound upon the Platonic model, 
she does expose its workings: 
One need never pay off the debt, either in the past or in the future, if one can 
only attain the ideal of sameness {1'idOal (du) meme}, which of course defies 
deterioration of any kind. [.... ] 
And no shame is attached to being an employee of the head of the family, or 
even his slave, for 'working the land' is already to do as he does {faire comme 
lu, ). [.... ] Miming the father's attributes {1e mime des attributions du pere} is 
achieved here and now. And is the triumph of his logos alone. [.... ] 
But we are almost forgetting that the whole Universe is already under the 
Father's monopoly. And that in these meetings it is at best the inscription of 
his eternal truths that he revives by repeating (them) {en (les) repCtant). 
Thus, man is swindled of the price of his own work. For he is now and always 
nothing but the more or less effective doubling of an omnipotent Phallus. 
Nonetheless, he submits to this fate and is even ready to die in order to 
perpetuate such an empire. The important thing is that history go on. 15 
Thus, social and cultural relations are maintained as normative 
within patriarchy through maintenance and policing of what I have 
called non-productive mimesis. This is managed through 
generations (father-son), across class divides (master-slave, 
14 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis, p. 310. 
15 Luce Irigaray, Speculum Of The Other Woman, trans. by Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985), pp. 351-353/Speculum de I'autre femme (Paris: Les Editions de 
Minuit, 1974), pp. 440-142. Henceforth cited as Speculum/Speculum. 
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employer-worker), and in religion (god-man), copying faithfully in 
order to replicate 'truth'. This resonates through Luce Irigaray's 
writings in her term 'hom(m)o-sexualite' (usually translated 
`hom(m)o-sexuality'; a word play referring to 'man/same- 
sexuality'). Its structures can be likened to those that exist in 
central areas of learning skills and child development: the child has 
to be able to recognize another person as being of the same general 
type, desire to 'be as', and to evaluate the extent to which his or 
her own actions are a successful imitation. 16 It is a structure of 
assimilation to the cultural environment against which Luce 
Irigaray chafes: 
At the level of culture, it seems that we are brought up (whether consciously 
or not) to be trained in repetition, to adapt to a society's systems, and 
educated to do like, to be like, without any decisive innovations or discoveries 
of our own. [.... ] Can we free ourselves from [.... ] almost fatal repetition at 
the cultural level? 17 
Non-productive mimesis here is "almost fatal" for women because, 
with `man/same-sexuality' as both dominative and normative - man 
being the 'same of the same' - woman is elsewhere. Not as 
'woman', but as what Luce Irigaray calls "otherness of sameness" 
{autre du meme}. 18 She cannot be `the same as'; nor, in a patriarchal 
culture, can she securely identify with a genealogy of women. Her 
function is that of the mirror, reflecting back to man, as a result 
of her `otherness', his `sameness'; what I will term other of the 
same. She has to adopt - and assimilate to - femininity. The 
"almost fatal" nature of this move is therefore twofold: firstly, it 
requires her adaption and assimilation to a hom(m)o-sexual 
16 Elizabeth Grosz, Space, Time, and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies 
(London: Routledge, 1995), p. 90. 
17 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous, p. 37/Je, tu, nous, p. 41. 
18 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 152/Ce sexe, p. 148. 
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culture; and secondly, as the necessary corollary (because she is 
not 'the same as'), it requires her replication of a `femininity' 
which is not of her making: it is a 'femininity' erected by `the 
same' to be its 'other'. It is because of this function that I have 
dubbed it maintenance mimesis or non-productive mimesis. It 
maintains the given cultural structure; and while it is productive 
of an identity appropriate for the subject assimilated to a 
patriarchal culture, it is not productive of Luce Irigaray's horizon 
of possibilities where women can become women. Discussing Luce 
Irigaray's readings of Nietzsche, Ellen Mortensen makes a link 
between this form of mimesis for women and the story of Echo: 
Echo's function in Ovid's mythical poem is to accompany the movement of 
Narcissus's self-reflection, to adorn and to deploy his self-representation, 
while keeping the integrity of the image intact. In this sense woman's 
femininity, defined within a narcissistic echo-nomy, ensures the smooth 
workings of the mimetic machinery. 19 
The levels of repression required are enormous. It is here, in 
reference to woman's relation to this 'femininity', that Luce 
Irigaray begins to use the terms mimicry, mime, masquerade, and 
hysteria. 
Mimicry and mime 
Before attending to Luce Irigaray's use of the term mimicry, I 
would like to affirm one of its every-day resonances: that of 
childhood mimicry. Children take the act of copying from non- 
productive mimesis, and actively, visibly and audibly use it in the 
19 Ellen Mortensen, 'Woman's Untruth and le feminin: Reading Irigaray with Nietzsche 
and Heidegger', in Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor and Margaret Whitford, Engaging with 
Irigaray, pp. 211-228 (p. 214). 
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repeating of the actions and words of others. The difference is in 
the aim, which is not to learn or to assimilate, but to assert power 
over the person being mimicked. This is the same whether it is 
being done playfully, to bully, as stubborn resistance or expression 
of anger; whether against other children or against adults. Although 
the result for the child can be both a maintenance of a position in a 
pecking order, and an intimation that the power of the other will 
one day be exceeded, the affects upon the other are likely to be 
exasperation, recognition of impertinence, and temporary 
withdrawal. The results for the child, therefore, are short-term 
gain remaining as but a trace in the long term. 20 
Luce Irigaray uses the term `mimicry' at two key moments in This 
Sex. In the inter-relation of these passages she appears to be 
performing a self-mimicry; each passage however indicates in a 
differing direction, one towards mime, the other towards 
productive mimesis: 
There is, in an initial phase, perhaps only one 'path', the one historically 
assigned to the feminine: that of mimicry {le mimetisme}. One must assume the 
feminine role deliberately. Which means already to convert a form of 
subordination into an affirmation, and thus to begin to thwart it. Whereas a 
direct feminine challenge to this condition means demanding to speak as a 
(masculine) `subject', that is it means to postulate a relation to the intelligible 
that would maintain sexual indifference. 
To play with mimesis {la mimesis} is thus, for a woman, to try to 
recover the place of her exploitation by discourse, without allowing herself to 
be simply reduced to it. 21 
In a first phase, there is perhaps only one path, and in any case it is the one to 
which the female condition is assigned: that of mimicry {le mimetisme}. But 
the mimetic role itself is complex, for it presupposes that one can lend oneself 
to everything, if not to everyone. That one can copy anything at all, anyone at 
all, can receive all impressions, without appropriating them to oneself, and 
20 There are links here with theories of the carnivalesque. See Laura Mulvey, 'Changes: 
Thoughts on Myth, Narrative and Historical Experience', in Visual and Other Pleasures 
(Houndmills: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 159-176 (pp. 167-169). 
21 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 76/Ce sexe, pp. 73-74. 
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without adding any. That is, can be nothing but a possibility that the 
philosopher may exploit for (self-) reflection. [.... ] If she ["the philosopher's 
wife"] can play that role so well, if it does not kill her, quite, it is because she 
keeps something in reserve with respect to this function. Because she still 
subsists, otherwise and elsewhere than there where she mimes {eile mime} so 
well what is asked of her. Because her own 'self' remains foreign to the whole 
staging. But she doubtless needs to reenact it {/a rejouer} in order to 
remember what that staging has probably metabolized so thoroughly that she 
has forgotten it: her own sex. 22 
The first of these passages carries the resonances of the assertion 
of childhood mimicry: "form of subordination", "a direct feminine 
challenge", "demanding", "to play".... and leads toward an 
understanding of productive mimesis. The second appears initially 
more passive: "the female condition is assigned", "presupposes 
that one can lend oneself", "receive all impressions, without 
appropriating them", "without adding", "be nothing but a 
possibility that the philosopher may exploit".... This process is then 
named as "mime". Its difference from non-productive mimesis 
(being the same as, or, of the same) resides in the fact that the 
femininity that woman mimes is not of her own making - and thus 
that, even as she mimes, she is always elsewhere. So, mimicry is 
used by Luce Irigaray as perhaps the only option for women within 
patriarchy, but one that is double edged. On the one hand, it offers 
the opportunity for strategies of resistance. These strategies have 
to be undertaken with great delicacy and deliberation, because on 
the other hand it involves the almost fatal repression of `becoming 
woman'. Indeed, Diana Chisholm refers to Luce Irigaray's concept of 
"a symptomatic mimicry of patriarchy's fetishes and projections, 
which is potentially both terroristic and terrorized. "23 
22 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 151-152/Ce sexe, pp. 147-148. 
23 Dianne Chisholm, `Irigaray's Hysteria', in Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor and Margaret 
Whitford, Engaging with Irigaray, pp. 263-283 (p. 269). 
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Another current usage of the term 'mimicry' is found in biology, 
where it means camouflage, or having the colouring of the 
environment. This usage also refers to the assimilation of an 
individual to its environment, and also has two readings, or 
effects. The first is the use of camouflage for protection. Margaret 
Whitford indicates that this may add to our understanding of Luce 
Irigaray's use of the term: "Irigaray may be arguing, I think, that 
women also need to protect themselves against (re)assimilation 
and destruction by the masculine economy. "24 This is fine up to a 
point: but camouflage is not only used by the preyed-upon for 
protection, but also by the predators (tigers, the army.... ). 
Elizabeth Grosz takes this discussion in another direction, to a 
second understanding of mimicry in animals, to the work of Roger 
Callois on the relation of the subject to space. 25 His paper `Mimicry 
and Legendary Psychasthenia'26 influenced Lacan's development of 
the theory of the mirror stage and Merleau-Ponty's work on the 
phenomenology of lived space. For Callois, `psychasthenia' is the 
lure exerted by space on the subject. In order to be confirmed in its 
identity, a subject or organism has to be secure in its perspective 
upon its body's relationship to the space it occupies (this is in 
distinction from the assimilation to the environment which occurs 
in learning processes, but is a necessary aspect of the development 
of identity). In some psychotics there is no ability to locate 
themselves in space. Callois finds an analogy to this in the mimicry 
of insects. Their mimicry may produce the opposite of protection: 
24 Margeret Whitford, Luce Irigaray, p. 72. 
25 Elizabeth Grosz, Space Time and Perversion, pp. 87-91 and pp. 189-190; Volatile 
Bodies (Bloomington, Indiana University Press), pp. 46-48. 
26 Roger Callois, 'Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia', October, 31 (1984), 17-32. 
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Callois cites one insect whose resemblance to leaves makes it prey 
to zealous hedge-clippers, and another whose resemblance to the 
leaves it feeds upon makes it often prey to cannibalism. Also, he 
indicates, mimicry in insects is visual, while many predators rely 
upon smell; some insects practice mimicry even though they are 
not vulnerable to predators. 27 For Callois, mimicry is an excess to 
strategies of survival, a product of a dislocation of identity and "a 
captivation of a creature by its representations of and as space 
[.... ]. The mimicking insect lives its camouflaged existence as not 
quite itself, as another". 28 
This seems closer to Luce Irigaray's use of the term mimicry - at 
least in the second instance quoted above, with its component 
aspect of mime. The subject compromises, represses or adapts its 
perspective on its own identity in favour of an apparent (literally 
visible, perceivable, and of the appearance) assimilation to its 
environment - in this case, the virtual world of `femininity' as 
erected by the structures of patriarchy. 
There is a close analogy with the visual performance of the mime 
artist. The audience does not actually see the wall the mime artist 
walks into, the door he or she opens, nor do they actually see the 
dog that the mime artist is miming, but through his or her stylised 
movements of exaggerated gesture, it is as if the wall or the door 
or the dog were there. The audience marvels because it is as if it 
can see the wall or door, or a dog instead of a person. What is 
demonstrated is indeed a captivation of the mime by his or her 
27 Roger Callois, ibid., pp. 24-25. 
28 Elizabeth Grosz, Space, Time, and Perversion, p. 190. Gunter Gebauer and Christoph 
Wulf liken Callois's understanding of mimicry to Freud's death drive. Mimesis, p. 282. 
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representations of and as space. Aspects of this are traceable in 
the earliest history of mime: in Doric Sicily the mime gave to the 
audience representations of daily life "distinct in terms of content 
from tragedies and comedies [.... ]; he [sic] simplifies, emphasizes 
and caricatures". 29 According to Gebauer and Wulf, Derrida's 
interest in the mime artist (in turn, a reading of Mallarme) is that 
"what he [i. e. the mime; sic] represents does not exist outside of 
his representation [.... ] In the mime's representation, the 
distinction between fiction and reality also collapses"; the scene 
"is more the illustration of the idea than a real action. "30 Derrida 
weaves links between the mimetic and the `between-character' of 
the hymen. 31 
To return to the present discussion of Luce Irigaray's terminology: 
when a woman is seen in our present culture it is not as the 
sexuate subject who is able to become woman because of the 
horizon of possibilities that are hers (in divinity, civil rights, the 
Symbolic.... ). Rather she is seen `as' `a' `woman', already miming the 
`femininity' of our culture. Mimicry, and particularly its component 
aspect of mime, is a strategy fraught with risk. Luce Irigaray will 
identify this as a risk of hysteria, a condition which is itself 
contiguous with mime: 
Hysteria is silent and at the same time it mimes {eile mime). And - how could 
it be otherwise - miming/reproducing {mimant-reproduisant} a language that is 
not its own, masculine language, it caricatures and deforms that language: it 
'lies', it 'deceives', as women have always been reputed to do. 32 
29 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, ibid., p. 29. 
30 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, ibid., pp. 300-301. 
31 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, ibid., p. 301. They reference Derrida, 'The 
Double Session', in Dissemination, trans. By Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981), pp. 209 and 213. 
32 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 137/Ce sexe, p. 138. 
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But Luce Irigaray begins to move her account of mime in a circular 
motion back closer to the more resistant structure of the first 
meaning of mimicry. There is a possibility of deflecting the 
collapse into hysteria indicated in this second aspect of mimicry, 
found in the movement of the woman always already miming this 
femininity. This has to mean that "she still subsists, otherwise 
and elsewhere than there where she mimes. [.... ] Her own `self' 
remains foreign... ". But (and this is crucial): "She doubtless needs 
to reenact it in order to remember what that staging has probably 
metabolized so thoroughly that she has forgotten it: her own sex. " 
Reenacting - or replaying - what has been forgotten does not speak 
of an unmediated truth, but of a painstaking (re)building. Luce 
Irigaray is not suggesting that either a unified subjectivity or an 
eternal feminine is uncoverable with a simplistic stepping into and 
out of character. The term "self" remains "'self'. " 
Masquerade 
Luce Irigaray returns the terminology to the realm of the 
psychoanalytic through the concept of 'masquerade'. The term is 
best recognised in feminist theory because of its incorporation 
into critical theory (particularly within film theory) since the mid 
1980s. Here, it is found as a developing set of readings of the 
psychoanalyst and translator of Freud Joan Riviere's essay 
'Womanliness as a Masquerade', first published in 1929.33 The paper 
is a discussion of a particular case history. The analysand was a 
professional woman "engaged in work of a propagandist nature, 
33 Joan Riviere, 'Womanliness as a Masquerade', in Formations of Fantasy, ed. by 
Victor Burgin, James Donald and Cora Kaplan (London: Methuen, 1986), pp. 35-44. 
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which consisted principally in speaking and writing". Despite her 
success in her job, she experienced anxiety after each public 
appointment, and sought reassurance from father figures among her 
colleagues, primarily through inappropriate flirting and seductive 
behaviour. 34 Through the dreams and analysis of this woman, 
Riviere deduced: 
Womanliness therefore could be assumed and worn as a mask, both to hide the 
possession of masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected if she was found 
to possess it - much as a thief will turn out his pockets an ask to be searched 
to prove that he has not the stolen goods. The reader may now ask how I define 
womanliness or where I draw the line between genuine womanliness and the 
'masquerade'. My suggestion is not, however, that there is any such 
difference; whether radical or superficial, they are the same thing. The 
capacity for womanliness was there in this woman - and one might even say it 
exists in the most completely homosexual woman - but owing to her conflicts 
it did not represent her main development and was used far more as a device 
for avoiding anxiety than as a primary mode of sexual enjoyment. 35 
It is this paragraph (particulary the first three sentences) overlaid 
with Lacan's understanding of masquerade, which has prompted 
interest to the extent that the paragraph has become part of the 
canon of cultural theory. 36 
Jacqueline Rose suggests that for Lacan "Sexuality belongs [.... ] in 
the realm of masquerade" and "masquerade is the very definition of 
`femininity' precisely because it is constructed with reference to a 
male sign. "37 It is a unified concept of `femininity', behind which is 
34 Joan Riviere, ibid., p. 36. 
35 Joan Riviere, ibid., p. 38. 
36 I do not wish to provide what would have to be a lengthy, technical, and ultimately 
tangential reading of Lacan's work on this area nor of the commentators upon Lacan. For more 
detail see Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (London: Routledge, 1990); John Fletcher, 'Versions 
of Masquerade', Screen, 29.3 (1988), 43-70; Jacqueline Rose, 'Introduction II' in Feminine 
Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne, ed. by Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose 
(Houndmills: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 27-57; Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision 
(London: Verso, 1986); and Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (London: 
Routledge, 1990). 
37 Jacqueline Rose, 'Introduction II', p. 43. 
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nothing but lack. Lacan incorporated the masquerade into his 
structures of fetishism and castration, and particularly the 
distinction between `being' and `having' the phallus - the former 
being the prerogative of women, and the latter, of men. Judith 
Butler says that Lacan explains that "the 'appearing as being' the 
Phallus that women are compelled to do is inevitably 
masquerade"38 while John Fletcher argues that for Lacan, "The 
masquerade comes to signify the alienation involved in the 
substitution of `appearing' for 'being'. "39 (One of the few 
substantive passages of Lacan that Luce Irigaray quotes is this one, 
where Lacan relates the `being' and `having' of the phallus to the 
masquerade; she does so in order to demonstrate his closeness to 
Freud's castration theory. 40) Butler mentions the greatly differing 
interpretations of Riviere's and Lacan's structures of masquerade, 
listing six different positional questions, followed by another 
seven aimed at Lacan directly. 41 She is herself, however, reductive 
in her reading of Lacan's `masquerade', offering an `either/or' 
option: 
... in relation to the problematic of expression and performativity. 
In other 
words, the question here is whether masquerade conceals a femininity that 
might be understood as genuine or authentic, or whether masquerade is the 
means by which femininity and the contests over its 'authenticity' are 
produced. 42 
Even more reductively, Luce Irigaray is the only writer Butler 
mentions in this connection, and she links her firmly to the second 
position. 
38 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, p. 77. 
39 John Fletcher, 'Versions of Masquerade', Screen, p. 53. 
40 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 62/Ce sexe, p. 58. 
41 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, pp. 47-48. 
42 Judith Butler, ibid., fn. 18, p. 159; see also p. 47. 
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Fletcher's paper `Versions of Masquerade' is centrally concerned, 
he says, to "retrieve the distinctive scenario of the masquerade, as 
first formulated by Joan Riviere, from its assimilation to the 
Lacanian theorisation of femininity or the Freudian account of 
fetishism and their deployment in feminist theory. "43 He suggests 
that Stephen Heath's paper `Joan Riviere and the Masquerade'44 
(published alongside the republication of Riviere's paper in 1986 
and which provided an indicative focus for many subsequent 
readings of it) in its reading of the pivotal paragraph quoted above: 
... ignores the crucial opposition maintained [.... ] between "a device for 
avoiding anxiety" and "a primary mode of enjoyment", which frames and 
regulates her apparent equation of femininity with the masquerade tout court. 
The force of the equation, I take it, is to indicate that the same attributes and 
behaviours are involved in each, but that they are caught up in and serve a 
different psychic economy. 45 
Fletcher's account of Riviere thus has some level of initial 
correspondence with the two strands of Luce Irigaray's `mimicry' 
as I have outlined them above, which could indeed be understood in 
turn as "a primary mode of enjoyment" and "a device for avoiding 
anxiety". His reading marks a distinction from Heath's, which, 
taking its cue from the first section of, the key paragraph, holds 
that "In the masquerade the woman mimics an authentic - genuine 
- womanliness, but then authentic womanliness is such a mimicry, 
is the masquerade [.... ]; to be a woman is to dissimulate a 
fundamental masculinity, femininity is that dissimulation. "46 
43 John Fletcher, 'Versions of Masquerade', p. 53. 
44 Stephen Heath, 'Joan Riviere and the Masquerade', in Victor Burgin, James Donald 
and Cora Kaplan, Formations of Fantasy, pp. 45-61. 
45 John Fletcher, 'Versions of Masquerade', p. 54. 
46 Stephen Heath, 'Joan Riviere and the Masquerade', p. 49. 
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Luce Irigaray's understanding of masquerade, however, maintains a 
crucial difference from Lacan and from the readings of Lacan and 
Riviere indicated above, one which is rooted in her conception of 
`femininity'. For Luce Irigaray, `femininity' is erected by men in 
both patriarchal and phallocentric structures to mark the other of 
their same. It is neither an essential aspect of woman's identity 
(even when taken to be so by those patriarchal or phallocentric 
structures), nor is it structured by women as reaction to/against 
patriarchy or phallocentricity. She links the masquerade explicitly 
at one point to Freud's concept of femininity: 
What do I mean by masquerade {mascarade}? In particular, what Freud calls 
"femininity". The belief, for example, that it is necessary to become a 
woman, a "normal" one at that, whereas a man is a man from the outset. He 
has only to effect his being-a-man, whereas a woman has to become a normal 
woman, that is, has to enter into the masquerade {mascarade} of femininity. 47 
And during her commentary on Freud's theory of castration she 
notes: 
In other words, the "fact of castration" will leave woman with only one option 
- the semblance, the masquerade (of) {Ia mascarade (de)) femininity, which 
will always already have been to "act like" {faire comme) the value 
recognized by/for the male. 48 
These passages place Luce Irigaray's concept of femininity - and 
thus masquerade - at a step removed from Heath's reading of 
Riviere, that "to be a woman is to dissimulate a fundamental 
masculinity, femininity is that dissimulation". So although the 
masquerade of femininity will always already have been to 'act 
like' the value recognized by/for the male, it is important to note 
that this 'femininity' was assigned to woman as an inferior copy of 
man's relation to the origin. The masquerade is woman's playing of 
47 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 133-134/Ce sexe, pp. 131-132. 
48 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, n. 31 p. 49/Speculum, n. 37 p. 55. Translation modified. 
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the script of femininity provided by man; and the script provides 
what Luce Irigaray calls elsewhere "all the masquerades {/es 
mascara des} of 'femininity' 
masquerade of femininity' is 
that are expected of her. "49 `The 
contiguous with `the masquerade: 
femininity', and both are constructed through masculinity. She will 
always already be acting out the masquerade (of) femininity; and as 
we have seen above, she will always already be elsewhere. Luce 
Irigaray does not suggest that one is prior to the other. 
All this leaves hanging the question 'why? '. If woman is always 
already elsewhere than enacting the masquerade (of) femininity, 
and inscribed into this is the possibility of resistance, then why is 
woman always already, masquerading? Within the dominance of 
phallocentrism it is an inevitability: 
Psychoanalysts say that masquerading (la mascarade) corresponds to woman's 
desire. That seems wrong to me. I think the masquerade has to be {qu'il faut} 
understood as what women do in order to recuperate some element of desire, 
to participate in man's desire, but at the price of renouncing their own. In the 
masquerade {la mascarade}, they submit to the dominant economy of desire in 
an attempt to remain `on the market' in spite of everything. But they are there 
as objects for sexual enjoyment, not as those who enjoy. [.... ] In the last 
analysis, the female Oedipus complex is woman's entry into a system of 
values that is not hers, and in which she can 'appear' and circulate only when 
enveloped in the needs/desires/fantasies of others, namely, men. 50 
Masquerade is not woman's desire. Passing through the Oedipal 
phase, woman enters a value system which requires that she 
renounce the possibility of her own desire. In order to recoup 
desire - albeit a participation in man's desire - woman enacts the 
masquerade required of her. At least in this way she will have 
some pleasure from remaining `on the market'. 
49 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 27/Ce sexe, p. 26. 
50 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 133-134/Ce sexe, pp. 131-132. 
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This last phrase could lead us into the political; and in a similar 
paragraph, Luce Irigaray outlines a corresponding structure of 
masquerade in patriarchy. Commenting on the liberal aim of 
modifying current social structures to allow women the same 
economic, social, political rights as men, she points out that: 
... on the exchange market - especially, or exemplarily, the market of sexual 
exchange - woman would also have to preserve and maintain what is called 
femininity. The value of a woman would accrue to her from her maternal role, 
and, in addition, from her 'femininity'. But in fact that 'femininity' is a role, 
in image, a value, imposed upon women by male systems of representation. In 
this masquerade of femininity {mascarade de la feminite}, the woman loses 
herself, and loses herself by playing on her femininity. The fact remains that 
this masquerade requires an effort on her part for which she is not 
compensated. Unless her pleasure comes simply from being chosen as an object 
of consumption or of desire by masculine 'subjects'. And, moreover, how can 
she do otherwise without being 'out of circulation'? 51 
It is interesting to reflect Luce Irigaray's conception of the 
masquerade back upon Fletcher's rounding off of aspects of his 
discussion of Riviere. He writes: 
There is no essence of 'womanliness'. In Riviere's argument it must be 
produced out of something very like its opposite. Riviere's distinction comes 
down to one between the mask of femininity as reaction-formation, renouncing 
and reversing wishes, and the mask of femininity covering the refusal to 
renounce them. In both cases it is the same mask. [.... ] This is not the Lacanian 
conception of a lack or a non-identity. Behind Riviere's mask there is always 
something else. 
The importance of Riviere's conception of the masquerade is that it 
constitutes a transgressive doubleness, an inscription of alternative wishes. 
The potential for a critical distance from the mythemes of femininity 
(passivity, responsiveness, deference, flattery, etc) is lodged already within 
it and the narratives it might generate. 52 
This echoes Luce Irigaray. For Luce Irigaray there is no essence of 
'womanliness'. It is produced from something very like its opposite 
- the `femininity' of patriarchy and phallocentrism. Woman has no 
choice but to respond to these structures by enacting the 
51 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 84/Ce sexe, p. 80. 
52 John Fletcher, 'Versions of Masquerade', p. 55. 
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masquerade. A renunciation of her desire is involved; so to is the 
fact that she is already elsewhere - she is neither lacking, nor 
subject either to the `eternal feminine'. In what seems a bleak 
scenario, the possibility for resistant strategies are embedded 
within the structure - even if masked by the mask itself. For Luce 
Irigaray, once again, the strategies for resistance can follow 
differing paths: primarily, hysterical mimicry or productive 
mimeses. 
Hysterical mimicry 
If for Luce Irigaray woman's adoption/adaption of `femininity' is a 
mimetic process, in which women masquerade that which they are 
required to be, then hysteria is a strategic redoubling of that 
mime, taking it to the nth degree in order to attempt to wrest back 
some control over their destiny, identity and sexuality. Hysteria 
can be seen as a calculated continuum of the masquerade 
`femininity'. 
In the devastating essay 'And the One Doesn't Stir Without the 
Other'53 Luce Irigaray demonstrates the structure of 
phallocentrism which demands the disruption of female 
genealogies, of mother-daughter relationships. What she writes is 
not the voice of the hysteric, but rather she indicates through the 
daughter's voice the immanence of hysteria in this structure, the 
not-yet-hysteria which is the result of phallocentrism and 
53 Luce Irigaray, 'And the One Doesn't Stir Without the Other', trans. by H616ne 
Vivienne Wenzel, Signs, 7.1 (Autumn 1981), 60-67/Et I'une ne bouge pas sans I'autre (Paris: 
Les Editions de Minuit, 1979). 
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`normalisation' through psychoanalysis. It is worth quoting a 
substantial passage: 
And if you lead me back again and again to this blind assimilation of you - but 
who are you? - if you turn your face from me, giving yourself to me only in an 
already inanimate form, abandoning me to competent men to undo my/your 
paralysis, I'll turn to my father. [... ] 
He leaves the house, I follow in his steps. Farewell, Mother, I shall 
never become your likeness. 
I do gymnastics. I practice the body exercises suited to my disorder. 
I'll become a schooled robot. I move my body, completely unmoved. I advance 
and move about to the rhythm prescribed for my cure. Will, not love, regulates 
my gestures, my leaps, my dancing about. Each hour of the day finds me 
applying myself: trying to obey the doctors' orders. I concur totally with their 
diagnosis of my condition. I give them my complete attention, all my energy. 
I'll be the living demonstration of the correctness of their principles. 
Animated, reanimated by their understanding. 
See from afar how I move with measured steps, me, once frozen in 
anger? Aren't I good now? A nearly perfect girl? I lack only a few garments, a 
little jewelry, some makeup, a disguise {travestissement 54), some ways of 
being or doing to appear perfect. I'm beginning to look like what's expected of 
me. One more effort, a little more anger against you who want me to remain 
little, you who want me to eat what you bring me rather than to see me dress 
like you, and I'll step out of the {ton) dream. Out of my disorder. Out of you in 
me, me in you. I'll leave us. I'll go into another home. I'll live my life, my 
story. 
Look at how healthy I am now. I don't even have to run after a man, he 
comes toward me. He approaches me. I await him, immobile, rooted. He's very 
near. I'm paralyzed with emotion. My blood no longer circulated very well. I 
hardly breathe. I leave. 
I can't tell you where I am going. Forget me, Mother. Forget you in me, 
me in you. Let's just forget us. Life continues .... 55 
The mother that the little girl wants to be like is already 
inanimate, causing the little girl to turn to her father and the 
fathers of psychoanalysis. She schools herself in the gestures 
required of her, desiring their approva l, concu rring with their 
opinion. This makes her womanly - all she needs in addition are the 
54 'travestissement' carries the connotations of transvestism and of drag, thus 
emphasising that this disguise of 'femininity' is a masculine construction of femininity. 
Irigaray had earlier noted 'The fact that certain men want to "act like" women thus raises 
the question whether the thereby take back for themselves that "femininity" which was 
assigned to woman. ' Speculum, n. 31 p. 491Speculum, n. 37 p. 55. This could also apply to 
those aspects of 'femininity' deemed appropriate for male artists. See Christine Battersby, 
Gender and Genius (London: The Women's Press, 1989). 
55 Luce Irigaray, 'And the One Doesn't Stir Without the Other', pp. 62-63/Et I'Une ne 
bouge pas sans Taufre, pp. 12-13. 
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appropriate accoutrements of dress and make-up. Her desire to be 
like the mother has turned to anger that the mother wished to feed 
her, rather than wanting her daughter visibly to mimic, to 
masquerade, `femininity'. The daughter's sexuality has become 
passive to the extent that she actively masquerades, but then 
waits to be chosen by a man. The separation from the mother is 
complete.... but of course the daughter ends up having repeated the 
same masquerade as her mother. The phenomenon of hysteria is 
shown by Luce Irigaray as an inevitability in the structuring of 
`femininity': "Hysteria is all she has left. [.... ] And hysterical 
miming {le mime hysterique} will be the little girl's or the 
woman's effort to save her sexuality from total repression and 
destruction. "56 Mimicry, `femininity', and hysteria, are so closely 
related and intertwined as to be almost contiguous. Where two are 
found, the third will not be too far distant: 
Hysteria: it speaks in the mode of a paralyzed gestural faculty, [.... ] as 
symptoms of an 'it can't speak to or about itself' ... And the drama of hysteria 
is that it is inserted schizotically between that gestural system, that desire 
paralysed and enclosed with its body, and a language that it has learned in the 
family, in school, in society, which is in no way continuous with - nor 
certainly, a metaphor for - the 'movements' of its desire. Both mutism and 
mimicry {le mimetisme) are then left to hysteria. Hysteria is silent and at the 
same time it mimes {eile mime). And - how could it be otherwise - 
miming/reproducing {mimant-reproduisant) a language that is not its own, 
masculine language, it caricatures and deforms that language: it 'lies', it 
'deceives', as women have always been reputed to do. 57 
In order to demonstrate the strategic choice of hysteria, Elizabeth 
Grosz indicates anorexia as a contemporary example: "a defiant 
taking-to-extremes of these ideals [.... ] a not always successful 
attempt at self determination. "5 8 Certainly the anorexic 
56 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, pp. 71-72/Speculum, pp. 85-86. 
57 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 136-137/Ce sexe, p. 134. 
58 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions, p. 136. 
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determines to become the perfectly thin body, maintaining an 
absolute control over diet and exercise in a mimetic parody of the 
effort required of young (white) Western women. 59 I think hysteric 
mimicry could be underlying other eating disorders, such as 
bingeing (sugar and spice and all things nice, that's what little 
girls are made of), and bulimia. It is possible to reaffirm the 
placing of this discussion the realm of the visible, the realm of the 
aesthetic and the realm of mimicry, with Lynda Nead's 
demonstration the absolute control required of the borders and 
orifices of (representations of) the female body in our culture. It is 
"an aesthetic that has structured the representation of the female 
body in western art since antiquity". s° Drawing upon Kenneth 
Clarke, Jacques Derrida and Mary Douglas, Nead shows how, across 
the breadth of Western culture's activities, "the female body is 
defined as lacking containment and issuing filth and pollution from 
its faltering outlines and broken surface" and how art constantly 
(re)submits it to regulation and "repair". 61 Luce Irigaray confirms 
the hysteric's relation to a dominative aesthetic: 62 
Enigmatic "somatizations", hysterical "dreams" in which we are supposed to 
see "the caricature of a work of art", as Freud puts it in Totem and Taboo. 
Woman's special form of neurosis would be to 'mimic' {serait une `mime'} a 
work of art, to be a bad (copy of a) work of art. Her neurosis would be 
recognized as a counterfeit or parody of an artistic process. It is transformed 
59 Surveys in the USA have shown a difference in attitude to body image between young 
white women and young black women, with a high percentage of the white women expressing 
a desire to lose weight and be thinner, while black women were expressing the importance of 
having 'thickness' on them and a physical presence (see Elizabeth Nickson, 'Learning Curves', 
The Guardian, 8 April 1996, section 2, p. 7). Luce Irigaray does not consider racial 
difference within hysteria; but neither does she mention anorexia in this context; It Is 
Elizabeth Grosz's exemplar, which is, I think, valid in certain dominant Western contexts. 
60 Lynda Nead, The Female Nude: Art, Obscenity and Sexuality (London: Routledge, 
1992), pp. 5-6. 
61 Lynda Nead, ibid., p. 7. 
62 See Josephine Donovan, 'Everyday Use and Moments of Being: Toward a 
Nondominative Aesthetic', in Aesthetics in Feminist Perspective, ed. by Hilde Hein and 
Carolyn Korsmeyer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 53-67, for a 
discussion of the dominative and the nondominative in aesthetic praxis. 
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into an aesthetic object, but one without value, which has to be condemned 
because it is a forgery {condamnable parce que re/event de la simulation. 
Stigmatisee en tant que faussaire. }. It is neither `nature' nor an appropriate 
technique for re-producing nature. 63 
In discussing "the primacy of boundaries in social configurations 
of the female body", Nead turns to Giovanni Battista Moroni's 
painting Chastity, to a photograph by Robert Mapplethorpe of the 
body-builder Lisa Lyons, and finally to anorexia: 
Here again the body is seen as image, according to a set of conventions, and 
woman acts both as judge and executioner. But rather than anorexia being seen 
as a distortion of physical needs, it can be posed instead as a confusion of 
psychical perceptions and, more exactly, as a confusion of form and its 
boundaries. For the anorectic, there is always excess matter deposited over 
the surface, the form of the body. The goal is to get rid of that surplus and to 
reveal the essential, core self - to get back to the original boundaries. 64 
This carries echoes of the earlier discussion of mimicry and 
Callois's identification of the dislocation of the insect's visual 
identity. In the discussion of hysteria, however, the intention, 
desire and will of the hysteric is important. Luce Irigaray locates 
in this "a revolutionary potential in hysteria"65 (and at one point 
describes the Erinnyes in the Oresteia as "women in rebellion, 
types of hysterical revolutionaries who rise up against the 
patriarchal power that is being established"66). It is a potential 
which Grosz summarises: 
Hers [the hysteric's] is a mode of defiance of patriarchy, not the site of its 
frustration. In this sense, the hysteric is a proto-feminist, or a least an 
isolated individual who, if she had access to the experiences of other women, 
may locate the problem in cultural expectations of femininity rather than in 
femininity itself. The hysteric's defiance through excess, through 
63 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 125/Speculum, p. 156. 
64 Lynda Nead, The Female Nude, pp. 10-11. 
65 Luce Irigaray, 'Women-Mothers, the Silent Substratum of the Social Order', trans. 
by David Macey, The Irigaray Reader, p. 47. 
66 Luce Irigaray, 'Body against Body: In Relation to the Mother', in Sexes and 
Genealogies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 7-21 (p. 12)/'Le corps-ä- 
corps avec la mere', in Sexes et Parentes (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1987), pp. 19-33 
(p. 24). 
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overcompliance, is a parody of the expected. 67 
It is for this reason that the phallocentric response of attempting 
to `cure' the hysteric by training her in a more appropriate 
adaptation to 'femininity' is itself a false `cure', treating "the 
wrong subject, the woman, her repressed (recuperable) desire, as if 
`she', not the symbolic relation, were the locus of illness. "68 The 
woman is thus not returned to her `self', her genealogies; the cause 
of her resistance is not attended too. Luce Irigaray's response as an 
analyst to hysteria is to attempt a working through of it, at least 
in part in the realm of the aesthetic: 
Hysteria stands between woman and mother, women and mothers. It is in 
tension between them. Hysteria must not be destroyed but allowed access to 
the imagination and to creativeness. For the hysteric access to such an identity 
is effected through a sexualized art, a colored and sonorous art, an art whose 
libidinal resources blossom in duality and reconciliation, within one woman, 
between mother and wife {femme}, and among women. Thanks to such an art, 
the hysteric should be able to regain her perceptions - her virginity, her 
gender - and keep hold of them. 69 
While recognising the revolutionary potential of hysteria, Luce 
Irigaray has no wish to valorise the hysteric, maintain her 
condition, or move all women towards a state of hysteria. Instead, 
Luce Irigaray adapts the hysteric's strategies of resistance into a 
productive mimesis. How Luce Irigaray defines this, how she 
deploys it in her own writing, and how it structures her whole 
project, will be the subject of the next chapter. 
67 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions, p. 135. 
68 Dianna Chisholm, Irigaray's Hysteria', p. 272. 
69 Luce Irigaray, 'Flesh Colors', in Sexes and Genealogies, pp. 151-165 (p. 164)/'Les 
Couleurs de la chair', in Sexes et parentes, pp. 165-179 (p. 179). This attention to hysteria 
through the visual and the aesthetic will be important in future discussions. 
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Chapter 2 
Mimesis part 2: Productive mimesis; Luce 
Irigaray's practice of mimesis; Luce 
Irigaray's oeuvre as/is mimesis. 
Productive mimesis 
As I have indicated in the previous chapter, Luce Irigaray identifies 
within Plato two forms of mimesis, which I have called non- 
productive or maintenance mimesis, and productive mimesis. She 
identifies productive mimesis as the process through which women 
might develop appropriate languages in the Symbolic: "it is 
doubtless in the direction of, and on the basis of, that [productive] 
mimesis {mimesis} that the possibility of a woman's writing {une 
ecriture de femme} may come about. "1 She has also identified 
within the structures of hysteria both mimicry and a place of 
resistance: "hysterical miming {le mime hysterique} will be the 
little girl's or the woman's effort to save her sexuality from total 
repression and destruction. "2 Gebauer and Wulf provide an account 
of mimesis that makes more understandable how it is possible for 
Luce Irigaray to make a political and resistant move between 
hysteria and mimesis: 
It becomes evident that the concept of mimesis necessarily loses its 
intellectual centrality with the rise of rational thought. [.... ] The change itself 
1 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. by Catherine Porter with Carolyn 
Burke (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 131/Ce sexe qul n'en est pas un (Paris: 
Les Editions de Minuit, 1977), pp. 129-130. Hereafter refered to as This Sex/Ce sexe. 
2 Luce Irigaray, Speculum Of The Other Woman, trans. by Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1985), p. 721 Speculum de I'autre femme (Paris: Les Editions do Minuit, 1974), pp. 85-86. Hereafter 
refered to as Speculum/Speculum. 
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allows us to recognize a second characteristic of mimesis: while modern 
rational thought refers to the single isolated cognitive subject, mimesis is 
always concerned with a relational network of more than one person. 3 
There are striking correlations between mimesis (as explained 
here) and hysteria. While Gebauer and Wulf do not in this 
introductory comment define "rational thought", when reflected 
back through their book it could imply both the related historical 
rise of `rationality' in ancient Greece and its re-affirmation in the 
Enlightenment, and the acquisition of `rationality' in the individual. 
Thus it can be related through the moment of cultural transition 
from oral to written histories to Luce Irigaray's location of the 
development of patriarchy, and also to the accession of the subject 
to the Law of the Father, to the phallocentric Symbolic. Both 
hysteria and mimesis are grounded in the social, and have elements 
of desire for approval/love: the person performing the mimesis 
desires to continue, and fit into, particular social patterns; the 
hysteric is adopting the gestures of 'femininity'. Both have 
elements of resistance: in productive mimesis (such as the 
musician), the aim is to develop, add to, or exceed a given situation 
which has been found insufficient to allow for the articulation of 
subjectivity; the hysteric wishes to regain and retain her 
subjectivity through absolute control of that `femininity', 
exceeding it through becoming the best at it (for example, the 
thinnest, in the case of anorexia). Both, then, will maintain a 
critical distance from established logic and rationality - in the 
case of hysteria, a critical distance which is increased by the 
linking of men, masculinity and rationality on the one hand, and 
women, femininity, and irrationality on the other. (Maybe in this 
3 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis: Culture Art Society, trans. by Don Reneau 
(London: University of California Press, 1995), p. 3. 
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positioning of mimesis, we can begin to see why male artists feel 
able, structurally, to call upon aspects of `femininity' while 
declining the compromised subjectivity and relation to the 
Symbolic allowed women. ) 
Gebauer and Wulf continue their paragraph: 
The mimetic production of a symbolic world refers to other worlds and to their 
creators and draws other persons into one's own world. As is apparent in this 
constellation, mimesis implies the recognition of mediation between worlds and 
people; it does not designate a subjection to received model, but rather an 
acceptance of traditions and the work of predecessors. It also implies a 
recognition of power: the inclusion of others introduces power, if only in 
symbolic terms, into one's own personal world, into the interpretive and 
perspectival modes developed there. The history of mimesis is a history of 
disputes over the power to make symbolic worlds, that is, the power to 
represent the self and others and interpret the world. To this extent mimesis 
possesses a political dimension and is part of the history of power relations. 4 
While there are aspects of this which are useful, such as the 
introduction of the move from the social to the political, it also 
contains the limits of Gebauer and Wulf's gender-free ('universal') 
understanding of mimesis. Implied here is an unproblematic 
relation to a Symbolic - an unproblematic access to it and 
representation in it. But the mimesis of the hysteric is doomed to 
be a mimesis of powerlessness, mimicry of a `femininity' which 
was never 'hers'. This then calls into question the "mediation 
between worlds and people". Without wishing to designate all 
women as hysterics, but remembering the embeddedness of 
hysteria in the structures of 'femininity', the questions for women 
are: is this a mimicry of mediation? If women have no mediation 
between themselves, then what is the mediation they mimic? If, as 
Luce Irigaray argues, women's genealogies are utterly disrupted, 
then there are no (cultural) traditions or predecessors. Women 
4 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, ibid., p. 3. 
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mimic either men, or their disempowered, hysterical 
'predecessors' - "'predecessors', " because these women were 
always already (what else could they do? ) mimicking something not 
'theirs'. Through her work Luce Irigaray argues for the development 
of structures which will allow for the reaffirming and integrity of 
female genealogies, and the related development of structures of 
mediation and the Symbolic. At present the majority options are 
either the mimicking of a `femininity' not of our making, or 
mimicking men and the phallic Symbolic - which are, of course, 
(two sides of) the same (coin). To get out of this bleak spot, we 
must pass through the resistant moment of hysteria and through 
productive mimesis. I would like to repeat a passage of Luce 
Irigaray's I quoted earlier concerning mimicry, and to follow 
through its subsequent discussion of mimesis. It breaks down into 
three paragraphs. 
1. 
There is, in an initial phase, perhaps only one 'path', the one historically 
assigned to the feminine: that of mimicry {le mimetisme). One must assume the 
feminine role deliberately. Which means already to convert a form of 
subordination into an affirmation, and thus to begin to thwart it. Whereas a 
direct feminine challenge to this condition means demanding to speak as a 
(masculine) 'subject', that is, it means to postulate a relation to the 
intelligible that would maintain sexual indifference. 5 
Luce Irigaray is suggesting that women have two strategies of 
response to their subordination. The second would equate to an 
`equal rights feminism', maintaining `sexual indifference'. It is an 
approach which would be akin to Lucy Lippard's identification of 
the desire for a bigger slice of a poisonous pie, 6 or to a denial that 
5 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 76/Ce sexe, pp. 73-74. 
6 Lucy Lippard, 'The Women Artists' Movement: What Next? ', in The Pink Glass Swan: Selected 
Feminist Essays on Art (New York: New Press, 1995), pp. 80-83 (p. 81). 
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gender is of any cultural importance. The first option is the 
strategy which Luce Irigaray has learned from the hysteric. As she 
notes elsewhere "there is always, in hysteria, both a reserve 
power and a paralyzed power [.... ] the possibility of another mode of 
`production', notably gestural and lingual; but this is maintained in 
its latency. Perhaps as a cultural reserve yet to come? ". 7 As the 
hysteric mimics `femininity', so too Luce Irigaray suggests that 
there is a possibility of tapping into this reserve cultural power 
through a deliberate mimicry of the role allotted women. This 
would be a knife-edge strategy: one does not wish to fall into the 
self-defeating paralysis of the hysteric. 
2. Luce Irigaray continues this passage: 
To play with mimesis {la mimesis} is thus, for a woman, to try to recover the 
place of her exploitation by discourse, without allowing herself to be simply 
reduced to it. It means to resubmit herself - inasmuch as she is on the side of 
the 'perceptible', of 'matter' - to 'ideas', in particular to ideas about herself, 
that are elaborated in/by a masculine logic, but so as to make 'visible', by an 
effect of playful repetition {rOpOtition ludique}, what was supposed to remain 
invisible: the cover-up of a possible operation of the feminine in language. It 
also means 'to unveil' the fact that, if women are such good mimics {miment si 
bien), it is because they are not simply resorbed in thus function. They also 
remain elsewhere: another case of the persistence of 'matter', but also of 
sexual pleasure. 8 
The suggestion here is that the differentiation of the woman who 
"play[s] with mimesis" from the hysteric's self-defeating mimicry 
is that the hysteric, in attempting to wrest control of the 
production of her 'feminine' subjectivity, also allows herself to be 
reduced to it. Instead, the mimesis has to occur in the realm of the 
playful, and can do so for two reasons: the first is that women 
undertaking it understand it in political terms ("trying to recover 
7 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 138/Ce sexe, p. 136. 
8 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 76/Ce sexe, pp. 73-74. 
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the place of their exploitation"); and, subsequently, that because 
the "cultural reserve yet to come" remains embedded in their 
strategy, they therefore always remain/retain it elsewhere than in 
the `feminine'. The hysteric's strategy, on the other hand, is one of 
an isolated individual, rather than collectively political (feminist); 
her stubborn reserve is "resorbed" into her perfection of her act of 
mimicry. 
Naomi Schor suggests that Luce Irigaray's concept of mimesis 
"might be described as an instance of what Derrida has termed 
paleonomy: 'the occasional maintenance of an old name in order to 
launch a new concept"' and that "mimesis comes to signify 
difference as positivity, a joyful reappropriation of the attributes 
of the other that is not in any way to be confused with a mere 
reversal of the existing phallocentric distribution of power". 9 If 
this approach to femininity is an example of paleonomy, then I 
don't think we can understand it as "a joyful reappropriation of the 
attributes of the other", even (particularly) if this is 
differentiated from a reversal of phallocentrism. Schor's concept 
smacks of potential embracing of victimhood, accepting the 
Freudian concept of anatomy as destiny, and the strategy of 
producing 'positive images' which remain in the phallocentric 
Symbolic. Surely Derrida's concept implies a knowing strategy, 
rather than the indiscriminate acceptance of otherness. He does in 
fact refer to the "strategic necessity" of paleonomy, and 
continues: 
Taking into account the fact that a name does not name the punctual simplicity 
of a concept, but rather a system of predicates defining a concept, a 
9 Naomi Schor, 'This Essentialism which is not One', in Engaging With Irigaray: Feminist 
Philosophy and Modern European Thought, ed. by Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor and Margaret Whitford 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 57-78 (p. 67). 
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conceptual structure centered on a given predicate, we proceed: 1) to the 
extraction of a reduced predicative trait that is held in reserve, limited in a 
given conceptual structure (limited for motivations and relations of force to be 
analyzed), named X; 2) to the delimitation, the grafting and regulated 
extension of the extracted predicate, the name X being maintained as a kind of 
lever of intervention, in order to maintain a grasp on the previous 
organization, which is to be transformed effectively. Therefore, extraction, 
graft, extension: you know that this is what I call, according to the process I 
have just described, writing. 10 
This "X" is very close to being a model of Luce Irigaray's mimesis 
(in writing) of `femininity' which does indeed name both patriarchy 
and phallocentrism as the system of predicates which name it. The 
"extraction of the reduced predicative trait" is a necessity for the 
maintenance of a critical distance, to remove women from their 
place of immediacy, and to prevent women's reduction once again 
to that place of her exploitation. `Femininity' is then used by Luce 
Irigaray - grafted and extended - with precision as a lever of 
intervention. As we have seen, it is "in the direction of, and on the 
basis of" this practice that Luce Irigaray says "the possibility of a 
woman's writing may come about". 11 This is why I feel the term 
productive mimesis is more appropriate than the notion of 
positivity. 
It is also important to note (in the context of my project) that Luce 
Irigaray uses the analogy of visibility - mimesis making visible 
that which was meant to be invisible - even if the visible here 
remains cited as 'visible'. Following her thorough critique of what 
she terms phallocentric "specul(ariz)ation" in Speculum, it tells us 
that Luce Irigaray is not leaving the realm of the visible, visible 
languages, and metaphors of visibility to phallocentrism: they are 
10 Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 
71. 
11 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 131/Ce sexe, p. 130. 
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to be worked through using the strategy of productive mimesis as 
much as speech and writing. Indeed, the visible is far too urgent a 
matter within Luce Irigaray's critiques to be left to the old 
specul(ariz)ation. Its blind spots, its dreams of symmetry, of its 
representations of woman as the other of the same, are all areas 
where women can enact a productive mimesis, exposing the lacunae 
in its texts. And if this working of the visual is at best parallel to 
Luce Irigaray's "parler-femme", 12 with its indication of verbal 
speech, then maybe it develops something more like a witnessing- 
woman. I would like to coin this phrase because of its multiplicity 
of appropriate (and appropriately contiguous) readings. `Witness', 
like 'perceive', combines the visual and the intellectual; but the 
phrase can also indicate 1) the woman and women who witness(es), 
2) an active witnessing of the construct `woman', and 3) the 
performative mode of a woman bearing witness. 
3. Luce Irigaray's final paragraph in the passage under 
consideration reads: 
Elsewhere of 'matter': if women can play with mimesis {la mimesis} it is 
because they are capable of bringing new nourishment to its operation. Because 
they have always nourished this operation? Is not the 'first' stake in mimesis 
{la mimesis} that of re-producing (from) nature? Of giving it form in order to 
appropriate it for oneself? As guardians of 'nature', are not women the ones 
who maintain, thus who make possible, the resource of mimesis {la mimesis} 
for men? For the logos? 13 
Continuing her discussion of productive mimesis, Luce Irigaray 
returns to the body and to reproduction. As Rosi Braidotti suggests, 
Luce Irigaray's productive mimesis "allows women to revisit and 
repossess the discursive and material sites where `woman' was 
12 Luce Irigaray, Ce sexe, p. 133. 
13 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 76-77/Ce sexe, p. 74. 
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essentialized, disqualified or quite simply excluded", 14 and the site 
of the mothering body is surely the most poignant of all of these. 
This is the move of Luce Irigaray's which has raised the hackles of 
her critics most of all. In 1985 Toril Moi, for example, argued that 
Luce Irigaray "falls for the temptation to produce her own positive 
theory of femininity. But [.... ] to define 'woman' is necessarily to 
essentialize her". 15 In conflating 'femininity' and `woman' Moi 
seems to be making an essentialising move herself in order to 
construct her argument (indicating the slippery elusiveness of the 
whole problematic). Rosi Braidotti, however, follows her own 
comment on Luce Irigaray's outline of mimesis by insisting that 
"working through the networks of discursive definitions of 
'woman"' produces processes of female subjectivity and of a 
"gendered female feminist community. " It forms an "ontological 
leap forward" where the collective "we, women" can empower the 
subjective becoming of "I, woman": 
This leap is forward, not backwards towards the glorification of an authentic 
archaic feminine power or of a well-hidden 'true' essence. It does not aim at 
recovering a lost origin or a forgotten land, but rather to bring about here and 
now a mode of representation that would take the fact of being a women as a 
positive, self-affirming political force. It is an act of self-legitimation 
whereby the 'she-self' blends her ontological desire to be with the conscious 
willed becoming of a collective political movement. This distinction between 
the will and desire marks a separation of register, of levels of experience, 
which must be underlined and never confused. [.... ] The distinction between 
identity and subjectivity is to be related to that between will and desire. 16 
This is a more productive framework through which to approach 
Luce Irigaray's comments on mimesis and reproduction. Luce 
Irigaray consistently refuses to reduce women to mothers, and 
14 Rosi Braidotti, 'On the Female Feminist Subject, or: From "She-Self" to "She-Other"', in Beyond 
Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics, and Female Subjectivity, ed. by Gisela Bock and 
Susan James (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 177-192 (p. 187). 
15 Toril Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory, (London: Methuen, 1985), p. 139. 
16 Rosi Braidotti, 'On the Female Feminist Subject', p. 186. 
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therefore refuses to construct either `woman' or `mother' as a site 
of origin for women; such a reduction itself being a displacement 
of woman's subjectivity and her relation to origin. As Alys Eve 
Weinbaum points out, "reproduction ventriloquizes mimetic 
repetition on the biological level. Indeed, the term - reproduction - 
itself assumes a paleonymic function. [.... ] `Reproduction' signifies 
[.... ] the biological process that both Western metaphysics and 
capitalism use to reduce women to mothers". 17 Luce Irigaray's use 
of rhetorical-ironic questions and the citing/siting of the terms 
"matter", "first" and "nature" serve to outline the possible 
productivity of mimesis in relation to reproduction, and also to 
perform mimesis in relation to that same reproduction. After 
noting the paleonymic function of 'reproduction', Weinbaum 
continues: 
For it is this term that best expresses women's potential to disrupt the violent 
and essentializing codification of their biological selves. In turning to her own 
body as biological ground, that same body, which is said to be the source of 
subordination, is repeated or reproduced with a difference. It is no longer the 
body assigned to woman to buttress the representation of male sexuality, but a 
body that allows woman to articulate her own subjectivity and that of other 
women. 18 
In other words, Luce Irigaray is invoking, in this use of the term 
`reproduction', what Braidotti calls the "female embodied self" in 
order to sustain "the project of redefining female subjectivity". ' 9 
If `woman' is not reduced to `mother', then the act of reproduction 
(as mimesis) cannot provide her `essence', nor can its 
representation show us her relation to origin: she is always already 
elsewhere. The problem is located in the reduction of `woman' to 
17 Alys Eve Weinbaum, 'Marc, Irigaray, and the Politics of Representation', Differences, 6.1 (1994), 
98-128 (p. 112). 
18 Alys Eve Weinbaum, ibid., p. 112. 
19 Rosi Braidotti, 'On the Female Feminist Subject', p. 186. 
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'mother'. 
Luce Irigaray's practice of mimesis 
As the paragraph on reproduction demonstrates, Luce Irigaray does 
not use mimesis as a purely theoretical tool: rather, it is embedded 
in her practice, and not always easily identifiable, available for 
study, or amenable to academic modelling. Indeed, the mimesis we 
detect in her writing is likely to be only the tip of the iceberg, and, 
I would guess, to provoke much of the exasperation felt by her 
critics. 20 Mimesis is rooted in practice, and is irreducible to 
theory: it "eludes theory formation. It is a product of human 
practice and must always be regarded as the issue of a deed, as a 
part of practice. "21 Further, the practice of a productive mimesis is 
never purely cerebral, but can always be found, either 
substantively or as a trace, in the body: 
The aspect of production expresses the nature of mimesis as activity 
undertaken by actors, as a deed. This [.... ] is articulated variously with the 
passage of time: as an act of painting or writing, as a making with one's own 
hands, as a generation of sounds with the voice or with musical instrument, or 
in reading aloud, or, ultimately, in reading silently, which retains scarcely any 
physical component at all. But there remains always a physical residue, which 
makes its presence felt in typically physical processes of depletion, such as 
fatigue [.... ] Mimesis brings into play a practical knowledge, a sens pratique. 22 
This effect of mimesis can be found threaded through Luce 
Irigaray's writing, for example in her antipathy towards, and 
20 Elizabeth Weed mentions "how Irigaray can quite effectively 'exasperate' through her discourse", 
citing Jean-Francois Lyotard's reactions to her in a colloquium. ? he Question of Style', In Carolyn Burke, 
Naomi Schor and Margaret Whitford, Engaging with Irigaray, pp. 79-109 (p. 108). 
21 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis, p. 316. 
22 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, ibid., pp. 315-316. 
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refusal to adopt, the cerebrally abstract (for example, in `Flesh 
Colors'23); and her refusal also to produce or use clearly extricable 
theoretical models. (The exception to prove this rule is the 
pedagogically-intended24 I Love To You, where she does on occasion 
cite models of practice. This can be reflected back upon the 
pedagogical aspects of mimesis, but also requests reflection upon 
the model cited - notably, Buddha's fusion of mind and body in his 
contemplation of the flower. 25) 
Luce Irigaray's comments on her own usage of mimesis lead into 
comments on mimicry and her narrative of "the philosopher's 
wife/woman" {la femme du philosophe)26. They occurred during the 
defence of her thesis (Speculum)27, in response to a question about 
what method she had used for her research: 
A delicate question. For isn't it the method, the path to knowledge, that has 
always also led us away, led us astray, by fraud and artifice, from woman's 
path, and to the point of consecrating its oblivion? [.... ] In order to reopen 
woman's path, in particular in and through language, it was therefore 
necessary to note the way in which the method is never as simple as it 
purports to be, the way in which the teleological project [.... ] the method takes 
on is always a project, conscious or not, of turning away, of deviation, and of 
reduction, in the artifice of sameness, of otherness. In other words, speaking 
at the greatest level of generality so far as philosophical methods are 
concerned: of the feminine. 28 
So academic methodologies in themselves distract from "woman's 
path", enacting a form of fraud and artifice for women. The 
23 Luce Irigaray, 'Flesh Colors', in Sexes and Genealogies (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), pp. 151-165/'Les Couleurs de la chair', in Sexes et Parentes (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1987), 
pp. 165-179. 
24 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You: Sketch of a Possible Felicity in History, trans. by Alison Martin 
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 11-12/J'aime ä toi: esquise dune felicitd dans I'histoire (Paris: Grasset), 
pp. 29-31. Hereafter cited as I Love To YoulJ'aime a toi. 
25 Luce Irigaray, /Love To You, pp. 24-251J'aime b tol, pp. 49-50. 
26 Luce Irigaray, Ce sexe, p. 148. Translated as "wife" in This Sex, p. 151. 
27 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 148/Ce sexe, p. 145. 
28 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 150/Ce sexe, pp. 146-147. 
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"teleological project" (of 'academic objectivity'? ) in posing as a 
straightforward path is in fact embroiled in the complications of 
`the same' and 'the other'. Thus the teleological project is a 
masquerade, is `feminine'. 
Thus it was necessary to destroy, but as Rene Char wrote, with nuptial tools. 
The tool is not a feminine {feminin} attribute. But woman may re-utilize its 
marks on her, in her. To put it another way: the option left to me was to have 
a fling with the philosophers, which is easier said than done ... for what path 
can one take to get back inside their ever so coherent systems? 29 
In this event, the only thing possible is to use the attributes of 
'femininity' (which are given to woman, and are almost all that she 
has); to explore the marks they have left upon her, and to use them 
to party with the philosophers. This is not totally out of kilter 
with Audre Lorde's assertion "For the master's tools will never 
dismantle the master's house. They may allow us temporarily to 
beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring 
about genuine change. And this fact is only threatening to those 
women who still define the master's house as their only source of 
support". 30 To attempt a teleological project would be to 'speak (as 
a) man', request the support of the master's house, and ignore any 
potential parler-femme; to use a separatist strategy would be to 
leave the meta-discourse of our culture intact. If the patriarchy 
requires mime of women, and phallocentrism requires masquerade, 
then that is what they will get with a vengeance. Luce Irigaray 
presents herself as mimeticising "the philosopher's wife/woman". 
Diana Chisholm says that here Luce Irigaray "has acted the part of 
the cultural terrorist", 31 before continuing: 
29 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 150/Ce sexe, p. 147. 
30 Audre Lorde, 'The Master's Tools will Never Dismantle the Master's House', in Sister Outsider: 
Essays and Speeches (Freedom, CA: Crossing Press, 1984), pp. 110-113. 
31 Dianne Chisholm, Irigaray's Hysteria', in Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor and Margaret Whitford, 
Engaging with Irigaray, pp. 263-283 (p. 270). 
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I read this voice as a trope, a parody-mime, that voices woman's silencing or 
exposes woman's being overspoken by men's logic of the Same. Such a 'voice' 
does not emanate directly from the repressed female body but functions as a 
metaphorical disease in a body of male discourse, riddling it with hints, 
allusions, parables of women's sexual difference. 32 
She will inhabit the phallocentric texts of the philosophers, fulfil 
her role of the other of the same, reflecting the same back to 
himself: "Reproductive material and duplicating mirror, the 
philosopher's wife/woman {femme} also has to underwrite that 
narcissism which often extends onto a transcendental 
dimension". 33 The rhetorical/ironic questioning is but a prominent 
aspect of this. 
It has been suggested that Luce Irigaray not only writes on the 
philosophers, but that she writes the philosophers. 34 I think this is 
to underestimate the project. Luce Irigaray appears to have taken 
to heart Virginia Woolf's analysis that "women have served all 
these centuries as looking-glasses possessing the magic and 
delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural 
size", 35 that is, she does it to such excess that the gaps and blind 
spots are revealed at `twice their natural size'. The reason that 
mimesis, rather than miming, can do this is that element of 
reserve: "having a fling with the philosopher also entails 
safeguarding those components of the mirror that cannot reflect 
themselves: its backing, its brilliancy, thus its dazzlements, its 
ecstasies. "36 As she says elsewhere, "marks and masks are 
32 Dianne Chisholm, ibid., p. 272. 
33 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 151/Ce sexe, p. 147. Translation modified. 
34 Elizabeth Weed, 'The Question of Style', p. 84. 
35 Virginia Woolf, A Room of One's Own (London: Hogarth Press, 1949), p. 53. 
36 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 151/Ce sexe, p. 147. 
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different {heterogene} in their relations with signs": 37 through 
utilising the marks of `femininity' Luce Irigaray enacts a mimesis 
of the representation of `femininity' - in order to undo it... in order 
to begin the opening of some space for a developing woman's 
Symbolic, the `parler-femme', the `witnessing-woman': 
Neither falsehood nor appearance and beauty are 'foreign' to truth. They are 
proper to it, if not its accessories and its underside. And the opposite remains 
caught up in the same. It grounds the economy - or echonomy - of sameness. 
With a flip of the coin, it forms the basis for its representations. Foreign, for 
its part, beckoned toward an outside. But it was forgotten. 
Mimesis is not to be outflanked this way. Certainly not by 'woman' - 
double. [.... ] By 'femininity' least of all. 
But woman? Is not to be reduced to mere femininity. Or to falsehood, or 
appearance or beauty. Short of staying out of it and projecting at (from) a 
distance that other of the self to which truth is, from the outset, hostile: 
falsehood, as well as beauty and appearance, ... Although femaleness has taken 
it/them as part of her forms, although she cannot do without it/them if she is 
to pass for what is: the truth. 
This operation also will be attributed to woman. Or is it to femininity? 
As a preparation for 'woman'. Who may be said to play with it as with a 
setting, framing, mounting, glazing. Until the time she? gets out? If in fact she 
ever plays. But so many things are attributed to whoever remains foreign to 
self-definition. Who risks - the abyss. 38 
It is at the point not only of realising that "Irigaray's mimesis is a 
way of retracing backwards the multilayered levels of 
signification, or representation, of women", 39 but of realising the 
extent of the convolution of forms of this risk, that many of Luce 
Irigaray's commentators - and supporters - such as Weed, 
Chisholm, Xu and Berg appear to experience a hiatus (I say this 
while acknowledging my indebtedness to their insights). There is 
an inevitable tension between the academic teleological project of 
37 Luce Irigaray, Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. by Gillian C. Gill (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991), p. 801Amante marine de Friedrich Neitzsche (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1980), 
p. 86. Hereafter cited as Marine LovedAmante marine. 
38 Luce Irigaray, Marine Lover, pp. 77-78/Amante marine, pp. 83-84. 
39 Rosi Braidotti, 'Of Bugs and Women: Irigaray and Deleuze on the Becoming-Woman', in Carolyn 
Burke, Naomi Schor, and Margaret Whitford, pp. 111-137 (p. 124). 
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their (my) texts and Luce Irigaray's project; a tension exacerbated, 
I feel, if the discussion of Luce Irigaray's strategy is restricted to 
analyses of her texts which are most immediately `on' the 
philosophers. The productivity of her texts is then restricted to an 
academic endeavour, and (despite occasional word play40) her 
mimesis becomes containable as an abstract methodology, `parler- 
femme' becomes an `epater les academiciens'. `Femininity' is 
deconstructed, displaced; `woman' is de-essentialised; 
`essentialism' rebutted or strategised... but a gap remains, a `hole' 
in the academic lens, which is not (yet) canny enough to be a 
mimesis of the `hole' in the scoptophilic lens of the dominant 
economy. 41 The gap is that `parler-femme' is practice - and 
concomitantly, mimesis is practice; a developing Symbolic is 
practice; 'her' subjectivity is practice; Luce Irigaray's oeuvre is 
practice. As such, it is irreducible to theory; which returns us to 
the earlier discussion of mimesis as being irreducible to theory. 
Before attending to Luce Irigaray's practice as mimesis, there is 
one final point. As practice, it is a web of strategic practices. 
While Luce Irigaray has warned that "philosophical discourse [.... ] 
constitutes the discourse on discourse" and is thus precisely the 
area which should be challenged, 42 this does not mean that the 
discourses for which philosophy sets the agenda - the discourses 
of its discourse - this does not mean that these 'supplementary' 
discourses are unworthy of attention. Indeed, their inclusion is 
crucial if the investigation of philosophical discourse is not to 
40 For example, Dianne Chisholm's wonderfully witty musings on whether Irigaray is a 'con' (Fr.: 
cunt, orifice, hole) artist or an 'ex'-centric - or even an 'ex-con' who has managed to escape. Dianne 
Chisholm, Irigaray's Hysteria', p. 264. 
41 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 26/Ce sexe, pp. 25-26. 
42 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 74/Ce sexe, p. 72. 
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remain abstract. While it would be naive to concentrate on these, 
leaving the meta-discourse of philosophy untouched, says Luce 
Irigaray, focus on the "limited or marginal issue"43 is also 
strategic, and from Speculum onwards is included in her work. The 
two main strands that emerge are ethics, folding back onto 
women's political collectivity, women's rights and civil rights; and 
her own struggle towards a Symbolic, an articulation of 
subjectivity and mediation through the 'parler-femme', the 
practice of (the) witnessing-woman. The gap in the present 
academic lens can only be articulated if one understands Luce 
Irigaray's oeuvre as/is mimesis, rather than taking mimesis as 
academic methodology, of relevance only to her work `on' the 
philosophers. 
Luce Irigaray's oeuvre as/is mimesis 
Paul Ricoeur offers us a developed analysis of mimesis which can 
be used to rescue Luce Irigaray's practice of mimesis from any 
reductive understanding as being a methodology. His paper 'Mimesis 
and Representation'44 aims to disentangle mimesis from its quite 
general understanding as a closed and limited form of 
representation - to ensure it is "removed from the enchanted 
precincts of re-presented presence. "45 It allows for a reading of 
Luce Irigaray's poetics - her oeuvre - not as an object to/for study, 
but as productive of an horizon of possibilities within which the 
reader is implicated. 
43 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 74/Ce sexe, p. 72. 
44 Paul Ricoeur, 'Mimesis and Representation', Annals of Scholarship, 2 (1981), 15-32. 
45 Paul Ricoeur, ibid., p. 16. 
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Ricoeur follows two paths. The first is to move from Platonic 
mimesis which is "interpreted in terms of a redoubled presence, 
works of art and of language being taken for weakened copies of 
things, whereas the things themselves borrow whatever tenor of 
meaning they have from their intelligible models, the Ideas", 46 and 
to concentrate instead upon Aristotle's development of productive 
mimesis, found primarily in his Poetics: "For Aristotle, mimesis 
only takes place within the area of human action, or production, or 
poiesis [Gr.: making]. [.... ] Far from producing a weakened image of 
pre-existing things, mimesis brings about an augmentation of 
meaning in the field of action, which is its privileged field. It does 
not equate itself with something already given. "47 Ricoeur's second 
move is away from a semiotic understanding towards one based 
upon hermeneutics: 
... [semiotic] theoreticians build upon an abstraction [.... ] by considering only 
the internal laws of the literary work. It is the task of hermeneutics, on the 
contrary, to reconstruct the set of operations by means of which a work 
arises from the opaque depths of living, acting, and suffering, to be given by 
an author to readers who receive it and thereby change their own action. For a 
semiotic theory that abstracts from this whole span of meaning, the work is 
constituted as an interior that alone is relevant. [.... ] For hermeneutics [.... ] 
there is neither an inside nor an outside to the work - the distinction of inside 
and outside being a methodological artifact - instead there is a concrete 
process in which the textual configuration conjoins the practical prefiguration 
and the practical transfiguration. 48 
This immediately warns us away from seeing our task as readers of 
texts as an abstraction, but rather to look for continuities between 
the text and that which is exterior to it. Ricoeur develops these 
three categories (practical prefiguration, textual configuration, 
and practical transfiguration) from three of Aristotle's terms: 
46 Paul Ricoeur, ibid., pp. 15-16. 
47 Paul Ricoeur, ibid., p. 16. 
48 Paul Ricoeur, pp. ibid., 17-18. 
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poiesis (making, action), sustasis or mythos (the synthesis of 
incidents into a story) and mimesis (the imitation of an action), 
which "thus form a chain that has to do with praxis, where each 
term must be understood in terms of its relations to the others. "49 
He names these mimesis,, mimesis2 and mimesis3. 
These categories may in some instances go some way towards 
explaining the problem I had identified in the previous section: the 
gaps in many of the commentaries on Luce Irigaray's use of 
mimesis. A semiotically influenced reader (according to Ricoeur) 
will place texts (in this case, Luce Irigaray's) in the category of 
sustasis, or textual configuration, and will feel most at home when 
she assumes that this is also what Luce Irigaray is doing: hence the 
over-attention given to those of Luce Irigaray's texts where she 
deals directly with texts by others: 
Modern semiotics offers one type of answer which rests solely on isolating the 
text. [.... ] Thanks to writing, and also thanks to emplotment, the narrative 
text acquires a semantic autonomy that cuts it off in three ways. First, from 
the presumed intention of its author; second, from the capacity of its first 
audience to receive it; third, from the socio-cultural conditions of its genesis. 
Mimesis2 is the emblem of this triple autonomy. 50 
Far from decrying mimesis2 (and referring to it sometimes as 
"emplotment"), Ricoeur is arguing for it to be seen as a mediation 
between mimesisi and mimesis3, rather than in isolation. Defining 
mimesis2 "as the configuration of action", Ricoeur also provides it 
with an historicity: "This configuration is governed by a 
schematization that is historically structured in a tradition or 
traditions, and it is expressed in individual works which stand in 
varying relations to the constraints generated by this 
49 Paul Ricoeur, ibid., pp. 16-17. 
50 Paul Ricoeur, ibid., p. 21. 
n..., ý.., ý. 
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schematism. "51 His further descriptions and analyses of it make 
one wonder further if the focus of discussions of Luce Irigaray's 
mimesis upon her texts 'on' other philosophers is both a mis-focus 
within her work and a mis-focus upon mimesis. Ricoeur's comment, 
for example, that "the poetic function suspends this concern for an 
external reference and turns language back on itself in order to 
celebrate itself"52 is redolent of Luce Irigaray's use of language in 
the texts where she is expressly working towards the articulation 
of the `parler-femme', the articulation of subjectivity. 
A further encouragement towards the integrative understanding 
provided by Ricoeur's mimesis2 (emplotment, configuration of 
action, textual configuration... ) is provided by Luce Irigaray's 
comments on her use of `inversion', which can be understood in this 
context as mimesis. Referring to it as a method used by Marx on the 
works of Hegel, and by Nietzsche upon Plato - i. e., their inversion 
of something exterior to themselves - she says that for her it was 
more complex: 
In my case, it was more a question of inverting myself. I was the other of/for 
man, I attempted to define the objective alterity of myself for myself as 
belonging to the female gender. I carried out an inversion of the femininity 
imposed upon me in order to try to define the female corresponding to my 
gender: the in-and-for-itself of my female nature. This process is extremely 
difficult to carry out and explains most of the misunderstandings about my 
work and thought. 53 
we consider this 'femininity' as text, in the Symbolic; and the 
female body likewise (taking our lead from Luce Irigaray's use of 
the term `morphology' in relation to bodies, not only as a 
51 Paul Ricoeur, ibid., p. 25. 
52 Paul Ricoeur, ibid., p. 21. 
53 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You, p. 63/J'aime i toi, p. 108. 
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metaphor54, but also in its sense within linguistics, referring to 
the formation of words) as well as, and at the same time as they 
operate in the real, then the full play of Ricoeur's three strands of 
mimesis can be woven through the complexities of Luce Irigaray's 
project. The `texts' on which she works - those by Levinas, 
Merleau-Ponty, Freud, etc - are then placed as components of the 
wider text of `femininity' in mimesis2, while practice (Ricoeur's 
`practical') and women are still present in the discussion of 
mimesis, and mimesis3. The full understanding of mimesis2 within 
Luce Irigaray's oeuvre, then, will be her project to write her 
subjectivity ("define the objective alterity of myself for myself as 
belonging to the female gender"), part of which process entails 
writing through the "femininity imposed upon [her]". It is thus not 
restricted to her work upon other philosophers. 
We can begin to see that Ricoeur's three strands of mimesis move 
laterally through Luce Irigaray's work, rather than delineate 
discrete aspects of it. Indeed, to take just one aspect of her 
mimetic practice: if her working through of the texts of others in 
order to write her subjectivity can be located within mimesis2, 
then the texts themselves are substantively within mimesis, and 
her comprehension of their nature and her politicised response to 
them are within mimesis3. 
For Ricoeur, as I have said, mimesis2 is a mediation between 
mimesis, and mimesis3. Mimesis2 cannot occur without some form 
of intelligibility, born of wider, specific, cultural understandings: 
54 Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray Philosophy in the Feminine (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 58- 
59. This will be discussed in full in a later chapter. 
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Mimesis, is this pre-understanding of what human action is, of its semantics, 
its symbolism, its temporality. From this pre-understanding which is common 
to poets and their readers arises fiction, and with fiction comes the second 
form of mimesis which is textual and literary. [.... ] Fiction would never be 
understandable if it did not configurate what is already figured in human 
action. 55 
Without wishing to expand upon the details Ricoeur's discussion 
which leads to this conclusion, it is, nonetheless, possible to see 
that this is the aspect of mimesis wherein lies the embeddedness 
of 'femininity' in our culture. Related to this is not only Luce 
Irigaray's identification of philosophy as the key field of 
investigation, but also an aspect of her work which I feel is under- 
valued by her commentators: her development of possible 
structures of ethics and civil rights - in Ricoeur's terms, the 
necessary `practical prefiguration' to the `textual configuration' of 
mimesis2. Rather than functioning as a simple cause and effect 
(this structure produces those texts), it is their interplay that 
means that the productivity of textual configuration (in this case, 
women's subjectivity articulated through an appropriate Symbolic) 
actively requires and provokes productivity in the realm of 
practical prefiguration in order to guarantee its intelligibility. 
`Parler-femme' would be meaningless without attention to the 
structures of civil rights and ethics. 
Ricoeur's final strand concerns practical transfiguration: 
Generalizing beyond Aristotle, I shall say that mimesis3 marks the intersection 
of the world of the text and the world of the hearer or reader. Therefore it Is 
the intersection of the world unfolded by fiction and the world wherein actual 
action unfolds. 56 
Underlying this is an acceptance of "the problematic of the 
55 Paul Ricoeur, 'Mimesis and Representation', p. 20. 
56 Paul Ricoeur, ibid., p. 26. 
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reception of a work as an integral part of the constitution of its 
meaning". 57 Here, then, we find not only the reader herself (Luce 
Irigaray in her act of reading), but also, in her reading, the spur 
towards the feminist project, which becomes manifest in mimesis, 
and mimesis2. Ricoeur argues that this demands a re-thinking of 
representation as "imitation copy": "It is no longer what is 
accidental to action that is re-presented or made present anew but 
what is essential". 58 In seeing mimesis2 as "configurating act", 
and keeping the flow between the three in the realm of praxis, this 
third strand is available as an "action about action. " Thus the 
world is not so much re-described through mimesis, as re- 
signified. 59 Once again, this helps us understand the practice of 
mimesis in Luce Irigaray's work as not only restricted to her re- 
investigation of the philosophers, but also as productive effect. I 
am thinking here particularly of an image evoked (in for example 
Je, Tu, Nous, Sexes and Genealogies, and I Love To You) of the 
woman reader (listener, viewer) making sense of what she is 
reading (hearing, seeing) through an active sense of female 
genealogies, and its concomitant, on the horizon, a sense of the 
universal for women as half of humanity, rather than subsisting as 
the `other' of the whole. This image of the woman reader (listener, 
viewer) is of course not only Luce Irigaray, but also a possible 
`myself' which Luce Irigaray evokes in me, as her reader. 
Ricoeur ends his paper with a "modest conclusion". It is "the wish 
that the concept of representation, upon which converge 
57 Paul Ricoeur, ibid., p. 27. 
58 Paul Ricoeur, ibid., p. 27. 
59 Paul Ricoeur, ibid., pp. 27-28. 
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philosophy's most serious attempts to question itself, rediscovers 
the polysemy and mobility that will make it available for new 
adventures of thinking. "60 At the end of this investigation of 
productive mimesis I feel we are now ready to look at Luce 
Irigaray's consideration of representation and the ways in which 
her broader. work is productive of new considerations for 
representation, in a way which is not reductive to illustration, 
positive images, or the discourse of hysteria. Instead I hope to 
weave into the discussion, as appropriate, the three strands of 
Luce Irigarayan productive mimesis: civil rights and ethics for 
women, the Symbolic for women, and the universal for women. 
60 Paul Ricoeur, ibid., p. 31. 
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Chapter 3 
The visual and the visible 1: analyzing the 
phallocentric visible. 
Luce Irigaray has been described, most prominently by Martin Jay, 
as being anti-visual or anti-ocular. ' My aim in this chapter and the 
following one is to undo this misreading of Irigaray's work by 
demonstrating that what she argues against is not visuality as 
such, but the phallologocentric structures of our culture, in which 
the phallic gaze and structures in the Symbolic order appropriate 
to man are over-valued at the expense both of other senses (in 
particular, touch) and of a Symbolic appropriate to woman. Luce 
Irigaray's analysis is that phallocentrism is constructed upon 
readings of the realm of the visual - what is or is not seen allows 
for the construction of castration anxiety and of woman as 'other 
of man's same'. This then determines the representation of women 
and the construction of 'femininity' in the Symbolic order. One 
might coin the term phalloculologocentrism to describe this 
process. 2 
Luce Irigaray's project has consistently had at its heart the 
problematic of woman's access to a Symbolic, and the need to 
create the conditions wherein what I shall refer to as a Symbolic 
1 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision In Twentieth Century French 
Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1993). pp. 526-542. 
2I note that Martin Jay coins the term "phallogocularcentrism" In the title of his 
chapter on Irigaray and Derrida - both less elegant and less persuasively descriptive than the 
thread of "phall-oculo-logo-centrism", for reasons which will become clear. Martin Jay, 
Downcast Eyes. R 493. 
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syntax appropriate to women can develop, not only in speech, but 
also in visual systems of gesture and representation. Ellie Ragland- 
Sullivan defines Lacan's concept of the Symbolic order as "a 
mediative function [.... ] which separates the Imaginary from the 
Real, creates loss and forms the necessary distance from the 
other's jouissance"; it does not, however, have any gender 
specificity in and of itself, and she argues against "feminists 
[who] still think of the Symbolic order as masculinist, synonymous 
with the father's name or some phallic law". 3 She may have been 
thinking of Luce Irigaray. Certainly, Irigaray would see the 
Symbolic order in our culture as the "mediative function" of a 
phallic Imaginary interacting with the Real. Rosalind Minsky has 
outlined Luce Irigaray's critique as arguing that "women are 
condemned to a cultural wilderness unless the female imaginary - 
consisting of phantasies around the female body - can be 
symbolised, thus allowing women to become subjects in their own 
right rather than simply objects of symbolic projection", and that 
the only way women can enter the Symbolic at present is as 
"ersatz men". 4 What Luce Irigaray is working towards is a dually- 
structured Symbolic order: a Symbolic which is structured through 
difference, and is productive of - and can accommodate -a `double 
syntax': 
Might we not say that it is because it has produced and continues to 'hold' 
syntax that the masculine maintains mastery over discourse? [.... ] This 
syntax of discourse, of discursive logic - more generally, too, the syntax of 
social organization, 'political' syntax - isn't this syntax always [.... ] a means 
of masculine self-affection, or masculine self-production or reproduction? 
3 Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, 'The Symbolic', in Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A Critical 
Dictionary, ed. by Elizabeth Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 420-423 (p. 423). 
4 Rosalind Minsky, Psychoanalysis and Gender: An Introductory Reader (London: 
Routledge, 1996), p. 194. Minsky differs from Ragland-Sullivan In writing the term 
'imaginary' with a lower-case initial letter - which is also the style used by Luce Irigaray's 
translators. I shall follow the original when quoting, but use the captial in my own text, In 
order to distinguish the psychoanalytic term from colloquial usage. 
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[.... ] The 'other' syntax, the one that would make feminine 'self-affection' 
possible, is lacking, repressed, censured: the feminine is never affected 
except by and for the masculine. What we would want to put into play, then, is 
a syntax that would make women's 'self-affection' possible. A 'self affection' 
that would certainly not be reducible to the economy of sameness of the One, 
and for which the syntax and the meaning remain to be found. 5 
Developing the concept of syntax within the structure of the 
Symbolic enables the distinguishing of inflections, significations, 
and sites of enunciation. These are presently phallocentric; but the 
term syntax marks the possibility of appropriate significatory 
structures for women. It is this possibility of shifting the 
structure of the Symbolic which marks an important difference 
between Luce Irigaray's thinking and that of Jacques Lacan, as 
Rosalind Minsky outlines: 
Unlike Lacan, she does not see the dominant male Imaginary (as the Symbolic) 
as unchangeable. This, she thinks, limits the potential of the Symbolic to the 
current masculine accounts of it. She argues, in a visionary mode, that women 
need to use their imaginations and creativity to construct a future Imaginary 
of their own with which they might create a new Symbolic. She argues that a 
radical transformation of the Symbolic and the social order could replace 
existing ways of thinking with a previously unimagined configuration of 
categories and syntax generated by two different Imaginaries, one related to 
the mother and women as themselves, and one related to men who would have 
abandoned their projections onto women. 6 
I would differ from Minsky only in re-asserting that the argument 
is not that women should "create a new Symbolic", but develop 
through sites of reserve an appropriate syntax. If phallocentric 
discourse is analyzed as a syntax within the Symbolic, then the 
Symbolic is dual and not in and of itself monolithic or phallic. 
In this chapter I shall outline Luce Irigaray's critiques of the 
phallocentric visual and its lack of a syntax appropriate to woman, 
5 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. by Catherine Porter with Carolyn 
Burke (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 132/Ce sexe qui Wen est pas un (Paris: 
Les Editions de Minuit, 1977), pp. 130-131. Hereafter cited as This Sex/Ce sexe. 
6 Rosalind Minsky, Psychoanalysis and Gender, p. 198. 
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and the effects of this upon visual representation - representation 
which is visible. In the following chapter I will explore the 
structure of the mirror and the speculum in Luce Irigaray's work; 
the link between the reserve of the mirror and the mimetic reserve 
described in the last section; Luce Irigaray's analysis of women's 
self-image and beauty; and finally the possibility of an inter- 
subject attentiveness - between women, between mother and 
daughter, between men and women - which emerges into the visible 
and extends our present notions of how the gaze, representation, 
and the reception of representation - viewing - might be 
configured. 
Critiques of phallocentrism's realm of the visual. 
In his self-avowedly "Icarian overview, [.... ] unabashedly synoptic 
metanarrative" of the role assigned to the visual in twentieth 
century philosophy in France,? Martin Jay accords Luce Irigaray a 
particular place in his overall structure. The only woman named on 
the contents page, she effectively becomes (despite nods towards 
diversity) the representative of a "French feminism [which] added 
still more fuel to the antiocularcentric fire". 8 Denying her work 
any substantive context of feminist theory and practice, Jay 
instead places her as a direct follower of Jacques Derrida, giving 
her a sequential position in the chapter which is dedicated to the 
two. He thus manages to perform that disruption of female 
genealogies (in this instance, intellectual and political 
7 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes, p. 542. 
8 Martin Jay, ibid., p. 498. 
81 
genealogies) which Luce Irigaray identifies as central to 
patriarchal structures; and at the same time he collapses her work 
back into the questionable category of `French feminism'. 9 For 
example, he names "French theorists" such as Luce Irigaray, Julia 
Kristeva, and Helene Cixous, whose "various claims for a special 
women's relationship to language were frequently couched in 
antiocular terms"; and states that Luce Irigaray's work "implied 
that visual experience was inevitably caught in a dialectic of 
domination in which women were always the victims". 10 He treats 
"oculocentrism" and "anti ocuIocentrism" as quasi-essentialist 
categories in his section on Luce Irigaray, rather than 
acknowledging that she is critiquing the overvaluation of 
particular structures of sight which are - and because they are - in 
intimate relation with structures of phallocentrism and supportive 
of the patriarchy. Luce Irigaray's political project and the political 
(and social, cultural) implications of her project are thus her 
`nothing-to-see' in his `blind-spot'. To collapse an anti- 
oculocentric critique into an anti-ocular position is as reductive as 
collapsing an anti -phalIocentric critique into an anti-male 
position. 
In her essay `Illuminating Passion: Irigaray's Transfiguration of 
Night', 1 Cathryn Vasseleu goes some way to responding to Jay's 
analysis of Luce Irigaray. She returns us to the fact that Luce 
9 See Christine Delphy, 'The Invention of French Feminism: An Essential Move', Yale 
French Studies, 87 (1995), 190-221. Delphy outlines the category of 'French feminism' as a 
construct within Anglo-American women's studies which is unrecognisable in France, pointing 
out that of the "Holy Trinity" within this category of Cixous, Kristeva and Irigaray, "the 
first two are completely outside feminist debate in France". Delphy, p. 192. 
10 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes, pp. 528,529,538. 
11 Cathryn Vasseleu, 'Illuminating Passion: Irigaray's Transfiguration of Night', in 
Vision in Context, ed. by Teresa Brennan and Martin Jay (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 127- 
137. 
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Irigaray's critique of oculocentrism is contingent upon her critique 
of phallocentrism and patriarchy: "there is no denying that much of 
Irigaray's criticism is directed toward the privileging of the visual 
in Western culture, which she argues is tied to the perpetuation of 
a monological masculine subjectivity"; 12 and while acknowledging 
some similarity between Luce Irigaray's thought and Jacques 
Derrida's, she indicates a significant difference of focus between 
the two: 
Like Derrida, Irigaray regards light as the founding metaphor of metaphysics. 
[.... ] [But] in Irigaray's naming of Western philosophy as photology, the weight 
of her argument does not fall on the elaboration of [this metaphor]. Her 
argument is instead directed toward the figuration of a complicity between 
photology and phallocentrism. 13 
While Vasseleu's aim of exploring Luce Irigaray's interest in light 
is tangential to my present project, these comments, along with 
her insistence that "Irigaray addresses illumination as an 
ineradicable passion"14 and her observation that "Jay's discussion 
omits aspects of Irigaray's interest in the representability of 
feminine subjectivity and eroticism", 15 are useful. Firstly, they 
return Martin Jay's comments to gendered political structures, 
with the effect that his comments can then be seen as 
symptomatic of aspects of those structures (the `blind spots' 
mentioned above). Blind spots can be noted in related areas: while 
Jay notes in passing Luce Irigaray's citation of Buddha's gaze at 
the flower, 16 he omits any mention of her evocations of a woman's 
visual pleasure in, for instance, Elemental Passions, which are 
12 Cathryn Vasseleu, ibid., p. 129. 
13 Cathryn Vasseleu, ibid., p. 130. 
14 Cathryn Vasseleu, ibid., p. 131. 
15 Cathryn Vasseleu, ibid., p. 129. 
16 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes, p. 538. Luce Irigaray's treatment of Buddha's gaze will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
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clearly not the writings of a woman who is anti-ocular. Secondly, 
Cathryn Vasseleu's comments indicate that Luce Irigaray has 
identified links between these phallocentric and patriarchal 
structures and the threaded areas of light, illumination, visibility, 
representation, the Symbolic, and sexuality. 
In Speculum (the book Jay mainly discusses) and all her other work, 
Luce Irigaray is attacking, and negotiating strategic responses to, 
phallocentrism and its role as a founding structure in Western 
patriarchy. A passage in Speculum outlines the relationship 
between classic psychoanalysis and the phallocentric gaze: 
By rights, though, the question should still be raised of the respective 
relationships between the gaze {du regard, des regards) and sexual difference, 
since, he [Freud] tells us, you have to see it {il faut voir} to believe it. And 
therefore, one must lose sight of something to see it anew {ne pas voir pour 
revoir)? Admittedly. But all the same.... Unless all the potency, and the 
difference (? ) were displaced into the gaze(s) {le(s) regard(s))? So Freud will 
see, without being seen {verra, sans etre vu)? Without being seen seeing {Sans 
titre vu voyant}? Without even being questioned about the potency of his gaze 
{son regard)? Which leads to envy of the omnipotence of gazing {ce regard), 
knowing? About sex/about the penis. To envy and jealousy of the eye-penis, of 
the phallic gaze {regard}? He will be able to see {voir} that I don't have one, 
will realize it in the twinkling of an eye {clin d'cail}. I shall not see {ne verrai 
pas) if he has one. More than me? But he will inform me of it. Displaced 
castration? » 
Fundamental to phallocentrism is a dependence upon sight and the 
visual before all other senses, and the siting through sighting of 
woman as `other of the same'. In the above passage Luce Irigaray 
demonstrates how this is embedded in both the theory and the 
practice of psychoanalysis. The phallocentric gaze sees the 
presence or absence of the penis before all else, and upon this 
(mis)sight builds its justificatory theory of castration. 
Additionally, the phallic gaze (Freud's gaze) is not to be gazed 
17 Luce Irigaray, Speculum Of The Other Woman, trans. by Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985), p. 47/Speculum de 1'autre femme (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 
1974), p. 53. Hereafter cited as Speculum/Speculum. 
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upon, and thus remains unquestioned 
way invested with omnipotence. Sitting 
sees that she does not have a gaze, 
psychoanalytic practice which echoe 
`fact' of woman's castration in the 
theory. The above passage continues: 
- not only potent, but in this 
behind the analysand, Freud 
in a conceptual structure of 
s the establishment of the 
structure of psychoanalytic 
The gaze {le regard) is at stake from the outset. Don't forget, in fact, what 
"castration", or the knowledge of castration, owes to the gaze (le regard), at 
least for Freud. The gaze {regard} has always been involved. 
Now the little girl, the woman, supposedly has nothing you can see {ä 
voir). She exposes, exhibits the possibility of a nothing to see {ä voir}. Or at 
any rate she shows nothing {un rien [... ] ä regarder} that is penis-shaped or 
could substitute for a penis. This is the odd, the uncanny thing, as far as the 
eye can see {ä perte de vue), this nothing around which lingers in horror, now 
and forever, an overcathexis of the eye {de l'ceil}, of appropriation by the 
gaze {le regard), and of the phallomorphic sexual metaphors, its reassuring 
accomplices. 
[.... ] Woman's castration is defined as her having nothing you can see 
{rien ä donner ä voir}, and her having nothing. In her having nothing penile, in 
seeing {de voir) that she has No Thing. Nothing like man. That is to say, no 
sex/organ that can be seen {qui se montre} in a form capable of founding its 
reality, reproducing its truth. Nothing to be seen {ä voir) is equivalent to 
having no thing. No being and no truth. The contract, the collusion between one 
sex/organ and the victory won by visual dominance {la maitrise par le regard) 
therefore leaves woman with her sexual void, with an 'actual castration' 
carried out in actual fact. She has the option of a 'neutral' libido or of 
sustaining herself by 'penis-envy'. 18 
According to Freudian psychoanalysis, because woman has "nothing 
that is penis-shaped", woman has nothing. She is deemed to have no 
thing of her own, no being or truth of her own, no ontology; instead, 
she is deemed simply not to have the ontology of man. Thus she is 
'other of the same', rather than accepted in and respected for her 
difference. The phallocentric gaze `discovers' all this, and can 
account for it and confirm her as 'other of the same' through the 
structures of castration theory and penis-envy. Thus also the 
omnipotence of the phallocentric gaze is confirmed. The 'blind 
spots' of psychoanalysis and of phallocentrism are woman's body 
18 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, pp. 47-48/Speculum, pp. 53-54. 
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and woman's sexuality. This, then, is the location of essentialism 
in the phallocentric economy: that the whole edifice of 
phallocentrism is built upon whether the penis can or cannot be 
seen and what is deduced from that, not upon whether the genitals 
seen are male or female. Phallocentric desire thus turns upon the 
sight of the penis. As Luce Irigaray says, "Auto-eroticism has 
become more autonomous, more powerful. And invisible as well, 
since it has entrusted itself to the eye and occupied the very site 
of sight. "' 9 
Two effects of phallocentrism's relation to the gaze must be 
mentioned. The first is found in Luce Irigaray's use of the term 
"hysteroscopy": 
Yes, man's eye - understood as substitute for the penis - will be able to 
prospect woman's sexual parts, seek there new sources of profit. Which are 
equally theoretical. By doing so he further fetishizes (his) desire. But the 
danger of the mystery remains, however large a public has been recruited of 
late for "hysteroscopy". 20 
This appears to be a useful way of negotiating the difficulties 
which British feminism encountered in the 1970s when employing 
psychoanalysis in order to understand the phenomenon of 
pornography. Before images of women's genitals were routinely 
presented in `high street' pornography, the concept of fetishism 
was used to account for the stylised and prop-laden imagery 
available in both pornography and art. Lisa Tickner wrote that 
"whilst the image of woman as fetishized object, repository for 
male sexual fantasies and fears, is `acceptable' in our society, the 
image of the vulva itself which the fetish seeks to displace, is 
19 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 95/Speculum, p. 116. 
20 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 145/Speculum, p. 180. Translation modified. 
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'obscene"', 21 going on to say that such an analysis was not 
available in cultures such as the Japanese Ukiyo-e tradition, where 
directories of courtesans included portraits of their faces and 
vulvas. Laura Mulvey wrote: "it is man's narcissistic fear of losing 
his own phallus [.... ] which causes shock at the sight of the female 
genitals and the fetishistic attempt to disguise or divert attention 
from them". 22 Working from a Freudian model, she analyzes 
fetishism as "a disavowal of woman's lack of a penis, and 
therefore should always involve avoiding the direct sight of the 
female genitals". 23 Such analyses of fetishism - widely interpreted 
as concluding that the fetish replaces the sight of woman's 
`castrated' genitals - were bound to require reevaluation upon the 
proliferation of images of women's genitals, alongside fetishistic 
props, in pornography in the UK from the late 1970s on. As John 
Ellis indicated in 1980, Laura Mulvey's 1973 position "seems to be 
unable to account for and analyze the ways in which current visual 
pornography is obsessed with women's genitals". 24 If we follow 
Luce Irigaray's analysis of phallocentrism's 'blind spots', and allow 
that the phallocentric gaze, rather than refusing to look at the 
`horror' of women's genitals, instead does not see what is there, 
then such imagery can be more fully understood. John Ellis 
summarizes this as "`I know (woman has no penis), nevertheless 
21 Lisa Tickner, 'The Body Politic: Female Sexuality and Women Artists Since 1970', 
Art History, 1.2 (June 1978), 236-251 (p. 243). 
22 Laura Mulvey, 'You Don't Know What is Happening, Do You, Mr Jones? ', Spare Rib, 8 
(1973), 13-16,30 (p. 15). 
23 John Ellis, 'Photography/Pornography/Art/Pornography', Screen, 21.1 (Spring 
1980), 81-108 (p. 99). He is refering to Laura Mulvey, 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema', Screen, 16.3 (Autumn 1975), 6-18, which had been written in 1973, as was 'You 
Don't Know What is Happening, Do You, Mr Jones? ', quoted above. 
24 John Ellis, ibid., p. 98. 
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(she has, through this fetish)'. "25 Fetishism `completes' women's 
genitals for the phallic gaze, rather than replacing, or displacing, 
them. Fetishistic discourses of representation, as Griselda Pollock 
has said, produce "terms of a hierarchical difference premised on 
assigning a lack to a perfectly whole body". 26 Women's genitals are 
thus `seen' in as much as they are looked at, but `seen as' (and thus 
signify her as) lacking. Such a 'hysteroscopy' as we have 
experienced in pornographic imagery, rather than contradicting the 
fetishistic structure as outlined by Laura Mulvey, will constantly 
reinforce (in the phallocentric gaze and mind) woman's lack of 
ontology, that she is other of man's same, and confirm man in his 
hom(m)osexuality, the auto-erotics of phalloculologocentrism. 
A second effect of phallocentrism's relation to the gaze is 
indicated by the following: 
Surely man favors the visual {visible} because it marks his exit from the life 
in the womb? His victory over the maternal power and his opportunity to 
overcome a mother whom he experiences as amorphous, formless, a pit, a 
chasm in which he risks losing his form? 27 
Classic psychoanalysis has been remarkably disinterested in the 
space (physical, psychical, and chronological) between conception 
and the emergence of the `subject' at birth. The first drives of the 
infant are said to follow birth; the inter-uterine, pre-birth 
experience appears not to be of import. This gap has become 
increasingly obvious not only through suggestive passages (on the 
placenta, on mother/daughter, on inter- and intra-subjectivity) in 
25 John Ellis, ibid., p. 100. 
26 Griselda Pollock, 'Missing Women: Rethinking Early Thoughts on Images of Women', in 
The Critical Image: Essays on Contemporary Photography, ed. by Carol Squiers (London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1991), pp. 202-219 (p. 219). 
27 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', in Sexes and Genealogies (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), pp. 55-72 (p. 59)/'Femmes divines', Sexes et Parentes (Paris: 
Les Editions de Minuit, 1987), pp. 67-85 (p. 71). 
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Luce Irigaray's work, but more explicitly in the work of Julia 
Kristeva, 28 and that of Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger. 29 It also 
appears to be a gap which can be accounted for by the dependence 
of phallocentrism upon particular forms of visual access and 
understandings of what is seen. (One example might be the 
anecdotal gap between the way in which fathers-to-be are moved 
by `seeing' `their' babies moving in the womb - in effect, seeing the 
external effect of that movement - and their reactions to visible 
changes in their partner's bodies and effects such as morning 
sickness. Why does one make the baby-to-be more `real' than the 
other? ). Proliferating manifestations of `hysteroscopy' other than 
pornography, such as increasing numbers of hysterectomies, 
caesarian births, and pre-natal scans, would be significant in this 
respect, but are really beyond the scope of this present project. 
The above quote from Luce Irigaray30 is also of interest for the 
added insight it offers regarding the constant reduction of women 
to mothers by patriarchal ideology. If, for phallocentrism, man's 
birth is birth into the realm of the visual (for the 'subject'), birth 
into visibility (of the 'subject' and his penis by others), birth into 
victory over maternal power, and birth from that place which he 
can see marks the otherness of his sameness, then in the 
patriarchal structures informed by the phallocentric gaze 
woman/women will always already be mother; the female other 
28 For example, 'Revolution in Poetic Language', in The Kristeva Reader, ed. by Toril 
Moi (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 89-136, and 'Stabat Mater', in The Kristeva Reader, pp. 
160-186. 
29 For example, Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger, The Matrixial Gaze (Leeds: Feminist Arts 
and Histories Network, 1995), and 'Matrix and Metramorphosis', Differences; 4.3 (1992), 
176-208. 
30 "Surely man favors the visual {visible} because it marks his exit from the life in the 
womb? His victory over the maternal power and his opportunity to overcome a mother whom 
he experiences as amorphous, formless, a pit, a chasm in which he risks losing his form? " 
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will always be (m)otherness of his sameness, in his hom(m)osexual 
economy. The effect of this upon current understandings of 
woman's relation to origin will be discussed below. 
Phalloculologocentrism: woman has no appropriate 
Symbolic syntax 
Writing this becomes a struggle. Words fail. Within phallocentric 
thinking there is no space, no comprehension, no air or water or 
warmth for a syntax in the Symbolic which is appropriate to 
women. If for phallocentrism the man's ontology is the only one 
which signifies, hingeing on the metaphor of having or not having 
the penis (verifiable through sight), and the formulation 'woman' is 
produced only in negative relation to this possession, then so too 
will be her entry into the Symbolic order: what has come to be 
known as `phallologocentrism'. Here, the penis is raised in the 
Imaginary to a relationship with the phallus as a signifier in the 
Symbolic. What is crucial here is that identification with the word, 
the structure and use of the word, is developed on visual 
investigation of having/not having the penis: what I would call 
ohalloculoloaocentrism. 
Luce Irigaray mimeticises Freud in order to expose his 'blind spot': 
The little girl does not submit to the "facts" easily, she keeps waiting for "it 
to grow", and "believes in that possibility for improbably long years. " Which 
means that no attempt will be made by the little girl - nor by the mother? nor 
by the woman? - to find symbols for the state of "this nothing to be seen", to 
defend its goals, or to lay claim to its rewards. Here again no economy would 
be possible whereby sexual reality can be represented by/for the woman. 31 
31 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 49/Speculum, pp. 55-56. 
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Once again the woman reader of this interrogation of Freud swims 
wildly between despair at the bleakness of the scenario given, and 
a grim laugh that Freud thought such a scenario credible, desirable, 
and the only one possible. In Speculum Luce Irigaray repeats at 
several points her analysis of woman's relation to the phallocular 
Symbolic syntax and the seen/not seen of the penis, each time 
coming at it with slightly different emphasis, or another twist: 
[The main concepts of psychoanalysis] are too narrowly derived from the 
history and historicization of (so-called) male sexuality. From that process by 
which consciousness comes into being and woman remains the place for the 
inscription of repressions. All of which demands that, without knowing it, she 
should provide a basis for such fantasies as the amputation of her sex organ, 
and that the "anatomy" of her body should put up the security for reality. 
[.... ] She will therefore be despoiled, without recourse, of all valid, valuable 
images of her sex/organs, her body. She is condemned to "psychosis", or at 
best "hysteria", for lack - censorship? foreclusion? repression? - of a valid 
signifier for her "first" desire and for her sex/organs. 32 
If phalloculologocentrism `sees' woman as other to man's 
sameness, then it follows that its concept `woman' is 
representation of this. As such, `she' does not represent her own 
ontology, and has no Symbolic syntax. As such, `she' does represent 
(though maybe he cannot see it) his 'blind spot': she "remains the 
place for the inscription of repressions". Inscribed into his 
conception of her/of her body are his repressions, his 'horrors'; 
written into the visible of representations of her/of her body; 
written into his visuality; his representations. Buoyed up by this, 
patriarchy denies her access to symbolic structures; or, in `liberal' 
regimes, permits limited access only insofar as she denies 
difference, masquerades as `the same as', masquerades herself as 
`other of the same' ("A man minus the possibility of (re)presenting 
oneself as a man =a woman". 33). All else is either unseen or unsee- 
32 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 55/Speculum, pp. 63-64. 
33 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 27/Speculum, p. 27. 
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able, denied visibility or accorded only the space of latent or 
actual 'hysteria'. Hence Rosi Braidotti: "To sum up Irigaray's theory 
of sexual difference as a political and epistemological project, I 
would emphasize [.... ] the belief that the subject Woman is that 
which has been excluded in the masculine system of 
representation, because she is in excess of it and as such she is 
unrepresentable. "34 Denied her ontology and an appropriate syntax 
in the Symbolic, woman's subjecthood is also deniable: the 
subjects, women, are elsewhere from the `woman' constructed by 
and represented in phalloculologocentrism. This echoes the findings 
of the chapter on productive mimesis. Luce Irigaray, however, 
warns us away from proposing a universal female subject: in 
relation to writing she has stated "if you think the feminine is 
diverse, as I believe, because subjectivity is diverse, then 
evidently style is diverse - short of its being a pure and simple 
technology. But then I don't know if it's possible to talk about a 
concrete subject, a feminine subject. "35 From now on, where it is 
necessary to distinguish, I will use the terminology `woman' and 
the subjects. women (the latter in preference to Rosi Braidotti's 
singular "the subject, Woman"). 
It is the intersection of 'woman' and being the subjects, women, in 
the lives and languages - the self-representations - of actual 
women that Luce Irigaray's overall project aims to disentangle. The 
34 Rosi Braidotti, 'Of Bugs and Women: Irigaray and Deleuze on the Becoming-Woman', in 
Engaging With Irigaray: Feminist Philosophy and Modern European Thought, ed. by Carolyn 
Burke, Naomi Schor and Margaret Whitford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 
pp. 111-137 (p. 123) (emphasis mine). 
35 Luce Irigaray, '"Je - Luce Irigaray": A Meeting with Luce Irigaray', Interview by 
Elizabeth Hirsh and Gary A. Olson, trans. by Elizabeth Hirsh and Gaetan Brulotte, in Women 
Writing Culture, ed. by Gary A. Olson and Elizabeth Hirsh (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1995), pp. 141-166 (p. 151). 
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problem remains in the phallic Symbolic syntax insofar as the 
phallic gaze cannot see the subjects, women, and as a result can 
only construct representations of `her' - `woman'. The subjects, 
women, therefore are nothing in the flaw that is its blind spot, 
unrepresentable: 
A fault, a flaw, a lack, an absence, outside the system of representations and 
autorepresentations {de representations, d'auto-representations}. Which are 
man's. By a hole in men's signifying economy. A nothing that might cause the 
ultimate destruction, the splintering, the break in their systems of 
"presence", of "re-presentation" and "representation" {de la "presence", 
de la "re-presentation". et "representation'}. A nothing threatening the 
process of production, reproduction, mastery, and profitability, of meaning, 
dominated by the phallus - that master signifier whose law of functioning 
erases, rejects, denies the surging up, the resurgence, the recall of a 
heterogeneity capable of reworking the principle of its authority. 36 
On the back of this 'nothing' that `woman' is, is the reserve of the 
subjects, women; always already elsewhere, the subjects, women, 
are the danger in his blind spot, the danger of the `mystery' that he 
has made. Placing this problem in the Symbolic is not a theoretical 
ruse for avoiding the messy, awkward, glorious world of the 
practical, the material, the empirical; but rather to attend to its 
function (as indicated at the start of this chapter) as a mediation 
between the Imaginary and the Real. How can women (including 
women artists) begin to articulate their experience - for example, 
through political, collective, strategic activity, and through the 
making of art - if the symbolic means available to them (and 
comprehensible) are not fully appropriate? It is politically urgent 
to identify where and why this may be the case, in order to develop 
strategies to counter the situation. The mimetic structures 
identified in the last chapter enable us to remain consciously in 
that place of reserve in order to develop strategies in the 
structures of this reality towards a Symbolic syntax which is more 
36 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 501Speculum,, p. 57. 
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appropriate. This is why Luce Irigaray is able to name the danger 
that the subjects, women, are to phallocentric "systems of 
`presence', of `re-presentation' and `representation"' while 
appropriating terminology descriptive of the realm of the Symbolic 
order. 
The phalloculologocentric account of 'woman's' relation to origin is 
important for mapping the difference between `woman' and the 
subjects, women. Cathryn Vasseleu once again prompts us to 
remember that this is indeed a phalloculologocentric account: 
Irigaray's analysis of photology is of a metaphoricity that ensures that any 
engendering of maternal origin is never to come to light. Irigaray emphasizes 
that feminine participation in representation is subsumed within an exclusively 
patrilineal economy, where it remains supplementary to a fantasy of masculine 
autogenesis. 37 
Luce Irigaray describes how, in phallocentric structures, once the 
little boy enters the phallic stage he desires to return to the place 
of origin - the mother - "in order to reestablish continuity with it 
and to see and know what happens there" and reproduce himself. 38 
Phallic `knowledge' is dependent upon sight - hysteroscopy - and, 
acting upon that knowledge, confirmation of man's own ontology 
depends upon maintenance mimesis of the fathers. The structures 
of male heterosexuality, to re-iterate, depend upon desire to be the 
same - hom(m)osexuality - not upon desire for difference; and upon 
the sight of the other of the same. 
Luce Irigaray develops this thread: 
No return to, toward, inside the place of origin is possible unless you have a 
penis. It is indeed otherwise that the girl, the woman, will find an economy of 
original desire/desire for the origin. She will herself be the place where origin 
37 Cathryn Vasseleu, 'Illuminating Passion', p. 130. 
38 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 41/Speculum, p. 45. 
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is repeated, of her re-production, of reproduction itself {1a repetition de 
I'origine, de sa re-production, de la reproduction}, though this does not mean 
that she thereby repeats 'her' original topos, 'her' origin. On the contrary, 
she must break any contact with it, or with her, and, making one last turn, by 
a kind of vault - up one more branch of the family tree - she must get to the 
place where origin can repeat by being counted. 39 
Woman cannot have a similar relation to origin because, within the 
phallic economy, as we have seen above, she is always already 
(m)other of the same: that is, she is site of origin for man. She is 
site of his maintenance mimesis, his reproduction of the same. She, 
who has not got one and is not one, cannot be counted in the 
economy of one + one + one + .... except by playing her role 
in 
maintaining man's genealogy. Shortly after this comment, when 
discussing woman's 'nothing to see', Luce Irigaray mentions in a 
footnote Freud's comments on women's genitals in his paper 'The 
uncanny': that, while women's genitals are considered unheimlich 
(uncanny, literally unhomely) by neurotic men, "this unheimlich' 
place, however, is the entrance to the former Heim (home) of all 
human beings". Luce Irigaray comments on this statement: "The 
woman-mother would be unheimlich not only by reason of a 
repression of a primitive relationship to the maternal but also 
because her sex/organs are strange, yet close; while `heimisch' as 
a mother, woman would remain `un' as a woman". 40 I deduce from 
this that Luce Irigaray is indicating another instance of the 
reduction of women to mothers; it is the `neurotic' man who cannot 
do this, who sees woman's genitals as the `uncanny' of the phallic, 
while the `normal' man can incorporate the sight of woman's 
genitals into the phalloculologocentric economy. (In the absence of 
Luce Irigaray's further investigation of him, then, two cheers for 
the `neurotic' man. Maybe he could hint a way forward for the 
39 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 41/Speculum, p. 45. Translation modified. 
40 Luce Irigaray, speculum, fn. 29, p. 48/Speculum, fn. 35, p. 54. 
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reconsideration of 'masculinity', as the hysteric does for 
`femininity'. ) 
The discounting of woman's relation to origin has effects within 
phalloculologocentric representational systems: 
Freud is still party to a certain logos and therefore to a certain economy of 
'presence', and he will be able to picture {se representer} the little girl 
becoming a woman only in terms of lack, absence, default, etc. To take an 
example or paradigm, Freud can discuss the little girl's relation to the place of 
origin only as a vacancy, a taking leave of the mother: as rejection, or hatred 
of the mother. That is to say, as a fault in the re-presentation {re- 
presentation} of origin. 41 
Just as there is no parallel figuration and no symmetry between 
the two sexes in their relation to origin, so too there is no 
reciprocal arrangement in their relation to the present economy of 
representation. If woman is `seen' as `castrated', as not having 
something (which means, according to Luce Irigaray, having no 
ontology of her own, and thus no signifiers in the phallic Symbolic), 
then so too her relation to origin will be seen as negative. How can 
she love the fact that she is like something that has nothing, that 
is nothing but the gap where something should be? In discussing 
Elizabeth Grosz on Luce Irigaray, Margaret Whitford indicates the 
devastating effect of this: 
All relations between women, and particularly the most intense and intimate 
ones, are affected by the patriarchal rupture of the primitive mother-daughter 
bond. One can only identify with a phallic or castrated mother, i. e., with a 
mother as defined by the patriarchal economy. To become a woman in 
patriarchy means in effect abandoning the mother. 42 
Luce Irigaray has described this eloquently and even more 
forcefully as not being a displacement of the woman's origin- 
desire, nor an abandonment, but "an exile, and extradition, an 
41 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, pp. 41-42/Speculum, pp. 45-46. 
42 Margaret Whitford, 'Reading Irigaray in the Nineties', in Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor 
and Margaret Whitford, Engaging with Irigaray, pp. 15-33 (p. 28). 
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exmatriation, from this/her economy of desire. [.... ] Woman would 
thus find no possible way to represent or tell the story of the 
economy of her libido. "43 
With no syntax in the Symbolic appropriate to her, and with a total 
disruption of her genealogies, woman is in a state of dereliction. 
Hysteria - actual or latent - is once again a structural 
inevitability: in attempting to wrest control of her subjectivity, 
her womanliness, her sexuality (as outlined in the section on 
mimesis), the hysteric finds herself in a non-symbolised space - 
the space of hysterical paralysis, hysterical muteness, hysterical 
babbling, incomprehensible in the present Symbolic order, 
incomprehensible as it has no syntax appropriate to it, and without 
any collectivity of action lending potential mediation among 
women, to women, and in response to which phallocentrism has no 
'cure' other than a re-training in the syntax and languages of the 
phallic economy: 
But this fault, this deficiency, this 'hole', inevitably affords woman too few 
figurations, images, or representations by which to represent herself. It is not 
that she lacks some 'master signifier' or that none is imposed upon her, but 
rather that access to a signifying economy, to the coining of signifiers, to 
their exchange, is difficult or even impossible for her because she remains an 
outsider, herself (a) subject to their norms. She borrows signifiers but cannot 
make her mark, or re-mark upon them. Which all surely keeps her deficient, 
empty, lacking, in a way that could be labelled 'psychotic': a latent but not 
actual psychosis, for want of a practical signifying system. 44 
Instead, there is a distanceless proximity between the woman and 
her utterance, and thus between women: "this distanceless 
proximity between women - between mother and daughter? - 
distanceless because no symbolic process allows us to account for 
43 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 43/Speculum p. 47. 
44 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 71/Speculum, p. 85. 
97 
It. "4 5 
This is obviously of great relevance when women's ability to make 
meaning through visual arts is under consideration. Within Western 
economies of representation, we have patriarchal structures, 
accountable under the strict regime of phalloculologocentrism. As 
a sub-section, in 'Fine Art' we have the seemingly mutable 
languages of representation within the art markets (including the 
art schools, the journals, etc) of modernity. But as the slightest 
examination reveals, these structures, while feigning a liberating 
openness and multiplicity, are unforgivingly patriarchal at all 
levels - from their structural organization through to the visible 
and material symbols of the works they trade. They are riven with 
father-son power struggles dressed in the clothes of the market's 
desire for novelty (the avant-garde), which mask the fundamental 
maintenance mimesis through which continuity is ensured. The sons 
are taught; stars validated; markets guaranteed. The position of 
women attempting to make meaning - develop a Symbolic syntax - 
comprehensible within these structures is compromised to an 
extent hard to underestimate. The art world requires that its 
artists produce work which can be accounted for within the 
structures of maintenance mimesis, and at the same time be seen 
as developing a visual language unique to the individual artist. It is 
this surface appearance of symbolic openness that appears both 
seductive and terrifying to the young women who are the majority 
of art students; it is the structure of maintenance mimesis that 
ensures them restricted success, whether in real terms 
45 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', trans. by David Macey, in The 
Irigaray Reader, ed. by Margaret Whitford (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 105-117 (p. 
107)/'La limit du transfert', in Parler nest jamais neutre (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 
1985), pp. 293-304 (pp. 295-296). 
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(recognition) or in producing an appropriate Symbolic syntax: as 
Luce Irigaray says, "she borrows signifiers but cannot make her 
mark, or re-mark upon them. " 
Disruptingphalloculoloaocentrism 
There are points of utter, unflinching bleakness in Luce Irigaray's 
analysis of the situation in which women find themselves in 
relation to the Symbolic order. However, as with mimesis, Luce 
Irigaray analyzes, in order to identify, places for resistance, 
moments of reserve - "the cultural reserve yet to come"; far from 
performing what might be called a `victim feminism', "she is 
envisaging the most far-reaching sociosymbolic reconstruction". 46 
Some of the complexities of this in relation to the Symbolic are 
already clear: a woman's negative relation to phalloculologo- 
centrism being a negative which is not simply a symmetrical 
opposite; her genealogies and relation to origin being utterly 
disrupted; her body, her sexuality, her ontology being unseen and 
unspoken; the strategy of productive mimesis being one of the few 
open to her; her "cultural reserve yet to come" being literally 
unspeakable, lacking an appropriate Symbolic syntax. 
Women's strategies within the realm of representation will need to 
be multi-layered, multi-threaded: 
For what is important is to disconcert the staging of representation {le 
montage de la representation} according to exclusively 'masculine' 
parameters, that is, according to a phallocratic order. It is not a matter of 
46 Margaret Whitford, 'Reading Irigaray in the Nineties', p. 30. 
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toppling that order so as to replace it - that amounts to the same thing in the 
end - but of disrupting and modifying it, starting from an `outside' that is 
exempt, in part, from phallocratic law. 47 
"Disconcert", "disrupt", "modify": these are terms which prefigure 
the tone of the later book I Love to You, with its aim of creating a 
dialogic space for both genders, an accommodation between a 
syntax in the Symbolic appropriate to men and a syntax in the 
Symbolic appropriate to women, and a space of attentiveness for 
the male/female couple. Although Luce Irigaray appears to have 
been welcomed as a theorist for lesbian separatism, 48 I feel that 
this is too simplistic a reading of her earlier work. The emphasis 
on woman to woman relationships throughout Luce Irigaray's work 
is strongly inclusive of lesbian women, of woman-to-woman love, 
of woman-to-woman sexuality, of woman-to-woman inter- 
subjectivity; but as demonstrated in the above passage (and 
others), Luce Irigaray did not, even in these earlier works, envisage 
a world without men, without a syntax appropriate to men. A world 
without patriarchy, yes; a world where the economies of 
representation are not the dominion of phallocentrism, yes; but 
still a world where women and men would, at some level, have to 
reach some accommodation with each other. (Connected to this is 
her expression of distrust of what has become known as 
`feminism', which, however, never detracts from her rigorous anti- 
patriarchal stance, and her insistance that men have to change. ) As 
she says in Je, Tu, Nous, "what is important [.... ] is to define the 
values of belonging to a gender, valid for each of the two genders. 
It is vital that a culture of the sexual, as yet nonexistent, be 
47 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 68/Ce sexe, p. 67. 
48 Margaret Whitford, `Reading Irigaray in the Nineties', p. 27. 
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elaborated, with each sex respected". 49 In I Love to You she 
describes herself as "a political militant for the impossible, which 
is not to say a utopian. Rather, I want what is yet to be as the only 
possibility of a future". 50 While in that book she discusses the 
possibility of raising children ethically, of mothering and fathering 
in an accommodative ethical framework, -91 it is clear that, for Luce 
Irigaray, respecting women includes respecting love between 
women, be that social, familial, sexual, or in the realm of the 
`divine'. 
"Disconcert[ing] the staging of representation according to 
exclusively 'masculine' parameters", therefore, should not be 
confused with substituting `masculine' representations with 
`feminine'. To do so, even in the name of a matriarchy or a sorority, 
would be to use the same structure of domination as those found in 
phallocratic orders - indeed, could be to perform a maintenance 
mimesis upon phallocentrism. Instead, Luce Irigaray has placed the 
term `masculine' in citation marks, implying that the term is as 
available for scrutiny and reordering as is the term 'feminine'. The 
phallocratic order, then, is not a monolith, but contingent upon its 
own representational orders, contingent upon phalloculologo- 
centrism. As I demonstrated in the last chapter, Luce Irigaray 
would concur with Audre Lourde that the master's tools would not 
49 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous: Toward a Culture of Difference, trans. by Alison Martin 
(London: Routledge, 1993), p. 12/Je, tu, nous: pour une culture de la difference (Paris: 
Grasset, 1990), p. 11. Hereafter cited as Je, Tu, NouslJe, tu, nous. 
50 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You: Sketch of a Possible Felicity in History, trans. by Alison 
Martin (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 101J'aime b toi: esquise dune fOlicitd dans l'histoire 
(Paris: Grasset), p. 26. Hereafter cited as I Love To You/J'aime ä toi. 
51 This is at least in part, I think, because that book resulted from requests from the 
mixed-sex FGCI (Federation of Young Communists of Italy) - hence its pedagogical air; and 
from reflections upon her own encounters with mixed-sex meetings of the PCI (Italian 
Communist Party). See the 'Prologue' of / Love to You, pp. 1-17/J'aime a toi, pp. 11-37. 
101 
destroy the master's house; here she is saying that the job has to 
start "from an `outside' that is exempt, in part, from phallocratic 
law". I would take this `outside' to refer to the `cultural reserve 
yet to come'; it remains within citation marks because phallocratic 
law does not recognize anything (as being) beyond its control, and 
because the `cultural reserve yet to come' is as yet virtually 
unsymbolised in an appropriate way. Tina Chanter points out: 
While in one sense - by virtue of her exclusion from it - woman is already 
'outside' representation, in another sense, her exclusion does not 
automatically provide her with the resources to interpret it from another 
standpoint. Reinterpretations of the place that woman is (such as Irigaray 
presents in An Ethics of Sexual Difference) have to be worked at, produced, 
and crafted. As Irigaray says, 'There is no simple manageable way to leap to 
the outside of phallogocentrism, nor any way to situate oneself there, that 
would result from the simple fact of being a woman. "52 
It is Rosi Braidotti's identification of "the subject, Woman" in 
Luce Irigaray which is important to be recalled here, "excluded in 
the masculine system of representation" as she is, "in excess of it 
and [.... ] unrepresentable. This Woman, revindicated as the rallying 
point of feminist-minded women, also opens the possibility of 
elaborating an-other system of representation. "53 Luce Irigaray's 
strategy of productive mimesis is at the heart of growing a 
Symbolic syntax of the subjects, women. As Rosi Braidotti says: 
... [it] amounts 
to a collective repossession by women of the images and 
representations of 'Woman' as they have been coded in language, culture, 
science, knowledge, and discourse and consequently internalized in the heart, 
mind, body, and lived experience of women. Mimetic repetition as a textual and 
political strategy is the active subversion of established mode of the 
representation and expression of women's experience. In this respect the 
redefinition of the subject Woman/women as both representation and 
experience amounts to no less than a change of civilization, of genealogy, of a 
sense of history. Feminist countergenealogies are the inroads to a new 
symbolic system by women. 54 
52 Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros: Irigaray's Rewriting of the Philosophers (London: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 171. The quote from Luce Irigaray is from This Sex, p. 162/Ce sexe, p. 
157. 
53 Rosi Braidotti, 'Of Bugs and Women', pp. 123-4. 
54 Rosi Braidotti, ibid., pp. 120-121. 
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This collective repossession by women of the representations of 
`Woman' requires, according to Braidotti, a moment of "a strategic 
form of essentialism", which she defines as "the temporary 
strategy that defines as Woman the stock of cumulated knowledge 
about the female, sexed subject - whose traits, qualities, and 
representation affect every woman. For each woman is the 
empirical referent of all that has been symbolized as femininity, 
the female subject, and the feminine. "55 Once again, this is not a 
simple act of reversal. As Luce Irigaray says in the passage quoted 
by Tina Chanter above, "there is no simple manageable way to leap 
to the outside of phallogocentrism, nor any way to situate oneself 
there, that would result from the simple fact of being a woman. " 
The subjects, women, are not the same as "the stock of cumulated 
knowledge" about `her' ('woman'), nor `her' supposed "traits, 
qualities, and representation". As I have demonstrated above, the 
moment of `essentialism' in phalloculologocentrism is dependent 
upon the sight of the penis, not upon the possession or otherwise of 
male or female genitals. Repossessing representations in order to 
perform the productive mimesis upon them thus entails passing 
through this phalloculologocentric moment of 'essentialist' 
categorisation. It is risky; but should hold little fear for women 
with collective cognisance of the structures of mimesis and the 
mimetic reserve. 
Luce Irigaray points out that the deductions made by the phallic 
gaze upon seeing woman's genitals - even upon mis-seeing them as 
`nothing' - are not inevitable: 
This nothing, which actually cannot well be mastered in the twinkling of an 
55 Rosi Braidotti, ibid., p. 124. 
103 
eye, might equally well have acted as an inducement to perform castration 
upon an age-old oculocentrism. It might have been interpreted as the 
intervention of a difference, of a deferent { un differend}, as a challenge to an 
imaginary whose functions are often improperly regulated in terms of sight 
{domine un peu abusivement par le regard). Or yet again as the 'symptom', the 
'signifier, ' of the possibility of an other libidinal economy, of a heterogeneity 
unknown in the practice of a discourse about the designated libido. Now the 
'castration complex' in becoming a woman will merely close off, repress? or 
censure? such possible interpretations. 56 
Oculocentrism could have been castrated - had its position of 
centrality and dominance removed - had the sight of the `missing' 
penis been seen not as the sight/site of something missing, of 
nothing, and thus as the site of the other of the same, but instead 
seen as the sight/site of difference, the site of man's difference 
and woman's difference. Woman's genitals would be seen, as are 
man's also; they would not be seen merely as not-man's, not-penis, 
no-thing. 
What is at stake here is not sight, not the ocular, but its structural 
function at the centre of the phallic economy. Resulting from her 
critique of phalloculologocentrism, Luce Irigaray suggests that the 
ocular be divested of its centrality, and that touch - devalued in 
the phallic economy - be revalued. As shown earlier in this chapter, 
Luce Irigaray states that man's overvaluation of sight arises in 
part from his entry into the realm of the visual - birth - being 
marked also as his shedding of what he experiences as the 
amorphous formlessness of the maternal body. In order to maintain 
his `manliness' (to be able to identify with the phallic construction 
of masculinity in the Symbolic order), to maintain `woman' as the 
other of his same, the phallic subject then subjects women to the 
realm of the visual through the structures of phalloculologo- 
centrism: 
56 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, pp. 48/Speculum, pp. 54. 
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Within this logic, the predominance of the visual {regard}, and of the 
discrimination and individualization of form, is particularly foreign to female 
eroticism. Woman takes pleasure more from touching than from looking (du 
regard}, and her entry into a dominant scopic economy {economie scopique} 
signifies, again, her consignment to passivity: she is to be the beautiful object 
of contemplation {le bel objet ä regarded . 57 
If a critique of the representation `woman' as "the beautiful object 
of contemplation" is one of the mainstays of feminist cultural 
theory, then the other two points in this passage - "the 
discrimination and individualization of form", and woman's 
pleasure in touch - are not so common, and bear some thinking 
about. Once again, there will be distinct implications for art 
practice. 
In the context of a passing reference to Luce Irigaray, Rosi 
Braidotti has said that "in many respects, Irigaray's project can be 
seen as an attempt to replace the visual with the tactile, seeing 
with touching. "58 I would respond that the word `replace' here can 
be misleading. Certainly, Luce Irigaray does not wish to replace the 
phallic structures of seeing with similar structures for touch. She 
does, however, disrupt the position of sight as the originating 
sense: 
We regress and we progress, way beyond all sense of sight, from the most 
primitive to the subtlest realm of the tactile. Everything is given to us by 
means of touch, a mediation that is continually forgotten. Anything that 
emerges into the visible realm {comme visible), the images of man and the 
world, remains for awhile in history, but this visual birth (une naissance) does 
not fulfil all our native potentialities. 59 
Before this "image of man" emerges into the visual - before he 
enters the present phallic syntax of the Symbolic order - he is in 
57 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 25-26/Ce sexe, p. 25. 
58 Rosi Braidotti, 'Body-Images and the Pornography of Representation', Journal of 
Gender Studies, 1.2 (1991), 137-151 (p. 148). 
59 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', p. 59/'Femmes divines', p. 71. 
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the realm of touch; he sets up the visual as prime in order to 
differentiate himself from a pre-natal and pre-Symbolic, maternal, 
context. Equally, touch is literally the `unseen' of sight, in so far as 
sight is dependent upon the inter-relation through touch of the 
component parts of the eyeball and eye socket. In this, touch can be 
understood as the 'reserve' of sight, unsymbolised. As women begin 
constructing a Symbolic syntax appropriate for their subjectivity, 
so the relative importance of sight and touch will shift: "This 
'style', or 'writing', of women tends to put the torch to fetish 
words, proper terms, well-constructed forms. This `style' does not 
privilege sight {le regard); instead, it takes each figure back to its 
source, which is among other things tactile". 60 
Fundamental to the primacy of the phallic gaze is a continuation 
and exaggeration of the move from the empirical experience of 
matter (as in the experience of touch) towards the differentiation 
of form (which is what the phallic economy requires of sight): "the 
gaze - and the theory, the theöria - must be protected by being 
resolved into a phallomorphic representation, into phallic 
categories. By being considered, for example, only `in regard to' {au 
regard} the shape of the male sex organ". 61 Cathryn Vasseleu brings 
this back to the phallic economy of representation: "The exclusion 
[of women from representation] is achieved in the differentiation 
between form and matter, in which matter remains the site of an 
unthematizable materiality. Though masculine identity is 
formulated in opposition to matter, the feminine as matter cannot 
be thought". 62 I would broadly agree that this would be Luce 
60 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 79/Ce sexe p. 76. 
61 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 80/Speculum, p. 97. 
62 Cathryn Vasseleu, 'Illuminating Passion', p 130. 
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Irigaray's position, as long as we take "the feminine" here to be 
the subjects, women. 63 This whole discussion will inform later 
discussion of process and materiality of art works. 
Yet there is further reason, I think, to question Rosi Braidotti's 
suggestion that Luce Irigaray's aim is to "replace" sight with 
touch. While she does indeed disrupt the relative valuation of sight 
and touch, she suggests also that things and experience in the 
realm of the visual can be seen and interpreted differently; and in 
order to make her point she uses the visual representational 
analogies of the rebus and the pictograph in a discussion of dreams 
(plate 1): 
Yet the fact that the dream can be interpreted only as a 'rebus' should have 
persuaded the `reader' to turn it in all directions and positions, and not favor 
one type of inscription that would already prescribe a meaning to it: a linear, 
teleologically horizontal or vertical displacement, over a surface as yet 
unwritten, which it brands by cutting it up according to rules of repetition and 
recurrence, obeying processes that already paralyze the 'body's' system of 
gestures within a given graphic order, etc. Why not rather have recalled those 
'pictures' ['imaged made for children, pictographs in which the hunter and 
hunted {chasse(e)}, and their dramatic relationships, are to be discovered 
between the branches, made out from between the trees. From the spaces 
between the figures, or stand-in figures. Spaces that organize the scene, 
blanks that sub-tend the scene's structuration and that will yet not be read as 
such. Or not read at all? Nor seen at all? Never in truth represented or 
representable, though this is not to say that they have no effect upon the 
present scenography. 64 
Through this visual analogy Luce Irigaray provides a thumbnail 
sketch of many strands of her thought: phallic dominance; the 
`parley-femme' yet to come; maintenance mimesis; hysteric 
paralysis; the unseen of the visible; the `nothing-to-see' that is 
`woman'. Thus she reminds us not to throw the baby of the visual 
63 It also depends upon a continuum between thought and the Symbolic; a moot point, 
tangential to the present discussion. Luce Irigaray clearly outlines a link between becoming 
the subject, woman, and access to an appropriate symbolic; from which one could Infer a 
continuum of sorts between thought and the Symbolic. See, for example, Speculum, p. 
124/Speculum, p. 155. 
64 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, pp. 137-8/Speculum, pp. 170-171. 
Vr 
The Spo: out Shooting 
1y lose both 
find some Gante, 
and Bird. The 
The Sportsman's Dilema 
n. d. Print 
Courtesy the Bodleian Library, Oxford University 
Plate 1 
THE SPORTSMAN'S DILEMMA, 
107 
out with the bath-water of the phallic economy; but rather to 
disrupt the phallic economy within the visual: to disrupt 
phalIocu/ologocentrism. 65 
The effects of' disrupting the phallocular will of course not only be 
found among women, nor in an essentialist, separatist `woman's 
Symbolic'. The Symbolic syntax appropriate to women and that 
appropriate to men, and the representation of men and women in 
their difference, will not occur with one syntax in isolation from 
the other: "You can't change one without changing the other. Yet 
while it's impossible to radically separate one from the other, we 
can shift the emphasis of cultural transformation from one to the 
other, above all we must not wait, passively, for language to 
progress". 66 Thus, there will be a resultant crisis of ontology for 
man. Luce Irigaray outlines the passage of this through phallocular 
structures: 
For even if the place of origin, the original dwelling, even if not only the 
woman but the mother can be unveiled to his sight, what will he make of the 
exploration of this mine? Except usurp even more the right to look at 
everything, at the place where he firmly believes he is working to reduce an 
illusion. Even if it should be a transcendental illusion. What will he, what will 
they, have seen as a result of that dilation? And what will they get out of it? A 
disillusion quite as illusory, since the transcendental keeps its secret. Between 
empirical and transcendental a suspense will still remain inviolate, will escape 
prospection, then, now, and in the future. The space-time of the risk that 
fetishes will be consumed, catch fire. In this fire, in this light, in the optical 
failure, the impossibility of gazing on their encounters in flame, the split 
(schize) founding and restructuring the difference between experience and 
transcendental (especially phallic) eminence will burn also. Exquisite/ex- 
schiziod crises of ontico-ontological difference. What manner of recasting all 
economy will ensue? To tell the truth, no one knows. And, to stay with truth, 
65 Luce Irigaray has re-enforced the analogy of the pictograph in a more recent 
interview: "If the culture is founded on a certain repression of the graphic order, and if that 
which returns at night under the guise of the dream presents itself as a sort of pictograph, 
isn't there the trace of a much more generalizable pictographic order that had already been 
historically repressed [.... ] I know that cultures in which writing is more pictographic are 
generally more favourable to the feminine subject and to a culture of the feminine. " 'Je - 
Luce Irigaray', p. 157. 
66 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous, p. 32/Je, tu, nous, p. 34. 
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you can only fear the worst. For you may fear a general crisis in the value 
system, a foundering of the values now current, the devaluation of their 
standard and of their regimen of monopolies. 67 
If through hysteroscopy man can gaze at will upon his site of origin 
- in the name of exploration, reduction of mystery - he is still 
gazing at an illusion. Woman transcends man (just as man 
transcends woman68) but the phallic gaze cannot recognize this. It 
does not recognize the subjects, women. In this non-recognition - 
this impossibility of seeing what is happening in the encounter - 
resides the risk for phallic, patriarchal man. Structures will 
change as the present values crumble. 
Visible representation in phalloculologocentrism 
As components of the Symbolic order, visible representations are 
of course products of, comprehensible in, and producers of, the 
same dominative orders as other components, notably verbal 
languages and representational systems. Luce Irigaray's constant 
returns to the economy of representation as the most urgent and 
productive site of struggle prioritises the structures of that 
economy, rather than attending only to the disposition of a 
particular type of representation. 69 The inclusive result of this can 
be seen in Je, Tu, Nous where she outlines pragmatic steps which 
can be taken to help "get out of this vicious circle of the 
patriarchal phallocratic order [.... ] through subjective relations 
67 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 145/Speculum, pp. 180-181. 
68 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, pp. 103-1051J'aime ä toi, pp. 161-164. 
69 Thus, while her linguistic research focuses on verbal representation, her deliniation 
of representational structure does not. 
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between mothers and daughters". 7° These steps are within pictorial 
representation, gestural representation, spatial representation, 
verbal representation, representations through other forms of 
visibility (such as mirrors) and through concrete objects, 
particularly ones made by women. 71 
My reading of Luce Irigaray leads me to argue that within 
phallocratic systems particular and urgent attention to 
representation in the visible is necessary. Women's attempts to 
construct an appropriate Symbolic syntax through visible 
representations have qualities verging on the poignant" and the 
heroic, but with deeply political potential. The phalloculologo- 
centric order, structured as it is upon a primacy of sight, is 
productive of an apparent ease of mediation through visual 
languages. This results from its projection of qualities of 
transparency onto the image, rather than treating as problematic 
both that which images might represent, and methods of seeing and 
reading those images. Seeing is believing, as Luce Irigaray has 
pointed out in relation to the founding metaphor of phallogo- 
centrism: castration theory, based upon man seeing or not-seeing 
the penis; 72 thus images are endowed with a common-sense non- 
questionability, a claim to verity. In particular, the brutality 
towards women often represented by images (including the 
brutality of denying women's ontology and subjectivity) frequently 
remains unquestioned; or, if it is questioned from within the 
women's movement, the response elsewhere can be one of 
incredulity. But the `real', the `truth', the `norm', and the 
70 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous, p. 47/Je, tu, nous, p. 53. 
71 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous, pp. 47-50/Je, tu, nous, pp. 53-56. 
72 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 47/Speculum, p. 53. 
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`inevitability' of visual images are of course those traits as 
developed within and defined by phallocentrism; women's relation 
to them is determined by their production in and relation to a 
phallic syntax. Hence, the psychic brutality towards women 
frequently represented by, or produced by, visual imagery is an 
inevitable result of woman's excision from her genealogies and her 
lack of an appropriate Symbolic syntax. Thus it is also more far- 
reaching than might be expected by those who discuss only 
particular categories of images, and (ironically) only in terms of 
them being transparent representations, `offensive to' or 
`degrading of' women. 73 This position is significant politically; but 
the picture is (pictures are) more complex. 
In the course of discussing civil rights for women, Luce Irigaray 
includes the right to feel at ease in public places and in the privacy 
of their homes; and in doing so she stresses specifically the role of 
visual representations: 
We now know what horrors such ease hides. We know to what private or public 
violence women have been subjected and are subjected, on the pretext of an 
easier life for them - direct violence or violence mediated to varying degrees 
by images {images}, symbols, etc. 74 
This develops from her position in an earlier, and often-quoted, 
paragraph (part of which I have already cited above), where she 
links the visual at all levels with phallocratic logic: 
Within this logic, the predominance of the visual {regard}, and of the 
73 I include my past self here: in the informal activist anti-pornography group I was a 
part of in the early 1980s, and in related sections of the movement such as Women Against 
Violence Against Women, this was the terminology developed. For example: "This rapidly 
expanding sector of the economy [i. e., pornography] relies on the degradation and humiliation 
of women to provide 'entertainment' for men", Central London WAVAW, 'What is 
Pornography? ', Spare Rib, 118 (1982), 52-55 (p. 55). 
74 Luce Irigaray, Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution, trans. by Karin 
Montin (London: Athlone Press, 1994), p. 82/Le temps de la difference: pour une revolution 
pacifique (Paris: Le Livre de Poche/Librairie Generale Frangaise, 1989), p. 96. 
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discrimination and individualization of form, is particularly foreign to female 
eroticism. Woman takes pleasure more from touching than from looking {du 
regard}, and her entry into a dominant scopic economy signifies, again, her 
consignment to passivity: she is to be the beautiful object of contemplation {le 
bel objet ä regarder). While her body finds itself thus eroticized, and called to 
a double movement of exhibition and of chaste retreat in order to stimulate the 
drives of the 'subject', her sexual organ represents the horror of nothing to 
see (du rien ä voir}. A defect in this systematics of representation and desire. 
A 'hole' in its scoptophilic lens. It is already evident in Greek statuary that 
this nothing-to-see has to be excluded, rejected, from such a scene of 
representation. Woman's genitals are simply absent, masked, sewn back up 
inside their 'crack'. 75 
At the centre of this passage is representation in the visual. The 
phallocratic economy is predominantly scopic; there is the question 
of the relation of touch and the visible, discussed above; `woman' 
is the object of visual contemplation; her genitals are not only 
'nothing-to-see', but they represent `nothing-to-see'. Thus, her 
genitals are excluded from "such a scene of representation" as the 
realm of `art' - that other production of beautiful objects of 
contemplation. 
There is a paradox here, that this exclusion of women's genitals 
from `art' should exist alongside the hysteroscopy discussed 
earlier. If `woman' is phalloculologocentrism's representation of 
the subjects, women, (who of course cannot be seen by it) and one 
of the ideal manifestations of this representation, 'woman', is "the 
beautiful object of contemplation", then this is what phallocentric 
man will re-reproduce, as the ideal, and a carrier of his meaning, in 
his 'art'. 76 I would like to refer to this as the representation. 
`woman', further developing my earlier distinction between 
'woman' and the subjects, women, and indicating that `woman' is a 
75 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 25-26/Ce sexe, pp. 25-26. 
76 In a further turn, this helps ensure latent hysteria, as we have seen: "woman's 
special form of neurosis would be to 'mimic' a work of art, to be a bad (copy of a) work of 
art'. Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 125/Speculum, p. 156. 
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series of phalloculologocentric representations. 77 If women's 
genitals and their significance - that the subjects, women, have 
her/their own relation to origin, and a potential appropriate 
Symbolic syntax - cannot be seen, then they will not be shown. If 
what phallocentric man sees when he sees her/their genitals is the 
"horror of nothing to see" and what Luce Irigaray calls elsewhere 
the "danger of the mystery"78 of this 'nothing', then they can have 
no place in his re-representation in `art' of 'woman' as "the 
beautiful object of contemplation". If they did, there would be an 
intolerable tension between his attempt at an act of contemplation 
and, on the one hand, the representation, 'woman's' loss of status 
as a passive object, and on the other the continually anxious 
investigation by his hysteroscopic gaze. The two are, of course, 
contiguous; the one will signify the other, and the one cannot exist 
without the other. In understanding their interdependence, 
phalloculologocentric man may well name them as the virgin and 
the whore, rather than seeing them both as his/the representation, 
'woman': once again seeing and naming ('oculo-logo') without 
reflecting upon the sources of that act of seeing ('oculo-logo- 
centric'). 
It is in relation to this interdependence being made manifest in 
works by artists from Courbet to Kitaj that we find many examples 
of high anxiety in comments by art writers. 79 Lynda Nead cites 
77 Actual women act out and live through these representations - become these 
representations - in their everyday lives through the structures of mimesis, as discussed in 
earlier chapters. This is policed in the everyday by patriarchal implementation of 
phalloculologocentrism. 
78 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 1451Speculum, p. 180. Translation modified. 
79 When the interdependence of hysteroscopy and the beautiful object of contemplation is 
made explicit by a woman, however, then the reaction, rather than anxiety to accommodate, 
can be one of anger or censorship. One example of this would be the general critical 
denigration of the untitled installation by Zoe Leonard in the 1992 Documenta, in Kassel, 
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many in The Female Nude; one of the most apposite coming from 
Kenneth Clark: 
To my mind art exists in the realm of contemplation, and is bound by some sort 
of imaginative transposition. The moment art becomes an incentive to action it 
loses its true character. This is my objection to painting with a communist 
programme, and it would also apply to pornography. [.... ] There are one or two 
doubtful cases -a small picture of copulation by Gericault and a Rodin bronze 
of the same subject. Although each of these is a true work of art, I personally 
feel that the subject comes between me and complete aesthetic enjoyment. 80 
Another example from Clark (not cited by Nead) concerns Boucher's 
painting Miss O'Murphy (plate 2). While showing an awareness of 
the contiguity between the representation, `woman', and 
hysteroscopy, nonetheless Clark sees, names, and omits to reflect 
upon the source of that act of seeing to the point of absurdity: 
Freshness of desire has seldom been more delicately expressed than by Miss 
O'Murphy's round young limbs, as they sprawl with undisguised satisfaction on 
the cushions of her sofa. By art Boucher has enabled us to enjoy her with as 
little shame as she is enjoying herself. One false note and we should be 
embarrassingly back in the world of sin. 81 
This omission includes neglecting to reflect upon the material 
practices of composing a painting (her choice of pose? ), the 
generally known material realities of Louise O'Murphy's life as the 
teenage daughter of an emigrant Irish cobbler, whose sisters were 
prostitutes and who was herself `the King's mistress' (her cushions 
and sofa? ), let alone desire (her desire? ), and saying nothing of 
"undisguised satisfaction" (imagine the effect of that pose on her 
back after, say, five minutes... ). 
Germany. (In the rooms of one wing of the city's Neue Gallerie, containing C18th portraits, 
Zoe Leonard had removed the portraits of men and re-arranged the portraits of women, 
juxtaposing them with increasing numbers of black and white photographs of women's 
genitals; the first room was nearly all portraits; the final room nearly all photographs. ) For 
example, Peter Schjeldahl wrote "with flabbergasting literal-mindedness, Zoe Leonard 
invaded a collection of [... ] paintings. [... ] It was a gesture of blasphemy - an offense that, 
unlike heresy, is open only to believers. [... ] Leonard's furious intervention... ". 'The 
Documenta of the Dog', Art in America, 80.9 (1992), 88-97,77 (p. 96). 
80 Kenneth Clark, in Pornography: The Longford Report (London: Coronet, 1972), pp. 
99-100. Cited by Lynda Nead, The Female Nude: Art, Obscenity and Sexuality (London: 
Routledge, 1992), p. 27. 
81 Kenneth Clark, The Nude: A Study of Ideal Art (London: John Murray, 1956), p. 140. 
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Francois Boucher 
Miss O'Murphy 
1752. Oil, 59 x 73 cm. 
Alte Pinakothek, Munich 
Plate 2 
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Luce Irigaray's comments on the excision of women's genitals from 
the scene of representation in phallocentric `art' are echoed in 
slightly earlier comments made by Suzanne Santoro in her artist's 
book, Towards New Expression (plate 3). In the short text in this 
image-based work, Santoro first discusses a graffito on a wall in 
Rome of a penis, a vulva, and drops of semen being collected in a 
cup: 
The penis and the semen were drawn with force and the cup for the care and 
preservation of the semen was given great importance. On the other hand there 
was the subordinate and mystified presence of the female genitals, the usual 
crack-hole, hole-crack. [.... ] When I saw how this subject had been treated in 
the past, I realized that even in diverse historical representation it had been 
annulled, smoothed down and, in the end, idealized. [.... ] We can no longer see 
ourselves as if we live in a dream or as an imitation of something that just 
does not reflect the reality of our lives. [.... ] The substance of expression is 
unlimited and has no established form. Self expression is a necessity. 
Expression begins with self assertion and with the awareness of the 
differences between ourselves and others. 82 
Santoro's aim through the bookwork is (as the title suggests) to 
begin to work towards what we might call (after reading Luce 
Irigaray) a syntax appropriate to women. She does this through the 
delicate and spare selection, editing, and juxtaposing of 
photographic images in this intimately-scaled book (each page is 
approximately 16 cm. x 11 cm. ). The images are of the vulva; the 
labia; the clitoris; of women's genitals seen from the front, with 
the outer and inner lips visible above the `Y' formed by the tops of 
the thighs; of the `Y' as represented by artists such as Cranach and 
Raphael, missing the representation of the lips; of Greek statues; 
of shells; and of flowers. Suzanne Santoro makes explicit her aim 
of encouraging women towards expression through an appropriate 
82 Suzanne Santoro, Per Una Espressione Nuova/Towards New Expression (Rome: 
Rivolta Femminile, 1974), unpaginated. Ce sexe was first published in France in 1977, but 
other similar comments appeared in Speculum in France in 1974. I do not wish to suggest any 
direct influence one way or the other. 
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Suzanne Santoro 
Per Una Espressione Nuova/Towards New Expression, front cover 
(Rome: Rivolta Femminile, 1974) 
Courtesy Chelsea School of Art Artist's Books Collection 
Plate 3 
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significatory system: 
The placing of the Greek figures, the flowers and the conch shell near the 
clitoris is a means of understanding the structure of the female genitals. It is 
also an invitation for the sexual self expression that has been denied to women 
till now, and it does not intend to attribute specific qualities to one sex or the 
other. 83 
Notoriously, the Arts Council of Great Britain (as it was then 
called) removed Towards New Expression from an exhibition of 
artist's books touring Britain in 1976-1977, after it had been 
selected and included in the published catalogue. 84 In an article 
written about the affair, Rozsika Parker contrasts this censorship 
with the inclusion of Allen Jones's artist's book Projects. It was 
about Jones's work that Laura Mulvey had expounded her theory of 
fetishism (as referred to above), and Rozsika Parker cites this in 
order to explain why the ACGB were able to include the Jones book 
while justifying their exclusion of Suzanne Santoro's "on the 
grounds that obscenity might be alleged. [.... ] We are willing to 
defend obscenity on the grounds of artistic excellence but 
considered that in this case the avowed intention of the book was 
primarily a plea for sexual self expression. "85 Bypassing the 
skewed logic of this (as Parker points out, presumably the work 
was "artistic[ally] excellen[t]" enough to merit its initial 
selection), and the vexed question of the definitions of `obscenity' 
in a patriarchal legal system, 86 I think we can expand Rozsika 
Parker's understanding of the censorship as resulting from 
phallocentric man's need to remove women's genitals from his 
83 Suzanne Santoro, ibid. 
84 Rozsika Parker, 'Censored', Spare Rib, 54 (1977), pp. 43-45. 
85 Robin Campbell of ACGB, quoted by Roszika Parker, ibid., pp. 44-45. 
86 See also Lynda Nead, The Female Nude, particularly pp. 25-33, on this definition. 
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sight. Drawing from Luce Irigaray's insights about hysteroscopy on 
the one hand, and the need to develop women's sexuate subjective 
identity (the subjects, women) and its necessary concomitant, a 
Symbolic syntax appropriate to women on the other, we can see 
Suzanne Santoro's work as being part of that broader, cultural, and 
ontological threat to phallocentric man which Luce Irigaray 
identifies. It is this not because it images women's genitals, but 
because it is a strategic response, developed from within the 
political, collective site of the women's movement, 87 to what Luce 
Irigaray identifies as the "need [.... ] to work out an art of the 
sexual, a sexed culture"; 88 "an art of the sexual that respects the 
colors, the sounds, and the forms proper to each sex". 89 
Luce Irigaray takes the discussion of the representation of 
women's bodies back further than the "Greek statuary" of the 
passage quoted earlier, to representations of women-goddesses: 
In those ['pre-historical'] days women were represented { representent} as 
goddesses: not only as mother goddesses - the only ones subsequent eras 
accepted - but also as women goddesses. This is particularly evident in the 
fact that women-goddesses are beautiful, slim, and their sex marked by a 
triangle (as for mother-goddesses) in which the lips are drawn; all this was to 
be wiped out by what followed. Their divinity doesn't depend upon the fact they 
can be mothers but upon their female identity, of which the inter-enter- 
opening of the lips { I'entre'ouverture des lcvres} are an affirmative 
expression. 9° 
Luce Irigaray indicates that these representations of goddesses 
were not reduced to representations of mother-goddesses. A 
concept of the divine in a Symbolic syntax appropriate to woman is 
87 Rozsika Parker, 'Censored', p. 44. 
88 Luce Irigaray, 'Each Sex Must Have its Own Rights', in Sexes and Genealogies, pp. 1- 
5 (p. 3)/'La necessit6 de droits sexuds', in Sexes et Patentes, pp. 13-18 (p. 15). 
89 Luce Irigaray, 'Flesh Colors', in Sexes and Genealogies, pp. 151-165 (p. 165)/'Les 
couleurs de la chair', in Sexes et Parentcs, pp. 165-179 (p. 179). 
90 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous, pp. 110-111/Je, tu, nous, p. 125. Translation modified. 
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not located in its representation of her ability to be a mother, but 
in its representation of her as a woman - with an image which 
sounds similar to some in Suzanne Santoro's book. It would be easy 
to assume that the kind of artworks which might be a contemporary 
development of this form of representation would include many of 
the goddess images produced from the 1970s onwards as a result 
of the women's movement. However, a large number of these enact 
a simplistic reversal upon the phallic languages we have been 
taught -a more general trap, of which Luce Irigaray is aware: 
From a feminine locus nothing can be articulated without a questioning of the 
symbolic itself. But we do not escape so easily from reversal. We do not 
escape, in particular, by thinking we can dispense with a rigorous 
interpretation of phallogocentrism. There is no simple manageable way to leap 
to the outside of phallogocentrism, nor any possible way to situate oneself 
there, that would result from the simple fact of being a woman. And in 
Speculum, if I was attempting to move back through the 'masculine' imaginary, 
that is, our cultural imaginary, it is because that move imposed itself, both in 
order to demarcate the possible 'outside' of this imaginary and to allow me to 
situate myself with respect to it as a woman, implicated in it and at the same 
time exceeding its limits. 91 
We can see in a brief examination of a couple of artworks how 
some artists, in attempting a feminist development of goddess 
imagery, have assumed that there is a "simple manageable way to 
leap to the outside of phallogocentrism", and how others have 
attempted "to demarcate the possible 'outside' of this imaginary 
and to [.... ] situate [themselves] with respect to it as a woman". 
A work such as Cynthia Mailman's Self Portrait as God (1977) 
(plate 4) falls into the former category. A painting 9' high, the 
centrally placed figure is well over life size. Painted in a 
symmetrical standing pose and using a perspective that increases 
illusionistically the height of the figure, the effect is of an all- 
91 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 162-163/Ce sexe, p. 157. 
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Self-Portrait as God 
1977. Acrylic on canvas, 108" x 60" 
Collection of the artist 
Photograph from The Power of Feminist Art, ed. by Norma Broude and Mary Garrard 
(New York: Abrams, 1994) 
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powerful being who literally and metaphorically looks down upon 
the viewer. Although the figure is naked and we see the lips of her 
vulva, any potentially revolutionary disruption of the viewer's 
relationship to the figure is immediately undone by the pose, the 
perspective, and by the style of painting. Flat areas of colour are 
articulated with hard-edged borders and use of line. The overall 
effect is of a phallic goddess, the one who knows, sees, and judges 
all, who maintains a fixity of position; the viewer too has to 
maintain a fixed (subordinate) position in order to be in 
relationship with her. (I can't help feeling also that there is 
displayed here by the artist - in what is after all a self-portrait - 
at best an over-weening ambition, and at worst a representation of 
sublime arrogance. ) Luce Irigaray has warned about how we explore 
goddesses: 
I am far from suggesting that [.... ] we have to regress to siren goddesses, who 
fight against men gods. Rather I think we must not merely instigate a return to 
the cosmic, but also ask ourselves why we have been held back from becoming 
divine women. [.... ] 
But all this must be done in the context of entering further into womanhood, 
not moving backwards. If we resist hierarchies (the man/woman hierarchy, or 
state/woman, of a certain form of God/woman, or machine/woman), only to 
fall back into the power {le pouvoir} of nature/woman, animal/woman, even 
matriarchs/ women, women/women, we have not made much progress. 92 
Cynthia Mailman in this painting has fallen back into these 
retrogressive power structures. There is no space for mediation 
between the subjects, women and her/their divine; there is no 
inter-subjectivity, no reassertion of female genealogies. We have 
here an equivalent to a Christian representation of an Old 
Testament God, or a Zeus, in a woman's body; a maintenance 
mimesis of phallocentric structures of representation and 
92 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', p. 60/'Femmes divines', pp. 72-73. Irigaray is 
meticulous in her usage of the two words for power: le pouvoir and la puissance. Here, the 
masculine le pouvoir re-enforces the patriarchal nature of power structures that must not be 
thoughtlessly re-instated. 
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patriarchal structures of religion. 
Yolanda Lopez's Portrait of the Artist as the Virgin of Guadalupe 
(1978) (plate 5) forms an interesting contrast as it has some 
strong similarities with Mailman's painting: both are two- 
dimensional works, both self portraits, and in both the figure is 
centrally placed, frontally posed, and against a background which 
represents infinite space. The Lopez however is an oil pastel 
drawing and just 24" high; the outlines are necessarily a little 
fuzzy because of the pastel; and the figure carries a cloak-like 
cloth which billows around her, giving a sense of dynamic inter- 
relation with space. Importantly, the figure is seen straight on 
(rather than illusionistically towering over the viewer), and active: 
she runs out of, or through, or is creat ing as she runs, the energy 
field which encircles her. Her eyes are partially closed by her very 
human grin, so the viewer is not fixed by her gaze into a spatially 
or emotionally static relationship with her. 
The Virgin of Guadalupe is seen as a national symbol by Mexicans, 
and as a symbol of cultural identity by Chicanas like Yolanda Lopez. 
In herself - the Virgin Mary as a Mexican - she begins to undo some 
of the Euro-centrism of Catholic symbolism; but she is still very 
much an interceder, and is maintained in a particular position in 
the Catholic patriarchy-hierarchy of imagery. She is: 
... the mark of a people's 
favour with God and thus boosts their confidence in 
the Church. At the shrine of Our Lady of Guadalupe, all the strands of Catholic 
devotion since the departure of the Reformed Churches are gathered together 
in their most characteristic form [.... ]. Her shrine is the best loved of Catholic 
Mexico. She was declared patroness of the country in 1754 by Pope Benedict 
XIV, and of the Americas in 1910. She is dark-complexioned like an Indian 
[.... ]. During the Mexican revolution, the Royalists fought under the standard of 
La Virgen de los Remedios, the ancient palladium of Cortes' conquering army, 
which he had brought with him from Alcantara. The independents marched 
Yolanda M. Lopez 
Portrait of the Artist as the Vigin of Guadalupe 
1978. Oil pastel on paper, 30" x 24" 
Collection of the artist 
Photograph from Sexual Politics, ed. by Amelia Jones (Los Angeles: UCLA, 1996) 
Plate 5 
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under the banner of Our Lady of Guadalupe. 93 
By representing herself as Guadalupe, Yolanda Lopez asserts a 
Chicana cultural identity; by representing Guadalupe as a physically 
and spatially dynamic contemporary women, Lopez discards the 
role of interceder; by showing her holding a snake, Lopez refers 
back and across cultures to pre-Columbian religion and to the 
Cretan snake goddess; by then placing this image as the centre of a 
triptych which also images her mother and grandmother, Lopez 
asserts a genealogy which modulates across time and space, both 
within each image and across them, wresting the imagery away 
from the Catholic church in an exploration of the matrilinear and 
the divine. She has written about this: 
I looked at Guadalupe as an artist, as an investigator of the power of images. I 
was interested in her visual message as a role model. Essentially she is 
beautiful, serene, passive. She has no emotional life or texture of her own. She 
exists within the realm of magical mythology sanctified as a formal entity by 
religious tradition. [.... ] Because I feel living, breathing women also deserve 
the respect and love lavished on Guadalupe, I have chosen to transform the 
image. Taking symbols of her power and virtue, I have transferred them to 
women I know. My hope in creating these alternative role models is to work 
with the viewer in a reconsideration of how we as Chicanas portray ourselves. 
It is questioning the idealized stereotype we as women are assumed to attempt 
to emulate. 94 
Before leaving this consideration of Luce Irigaray's disruption of 
phalloculologocentric visual representation I would like to attend 
to her comments on the abstract and the figurative. Luce Irigaray 
precedes the comments quoted earlier concerning the 
representations of women-goddesses thus: 
For us women, meaning remains concrete, close, related to what is natural, to 
perceptible forms. It also develops like our bodies, those of our children, of 
93 Marina Warner, Alone of All Her Sex: The Myth and Cult of the Virgin Mary (London: 
Pan Books, 1985), pp. 302-303. 
94 Yolanda Lopez, quoted by Shifra Goldman, 'Contemporary Chicana Artists', In 
Feminist Art Criticism: An Anthology, ed. by Arlene Raven, Cassandra Langer, and Joanna 
Frueh (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 187-205 (p. 199). 
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our sexual partners, of those that belong to the living world. At that time in 
History - conventionally termed Prehistory - when women participated in civil 
and religions life, written signs were still partially figurative, non-abstract, 
arbitrary, fiduciary. 95 
As we have seen in the section on mimesis, `pre-history' is an era 
Luce Irigaray identifies as pre-alphabetical writing as well as pre- 
phallocentric. Here she makes a link between writing, gender, and 
figuration/abstraction, before discussing the differences in 
representations of divine women. In an interview about her 
practice of writing she suggests that our present alphabetical 
writing is not part of a syntax in the Symbolic which is appropriate 
for women: 
One means of communicating thought, in the late twentieth century, is by 
alphabetical writing. Thus, I use it to communicate even if I think this method 
is limiting to what I have to say, especially as a woman. 
[.... ] Indeed, alphabetical writing is liked historically to the civil and religious 
codification of patriarchal powers. 96 
The limits of alphabetical writing are a result of its abstractness; 
"writing has difficulty translating colors, sounds, bodily identity, 
the chromo-soma.... All the civilizations that give priority to 
nonfigurative writing, arbitrary forms, and formal codes, move 
away from color and from tonality as qualities of flesh, gender, 
genealogy. They express these as numbers. Mastery and the 
abstraction of the living being? "97 The stress of our culture upon 
an abstract system for a primary method of communication 
impacts upon the Symbolic at all levels - and indeed is implicated 
in Philosophy itself, the discourse of discourses: 
The birth of Western philosophy is accompanied by the constitution of a logos, 
a language obeying rules such as those of self-identity, of non-contradiction, 
etc., which distinguish if from a simple empirical language. These logical rules 
have been defined in order to ensnare the totality of the real in the nets of 
95 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous, p. 110/Je, tu, nous, p. 125. 
96 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous, pp. 51,53/Je, tu, nous, pp. 59,61. 
97 Luce Irigaray, 'Flesh Colors', p. 160/'Les couleurs de la chair', pp. 174-175. 
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language, and thus to remove it from sensible experience, from the ever in- 
finite contiguity of daily life. 
Philosophy thus represents an artificially constructed language in 
comparison to what is called natural language. But the latter is itself already 
constructed and there is an interaction between philosophical discourse and 
everyday discourse. 98 
For Luce Irigaray, the abstract is a human product which is 
completely arbitrary in its relation to the human body. This is 
expounded upon in most detail in `Flesh Colors'99 which starts with 
an examination of the psychoanalytic scenario, where sound (the 
spoken word) is prioritised over light. The gestures and colours 
within that scenario are spoken of when the' spoken word fails - for 
example, the gestures of the hysteric are only commented upon 
because of her muteness. Because sound moves more slowly than 
light, "psychoanalytic practice becomes an exercise in 
patience"100, a soporific experience, where the subject risks 
sinking into a colourless demented language of arbitrary forms. 
Lying down increases this risk, as the subject no longer needs a 
sense of balance, encouraging an artificial, arbitrary - abstract - 
reality. This model is one that echoes across all of Luce Irigaray's 
work on writing, on the abstract and the arbitrary, and which 
informs her thinking about the cultural, social, political, and 
religious roles accorded the body. 
Frequently in our culture the abstract is referred to as objectivity, 
but this is a delusion, as Luce Irigaray has outlined in another 
essay: 
98 Luce Irigaray, 'Thinking Life as Relation: An Interview with Luce Irigaray', interview 
by Stephen Pluhacek and Heidi Bostic, Man and World, 29 (1996), 343-360 (p. 349). 
99 Luce Irigaray, 'Flesh Colors', pp. 153-165/'Les couleurs de la chair', pp. 167-179. 
100 Luce Irigaray, 'Flesh Colors', p. 153/'Les couleurs do la chair, p. 167. 
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This abstractness and the loss of that concrete, sensual immediacy that was 
always Hegel's point of departure block the passage from subjective into 
objective, from objective into subjective. Hegel sought to keep faith with 
nature but to do this one must pass through that question of sex and the spirit. 
The increase in so-called objective cultural effects produced by an inadequate 
dialectic of subjective and objective risks burying us under its spiritless shell, 
overwhelming us with its pestilential waste products. l01 
Alphabetical writing is fundamentally implicated in this; as we 
have seen, Luce Irigaray affirms that it developed as cultures 
shifted from women-goddesses to mother-of-sons-goddesses; from 
goddesses to gods; from oral histories to written histories; from 
living with nature to hierarchical domination of nature; and as 
financial systems were developed. Underlying this is a 
phallocentric structure which sees woman not as different but as 
other of the same. This is itself a form of abstraction: 
Cultures have forced us to repress the female genealogies. This means that we 
have entered into a kind of historical mania made up of: 
- forms that are balanced in an artificial game of contradictions (the two 
poles are contained within sameness). 102 
And as a result our culture is constructed from "resemblances, 
abstracted from the body instead of expressive of it, that form a 
system of mimicries that allow me to say that I am like the other 
sex without in fact there being any correspondence with the same 
living forms, the same relations to sounds, to colors". 103 These 
"resemblances, abstracted from the body instead of expressive of 
it" can, I think, begin to account for the shift Luce Irigaray notes 
from the representation of women-goddesses to mother-of-sons- 
goddesses: 
During the period when there were female goddesses, the woman's sexual 
organs always appear in the representation of the bodies of women, 
101 Luce Irigaray, 'The Universal as Mediation', in Sexes and Genealogies, pp. 125-149 
(p. 142)/'L'universel comme mediation', in Sexes et Parentcs, pp. 139-164 (p. 156). 
102 Luce Irigaray, 'Flesh Colors', p. 160PLes couleurs de la chair', pp. 174-175. 
103 Luce Irigaray, 'Flesh Colors', p. 160/'Les couleurs de la chair', pp. 174-175. 
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particularly goddesses, and not merely in the form of the triangle indicating 
the womb, but also in the form of the labia, an inscription which will later be 
erased. The cult of goddesses who are exclusively mothers, and mothers of 
sons, is a late episode in the history of women. In the symbolism of social 
exchanges, it is accompanied by the representation of the woman's sexual 
organs as the figure of the triangle representing the womb and standing as a 
symbol of the maternal function. 104 
The triangle alone represented women reduced to mothers; the 
representation, `woman', without her ontology recognised, without 
her relation to origin represented. The triangle plus the labia 
represents the woman-goddess, and the possibility of mediation 
for the subjects, women. Neither of these representations could be 
confused with Realism, and it becomes clear that Luce Irigaray, in 
decrying abstract representation, is not implying that we return to 
forms of Western Realism in art. That which is expressive of the 
body, after all, has to be a form of mediation, not a form of 
illusion. Considered this way, the rigid structures of two- 
dimensional, illusionistic Realism could be considered as 
"resemblances, abstracted from the body instead of expressive of 
it". 105 (This discussion will be of importance for later chapters. ) 
Now, mindful of Luce Irigaray's analysis of the phalloculologo- 
centric structures which inform "our current world - grey, 
abstract and destitute", 106 we can turn our attention to possible 
ways of working towards a Symbolic syntax in the visual 
appropriate for women. 
104 Luce Irigaray, 'Questions to Emmanuel Levinas', in The Irigaray Reader, pp. 178-189 
(p. 178). 
105 It also accounts for patriarchy's (and patriarchal capitalism's) ability to exchange 
women through the structure of the representation, 'woman' - which Is, after all, an 
abstraction: "Woman's price is not determined by the 'properties' of her body - although her 
body constitutes the material support of that price. But when women are exchanged, woman's 
body must be treated as an abstraction. The exchange operation cannot take place in terms of 
some intrinsic, immanent value of the commodity. It can only come about when two objects - 
two women - are in a relation of equality with a third term that is neither the one not the 
other. " Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 175/Ce sexe, p. 171. 
106 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous, p. 111/Je, tu, nous, p. 126. 
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Chapter 4 
The visual and the visible 2: creating 
structures in a Symbolic syntax appropriate 
to women. 
Mirror. speculum. burning glass 
Luce Irigaray uses the analogy of a mirror in various forms - 
particularly flat, concave, and convex - to expose the structures of 
phalloculocentrism and its determining of the structures of 
phallogocentrism. She does this in order to undo those structures 
while asserting a potential ecstatic relationship with light in the 
realm of the spiritual for women; a prerequisite on the horizon of 
possibilities to enable the becoming of the subjects, women. Light, 
of course, is a prerequisite of the visual; and Luce Irigaray draws 
several distinctions between patriarchal understandings of light, 
dark, shadow, and so forth (particularly within philosophy) and 
anti-patriarchal ways of looking at these phenomenon. Ultimately 
these lead towards an undoing of the phallocentric gaze of the 
'subject' at the 'object' as the determinant of inter-relationship, 
and suggest instead intersubjective relationships where listening 
is as important as looking, but, crucially, both have qualities of 
attentiveness. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, within Western culture 
'woman' functions as `other of the same' for man; and thus, bereft 
of her subjecthood, she can only do so as a representation. Man 
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being confirmed in his 'sameness' by her 'otherness', the 
representation, 'woman' (which he has constructed) functions for 
his subjectivity as a mirror. As Luce Irigaray says, "Of course, a 
mirror is needed. But this can be 'interiorized', put inside. 
Representation can dispense with and supplant the role played in 
the real life of the senses by the mirror". 1 With reference to Parier 
n'est jamais neutre, 2 Tina Chanter outlines Luce Irigaray's 
understanding of the image-like, representational, qualities of 
reflections through her (Luce Irigaray's) comparison of the 
reflection with the written letter -a comparison that does indeed 
rest at the heart of phalloculologocentrism. Both the reflection of 
the 'subject' in the mirror, and the written letter, constitute the 
'subject' as distinct, but both necessitate a surface support. Both 
are isolated (abstract? ) from the gestures preceding and following, 
and thus fixed, "providing an image of unity where in fact there is 
none. [.... ] Creating a fiction of absolute presence and uniformity, 
the mirror image imposes a coherence that is nonetheless 
conditioned by `fragmentation' and `dispersal"'. 3 The paradox of the 
reflection in the mirror is that it indeed is not the reproduction of 
'the same', but it is a representation which fixes the 'other of the 
same' as the device through which `the same' knows itself: 
And even if, conceptually, my right hand and my left hand, or my hand and its 
image in the mirror, are rigorously the same, or the same thing, this would 
not be true for the intuitive character of space in which the paradox of 
symmetry was taken into account. Thus already a mirror turns out to support 
the apprehension of objects. [.... ] Does the subject derive his power from the 
appropriation of this non-place of the mirror? 4 
1 Luce Irigaray, Speculum Of The Other Woman, trans. by Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985), p. 95/Speculum de I'autre femme (Paris: Les Editions do Minuit, 
1974), p. 116. Hereafter cited as Speculum/Speculum. 
2 Luce Irigaray, Parier n'est jamais neutre (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1985). 
3 Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros: Irigaray's Rewriting of the Philosophers (London: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 250. 
4 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 205/Speculum, p. 256. 
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The construction of the representation, 'woman', as not-man, as 
other, is (as we have seen) always already (m)other for man. Here 
is the paradox of the mirror's symmetry: that the representation, 
'woman', is not the same as him, but, as his place of origin, has to 
be defined by him in terms of 'her' relation to his sameness - the- 
same-but-other, other-of-the-same, the-same-back-to-front, 
inverted: mirror-image, rather than the same; mirror-image, rather 
than different. If she were to be recognised as different (as the 
subject, woman), then the structures of his 'subjectivity' would be 
in crisis. At present, however, as we have seen, this functioning of 
the representation, 'woman', when produced as the expected role, is 
fatal for the subjects, women: 
Now, if this ego is to be valuable, some 'mirror' is needed to reassure it and 
re-insure it of its value. Woman will be the foundation for this specular 
duplication, giving man back 'his' image and repeating it as the 'same'. If an 
other image, an other mirror were to intervene, this inevitably would entail 
the risk of mortal crisis. Woman will therefore be this sameness - or at least 
its mirror image - and, in her role of mother, she will facilitate the repetition 
of the same, in contempt for her difference. Her own sexual difference. 
Moreover, through her 'penis envy', she will supply anything that might be 
lacking in this specula(riza)tion. Calling back, now and forever, that remainder 
that melts into the depths of the mirror, that sexual energy necessary to 
carry out the work. The work of death. 5 
The structures of castration incorporated here are echoed by Sarah 
Miller's evoking of "the horror of nothing to see" in her account of 
Luce Irigaray's argument: "[woman's] absence of being functions 
like a mirror, casting man's reflection back on himself. His 
recognition of himself and his identity depend on the empty depths 
of the looking glass. Phallocentrism is constructed on this 
'homosexual' [sic - i. e. "hom(m)osexual"] glance - the woman's 
place is to have no place, but to be a reflecting surface that 
5 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 54/Speculum, p. 63. 
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permits man's speculation". 6 
These structures of castration theory are impossible to 
disentangle from any aspect of the construction of the 
representation, 'woman' which makes her "only the path, the 
method, the theory, the mirror"7 for the 'subject'; but this 
investment of the one in the other is in turn utterly dependent upon 
phallocentric ways of seeing, in particular the overvaluing of 
aspects of sight while ignoring sight's interaction with other 
senses - significantly, touch. The representation, 'woman', 
functions within phalloculocentrism as a flat mirror, "a faithful, 
polished mirror, empty of altering reflections", 8 two dimensional, 
lacking any form of its own: "the flat mirror reflects the greater 
part of women's sexual organs only as a hole", 9 confirming the 
male subject in his singular position, disallowing any play of 
couples, whether woman/man or mother/daughter, 10 and instead 
allowing only the play of the paradox of symmetry. Woman as a 
desiring subject would expose the flat mirror as a fiction: 
As for the priority of symmetry, it co-relates with that of the flat mirror - 
which may be used for the self-reflection of the masculine subject in language, 
for its constitution as subject of discourse. Now woman, starting with this flat 
mirror alone, can only come into being as the inverted other of the masculine 
subject (his alter ego), or as the place of emergence and veiling of the cause of 
his (phallic) desire, or again as lack, since her sex for the most part - and only 
the historically valorised part - is not subject to specularization. Thus in the 
advent of a 'feminine' desire, this flat mirror cannot be privileged and 
symmetry cannot function as it does in the logic and discourse of a masculine 
6 Sarah Miller, 'Bringing up Demons', Diacritics, 18.1 (1988), 2-17 (p. 7). 
7 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 2391Speculum, p. 297. 
8 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 1361Speculum, p. 168. 
9 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, fn. 92, p. 89/Speculum, fn. 122, p. 109. 
10 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 77/Speculum, p. 92. 
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subject. 11 
This idealised reflecting of the male subject back to himself is 
understood as a closed circuit by the phallocentric gaze. But then, 
as we have seen, the phallocentric gaze, phalloculocentric in its 
auto eroticism, occupies the site of sight, ignoring other senses. It 
sees that woman is the other of its same; it sees she has nothing 
to see; it sees only the symmetrical paradox. It does not see that 
the/his representation, `woman' (like the letter, the logos, which 
will be developed as a result of this `seeing') is a phenomenon 
dependent upon the structures of the/his flat mirror. It does not 
see that the mirror does not reflect itself, that the mirror has its 
own form, that the mirror does not reflect its silvery backing. This 
silvery backing is, if you like, the 'reserve' of the mirror: a part of 
the mirror reserved from the phallocentric gaze. As with the 
hysteric, and as with the implementation of productive mimesis, so 
too in the structure of the flat mirror which bears the 
phallocentric gaze upon the/his reflection-image of the 
representation, 'woman', there is a reserve which can be deployed 
strategically in order to disconcert the economy of representation, 
disrupt the unity of the male subject: "This silvering at the back of 
the mirror might, at least, retain the being {I'etre} - which we have 
been perhaps and which perhaps we will be again - though our 
mirage has failed at present or has been covered over by alien 
speculations". 12 While phallocentric man does not see this reserve, 
he structures the `absence of its presence' and its effects in order 
11 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. by Catherine Porter with Carolyn 
Burke (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 129/Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un (Paris: 
Les Editions de Minuit, 1977), p. 127. Hereafter cited as This Sex/Ce sexe. 
12 Luce Irigaray, speculum, p. 197/Speculum, p. 245. 
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to sustain his subjectivity. His refusal to see it risks his 
structure: 
Where will the other {ou [... ] va-t-elle} spring up again? Where will the risk be 
situated which sublates the subject's passion for remaining ever and again the 
same, for affirming himself ever and again the same. In the duplicity of his 
speculation? A more or less conscious duplicity? Since he is only partially and 
marginally where he reflects/is reflected? [.... ] The Other, lapsed within, 
disquieting in its shadow and its rage, sustaining the organization of a universe 
eternally identical to the self. The backside of (self) representation, of the 
visual plane where he gazes upon himself? 13 
The chapter of Speculum from which this comes, 'Any Theory of the 
"Subject" Has Always Been Appropriated by the "Masculine"', 
contains an extended passage where Luce Irigaray expands her 
analysis of the mirror. She suggests that we need to break through 
the two dimensionality of the flat mirror, in order to find the more 
appropriate mirror and achieve recognition of the silvery backing. 
In other words, the task is to disrupt the phalloculologocentric 
gaze, the dominance of its syntax in the Symbolic, and its creation, 
the representation, `woman', in order to develop recognition of the 
subjects, women, and an appropriate syntax in the Symbolic, and 
also, importantly, to recognize the necessary discursivity that 
(inter)subjectivity and such a syntax entail. 14 
Having evoked the two-dimensionality of the flat mirror and the 
visual structure of the phallocentric gaze through referring to "a 
given plan/e: a projection from a single source", 15 Luce Irigaray 
once again argues for an engaged, rather than a separatist, 
strategic response: 
This disconcerting of language, though anarchic in its deeds of title, 
. 13 Luce Irigaray, 
Speculum, p. 135/Speculum, pp. 167-168. 
14 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 132-135/Ce sexe, pp. 130-133. 
15 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 142/Speculum, p. 177. 
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nonetheless demands patient exactitude. The symptoms, for their part are 
implacably precise. And if it is indeed a question of breaking (with) a certain 
mode of specula(riza)tion, this does not imply renouncing all mirrors or 
refraining from analysis of the hold this plante {plan} of representation 
maintains, rendering female desire aphasic and more generally atonic in all but 
its phallomorphic disguises, masquerades, and demands. For to dodge this time 
of interpretation is to risk its freezing over, losing hold, cutting back. All over 
again. 16 
To throw out the mirror and its play of couples - its discursivity - 
would leave women's desire still not understood and without 
understanding; without its accents, its pitches, its timbre, which 
means that such a strategy would leave the representation, 
`woman', intact within the phallocentric gaze. 
Luce Irigaray continues this passage by shifting her terminology 
subtly to expose the implications of "breaking (with) a certain 
mode of specula(riza)tion". She presents a vision of what might be 
found upon disrupting the two dimensional surface of the mirror - 
"this plan/e of representation" - and with it, the representation, 
`woman'. Breaking (with) a two dimensional plan/e of 
representation necessitates a breaking through; which brings us 
into contact with the brilliance of the reserve of the mirror as the 
result of a movement that evokes concavity: 
But perhaps through this specular surface which sustains discourse {le 
discours} is found not the void of nothingness but the dazzle of multifaceted 
speleology. A scintillating and incandescent concavity, of language also, that 
threatens to set fire to fetish-objects and eyes plugged with gold {les yeux 
aurifles}. The recasting of their truth value is already at hand. We need only 
press on a little further into the depths, into that so-called dark cave which 
serves as hidden foundation to their speculations. For there where we expect 
to find the opaque and silent matrix of a logos immutable in the certainty of its 
own light, fires and mirrors are beginning to radiate, sapping the evidence of 
reason at its base! Not so much by anything stored in the cave - which would 
still be a claim based on the notion of the closed volume - but again and yet 
16 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 143/Speculum, p. 178. 
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again by their indefinitely re-kindled hearths. 17 
The concavity - the space through and behind the flat mirror's 
surface - scintillates and burns infinitely. This is not the dark 
continent, the dark cave, the yawning gap, or the vagina dentata. 
Each of these terms - and others related - are products of 
phallocentric fear of multiplicity and difference; phallocentric in 
nature, they are immutable notions stored in the fixity - "the 
closed volume" - that is created by phallocentric man as the 
fearsome flip-side to the/his beautiful object of contemplation. 
This makes inevitable the rhetoric of Luce Irigaray's following 
questions: 
But which 'subject' up till now has investigated the fact that a concave mirror 
concentrates the light {/a lumiere} and, specifically, that this is not wholly 
irrelevant to woman's sexuality {le sexe de la femme)? Any more than is a 
man's sexuality {le sexe de I'homme} to the convex mirror? Which 'subject' 
has taken an interest in the anamorphoses produced by the conjunction of such 
curvatures? What impossible reflected images, maddening reflections, parodic 
transformations took place at each of their articulations? 18 
As the title of this section of Speculum suggests ('Any Theory of 
the "Subject" Has Always Been Appropriated by the "Masculine"'/ 
`Toute theorie du "sujet" aura toujours ete appropriee au 
"masculin"'), Luce Irigaray places the term `subject' in quotation 
marks when she is referring to the supposed universal subject 
which is, however, always already masculine - i. e., when she refers 
to that subjecthood granted men within a phallocentric economy. 
One must assume that Luce Irigaray is aware of such paintings as 
Hans Holbein's The Ambassadors (1533) (plate 6) with its 
17 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, pp. 143-144/Speculum, pp. 178-179. Translation modified: 
les yeux aurifds was translated as gilded eyes, but in fact refers to gold tooth fillings. I take 
this not to be a reference to decorated surface (she is talking about eyes, not the mirror's 
surface), but another confirmation of Luce Irigaray's analysis that the amalgam of the 
exchange value of women in patriarchy and capitalism is essentially rotten. 
18 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 144/Speculum, p. 179. 
Hans Holbein the Younger 
Jean de Dinteville and Georges de Selve (The Ambassadors) 
1533. National Gallery, London 
Plate 6 
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anamorphic skull in the foreground. 19 Other anamorphic paintings 
rely upon a cylindrical mirror to provide, in the reflection, the 
`correct' reading of the image (plate 7). It could be argued, of 
course, that both of these forms of anamorphic image - reliant 
upon a fixed viewing position, and in the second instance, upon the 
phallocentric convex mirror - rather than "reveal[ing] the 
limitations of a worldly existence"20 instead re-assert the primacy 
of single-point perspective (the visual structure of 
phalloculocentric representation par excellence) as the only means 
by which confusion can be righted. Thus again the `subject' is 
affirmed in his subjecthood and its worldly and transcendental 
structures. The above passage continues: 
And here again, here too, one will rightly suspect any perspective, however 
surreptitious, that centers the subject, any autonomous circuit of 
subjectivity, and systematicity hooked back onto itself, any closure that 
claims for whatever reason to be metaphysical - or familial, social, economic 
even -, to have rightfully taken over, fixed, and framed that concave mirror's 
incandescent hearth. If this mirror - which, however, makes a hole {trou} - 
sets itself up pompously as an authority in order to give shape to the 
imaginary orb of a 'subject', it thereby defends itself phobically in/by this 
inner 'center' from the fires of the desire of/for woman. Inhabiting a securing 
morphology, making of its very structure some comfortable sepulcher from 
whence it may, possibly, by some hypothetical survival, be able to look out. 
(Re)g(u)arding itself by all sorts of windows-on-wheels, optical apparatuses, 
glasses, and mirrors, from/in this burning glass, which enflames all that falls 
into its cup. 21 
This prompts me to examine two more recent artworks. The 
19 Certainly, one might assume that she was aware of Lacan's reference to this painting 
during a discussion of anamorphosis in the publication of his 1964 seminar. Jacques Lacan, 
The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, trans. by Alan Sheridan, intro. by David 
Macey (London: Penguin, 1994. First French publication, 1973), pp. 85-89. I would like to 
thank Griselda Pollock for directing me to this. During the course of this passage Lacan 
wonders "How is it that nobody has ever thought of connecting this with ... the effect of an 
erection? Imagine a tattoo traced on the sexual organ ad hoc in the state of repose and 
assuming its, if I may say so, developed form in another state". Jacques Lacan, ibid. (pp. 87- 
88). 
20 Philippa Berry, 'The Burning Glass', in Engaging With Irigaray: Feminist Philosophy 
and Modern European Thought, ed. by Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor and Margaret Whitford 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 229-246 (f. n. 32, p. 245). 
21 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 144/Speculum, p. 179-180. 
Henry Kettle 
Sleeping Venus Uncovered by Amor, c. 1770 
Cylinder anamorphosis, oil on panel, 14.5" x 19" 
Collection Schuyt, Amsterdam 
Photographs from Fred Leeman, Hidden lmges (New York: Abrams, 1976) 
Plate 7 
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anamorphic representations to which I have referred above do 
indeed claim to be metaphysical while re-centring the `subject' 
through demanding a fixed viewing point. Luce Irigaray here 
however is discussing the fixity enforced upon the potentiality of a 
concave mirror, and in this respect two works by Anish Kapoor 
come into mind. 
The first was exhibited in Documenta in 1992 (plate 8) Viewers 
were allowed into a room in carefully regulated numbers. We 
entered to find a windowless cubic space with diffused top light. In 
the centre of the floor was a round, dense matt black disk or rug. 
Having seen Kapoor's work on earlier occasions I was accustomed 
to his use of powdered pigments in saturated colours in his 
sculpture. This achieved such an absolute density of colour that the 
effect was sometimes paradoxically two-fold: to enhance the 
viewer's perception of form, solidity, and surface, while also 
disconcerting the viewer's perception of space. This is what I 
assumed was happening here, through the placing of black pigment 
on the floor; and (taking my cue from the two other viewers in the 
room) walked warily around it, gazing into the seemingly infinite 
depths of its surface. It was a good while before I realised with a 
jolt that I was not walking around pigment on the floor, but in fact 
was walking around a not insubstantial hole. I'm not sure now what 
it was that caused the jolt of perception, a trick of the light 
maybe, or an imperfection in the pigment caused by a small piece 
of debris having fallen in; once the perceptual shift had happened I 
noticed both, and I could no longer revert to seeing the blackness as 
a floor-level disk. Kapoor had created a sphere-shaped hollow under 
floor level, with a narrow slice of it cut off where it intersected 
with the floor. The walls of the sphere were then covered with the 
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n. d. Photograph from Documenta/Xvol. 2, ed. by Roland Nachtigaller and Nicola von 
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black pigment. It is hard to know what the effect would have been 
without the two external accidents of light and debris; certainly a 
related work seen in the Venice Biennale of 1990, which was set 
vertically into a wall, did not survive the viewers' curious 
insertion of hands into the space and fingers around the rim. The 
delicate powdered pigment, once disturbed, betrayed the form it 
was covering. In Documenta, the sphere was much larger, and the 
vertiginous feeling caused by standing above it provoked dizzy 
staring rather than speculative exploration. In my perception the 
absolute nature of the concavity coupled with its lack of fixity did 
not (of course) produce the brilliance about which Luce Irigaray 
speaks, but it did edge towards an effect of scintillation in my 
vision. 
The second piece by Anish Kapoor I wish to mention is Untitled 
(1995), exhibited in the group exhibition `Belladonna' at the ICA, 
London, January-April 1996 (plate 9). This was the first piece I had 
seen by Kapoor made from metal, rather than his trade-mark 
powdered pigment. A rectangular shape of polished aluminium 
almost 1.5 x1 metre was set onto the wall. In the centre of this 
rectangle the aluminium veered back into the wall space to create 
an oval recess or tunnel. The viewer was reflected in the highly 
polished surface, initially the right way up on the flat surround, 
then upside down as the concavity opened up, then in a series of 
smudge-shapes in the interior of the cavity. The recess was just 
under a metre deep; despite the multiplicity of reflections, 
however, it did seem finite, with its dimensions fixed. It did have 
an immediate impression of being transgressive in a fashionable, 
1990s, post-modern-chic manner: the piece had immediate sexual 
connotations in its shape, form, and penetrative aspect. Ultimately 
Anish Kapoor 
Untitled 
1995. c. 48" high. Aluminium 
Courtesy ICA, London 
Plate 9 
e 
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though, it was disappointing. The reflections had a novelty value, a 
little like the distorting mirrors found in fairgrounds, rather than 
an effect of disrupting the viewers' space, place, and perception. 
The size - much smaller than the average viewer - began to return 
it to object-status; and the size of the cavity, which appeared to 
be about head-and-shoulders size, struck me as too obvious, too 
illustrational an evocation of a birth canal. One could also have 
taken the piece initially as an illustration of Luce Irigaray's 
concave mirror. Without wishing to suggest any direct or 
intentional correspondence on the part of the artist, anyone with 
even slight acquaintance with Luce Irigaray's work might well have 
seen this too. Seen as such, it would fail miserably: it was indeed a 
stand-in, a failed illusion of the scintillation and brilliance of 
which Luce Irigaray speaks. 
This begs the question: was my disappointment in the piece a result 
of intrinsic weaknesses it had as an art work, or directed at its 
failure to illustrate Luce Irigaray's work? Getting pleasure from 
art works one feels one `ought not' to get pleasure from, and not 
getting pleasure from works one feels one `ought' to get pleasure 
from are interesting and continuing problems for feminism; and 
works which illustrate pre-given (therefore fixed) theory, rather 
than being productive of their own theory (and which are, 
therefore, discursive), inevitably have structural problems 
concerning how they create meaning. While a discussion of the 
relationship between politics and aesthetics is implicit throughout 
this thesis, suffice it to say here that with the second piece, the 
two disappointments were entwined: I could not see the work 
without immediately thinking of Luce Irigaray; and the first piece 
was clearly stronger, but did not provoke thoughts of Luce 
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Irigaray's work in me until I made a comparison between it and the 
second piece. It was, however more productive of Luce Irigaray's 
analysis for me, in the way in which it made me think about space, 
place and perception, vision and sensation, in my processing of my 
experience of the work. The paradox was that the possibility of 
such a scintillation as evoked by Luce Irigaray was hinted at far 
more persuasively by the black spherical hole, with its production 
of vertigo and its disruption of the relation between its space, the 
viewer, and the viewer's perception, than by the rather tacky 
aluminium false-mirror, which was productive only of the frisson 
of novelty and a speculative gaze. Discussion with other people who 
had seen this second piece centred on the question of whether we 
had reached inside to ascertain for ourselves what its limits were. 
It encouraged the phallocentric gaze, tickling it rather than 
disrupting it. 
Luce Irigaray is well aware of the associations of the convex 
mirror with gynaecological instruments and the knife-edge along 
which she travels: the attempt to develop an analogy in a syntax 
appropriate for women, while still speaking in a Symbolic which 
needs to undo its own phallologocentricity, with the risk of 
collapsing back into phallocular structures: 
But, may come the objection, - defending again the objective and the object - 
the speculum is not necessarily a mirror. It may, quite simply, be an 
instrument to dilate {ecarte} the lips, the orifices, the walls {parois}, so that 
the eye can penetrate the interior. So that the eye can enter, to see, notably 
with speculative intent. 22 
The group of words around `speculum', including speculation, 
speculate and specularization, are played with from the title of 
Speculum onwards, with their intellectual, financial and visual 
22 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 144/Speculum, p. 180. 
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meanings being alluded to at different moments. Luce Irigaray has 
said on at least two occasions that she was unhappy with the 
translation of the title Speculum, de I'autre femme as Speculum of 
the Other Woman. 23 The (non)placing of punctuation encouraged the 
understanding for an English-language readership that Luce Irigaray 
was suggesting both a straightforward mirror - in which, in a 
phallocentric structure, the subject sees the other of his same - 
and also the gynaecological instrument, the speculum, which Luce 
Irigaray was then assumed to use as an analogy to speculate upon 
her `other woman' - whomsoever, and in whatsoever relationship, 
she might have been. In both of these dissenting passages Luce 
Irigaray states that upon reflection the translation Speculum: On 
the Other: Woman would have indicated more strongly a further 
meaning: 
In the title of Speculum, as throughout the whole book, I played on words, on 
meanings, to enable a different truth {une autre verite} to appear. Thus, 
speculum denotes a gynecological instrument, though at an earlier period in our 
culture this term was used to denote the most faithful {la plus fidele} 
expression of reality possible. Speculum mundi, for example, was not an 
uncommon title and was what I had in mind. 24 
She expands upon this elsewhere: 
It's not simply a question of a mirror in which one sees oneself, but of the way 
in which it's possible to give an account of the world within a discourse: a 
mirror of the world. How I'm going to try to give an account of the world in 
my discourse. It's in this sense above all that I also played with the mirror, 
but not simply, because the mirror in a simple sense, in which I see myself, 
has served for the most part to constitute a masculine subject. 25 
So the speculum is not simply an instrument of the phalloculo- 
23 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You: Sketch of a Possible Felicity in History, trans. by Alison 
Martin (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 59-611J'aime ä toi: esquise dune fdlicitd dans 
l'histoire (Paris: Grasset), pp. 101-104. Hereafter cited as I Love To You/J'aime ä tol. "Je 
- Luce Irigaray": A Meeting with Luce Irigaray', interview by Elizabeth Hirsh and Gary A. 
Olson, trans. by Elizabeth Hirsh and Gaetan Brulotte, in Women Writing Culture, ed. by Gary 
A. Olson and Elizabeth Hirsh (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 
141-166 (pp. 147-148). 
24 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, pp. 59-601J'aime ä to!, pp. 101-102. 
25 Luce Irigaray, 'Je - Luce Irigaray', pp. 147. 
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centric hysteroscopy discussed in the last chapter. Luce Irigaray is 
using the analogy of the speculum not as maintenance mimesis 
(which Anish Kapoor falls back into, for instance) but as productive 
mimesis. This much should be evident from the overall text: the 
reflecting back of the patriarchal and phalloculologocentric 
philosophies of Plato and Freud upon themselves; the central 
section of the book named `Speculum' pushing to either side the 
sections on Freud and on Plato; the three central chapters of that 
central section named `Une mere de glace' ('The ice-glass-mirror 
mother'), `... And if, Taking the Eye of a Man Recently Dead,... ', and `La 
mysterique' ('the woman hysteric-mystic-mystery'), and so forth. 
Her speculum is not looking for an absolute or universal truth, but, 
as quoted above, for "a different truth [.... ] the most faithful 
expression of reality". The word "faithful", occurring here in I Love 
to You, is used through that book in close relation with the 
subject's recognition of the limits of his or her subjecthood in a 
relation of intersubjectivity. Its use in relation to the speculum 
denotes the nature of the subjecthood and its truth, its reality: a 
subjecthood which recognises the subjectivity of others, and, 
therefore, recognises also that it has limits and that others cannot 
be reduced to its objects - or to itself. 
Once again, however, the subtlety of Luce Irigaray's moves within 
language can be blunted with the inevitable problems of 
translation. For example, Philippa Berry has pointed out26 that, in 
the phrase quoted above, "it may, quite simply, be an instrument to 
dilate the lips", the choice of "dilate" for the original "ecarte" 
cannot carry the full implication of the French, which my 
26 Philippa Berry, 'The Burning Glass', p. 236. 
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dictionary tells me includes such meanings as 'to part', but also `to 
brush aside', `to remove', `to distract', `to stray' and `to diverge 
from'. 27 This indicates a potential reserve in the structure of the 
speculum, and possibilities for a productive mimesis of it. Philippa 
Berry suggests one apposite example of this: 
In her separation of the other woman, not from the mother but rather from the 
restricted place of the mother allocated to woman in patriarchy, one of 
Irigaray's key moves in Speculum is to turn the mirror that is "mother- 
matter" in upon itself, in an act of self-examination [.... ]. Irigaray's emphasis 
[is] upon a feminist ecart or in-turning into a mysterious opening - an opening 
she implies to be the forgotten ground of philosophical speculation... 28 
The use of productive mimesis of the speculum shatters the ice- 
glass-mirror that is the two dimensional representation, `woman', 
exposing the device that it is and recognising the brilliance that is 
that mirror's backing, unseen and unknown in phallocular 
structures. 
The structure of the eye itself - or rather, the phalloculologo- 
centric understanding of the eye and its vision - is also available 
for question here. I have already noted Luce Irigaray's summary of 
this as "a given plan/e: a projection from a single source". 29 This 
evokes the image of a slide projector, with the flat surface of the 
screen carrying the illusionary projected image, also a flat 
representation. I understand this as being suggestive of a closed 
circuit: that the masculine subject sees only what he wants to see 
in order to maintain his subjecthood. Thus the representation, 
`woman' is an illusion on the flat surface of the mirror -a flat 
surface which is necessary in order to reflect back to him without 
distortion the image he wishes to see: the other of his same. One of 
27 s. v. ecarter, The oxford Hachette French Dictionary (1994). 
28 Philippa Berry, 'The Burning Glass', p. 236. 
29 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 1421Speculum, p. 177. 
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the central chapters in Speculum, `... And if, Taking the Eye of a Man 
Recently Dead,... ', explores the relation between Descartes' ocular 
experiments (the title comes from the Fifth Discourse of his 
treatise on refraction and telescopes) and his assertion of 
subjecthood; another chapter, Wore: Young Virgin, Pupil of the Eye', 
also attends to Enlightenment thought, in particular "reason - 
which will also be called natural light"30 and the structures that 
support this analogy. The title also draws our attention to the 
meanings of the name given to Kore, the daughter of Demeter. Her 
story is not discussed here, but it is elsewhere, where it is offered 
by Luce Irigaray as the telling through myth of the potentially fatal 
results of the disruption to the mother/daughter relationship 
caused by the exchange (and theft/rape) of women between men. 31 
But here, in the centre of Speculum, the patriarchal exploration and 
philosophy of the structure, role and definition of the kore is 
described: 
The Words of the Father depend for their effect upon a measured and 
harmonious reflection of each part within the whole, untroubled by 
searchlights by night or eclipses by day. This rigorous distribution of each 
speck of brightness, of which only the information is retained, is set up by 
relays of mirrors - as well as filters, lenses, paraphragms, camerae obscurae 
{de chambres noires}, projection and reproduction screens - which divide up 
"Being" {l' "eire"} as a whole into fragments suitable to each "being" 
{"etant'J: [.... ] [including the] mirror of the eye in which the central point of 
vision - the kore - is the most purely reflecting. 32 
But of course the kore - the pupil of the eye - is not a flat 
30 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 148/Speculum, p. 184. 
31 For example, in 'Luce Irigaray: Paris, Summer 1980', interview by Elaine Hoffman 
Baruch and Lucienne Serrano, in Women Analyze Women in France, England and the United 
States, ed. by Elaine Hoffman Baruch and Lucienne Serrano (London: HarvesterWheatsheaf, 
1988), pp. 147-164 (p. 157), and Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. by Gillian C. 
Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 111-115/Amante marine de Friedrich 
Nietzsche (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1980), pp. 119-123. 
32 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, pp. 148-149/Speculum, p. 185. Original emphases 
restored. 
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reflecting/projecting surface; it is the darkness marking the 
entrance from the external convexity to the internal concavity of 
the eye, a `hole', a `nothing to see'; a place where sight is 
underwritten by touch; a physically structural relationship 
between concavity and convexity, mediated through proximity and 
touch; the space and place through which the vision of the `subject' 
really is turned upside down. Luce Irigaray says that "touch is a 
more subjective, intersubjective sense [than sight]; it is 
somewhere between active and passive; it escapes the possessive, 
mechanical and warlike economy, except where it is reduced to 
assault and battery or to a part of the body". 33 Is this, a site of the 
interaction of sight and touch, and a site of patriarchal denial of 
touch, the causal site of the `blind spot'? If so, why? The concave 
mirror, given the slightest entrance of light, will generate a 
scintillating brilliance so intense that it will burn anything within 
and anything which looks within. The gaze is more than dazzled; it 
is blinded; it will look, but see nothing. "Then the gaze, aghast at 
such bareness, will have concluded that at any rate all brilliance 
was its own preserve, that it could continue to speculate without 
competition". 34 So, says Luce Irigaray, while its ability to create 
`confusion' is noted, "the concave mirror's potential for setting 
things afire is not mentioned". 35 In this way, "Nature, physis, is 
apprehended by (her) mirage, not by her dazzling radiance. Men 
freeze nature to understand her, they do not set her aflame. {Elle se 
33 Luce Irigaray, Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution, trans. by Karin 
Montin (London: Athlone Press, 1994), p. 21/Le temps de la diffdrence: pour une rdvolution 
pacifique (Paris: Le Livre de Poche/Librairie Generale Frangaise, 1989), p. 38. Hereafter 
cited as Thinking the Difference/Le temps de la difference. 
34 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 1461Speculum, p. 182. 
35 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 1491Speculum, p. 186. 
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comprend en la/se glacant non en l'/s'embrasant}". 36 
In Western patriarchy, the place from which women have been 
allowed to speak and act publicly is the site of la mysterique - the 
hysteric-mystic-mystery which is the name Luce Irigaray gives to: 
... mystic language or discourse. [.... ] This is the place where consciousness is 
no longer master, where, to its extreme confusion, it sinks into a 'dark night' 
that is also fire and flames. This is the place where 'she' - and in some cases 
he, if he follows 'her' lead - speaks about the dazzling glare which comes from 
the source of light that has been logically repressed [.... ]. Also about a 'burning 
glass' {miroir ardent}. 37 
What patriarchy understands in its representational economy is the 
ice-glass-mirror - la glace - when what could be understood is the 
brilliance of the soul-mirror - la psyche. It is this (sense of) vision 
which is at the centre of Speculum: the attempt, with words which 
evoke passion, to find ways of recognising the female, woman's, 
soul; the same attempt that is central to the enunciative position 
of la mysterique: 
And my eyes have proved sharp enough to look upon that glory without 
blinking. They would have been seared had they not been that simple eye of the 
`soul' that sets fire to what it ad-mires out of its hollow socket. A burning 
glass {miroir ardent} is the soul who in her cave (re)joins with the source of 
light to set everything ablaze {embraser} that approached her hearth. Leaving 
only ashes there, only a hole: fathomless in her incendiary blaze. 38 
We could pause here to remember the painting by Berthe Morisot 
called La Psyche (1876) (plate 10), which images a young woman 
standing before a tall swing-mirror of the type called in France une 
psyche. It is ambiguous whether the title refers explicity to the 
mirror, or more eliptically evokes through the figure of the young 
woman, Psyche, who, in Greek myth, was a mortal woman who 
36 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 150/Speculum, p. 186. 
37 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 191/Speculum, p. 238. 
38 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 197/Speculum, p. 246. 
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Psyche 
1876. Oil on canvas, 25.5" x 21.25" 
Thyssen Bornemisza Collection, Lugano 
Photograph from Kathleen Adler and Tamar Garb, Berthe Morisot (Oxford: Phaidon 
Press, 1987) 
Plate 10 
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gazed upon the god Eros. Anne Higonnet quotes Carla Gottleib, who 
says "Living in a world of positivist values, the nineteenth-century 
artist does not play with the double meaning of the term". 39 
However, Higonnet also reads the painting as showing the woman 
"gathering a loose chemise around her waist", when to me it looks 
like a more fitted garment with gathering and front lacing, and she 
states that "the mirror image is directed to us", when parts of the 
reflection are not visible to us, and would only be so for the women 
in the pose. She also projects onto the women in the painting 
particular speculations: "she considers how her figure would look 
if she were formally dressed [.... ] absorbed by the mirror image of 
alterations intended for the public eye". 40 I would suggest that 
there is more ambiguity in the painting than Higonnet credits, 
particularly in that we are aware that we do not see the whole of 
the image that the woman in the pose sees. Not only do we see more 
of her, but we see her more clearly than we see her mirror image: 
its clarity is hers alone. Certainly, there is a tension between 
interior and exterior - the painting of the chemise in the mirror is 
highly generalised, and could just pass as an image of the dress 
Morisot painted in At the Ball a year earlier. But there is also 
tension between the exteriorising of the image and the 
interiorising of thought suggested by the word `reflection'. To 
project a content for the woman's thoughts is to limit the 
possibilities which Morisot herself may have been contemplating, 
as well as the nuances we can read into the representation of a 
39 Carla Gottleib, quoted by Anne Higonnet, Berthe Morisot's Images of Women 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), fn. 4 p. 279. 
40 Anne Higonnet, ibid., p. 167. 
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woman and her reflection today. 41 The ambiguities can add to, 
rather than detract from, the present significance of La Psyche, 
and not La glace, as a title. It can lead us to a consideration of Luce 
Irigaray's analysis of women's contemplations of their reflections 
in (front of) the mirror. 
Reflection, self-image. beauty 
In `Divine women', Luce Irigaray quotes Ludwig Feuerbach as saying 
"God is the mirror of man", adding: 
Woman has no mirror wherewith to become woman. Having a God and becoming 
one's gender go hand in hand. God is the other that we need absolutely. In order 
to become, we need some shadowy perception of achievement {besoin du 
pressentiment dun accomplissement pour devenir}; not a fixed objective, not 
a One postulated to be immutable but rather a cohesion and a horizon that 
assures us the passage between past and future, the bridge of a present that 
remembers, that is not sheer oblivion and loss, not a crumbling away of 
existence, a failure simply, to take note. 42 
Feuerbach's comment adds to the complexity of the structure which 
41 See Griselda Pollock, Vision and Difference: Femininity, Feminism and the Histories of 
Art (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 81, for a dicussion of La Psychd as an example of 
Morisot's "concern with female subjectivity especially at critical turning-points of the 
feminine" and with "spaces of femininity". 
42 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', in Sexes and Genealogies (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), pp. 55-72 (p. 67)/'Femmes divines', in Sexes et Parentes (Paris: 
Les Editions de Minuit, 1987), pp. 67-85 (p. 79). I would like to note that there is an echo 
here of Lacan's 'mirror phase' and critiques of it; an echo which will recur through this 
section. To engage with this fully would, again, be necessarily technical, lengthy, and 
tangential to my aim, which is not to chart the differences between Luce Irigaray and Jacques 
Lacan; such a project would be of more interest in a psychoanalytic-historical context, but is 
not really of interest here. So I would like to leave Lacan's work in the status of being 
symptomatic of the phallocentric structures that Luce Irigaray is trying to undo, rather than 
present it as over-determinedly causal of her work. This is also in acknowledgement her own 
stated aims: "I did not want [.... ], as some have thought or written, to enact the parricide of 
one of my supposed masters. Not at all. I wanted to begin to define what a woman is, thus 
myself as a woman - and not only a woman but as freely belonging to the female gender or 
generic - by carrying out a partial process of limitation or negation relative to my natural 
immediacy, and relative to the representation I had been given of what I was as a woman, 
that is, the other of/for man, the other of male culture. " I Love To You, pp. 63-641J'aime A 
toi, pp. 108-109. 
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rests upon a fundamentally simple premise: phallocentric 
structures build man's subjectivity upon his 'seeing' everything 
around him as other of his same. Most importantly for this 
discussion, it means that he has constructed the representation, 
'woman', and projected it upon women. But it also means that, 
certainly in patriarchal, Western, Judeo- or Helleno-Christian 
cultures, man can create God in his own image. This other, 
'idealised', other of his same (as distinct from the 'deformed' other 
of his same, the representation, 'woman') then functions as the 
horizon of his possibilities, that necessity for a 'becoming' into 
subjectivity. As I noted at the start of this chapter, for patriarchal 
man, the other of his same functions for his subjectivity as a 
mirror, and Luce Irigaray has indicated that "Representation can 
dispense with and supplant the role played in the real life of the 
senses by the mirror". 43 But if women do not have an horizon of 
possibilities, an enunciative divine/position from the burning 
mirror, then one of the things that is needed is a movement the 
other way: 
The impotence, the formlessness, the deformity associated with women, the 
way they are equated with something other than the human and split between 
the human and the inhuman (half-woman, half-animal), their duty to be 
adorned, masked, and made up, etc., rather than being allowed their own 
physical, bodily beauty, their own skin, their own form(s), all this is 
symptomatic of the fact that women lack a female god who can open up the 
perspective in which their flesh can be transfigured. 44 
As well as a move towards recognising the potential for a 
representation that is an horizon of possibilities, we need also to 
move from this to its necessary corollary: a representation that is 
"in the real life of the senses" that allows for such an horizon; a 
self-image in a real-life mirror and elsewhere. There are clear 
43 Luce Irigaray, Speculum, p. 95/Speculum, p. 116. 
44 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', p. 64/'Femmes divines', p. 76. 
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implications here for art practices (representational practices) by 
women; not only how women image themselves, but how they image 
each other, how they image womanliness and femininity: becoming 
a woman. I think that what Luce Irigaray does in following this 
argument through is, without being proscriptive about the nature of 
practice, to offer indicative analyses of the structures by and 
through which women represent themselves in the broadest sense 
(initially to themselves, but not exclusively). 
In 'Divine Women' Luce Irigaray performs such a move (from an 
horizon of possibilities in the divine to one in the spirit through 
the body) in her account of women's relation to their own self 
image in the mirror, and to their beauty: "Women have rarely used 
their beauty as a weapon for themselves, even more rarely as a 
spiritual weapon. The body's splendour has rarely been used as a 
lever to advance self-love, self-fulfilment". 45 Without being able 
to see their self-image (to represent it to themselves) as 
beautiful, there is no potential for women to recognize/develop a 
representation which is an horizon of possibilities appropriate for 
them; such an horizon would necessarily include a possibility of 
beauty for women, a female soul, and a female divine. Following 
this point, over the subsequent couple of pages, Luce Irigaray 
works through the problems of self-image for women in a 
patriarchy, and the credible potential self representation (I 
distinguish here between women's relation with self-image, by 
which I mean in particular the visual image in the mirror, and self- 
representation in the broad sense indicated above, and including 
how women represent that self-image to themselves: how they see 
45 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', p. 64PFemmes divines', p. 76. 
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the image, allow for and develop its potential as an horizon). I shall 
follow these arguments through, taking Luce Irigaray's discussion 
in five sections. 
1. 
Maternal beauty has been glorified in our religious and social traditions, but 
womanly beauty for centuries has been seen merely as a trap for the other 
(quo seduction pour fair tomber t'autre chez la femme amante). The 
transfiguration of a female body by beauty, the active share that the woman 
can have In that transfiguration, are today often misunderstood. Perhaps they 
have been forgotten. Beauty is not presented or represented as the spiritual 
predicate of the flesh. Yet, it is not impossible to imagine that a body can be, 
can above all become, intelligent or stupid, that our relation to corporal love 
can be actively aesthetic or passively abject {soumis}, reduced: for example, 
to a pseudoanimality (animals themselves are beautiful in their sexual 
displays; bestial is an animal quality negatively attributed to man), or to 
motherhood, with its associations to bodily deformity and the link often made 
between it and chastity. 46 
Beauty in women, as it is understood in Western patriarchal 
culture, is found in the two extremes of the representation, 
'woman': the/his mother and the/his mistress, the virgin and the 
whore, the beautiful object of contemplation and the woman 
subjected to hysteroscopy. This has been well charted, not least 
through feminist research and works such as Julia O'Faolain and 
Lauro Martines' Not in God's Image. They have collected such 
passages from the early teachings of the Church as this from 
Tertullian: "And so a veil must be drawn over a beauty so dangerous 
as to have brought scandal into heaven itself, so that before God, in 
whose eyes it is guilty of the angel's fall, it may blush in the 
presence of the remaining angels and give up the licence to show 
itself and hide even from the eyes of men". 47 Mary was the model of 
46 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', pp. 64-65/'Femmes divines', pp. 76-77. 
47 Tertullian, De Virginibus Velandis, quoted by Julia O'Faolain and Lauro Martines, Not 
In God's Image: Women in History (London: Virago, 1979), p. 144. 
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beauty for women, but as mother and virgin, not as woman. Mothers 
were encouraged to emulate her as much as was possible. Marina 
Warner includes in her eloquent charting of the mythic figurations 
of Mary the following modern prayer for girls: "Most blessed Virgin 
Mary ... your life of 
faith and love and perfect unity with Christ was 
planned by God to show us clearly what our lives should be ... you 
are the outstanding model of motherhood and virginity"; 48 while 
Olwen Hufton has collected a C17th French prayer recommended by 
the church for women in labour which begins: "Oh Mother of the 
holiest one of holies who approached nearest to his divine 
perfection and so became mother to such a son". 49 But to place 
women as mothers by creating an ideal who is figured as a mother 
rather than as a woman is to reduce women; and to structure an 
ideal of motherhood which has bodily failure built in to it (she 
conceived without sex, and did not die but was taken body and soul 
into heaven) is to reduce still further any possible sense of 
becoming women. As it is, and with this impossible ideal, Luce 
Irigaray reminds us, the motherly body is often considered 
deformed (and thus shameful in its relation to the ideal? 50) and has 
to remain chaste (the closest approximation to the patriarchal 
48 From Marian Devotions for Today. Based on the Second Vatican Council, ed. by Fr. 
Dermot Hurley (Dublin, 1971), quoted by Marina Warner, Alone of All Her Sex: The Myth and 
Cult of the Virgin Mary (London: Pan Books, 1985), p. 68. 
49 From Ddvotions particulibrs pour les femmes enceintes (1665), quoted by Olwen 
Hufton, The Prospect Before Her. - A History of Women in Western Europe. Volume 1: 1500- 
1800 (London: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 183. 
50 Again, as laid down by the early Church. For example, Fortunatus (530-609), Bishop 
of Poitiers on pregnant women: "When the belly swells from its wound and sensual dropsy ii 
grows, the woman's exhausted health hangs by a hair. The raised skin is so distent and mis- 
shapen that even though the mother may be happy with her burden, she becomes ashamed .... 
How describe the tears shed at the moment when the muscles relax to release the prisoner 
and procure relief for the viscera? A way is forced violently through the passage and a being, 
perhaps lifeless, brought to life. The mother painfully turns her dull glance towards him. What 
does she see? An Infant stretched motionless ... so that she no 
longer deserves to be called 
either mother or virgin. ' Opera Poetica, quoted by Julia O'Faolain and Lauro Martines, Not in 
God's Image, p. 151. 
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definition of Mary's virginity? ). 
The language that Luce Irigaray uses in her discussion of female 
beauty and women's self-images in the mirror intertwines 
terminology of corporeality with that of Christianity, particularly 
Catholicism. While exposing the maintenance mimesis expected of 
women in Western patriarchy, she performs an act of productive 
mimesis upon this terminology in order to work towards a sense of 
spirituality or the divine for women, which issues from a sense of 
female beauty. A sense of womanly corporeal beauty is part of this, 
and thus so too is a woman's comprehension of beauty in her self- 
image. In this introductory passage, Luce Irigaray talks of "the 
transfiguration of the female body by beauty" and the possibility 
that beauty can be "the spiritual predicate of the flesh". We 
already consider other emotional and intellectual aspects of the 
body; why, then, is it impossible to think of the spirituality of the 
female body? 
2. 
Female beauty {la beautO feminine} is always considered as finery { parure} 
ultimately designed to attract the other into the self. It is almost never 
perceived as a manifestation of, an appearance of, a phenomenon expressive of 
{qui dit) interiority - whether of love, of thought, of flesh. We look at 
ourselves in the mirror to please someone, rarely to interrogate the state of 
our body or our spirit, rarely for ourselves and in search of { en vue de} our 
own becoming. 51 
Feminine beauty is une parure - that most feminine of finery, a 
word used in France in relation to (for example) the frivolity of 
food trimmings, bridal wear, and the innate floweriness of spring. 
Innate, frivolous, up for consumption, and feminine, it is both a 
trap - indicative of intentionality and concealment - and surface, 
51 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', p. 64/'Femmes divines', p. 77. Translation modified. 
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not speaking of the profundity and interiority of body and spirit. We 
are back in the realm of the two dimensionality of the 
phalloculologocentric representation, 'woman': surface, with an 
illusion of depth. The relationship that women as the 
representation, `woman', have with the mirror at present is one of 
maintenance mimesis of the representation, `woman': to please, to 
reproduce the allure that the other has in the eyes of the same. We 
cannot become subjects in this representational economy; we 
cannot become women. When we look at images of ourselves, in the 
mirror and elsewhere, we look at ourselves as the representation, 
'woman'. We represent ourselves to ourselves as the 
representation, `woman'. 
3. 
The mirror almost always serves to reduce us to a pure exteriority - of a 
very particular kind. It functions (il intervient) as a possible way to constitute 
screens between the other and myself. In a way quite different from mucuses 
or skin, living, porous, fluid differentiations and the possibility of communion, 
the mirror is a weapon of frozen {glacee} - and polemical - distancing. I risk 
only my double to love. I do not abandon or give myself as body, flesh, as 
immediate - and geological, genealogical - affects. The mirror signifies the 
constitution of a fabricated (female) other {d'un(e) autre fabrique(e)} that I 
shall put forward as an instrument {enjeu} of seduction in my place. I seek to 
be seductive and to be content with images of which I remain the artisan, the 
artist. 52 
In the dominant ways of seeing in Western culture the flat mirror, 
as we have seen, structures representational and interpretive 
possibilities. As guarantor of the 'subject', it is also guarantor of 
the other of his same. A screen for projecting onto, it maintains 
this `otherness', it maintains a distance without a possibility of 
mediation and disallows the play of couples. Thus the 
representation, 'woman' is fixed, frozen: the mirror is la glace - 
52 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', p. 65/'Femmes divines', p. 77. Translation modified. 
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the ice-glass-mirror - not la psyche, the soul-mirror, or the miroir 
ardent. A woman, always already elsewhere than the 
representation, 'woman' - her double - can never enter fully that 
play of the couple, can never, as the representation, 'woman', fully 
risk love. How can she when her subjectivity is elsewhere? The 
representation, `woman', created by patriarchal man, is re-created 
in a process of maintenance mimesis by women. This is her stake in 
the patriarchal game of representation: to create the seductive 
parure. As with the hysteric and her mimesis (as we saw earlier), 
this is her art. How can there be room here for her to make anything 
else as art? This does not mean that she will not make 'art': but 
that the 'art' she makes will enbody aspects of the representation, 
'woman', and not her subjecthood, her subjectivity. 
4. 
I have yet to unveil, unmask { demasqude}, or veil myself for me - to veil 
myself for self-contemplation, for example, to retouch myself with my gaze 
so as to limit my exposure to the other, but also to again be in touch with 
{retoucher} my own gestures and garments, thus to re-nest (into) my vision 
and contemplation of myself. Which is not a kind of cold narcissism, but rather 
a way that I can supply extra help and assistance, as an adult, to the different 
houses, the different bodies that have borne me, enveloped me, rocked me, 
embraced me, wrapped themselves around me... The mirror, and indeed the 
gaze, are frequently used as non-tactile weapons or tools, which break off the 
fluidity of touch, including that of the gaze. 53 
If la parure is a covering of finery and trimmings for the 
representation, 'woman', then the subjects, women, must have 
garments which are different and with a different relationship to 
the gaze. In 'The poverty of psychoanalysis' Luce Irigaray describes 
the function of the dance of the veil: "In many traditions [it] is the 
sexual and religious rite par excellence, a dance with a mystery 
and a cosmic reality that is at once prior to and beyond any 
53 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', p. 65/'Femmes divines', pp. 77-78. Translation 
modified. 
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already-constituted subjectivity. The scene is played out by the 
goddess-mother {la deesse-mere} or the woman-lover {amante}, the 
gods and the universe. It does not cover nothingness; it attempts to 
pass through illusion towards the act/gesture of creating or 
begetting the world". 54 This leads me to understand the use of the 
word `veil' in the above passage as indicating in two ontological 
directions: not merely a choice of being clothed or not. "I have yet 
to unveil, unmask" I see as an acknowledgement of having yet to 
remove the covering that is la parure, the representation, `woman', 
the masquerade required within patriarchy: to remove the surface 
plan/e or screen of the mirror. With "I have yet to [.... ] veil myself 
for me" a difference in the veil is indicated: note that she says 
"veil" and not "re-veil" after the unveiling. I understand this as 
referring to clothing oneself with the vestments that are the 
Symbolic syntax of one's subjectivity, and thus to have a 
screen/veil of mediation, whether of the subject with herself or of 
intersubjectivity. This is a veil that allows the self-contemplation 
of the subjects, women; and it also sets limits on that subjectivity 
and choice about marking those limits. It is a veil which allows 
touch to return to the gaze, rather than one which retains the gaze 
as abstract specularization. This is not the frozen auto-erotics 
projected onto the representation, `woman', by an economy of the 
same, but a subjectivity to which amorousness, touch, vision and 
history have been returned, and in which they are returned to each 
other. 
5. 
54 Luce Irigaray, 'The Poverty of Psychoanalysis', trans. by David Macey, In The 
Irigaray Reader, ed. by Margaret Whitford (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 79-104 (p. 
87)/'Misere de la psychanalyse', In Parlor West Jamals neutre (Paris: Les Editions de 
Minuit, 1985), pp. 253-279 (p. 261). Translation modified. 
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Though necessary at times for separating, the mirror - and the gaze when it 
acts as a mirror - ought to remain a means and not an end to which I yield. The 
mirror should assist, not undermine my incarnation. Generally it reflects back 
{renvoie} nothing but superficial, flat images. There are other means that 
generate volume better than specular reflection {le reflet speculaire}. To work 
at beauty is at least as much a matter of working at gestures as the 
relationship to space and to others as it is a matter of cross-examining, 
usually with anxiety, your mirror. The mirror freezes our becoming breath, 
our becoming space. Our becoming bird, perhaps? Though it may at times help 
us to emerge, to move out of the water, the mirror paralyzes our energies 
{elans}, our movements, our wings. What protects me from the other and 
allows me to move toward him or her is more often the plotting out of a space 
of air {I'amenagement d'un territoire d'air} rather than the interposition of 
mirrors and ice-glasses { glaces} whose cutting edge always threatens to turn 
against me. After the totally enveloping waters of our prenatal time, we have 
to construct for ourselves, bit by bit, an envelope of air for our time on earth 
- air in which we can breathe and sing freely, in which we can spread our 
appearances and movements. Once we were fishes. We are destined to become 
birds. This will not happen without opening and mobility in the air. 55 
Luce Irigaray is not discarding mirrors. A sense of immediacy is 
intensely problematic for women, who have not had an appropriate 
Symbolic syntax through which to mediate themselves and their 
subjectivity. Then, a sense of separation is necessary, and mirrors 
can assist. But assist they must, not hinder: at present, they do not 
assist women's becoming and their subjectivity. As we have seen, 
in phalloculologocentric structures, they fix women as the 
representation, `woman', freeze them into an anxious, speculative 
relationship with their own self-imagery. Luce Irigaray suggests 
that beauty is to be found in our gestural relationships with space, 
with other subjects. Space - air - is necessary for breath, life and 
movement. Beauty will be found in our becoming the subjects, 
women, for which air and space is necessary. It does not reside in 
the anxious relationship of the representation, 'women', with her 
image as the representation, `woman', in the mirror; caught in a 
closed circuit, a maintenance mimesis of the phalloculologocentric 
gaze. 
55 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', pp. 65-66/'Femmes divines', pp. 78. Translation 
modified. 
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Looking listening. attentiveness 
Women cannot represent themselves to themselves as subjects (let 
alone represent themselves to other subjects as subjects) while 
they are stuck in a representational economy of same and other, in 
which they are doomed to be forever other of the same. Women's 
relation to their self-image and to images of women, womanliness, 
and femininity is one that Rosalind Coward has identified as one 
not of narcissism, but of "narcissistic damage". 56 But women can 
scarcely become subjects without representational economies 
which recognize their subjectivity, and which are, therefore, 
economies of intersubjectivity. What is crucial to ensure the 
functioning of a Symbolic syntax appropriate to women is to build 
ways of attending to that syntax. It is not enough to develop a 
syntax in the Symbolic, then to assume that the methods of 
understanding it are unproblematic. If women collectively and 
painstakingly are developing visual languages which are 
appropriate, then we must not omit to attend to how we understand 
them. We must not continue developing such a syntax and our 
understandings of it (how we represent it to ourselves) without 
attending to the methods by which we come to those 
understandings. How do we look, listen, read? In this context, how 
do we (women) experience artworks (by women)? And how is that 
experience then mediated, to ourselves and to other subjects? What 
is an intersubjective relationship between the artist and the 
woman who looks at her work? How can it be developed? 
56 Rosalind Coward, Female Desire: Women's sexuality Today (London: Paladin, 1984), 
p. 80. 
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In I Love to You Luce Irigaray poses the initial questions: 
Yet isn't it time for us to become communicating subjects? Have we not 
exhausted our other possibilities, indeed our other desires? Isn't it time for us 
to become capable not only of speech {paroles} but also of speaking to one 
another? Which is not the same thing at all. 57 
This speech is not necessarily the Symbolic towards which she 
aims elsewhere, accommodating the syntax appropriate for women. 
Indeed, she points out just before this that: 
Teleology, for man [.... ] is not conversing {dialoguer} with the other but rather 
suspending the interaction of the relation with the other in order to accomplish 
the self's own intention [.... ]. The whole of Western philosophy is the mastery 
of the direction of will and thought by the subject, historically man. Nothing is 
changed by the fact that nowadays women have access to this. 58 
If the subject and relations between subjects are not 
reconstituted, then things could get worse for women. Establishing 
"a new economy of existence or being which is neither that of 
mastery nor that of slavery but rather of exchange with no 
preconstituted object - vital exchange, cultural exchange, of words 
{paroles}, gestures, etc. "59 is the point of discussion here; indeed, 
one implication of I Love to You, when considered against the 
background of the earlier work, would be that a Symbolic syntax 
appropriate for women would be impossible without this shift to a 
"new economy" of exchange; another implication is that this 
change would inevitably begin to undo the languages of patriarchy, 
clearing the space for a syntax appropriate for women. The two 
must go hand in hand if women are to do something more than 
perform a maintenance mimesis upon patriarchy. 
57 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 451J'aime ä toi, p. 81. 
58 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 451J'aime ä to!, pp. 79-80. 
59 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 45/J'aime A to!, p. 80. 
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In a very pragmatic way, Luce Irigaray indicates two structures of 
discourse which are already in use. These, she suggests, are models 
of, on the one hand, the form of discourse to be disrupted, and on 
the other, the form of discourse to be developed: 
... there is a 
difference in subjective economy between the hierarchical 
transmission of an already established discourse fun langage} and language {une 
langue}, order and law, and the exchange of meaning between us here and now. 
The first model of transmission or instruction is more parental, more 
genealogical, more hierarchical; the second more horizontal and 
intersubjective. The first model risks enslavement to the past, the second 
opens up a present in order to construct a future. 60 
These two models both help shape and are shaped by different 
structures of, and assumptions about, subjectivity, as can be 
deduced from their differing methods of giving and receiving: "The 
first model operates by way of transmitted dependency, the second 
by way of reciprocal listening {une ecoute reciproque)". 61 Thus is 
brought in a concern of Luce Irigaray's which has increased since 
the late 1980s: that of working towards an anti-patriarchal culture 
(I mean by `culture' the tenor of social, political, and artistic 
interaction between subjects). This is a necessary development 
from her analysis of the non-subjecthood of women under 
patriarchy and her work towards possible subjectivity, Symbolic 
syntax, and horizons for women. Women cannot become subjects in 
broader cultural and social structures which alienate them. As she 
puts it later in the book, discussing the use of the masculine as the 
normative subject in language: 
The he/they {il(s)} becomes a pseudo-transcendence to which she is oriented, 
losing her subjectivity on the way, and thus the possibility of real 
communication. 
Communication, exchange between people, intersubjectivity - the 
privileged loci of the least alienated female identity - are thus held back from 
appropriation by the female gender and from reciprocity between the sexes. 
60 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, pp. 45-461J'aime A to!, p. 81. 
61 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 461J'aime A tol, p. 81. 
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With no return to the self, woman/women cannot truly engage in dialogue. 62 
Luce Irigaray proposes a developed practice of listening as key to 
anti-patriarchal culture: 
Listening that does not exclude respect, especially for the other's experience, 
for the unique contribution he or she makes to culture beyond the transfer of 
information. The first model is not, strictly speaking, a model of 
communication. It is, at best, an information model, constituting knowledge as 
an aggregate of information and as the power {le pouvoir} it is likely to confer 
within institutions, in the opinion of colleagues or followers. The second model 
offers itself as an opening to a field of communication, as a world of the 
creation and exchange of thought and culture in which no man or woman can 
become master or slave for fear of destroying the given objective. 63 
This second model harkens back to comments that Luce Irigaray 
makes about the structures of listening in the psychoanalytic 
scenario, both in This Sex and in essays such as `The Limits of the 
Transference'. 64 For example, the analyst may: 
... on the traditional model of the theoretical, privilege a certain 'visible' 
element, which goes hand in hand with truth and proper meaning ... My ear may 
then be what discriminates, and identifies, and classifies, and interprets this 
'visible' element; it may be at the service of perception from a distance, and 
privilege what is 'well formed'. 65 
The phalloculologocentric model of the relation between the 
analyst and the analysand retains power with the analyst, to whom 
belongs the gaze with its speculative, teleological structure and 
its need to discriminate form. Any practice of listening follows 
upon this structure and its configuring of the logos: distant, 
defining, controlling, turning what is said into information. But 
there is an alternative, where listening: 
... may let itself be touched 
differently. [.... ] And this would mean that what is 
62 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 98/J'aime A tol, p. 153. 
63 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 46/Jaime A toi, p. 81-82. 
64 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', trans. by David Macey, in The 
Irigaray Reader, pp. 105-117/'La limit du transfert', in Parier West Jamals neutre, pp. 
293-305. 
65 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 147/Ce sexe, p. 144. 
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to be heard and accomplished is rather a different mode of the 'syntactic', in 
language and in the body. Let me add that as soon as your listening ceases to 
privilege meaning, the well formed, the visible, then the analyst's body, your 
own - in this connection we could take another look at what is called 
'benevolent neutrality' ... - is no longer protected by that sort of screen or 
referent. And so it comes into play 'differently' in transference. [.... ] We 
would thus escape from a dominant scopic economy, we would be to a greater 
extent in an economy of flow. 66 
Here we have a description of a practice of `listening' which is 
(like that of sight) underwritten by touch; which is not 
predetermined by a certain economy of the logos which in turn 
rests upon a teleological scopic economy. It is a practice which 
works against the teleology of the classical analytic scenario, 
where the analyst works at "'narrating', dissecting, interpreting 
the transference of the (male or female) analysand alone", but one 
that recognises "both transferences. Here is one of the things at 
stake in analytic power. Analysts do indeed have transferences". 67 
So overall in this advanced practice of listening we have a 
structure that recognises the subjectivity of the person who is 
speaking (does not reduce him or her to an object), and where the 
person listening does not deploy a "benevolent neutrality" but 
which instead recognises their listening, even their objectivity, as 
a subjective and bodily practice. It is a practice of engagement, not 
one of distance; a practice of communication between two subjects 
in which both are active participants; an active practice of 
intersubjectivity. It is a practice also which does not isolate the 
senses from each other, and which in its shape as a practice, can be 
found in the intersubjective engagement of other senses. Indeed, 
Luce Irigaray finds one of the most exemplary instances of this 
66 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 147-148/Ce sexe, p. 144. 
67 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 148/Ce sexe, pp. 144-145. Translation modified. 
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practice in the realm of sight and the gaze, as will be discussed 
below. I would like to call it a practice of attentiveness, as I think 
this suggests a combination of activity, non-imposition, and being- 
a-subject. I will follow through some of Luce Irigaray's 
discussions of this practice and this quality as I think it can 
advance possibilities for engaging with artworks. As I do so I also 
want to shift the terminology for the woman who experiences or 
encounters the artwork away from `the viewer' with its naming of 
sight as the only sense which is involved, and also away from `the 
female gaze', which, for all its theorizing, still appears to imply a 
simple inversion of the theory from which it developed, of the 
phallocentric male gaze. The word `audience' has overtones of 
sociological surveys and of the theatrical, but does have the 
benefit of retaining a trace of Luce Irigaray's interest in the 
practice of listening. There is no phrase or word to encapsulate 
`the subject, woman, who is in an intersubjective relationship with 
another subject, woman, mediated by the artworks of the second 
subject' (! ) so as a compromise I will use the attentive woman or 
the attentive audience, on the understanding that attentiveness 
involves more than one sense, and presupposes a move towards 
intersubjectivity. 
Essential to a practice of intersubjectivity is a recognition of the 
limits of the subject. If the other subject cannot be reduced to an 
object and so cannot be reduced to being the other of the same, 
then the subject has to recognize his or her limits. For Luce 
Irigaray, recognition of gender identity and gender difference is 
key for the subject's recognition that he or she is not everything: 
In this way, to recognize an identity in oneself is itself to overcome instinctual 
and egological immediacy by recognizing the negative in the self. "I am sexed" 
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implies, "I am not everything". Identifying with my gender amounts to 
entering the world of mediation provided I recognize the existence of the other 
gender. There will thus no longer be the simple identity of my will with itself 
since respecting my nature as generic identity constrains the immediacy of my 
will. But this constraint does not emanate from an abstract or impersonal law. 
It is established on the basis of the objectivity of who I actually am. Before 
being limited by others, I am limited by myself owing to the objectivity of my 
sexed body and to the particularity that ensues from my inscription in a 
genealogy. In this sense, there is no immediate subjectivity. This is an 
incorrect concept, notion or expression. 68 
This is a subtle structure of accounting for a relation to mediation. 
If the subject recognizes an identity, then the will is constrained: 
the will has to recognize that the subject is not everything, that 
there are other identities. The sexed body, productive of particular 
structures of subjectivity, is also productive of the limits of that 
subjectivity - the negative of subjectivity being the recognition of 
other subjectivities. With the recognition of those limits comes 
the necessity for mediation. The subject, in a situation of 
intersubjectivity, cannot rest in a state of immediacy to itself or 
to other subjects. As Luce Irigaray says elsewhere, "Each subject 
is indexed to a gender and addresses another subject which is 
equally so: 'she address youhe, for example. This calls for the 
68 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, pp. 51-52/J'aime A to!, pp. 91-92. She does state 
explicitly her privileging of gender difference over other differences - for example "But I 
think that it's because I'm able to situate there [ie: between woman and man] the difference 
and the negative which I will never surmount [.... ] that I'm able to respect the differences 
everywhere: differences between the other races, differences between the generations, and 
so on. Because I've placed a limit on my horizon, on my power. " 'Je - Luce Irigaray', p. 161. 
This is, of course, a highly contentious position. One of the most considered and Interesting 
critiques of it is Henry Louis Gates, 'Significant Others', Contemporary Literature, 29.4 
(1988), 606-623. Gates criticises Irigaray's lack of concern for daily struggle (based on a 
reading of Speculum and This Sex) and opens up consideration of white men's specularization 
of black men, and gay male specularization. He concludes by prefering to Luce Irigaray some 
lines from Audre Lorde: "It is a waste of time hating a mirror/or its reflection/instead of 
stopping the hand/that makes glass with distortions". This is ironic: I think Luce Irigaray 
would agree with Audre Lorde about this, and indeed also with Gates when he says: "We must 
also interrogate [white, patriarchal representation]'s material conditions of emergence - and 
thus take a very practical interest in patriarchy as an everyday practice whith specific 
conditions of reproduction" (pp. 622-623). Luce Irigaray has insisted from early on that "in 
order for a woman to reach the place where she takes pleasure as a woman, a long detour by 
way of the analysis of the various systems of oppression brought to bear upon her is 
assuredly necessary". Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 31/Ce sexe, p. 30. 
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construction of new types of mediation allowing an inter- 
communication between the genders which is not reducible to need, 
not to instinct, nor to natural fecundity, etc. ". 69 
As might be imagined, achieving this is far from being the same 
process for each gender, not least because men and women have a 
different relation to the Symbolic in our present culture. Thus what 
is necessary is not only a sense of identity and its limits, but a 
more active sense of identity: what Luce Irigaray calls a relational 
identity, a subjective identity which recognizes that each gender 
has its own particular problems to overcome to achieve 
intersubjectivity and thus attentiveness, both with other subjects 
of its own gender and of the other gender: "Such a relation [of 
attentiveness] can only come about if man renounces the 
domination of nature and of the economy of subjectivity, and if 
woman has the ability to govern her nature so that she becomes 
subjectivity". 70 Men must realize that their subjectivity has 
limits; while women must realize their subjective identity (their 
identity as subjects) and, therefore, their need for subjective 
mediation: 
Men f1r d women must modify their relational identity. Certainly, women 
`spontaneously' privilege the relation between subjects and men the relation to 
objects. The feminine subject constructs itself through a relation to the other, 
the masculine subject through the manufacture of objects and worlds starting 
from which it is possible for him to exchange with the other. Let us say the 
woman must learn to put some objectivity susceptible to being shared between 
/and you: this relation must not remain, for her, at the level of need and of 
subjective immediacy, otherwise the you risks disappearing as you. The man, 
on the other hand, needs to rediscover the other as subject beyond his 
universe of objects. What the one and the other lack in order to realize their 
relation is a dialectic between subjectivity and objectivity, at the same time 
69 Luce Irigaray, 'Thinking Life as Relation: An Interview with Luce Irigaray', Interview 
by Stephen Pluhacek and Heidi Bostic, Man and World, 29 (1996), 343-360 (p. 355). 
70 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 461J'aime d toi, p. 82. 
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proper to each and common. 71 
In this passage, Luce Irigaray returns us to the highly pragmatic 
nature of this relationship: indeed (to treat it pragmatically), it 
could serve as an analysis of the crisis of representation in the art 
world. Historically, women artists have had to make work which 
can be seen to be a maintenance mimesis of the patriarchal 
languages of men; while at the same time that work has been 
written about as if it were a symptom of their immediacy as 
women (a phenomenon well charted within feminist art history). 
More recently, the apparent break down of the visual languages of 
art has served only to present the father-son power struggles of 
the maintenance mimeses in a slightly altered guise. The space 
that seems to have opened up for developing subjectivities is still, 
for men, about the production of the object (often as spectacle) and 
not about developing an awareness of the other subject and the 
possibilities of intersubjectivity. The market keeps excelling 
itself, not only (and most clearly) with palpable objects (paintings, 
sculptures etc) but with the selling of objects of little or no 
monetary value (Richard Long's stone circles, David Mach's 
sculptures made from wire coat hangers, matches, etc) and the 
marketing of body art (from Pietro Manzoni's canning of his breath 
and shit to photographic documentation of performance work being 
promoted to the level of artwork itself - and always on the behalf 
of the performer being photographed, not the photographer). 
Aspects of conceptual work could be considered as avoiding this; 
but some which clearly rely upon a degree of intersubjectivity, 
such as Sol LeWitt's wall drawings and Lawrence Weiner's 
71 Luce Irigaray, 'Thinking Life as Relation', p. 355. 
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descriptive statements, nonetheless compromise this by only being 
available as objects on the market. They can only be accessed once 
they have negotiated the market (been sold) and have been 
reproduced by the owner. All of these correspond to Luce Irigaray's 
identification of men's patterns of 'communication': "For men's 
teleology implies rather an abandonment of immediate 
communication - of intersubjectivity and dialogue - in order to set 
off in quest of an oeuvre (in which they usually alienate 
themselves) and, among other things, a spiritual journey compelled 
by a transcendence appropriate to their ego". 72 
For women, the situation is slightly different. Of course, some are 
still permitted a place through their maintenance mimesis of 
patriarchal languages; and in some cases their work is still 
written about as a symptom of their immediacy. For others, 
particularly those who acknowledge their gender, the expression of 
a subjectivity through an appropriate Symbolic syntax has become 
an issue - even if it is one they appear at once to close. Tracy Emin, 
for example, with her to-camera monologue on video about an 
abortion, and her creation of confessional rooms, furniture, quilts, 
and so forth, de-politicises - or even undoes the politics of - 
feminist work of the 1970s through copying the surface style of 
that work while ignoring its collectivity, its political intent, and 
its responsibility towards its audience. 
Other cases appear more ambiguous. Janine Antoni's performance 
Loving Care (1993) (plate 11) is one such. Having dipped her long 
hair in Loving Care hair dye - rumoured to be the brand used by her 
72 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 1001J'aime ä toi, p. 157. 
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Janine Antoni 
Loving Care 
Performance at the Anthony D'Offay Gallery, London, 1993 
Photograph from Janine Antonia Slip of the Tongue (Glasgow & Dublin: CCA & IMMA, 
1995) 
Plate 11 
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mother - Antoni then proceeded to `mop' the floor of the gallery 
with it. One understanding of this work could be that Janine Antoni 
was performing a mimesis of the 1950s works of Yves Klein which 
involved painting the naked bodies of women models then using 
their bodies to make marks. 73 It could be argued that it is a 
productive mimesis: she reasserted a female genealogy (the link 
with her mother, and earlier works by feminists such as Mierle 
Laderman Ukeles) while bring to mind the irony of the product 
name, `Loving Care' - it is, after all, a product to aid women in 
performing the masquerade, femininity, and not about loving the 
subject, woman. It is also a highly ironic reference to `women's 
work' (the `loving care' of usually unseen tasks of cleaning) and to 
Jackson Pollock's action painting. But another understanding can be 
gleaned from the photographic documentation. Here are images of a 
woman turning herself into an object - or maybe abjecting herself 
- before the speculative gaze of the viewers. If this is what 
happened (I was not present at the performance) then either way - 
object or abject - she denies any possibility of articulating her 
subjectivity and of an attentive, intersubjective, presence from 
(and relationship with) the audience. 
There is a problem in achieving an intersubjectivity between 
women to which Luce Irigaray returns on a number of occasions. 
Between a woman and a man there is the irreducible difference of 
gender: 
... between a man and a woman there's a negative, a type of irreducibility that doesn't exist between a woman and a woman. Let's say between a man and a 
woman the negativity (Ia negativite} is, dare I say it, of an ontological, 
irreducible type. But between a woman and another woman it's of a much more 
73 Dan Cameron makes the link between this piece and the Yves Klein works in Janine 
Anton!: Slip of the Tongue, ed. by Nicola White and Brenda McParland (Glasgow and Dublin: 
CCA and IMMA, 1995), p. 45. 
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empirical type and, furthermore, can only be understood and can only live in 
the ontological difference between man and woman. It's complicated. 74 
Luce Irigaray holds that gender difference and gendered 
subjectivity works across other forms of difference. The subject's 
recognition of difference and of the other subject is rooted in the 
experience of sexual difference and its irreducibility. For a 
subject, woman, to recognize the difference that is another 
subject, woman, she has first to be a woman - to have her 
subjecthood - and secondly to have a relational identity - to have 
an awareness of her limits, and that the other subject is 
irreducible to herself. The subject, woman, is still more likely to 
reduce the other subject, woman, to herself, than she is to reduce 
the other subject, man. This is more to do with identity than with 
identification; by which I mean that it is a matter of ontology, of 
the relation to origin and the subsequent relationship with the 
mother: 
The possible discovery of their identity [.... ] poses a major problem of 
subjective relationships. Woman has a direct intersubjective relationship with 
her mother. Hers is more an inter-subject economy than an economy of 
subject-object relations; it is thus a very social and cultural economy that has 
doubtless led to interpretation in which women are seen as the guardians of 
love. This subjective economy between mother and daughter can be partially 
translated into action {en gestes} [.... ]. But that is not enough. Woman must be 
able to express herself in words, images and symbols in this intersubjective 
relationship with her mother, then with other women, if she is to enter into a 
non-destructive relationship with men. This very special economy of woman's 
identity must be permitted, known and defined. It is essential to a real culture. 
It means supporting, not destroying, the mother-daughter relationship. 75 
It is not so much that what is needed here (between mothers and 
daughters, and then between women) is a re-assertion of limits; 
what is necessary is an insertion -a bringing into play - of 
objects. To become the subjects, women, cries out for mediation 
74 Luce Irigaray, 'Je - Luce Irigaray', p. 160. 
75 Luce Irigaray, Thinking the Difference, pp. 19-20/Le temps de la difference, p. 37. 
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between women. Luce Irigaray suggests this when discussing the 
interaction of the woman analyst and the women analysand: 
When it is a matter of analysis of women, between women, this path has to be 
invented, created. [.... ] Our grammar remains foreign to this becoming of 
feminine jouissance, which loses its self-affection and the possibility of 
speaking its name therein. 
Unable to create their own words, women remain and move in an 
immediacy without any transitional, transactional object. They take-give 
without mediation, commune without knowing it with and in a flesh they do not 
recognize: maternal flesh not reducible to a reproductive body, more or less 
shapeless amorous matter to which there could be no debt, no possible 
return. 76 
So there is a fundamental need for women to create objects in an 
appropriate syntax; objects that function transactionally between 
them in order to achieve a form of intersubjective mediation. 
Indeed, in her list of highly pragmatic recommendations to aid the 
creation of space between mothers and daughters, Luce Irigaray 
suggests "Between mother and daughter, interpose small handmade 
objects to make up for losses of spatial identity, for intrusions 
into personal space". 77 Evidently not tokens to assuage guilt after 
traumatic rows, these objects are the development of a Symbolic - 
and symbolised - syntax in the mother-daughter relationship; one 
that will create the third space of mediation, and avoid women 
collapsing back into immediacy. 
To extrapolate from this, therefore, the art object between women 
can then be understood as a means of attending to an 
intersubjective relation if we recognize it as a gift of a means of 
mediation between subjects, rather than as a stand-in for the 
objectness of the other, as phallocentric man does with his 
76 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 105/'La limit du transfert', p. 
293. 
77 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous: Toward a Culture of Difference, trans. by Alison Martin 
(London: Routledge, 1993), p. 49/Je, tu, nous: pour une culture de la difference (Paris: 
Grasset, 1990), pp. 55-56. Hereafter cited as Je, Tu, Nous/Je, tu, nous. 
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production of objects. There is a risk however: 
How can women - especially amongst themselves - refrain from taking from 
this gift the means to palliate their dereliction through a more or less 
immediate and paradoxical mimetic identification? This operation turns the 
donor inside out before there is any gift-object and closes the path of the 
taker; a gesture which involves a sort of capitalization of the mucous 
membrane, an exteriorization of what is most inner. 78 
A woman may make an object - an artwork - as a means of 
mediation and offer it in all good faith as a space through which 
mediation can occur. But this does not guarantee that the woman to 
whom it is offered will be a subject able to accept and produce 
intersubjective relationships between women, or able to be 
attentive. This risks a hurt to the subjectivity of the woman who 
gives the space/object. In part, this risk may be ameliorated by the 
nature of the enunciation, the presenting of what we can call the 
gift-space/object. We can look here at the offer of love. Luce 
Irigaray explains her use of the phrase `I love to you': 
love to you thus means: I do not take you for a direct object, nor for an 
indirect object by revolving around you. It is, rather, around myself that I 
have to revolve in order to maintain the to you thanks to the return to me. Not 
with my prey - you become mine - but with the intention of respecting my 
nature, my history, my intentionality, while also respecting yours. Hence, I do 
not return to me by way of: I wonder if I am loved. That would result from an 
introverted intentionality, going toward the other so as to return ruminating, 
sadly and endlessly, over solipsistic questions in a sort of cultural 
cannibalism. 79 
Luce Irigaray is here suggesting an approach to an intersubjective 
mediation through the phrase `I love to you'. If we take this as a 
model for extended forms of intersubjective communication, then 
it suggests practices of enunciation - of creating intersubjective 
objects - that neither reduce the other subject to an object, nor 
uses them to reflect back one's subjectivity. If I then further 
78 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 110/ 'La limit du transfert', p. 
298. 
79 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 110/J'aime ä to!, pp. 172-173. 
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extrapolate from this to the making of art, it suggests a practice 
which is respectful of the subjectivity of the artist (i. e. which is 
not a maintenance mimesis but instead aids the woman artist in 
becoming the subject, woman) and which is offered as a mediation 
between attentive subjects, not a spectacle whereby to win 
approval. `Attentiveness' here is thus actively two-way, not only 
about the audience, woman. For the artist, it is not only about the 
private, studio practice of making her work, but also about the 
broader aspects of enunciation through the making of art: the 
practices of the market, exhibiting, documentation, criticism, 
teaching or lecturing, and so forth. This suggests that women 
artists continue to get more attentive to these practices as 
practices (that they get more `difficult'? ) and make the shift from 
treating their artworks as objects of distance (as galleries tend 
to), instead treating them as objects of mediation, or, rather, 
objects through which mediation can happen. It means taking 
further responsibility for the work, whatever its material nature: 
in particular, painstaking exactitude over the installation of work, 
but also, for example, in the heart of the gallery system, insisting 
upon a veto - and making positive suggestions about - other 
aspects of the gallery's activity. 80 
Luce Irigaray discusses the reciprocal activity of listening in one 
chapter of I Love to You. 81 She outlines it as a highly exacting 
80 Without wishing to point the finger at individuals, personal experience of working as a 
critic and art administrator suggests that the epithet 'difficult' is more readily applied by 
curators to artists who are women than to artists who are men; indeed, the man who is 
exacting about the context his work in which his is presented may be described as 
'committed' or 'professional'. I would read this as symptomatic of two things: firstly, the 
problematic of phallogocentric representation of 'woman', and secondly, the strategies some 
women already employ to disrupt or open up the structures of various gallery situations. 
81 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, pp. 115-119/J'aime ä toi, pp. 179-185. 
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practice of concentration, attentiveness, and silence: an emptying 
of the ego in order to offer the other subject "the possibility of 
existing, of expressing your intention, your intentionality, without 
your calling out for it and even without asking, without 
overcoming, without annulling, without killing". 82 The situation she 
is assuming here is one of discussion between two subjects: "one 
with the other in the serenity and the occasion of being with, 
respecting difference". 83 Is it then possible to move the model of 
practice she offers here and apply it to an attentive audience of an 
artwork? Is it possible to apply practices from face-to-face 
communication, with the mediation of the spoken word and of 
bodily gesture, to the situation of encountering the mediating 
object of the artwork? I think so, precisely because it is a set of 
practices that are given - emotional, intellectual, spiritual 
practices carried out in and through the body. The risk here would 
be that the artist would still be treating her work as a object of 
distance, rather than an object through which mediation will take 
place; in which case the gift of attentiveness from an audience, if 
it is acknowledged by the artist, will be either ignored, or 
(mis)taken as a response to the question "am I loved? ". Luce 
Irigaray does not mention this risk and its effects on the attentive 
subject. But what is offered by this attentive audience is not the 
gift-space/object mentioned above: instead, her practice of 
attentiveness is part and parcel of being-a-subject. Part of 
becoming the subject, woman, is an acknowledgment that the other 
subject is not reducible to the self, and that an active practice of 
intersubjectivity is necessary. Thus the gift of attentiveness, 
82 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 1181J'aime ä toi, p. 184. 
83 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 118/J'aime ä toi, p. 184. 
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insofar as it is a gift, is a gift of flow from one subject to both 
subjects, as the following passages indicate: 
Thus, I am listening to you is not to expect or hear some information from you, 
nor is it the pure expression of sentiment (a rather naive aim of 
psychoanalysis sometimes). I am listening to you is to listen to your words as 
something unique, irreducible, especially to my own, as something new, as yet 
unknown. It is to understand and hear them as the manifestation of an intention, 
of human and spiritual development. [.... ] 
I am listening to you, as to another who transcends me, requires a transition 
to a new dimension. I am listening to you: I perceive what you are saying, I am 
attentive to it, I am attempting to understand and hear your intention. Which 
does not mean: I comprehend you, I know you, so I do not need to listen to you 
and I can even plan a future for you. [.... ] 
I am listening to you not on the basis of what I know, I feel, I already am, nor 
in terms of what the world and language already are, thus in a formalistic 
manner, so to speak. I am listening to you rather as the revelation of a truth 
that has yet to manifest itself - yours and that of the world revealed through 
and by you. I give you a silence in which your future - and perhaps my own, 
but with you and not as you and without you - may emerge and lay its 
foundation. [.... ] 
This silence is the condition for a possible respect for myself and for the other 
within our respective limits. 84 
These are practices that can be adopted by attentive audiences 
(even by attentive critics? ). Luce Irigaray describes this silence as 
"a space-time"85 made possible by recognising the irreducibility of 
the other subject. Maybe then our encounters with the gift- 
space/object, the artwork of the other subject, are wholly 
appropriately regarded as chances for intersubjectivity, times to 
avoid "subjective affect [.... ]. Sentiment [which] will bind one to the 
other, often in one direction and not reciprocally". 86 
In an earlier evocation of this attentiveness, Luce Irigaray frames 
the discussion in terms of art and aesthetics as social practice: 
For a dialectic of the couple to occur, we need an art of perception that cannot 
be reduced either to a pure innerness or a pure outerness but passes 
ceaselessly from one to the other. This art requires that concrete perception 
84 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, pp. 116-117/J'aime ä toi, pp. 180-182. 
85 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 117/J'aime A toi, p. 182. 
86 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, pp. 116-117/J'aime A toi, pp. 179-180. 
172 
be detailed and attentive, a perception that as autoaffection is individual, is 
copulative as the privileged space of hetero-affection, and finally is collective. 
[.... ] A contemplation of nature in itself, of the self {de soi} and of the other. 87 
She suggests that such an art can be found in some cultures of the 
East, particularly India. This passage alerts the reader to the 
aesthetic and visual possibilities of mediation, though she is 
adamant that "there is a danger that ethics should become a part of 
{soit laissee ä} aesthetics and seen as secondary to the life of the 
people, pleasant but not essential to spiritual development". 88 Does 
this mean that Luce Irigaray considers aesthetics beneath ethics? I 
think it is an analysis of the present relation between the two in 
our culture. In / Love to You she indicates that in some other 
cultures an ethical dialectic of the (sexual) couple is expressed 
aesthetically: 
In cultures where sexual attraction is cultivated, certain gestures express the 
desire for coming together, for union. 
A greeting is made by the whole body. 
A request for carnal union may be expressed by the hands. 
Hands are placed in different positions depending on the degree of union 
desired. 
These modalities of speech and gesture can be brought into relation 
with: 
forms 
colors 
sounds 
fragrances 
breath 
appropriate to man and to woman and to each of their chakras. 
Love, even carnal love, is therefore cultivated and made divine. The act 
of love becomes the transubstantiation of the self and his or her lover into a 
spiritual body. It is a feast, celebration, and a renaissance, not a decline, a fall 
to be redeemed by procreation. Love is redemption of the flesh through the 
transfiguration of desire for the other (as an object? ) into desire with the 
other. 89 
87 Luce Irigaray, 'The Universal as Mediation', in Sexes and Genealogies, pp. 125-149 
(p. 144)/'L'universel comme mediation', in Sexes et Parentes, pp. 139-164 (p. 159). 
Translation modified. 
88 Luce Irigaray, 'The Universal as Mediation', p. 145/ 'L'universel comme mediation', 
p. 159. 
89 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 1391Jaime ä toi, pp. 218-219. 
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What is significant here is that the ethical relation of the couple 
has an aesthetic mediation; it is mediated through the aesthetic 
relation and perceptible through different senses. This is also 
stressed elsewhere: "Looking again at {rouvrant les yeux sur} the 
woman he has loved, the lover may contemplate the work of 
fecundation. And, if the abandon of the beloved woman - and of the 
female lover - means a childlike trust, and animal exuberance, it 
illuminates the aesthetics and ethics of the amorous gesture, for 
those who take the time to reopen their eyes". 90 It is not a question 
of establishing an ethical relation, and adding the aesthetics, nor 
of seeing an aesthetic representation distanced in time and space 
from the ethical relation. It may be a question of reconsidering the 
Western term - and processes of - `aesthetics'. Certainly, it 
assumes that at its most developed and intimate level, 
intersubjectivity is a practice both of ethics and aesthetics: of 
beauty. This is emphasised in the discussion of certain Eastern 
cultures: 
What is remarkable in these traditions is the fact that thought is ready to 
listen to nature, to the sensible. The famous example of this is Buddha 
contemplating a flower. For him, this gesture probably represents the perfect 
act, since it respects nature while becoming spiritual. The overcoming of 
matter by spirit or the privileging of the speculative over the sensible is, 
therefore, no more. Buddha becomes spirit while remaining sensible, awakened 
flesh. Surely this is a fine {une belle} lesson in love? 91 
Here we have again the evocation of listening in relation to a visual 
contemplation, and a working of spirit and flesh together: a "lesson 
in love" for both men and women. 
Luce Irigaray's references to yogic practices and to Buddha can be 
90 Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. by Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. 
Gill (London: Athlone Press, 1993), p. 1901Ethique de la Diffdrence Sexuelle, (Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit, 1984), p. 177. Translation modified. Hereafter cited as Ethics/Ethique. 
91 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, pp. 139-1401J'aime ä toi, p. 219. 
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challenging to a Eurocentric audience, both to our sense of 
positioning in relation to cultural difference, and to a wariness of 
a New Age supermarket-trolley approach to spirituality. However, 
such references have been for a number of years, and are 
increasingly, a significant element within the overall parameters 
of her work. 92 Gayatri Spivak has noted how "French theorists such 
as Derrida, Lyotard, Deuluze and the like, have at one time or 
another been interested in reaching out to all that is not the West, 
because they have, in one way or another, questioned the 
millennially cherished excellences of Western metaphysics", 
prefacing this with the warning that "in order to learn enough 
about Third World women and to develop a different readership, the 
immense heterogeneity of the field must be appreciated, and the 
First World feminist must learn to stop feeling privileged as a 
women". 93 Questioned about these comments three years after 
writing them, Gayatri Spivak strengthens her critique. The problem 
of the interest this strand of Western philosophy has in the non- 
Western lies in the shape of what she calls it's "turn", analyzed as 
"a desire marking the place of the management of a crisis". The 
reversal of the binary opposition, "the so-called non-West's turn 
toward the West" she names a "command" which works to 
deconstruct the Western intellectual desire. In so doing, and 
"making out a life [.... ] as [an] intellectual" she then also needs to 
see how far she herself is "caught within the European desire to 
turn towards the East". As a result, her work of the moment was 
92 An early reference to an Interest in yoga is noted by the interviewers In 'Luce 
Irigaray: Paris, Summer 1980', p. 150; more recently, she has devoted a book to the uses of 
yogic practices of breath in establishing ethical relationships. Tra oriente e occidente: dalla 
singolaritä alla comunitä (Rome: Manifestolibri, 1997). As yet this is untranslated into 
French or English. 
93 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'French Feminism in an International Frame' (1981), in 
In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 134-153 (p. 136). 
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"to show how in fact the limits of the theories of interpretation 
that I am working with are revealed through the encounter of what 
can be defined as `non-Western material"'. 94 This analysis outlines 
what is a continuing complexity of inter-relationship between 
Western and non-Western intellectuals and thinking, where an 
asymmetrical relation is still caught in an imbalance of power. 
Luce Irigaray's project is also (though differently) one of working 
at "the limits of the theories of interpretation". I find it 
interesting that her references to Buddha and contemplative 
practices occur mainly in a text which is neither aimed at a 
readership which is academic or with a specialist theoretical 
interest, nor is it polemic. This removes the references from a 
mimesis of a Western discipline and from a potential 
interpretation of advocacy. While I do not wish to remove Luce 
Irigaray from the problematic structure of intellectual desire 
mapped by Gayatri Spivak, it is important to note that her 
references are highly particular and focused. So too is their 
context - discussions of practices of intersubjectivity and 
attentiveness. This places her turn to the non-Western at one 
remove from the desire which reduces a heterogeneity of peoples 
to an assumed unified class. Consequentially, it is important to 
understand the particularity of the practices to which she refers, 
and how they contribute to her discussions of practices of 
subjectivity within Western psychoanalytic and civic structures. 
While in the West individuals may be able to disentangle (even if in 
a generalised fashion) different strands globally within 
94 Gayatri Spivak, 'Criticism, Feminism, and the Institution', interview by Elizabeth 
Grosz, in The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues, ed. by Sarah Harasym 
(London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 1-16 (p. 8). 
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Christianity and their cultural and social impact - the Jesuits from 
the Mormons, the Baptists from the Anglicans, Italian Catholicism 
from Irish, and both from Liberation Theology - few would be able 
to disentangle the similar differences which occur globally within 
Buddhism. It is important to recognize that Luce Irigaray is 
discussing practices, and not ritual, religion, or cultures. She has 
recently stated this explicitly: 
In any case, western culture has not taught me the way of that with which I've 
begun to experiment, of necessity, in a solitary manner. I have had to turn 
towards the East, the Far East, as have some of the most recent philosophers 
of the West, in order to find there guides and methodological rudiments. I think 
I've done it differently from the masters of the West. I have no pretence 
towards encompassing the knowledge of the eastern masters in my thought, 
nor of simply passing from their words to mine. Such manners of transmission 
seem to be to be perishable. I have followed the teaching of masters for whom 
a daily practice - in fact, of yoga - represents the way to be born or reborn, 
and to discover some of the words and deeds that carry another signification, 
another light, another rationality. 95 
The yogic and meditative practices to which Luce Irigaray refers 
can be found in the differing cultures of India, Japan, Tibet, Korea, 
China, Burma, and many other countries, and their relation to the 
daily ways of life and religions of these places is complex. This is 
not least because these practices can be removed from formal 
religious structures, and instead actively return the responsibility 
for morality and ethics to the individual practitioner. For example, 
although it is often classed by the West as a religion, Buddhism is 
a philosophy; most manifestations of it do not centre upon a belief 
system, god, or gods. Within Zen (one strand within Buddhism) one 
might learn that yogic and meditative practices can aid focus upon 
the moment, even if the chosen activity for that moment might be 
seen as, say, inherently criminal. One would also learn that those 
95 Luce Irigaray, Tra oriente e occidente, pp. 10-11. Capitalising as in the original. I 
would like to thank Nancy Proctor for translating the introduction of this book for me. 
Irigaray's concept of being 'born' will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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around the practitioner may well not notice when she or he is using 
Zen practices in order to focus upon the activity of a particular 
moment. Because of this return to the subject's activity, away 
from the metastructures within a particular culture, Zen has long 
been recognised as a philosophy of practice which has trans- 
cultural possibilities. 96 Indeed, the key Zen philosophers ('masters', 
or teachers) through the centuries have come from diverse 
cultures. Further, forms such as Rinzai Zen (a Japanese form) are 
taught in an overt and flexible philosophical manner, by the setting 
of unique problems (koans) appropriate to the life, work, culture, 
and experience of the individual. 
I am focussing on Zen here as it is the philosophy of meditation and 
attentiveness which probably has the most extensive literature. 
Clearly not a belief structure (not a religion), it offers practices of 
analysis through which, over time, the individual can come to 
terms with his or her interaction with others. 97 Within the 
literature of Zen is discussion of the moment of Buddha's gaze at 
the flower, to which Luce Irigaray refers as a model for 
intersubjectivity. The Mumonkan, one of the classic Zen texts by 
the C13th Mumon, is a collection of 48 problems. One recounts the 
Case (or anecdote) of Buddha and the flower, with Mumon's 
commentary upon it. The Case is this: 
Once when the World-Honoured One, in ancient times, was upon Mount 
Grdhrakuta, he held up a flower before the congregation of monks. At this time 
96 There are also echoes here of some of the criticisms of psychoanalysis - its 
concentration upon the individual, its a-historicity, its lack of attention to issues such as 
class. But the differing cultural flexibilities of Zen and psychoanalysis (I am far from 
suggesting that they are interchangeable) are ensured by attention to/of the particularity of 
individual, which in turn ensures that such issues are within their parameters as is 
appropriate. 
97 In this, the relation of Zen to some aspects of 'New Age' culture is similar to that of 
the practice of psychoanalysis to other aspects of 'New Age' culture - unrecognizable. 
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all were silent, but the Venerable Kasyapa only smiled. The World-Honoured 
One said, "I have the Eye of the True Law, The Secret Essence of Nirvana, the 
Formless form, the Mysterious Law-Gate. Without relying upon words and 
letters, beyond all teaching as special transmission, I pass this all on to 
Mahakasyapa". 98 
R. H. Blyth, in his extended commentary upon the original text and 
his translation, gives us some insights which can aid our 
understanding of Luce Irigaray's interest in this moment of the 
Sakyamuni Buddha. The title Buddha itself "comes from buddh, to be 
completely aware, and was translated into Chinese by [the symbol 
meaning] to perceive, be awake, and [the symbol meaning] gnosis. 
The original meaning of [the symbol meaning Buddha] is to flourish. 
It was used for its sound". 99 So here we have the person who 
`performed' this action referred to initially as completely aware, 
and as mystic knowledge in perception (gnosticism itself was of 
the C2nd AD). In an attractive move, it is the sound of the symbol 
meaning `to flourish' that determines his later visual/written 
representation. R. H. Blyth says "for Zen the important thing is not 
the life and death of Sakyamuni, nor his teachings, but his 
enlightenment. Not his words but his silence, not his acts but his 
un-acts are what we would grasp". 10° 
98 Zen and Zen Classics, ed. and trans. by R. H. Blyth, 5 vols (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 
1960-1966), IV: Mumonkan (1966), p. 76. R. H. Blyth comments closely on the difficulty of 
translation. I would like to draw out here just one phrase, which he translated as "The Eye of 
the True Law", which, left without further comment could imply the worst excesses of 
phalloculologocentrism. He comments on the four Chinese symbols in the original: "[the first 
symbol] means absolute, beyond true and false and all other antitheses. [The second symbol] 
means things, the Buddhist Law. Here it means perhaps all existence. [The third symbol] 
means clear apprehension without any added intellectual deformation or emotional 
discoloration. [The forth symbol] means that all is included, nothing omitted or wasted". RH 
Blyth, Mumonkan, p. 75. This gives a far more sympathetic reading in the context of this 
thesis. While this is a standard English-language translation, it carries heavily the Inflection 
of its time and its translator (Blyth was born 1898). More recently, Thomas Cleary has 
translated the phrase as "treasury of the eye of truth". Keizan, Transmission of Light: Zen in 
the Art of Enlightenment, trans. by Thomas Cleary (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1990), 
p. 6. 
99RH Blyth in Mumonkan, p. 74. 
100 RH Blyth, ibid., p. 75. 
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This practice of enlightened silence begins to resonate through a 
re-reading of Luce Irigaray's understanding of listening or 
attentiveness. The moment of the gift of space-time within a 
relation of intersubjectivity can be found in Zen teaching: "There is 
a common assumption that this moment is not perfect, and because 
of this worldly assumption, we blind ourselves from seeing our 
partners as they really are, as Bodhisattvas. When we begin to see 
people as the Bodhisattvas that they really are, we are seeing 
reality". 101 'Bodhisattva' is a term describing people engaged with 
a process towards enlightenment or self-realization. This could be 
read sympathetically through Luce Irigaray's concept of 'becoming 
subjects', with its integral figuration of an horizon of 
possibilities. Without wishing to overstate any similarities, the 
term could also resonate with the name and process of the 
analysand. So too the practice of `enlightened silence' in relation to 
the other subject echoes Luce Irigaray's comments on the 
transference and counter-transference: 
The analyst must constantly keep present the dimension of his or her 
transference; the other to whom he or she listens must remain close and 
distant within a reversible and open transferential relationship, that links all 
possible positions in space and time. [.... ] The analyst perceives him/herself as 
what he or she is, has been, is becoming, so as to hear the other without 
confusion. This listening marks the limits of his or her possibilities; it acts as 
an horizon between him or her and the analysand; the horizon of life and death, 
a matrix-envelope to be constantly reconstituted in its most nourishing and 
protective dimension, the opening remaining for becoming and reception by/of 
the other. 102 
R. H. Blyth says of the moment between Buddha and Kasyapa "We 
might call this a love scene"; 103 it could also be read as a moment 
101 Joshu Sasaki Roshi, 'True Religion', Metamorphosis, Winter 1977 (unpaginated). 
102 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 115/'La limite du transfert', p. 
304. Translation modified. 
103 RH Blyth in Mumonkan, pp. 76-77. 
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of mediation of "a reversible and open transferential relationship". 
Buddha's state of enlightenment was his `gift' to Kasyapa: "It 
would be a great mistake to think that Kasyapa smiled as a sign 
that he understood something or other. His `breaking his face' was 
the opening of the flower". 104 The flower and Buddha's gesture are 
not reduced to being Kasyapa's objects, his `others', just as the 
flower is not reduced by the Buddha. This is what is mediated - the 
moment of intersubjectivity, of enlightenment, not a truth about 
the flower: "what Zen wishes us to avoid [is] the dividing of the 
flower and its meaning [.... ] When `the bright consummate flower' is 
really seen, the flower sees itself. The self flowers". 105 
It becomes difficult to differentiate between the dissolving of the 
ego in the practices indicated in such texts, and the dissolving of 
the ego indicated in Luce Irigaray's texts on intersubjectivity. 
Although their impulses differ radically, some of their practices 
and effects resonate clearly; indeed, Luce Irigaray has made this 
resonance implicit at particular moments. Ten years before 
explicitly indicating Buddha's contemplation of the flower, she 
wrote a meditation upon the extreme difficulty of not reducing the 
other subject to an object, in which the subject-not-to-be-so- 
reduced was written as a flower: "Do you want the flower to open 
only once? The unveiling of the opening would then belong to you. 
The beauty or truth of the opening would be your discovery. 
Proposed and exposed in one definitive blossoming. The nightly 
closing of the flower, its folding back into itself would not take 
place. [.... ] Fixed display, rapt - an immortal show. Unattainable, 
104 RH Blyth, ibid., p. 80. 
105 RH Blyth, ibid., p. 80. 
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thus transported outside itself". 106 This would sit comfortably 
with some Buddhist teachings. For example, Joshu Sasaki Roshi has 
written: "We all have a personal consciousness which looks at 
things as objects. [.... ] When that personal consciousness becomes 
free of the need to look at the pine tree as object, then your 
personal nature becomes perfect. Now you are looking at bird as 
object, but you don't need to. Bird is [one with] you". 107 To refigure 
this in Luce Irigaray's terminology: the other subject retains its 
subjecthood as you recognize its irreducibility to yourself and its 
irreducibility to being your other; as I quoted her earlier, "one with 
the other in the serenity and the occasion of being with, respecting 
difference". 108 
Luce Irigaray's most far-reaching passage on Buddha concerns the 
realm of the visual. She refers to his 'gaze' at the flower: 
By training the senses in concentration we can integrate multiplicity and 
remedy the fragmentation associated with singularity and the distraction of 
desiring all that is perceived, encountered, or produced. There is no question, 
then, of renouncing the sensible, of sacrificing it to the universal, but rather it 
is cultivated to the point where it becomes spiritual energy. And so the 
Buddha's gazing at the flower is not an inattentive or predatory gaze, nor the 
decline of the speculative into flesh. It is both material and spiritual 
contemplation, furnishing thought with an already sublimated energy. 
This contemplation is also a training in finding pleasure while respecting 
what does not belong to me. Indeed, Buddha contemplates the flower without 
picking it. He gazes at what is other to him without uprooting it. Moreover, 
what he is gazing at is not just anything - it is a flower, which perhaps offers 
us the best object for meditation upon the appropriateness of form to matter. 
Buddha's gazing at the flower might provide us with a model. So might 
the flower. Between us, we can train ourselves to be both contemplative 
regard and the beauty appropriate to our matter, the spiritual and carnal 
106 Luce Irigaray, Elemental Passions, pp. 31-32/Passions dldmentaires, p. 38. The 
meditation upon this problem forms the whole of section 6 of the book (pp. 31-36/pp. 37-44). 
107 Joshu Sasaki Rosh!, Buddha is the Center of Gravity, trans. by Fusako Akino (San 
Cristobal, 1974), p. 88. Indeed, Luce Irigaray's flower is one which has wings. Elemental 
Passions, pp. 34-35/Passions eldmentalres, pp. 41-42. 
108 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 118/J'aime A toi, p. 184. 
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fulfilment of the forms of our body. 109 
Here, in this non-patriarchal gaze, we find one of Luce Irigaray's 
most developed accounts of becoming a subject and intersubjective 
communication. The nature of the particular body is respected (not 
sacrificed to a spurious `universal') while at the same time 
fragmentation is remedied. Flesh and spirit are one in the subject; 
the subject becomes in its recognition of the other subject. 
Communally, in intersubjectivity, in love to each other, we achieve 
our beauty: 
Thus, neither the one nor the other will take the initiative of plucking { cuefUer} 
the bloom in order to contemplate it. Both contemplate {recueillis} and bloom. 
Opening and closing themselves in order to keep giving each other that which 
they could never have brought to life. 110 
Having explored the structures supporting a syntax appropriate to 
women, and confirmed the role of artworks in mediation, I will now 
move on to case studies of the inter-relation of further aspects of 
Luce Irigaray's thinking with particular art practices and works. 
Firstly, I will explore the concept of morphology and its 
discernment in particular media; then psychoanalytic 
understandings of gesture and the gestures of the artist; and 
finally, discuss the need to reassert female genealogies and how 
this is being negotiated in a particular cultural context. 
109 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 251J'aime A to!, pp. 48-49. 
110 Luce Irigaray, Ethics, p. 194/Ethlque, p. 180. 
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Chapter 5 
Morphology, materiality, signification. 
Morphology 
In her important introductory text on French feminism and cultural 
theory, Toril Moi provided an influential gloss on Luce Irigaray's 
use of the term `morphology'. Moi writes: "Irigaray's theory of 
`woman' takes as its starting point a basic assumption of analogy 
between woman's psychology and her `morphology' (Gr. morphe, 
`form'), which she rather obscurely takes to be different from her 
anatomy. "1 This summary set a tone of subtle misunderstanding for 
subsequent discussion of Luce Irigaray's use of the term, extended 
by Margaret Whitford's suggestion that Irigaray is "making a 
connection between the morphology of the body and the morphology 
" of different kinds of thought processes". 2 As Moi's comment 
contains, however, three errors or possible misreadings of Luce 
Irigaray's work, it does not provide a support for advanced 
engagement with this concept. Instead it has supported further 
misreadings, leading to simplistic dismissals of Luce Irigaray as 
an essentialist. In this chapter I want to retrieve the term 
`morphology' as Luce Irigaray uses it from a reduction to anatomy 
and essentialism. I want, moreover, to examine the possibility of 
the concept for reading certain material practices in art, not in 
order to position such practices as illustrations of an Irigarayan 
morphology, but to allow for the play of a morpho-logic as prior to, 
1 Toril Moi, SexualTextual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory (London: Methuen, 1985), p. 143. 
2 Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 58. 
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while also allowing for, the production of what Luce Irigaray terms 
a syntax in the Symbolic. 
My first criticism of Toril Moi is that Luce Irigaray has not 
produced what Moi calls "a theory of `woman"'. To suggest that 
women cannot be theorised as they have not yet attained their 
subjectivity is a theoretical position; but it is not - cannot be -a 
theory of the subjects, women. What Irigaray has done is to analyze 
the phallocentric theory of woman propounded by Western 
patriarchal culture. She also suggests strategies which women 
have used to resist this and which could be used by them in working 
towards becoming the subjects, women. My second criticism of Moi 
is that although the term `morphology' is indeed from the Greek 
morphe, meaning `form', and is used in the field of biology, it does 
not automatically imply an anatomical reading. In biology it does 
not refer to deterministic analysis of forms in themselves, but to a 
method of discerning patterns of relationships between forms (as 
is known to plants-women and plants-men, and thus explaining why 
flowers as superficially dissimilar as buttercups and delphiniums 
are in the same family: they share a morphology). `Morphology' is 
also used as a term within linguistics (the subject in which Luce 
Irigaray presented her first Doctorate3), where it names a method 
of studying the component parts of words and of language. So while 
there is a biological implication in the use of the term 
`morphology', to reduce it, as Moi does, to the anatomical is to 
restrict its possibilities. Furthermore, when Luce Irigaray uses the 
term we are always also in the realm of linguistic structures. 
3 Luce Irigaray, Le langage des dements (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1973). 
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Despite Toril Moi's argument, therefore, Luce Irigaray does not 
structure a relationship of "analogy" between woman's psychology 
and her anatomy (which is what I take Toril Moi to be meaning in 
her use of the term morphology). Rather, I think that she uses the 
term precisely to evoke and describe a distinct relationship not 
covered by the term `analogy'. 'Morphology' names the site of a 
discursive and dynamic relationship between a subject's empirical 
living in the body and in the Symbolic; a relationship which does 
not go in one direction, but where the way the subject understands 
the body is significant in determining an appropriate syntax in the 
Symbolic; and where in turn the subject understands - or reads - 
the body through the Symbolic syntax. The subject then `sees' 
anatomy according to the signifiers of that syntax. The 
'objectivity' granted this understanding is thus determined in a 
dynamic relationship with the subject's language inflected 
subjectivity. 
This last point, of course, can be applied to both men and women. 
As Jane Gallop points out: 
When she speaks of 'the sex which is one', she is not speaking of male genital 
anatomy but rather of an already phallomorphic conception of male genitals, 
that actually has only a selective relation to male anatomy. Irigaray, for 
example, nowhere mentions the testicles. Male genital anatomy does not 
determine phallomorphic logic, but rather phallomorphic logic determines a 
certain unitary perception of male genitalia. 4 
Indeed, an initial, resistant reaction to reading Luce Irigaray's 
enunciation of the multiplicity of women's sexual pleasure and 
sexual organs5 can be to reflect that men's sexual pleasure and 
sexual organs are also multiple: not only the testicles, but the 
4 Jane Gallop, Thinking Through the Body (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 94. 
5 For example, Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. by Catherine Porter with Carolyn 
Burke (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 28/Ce sexe qui n'en estpas un (Paris: Les Editions de 
Minuit, 1977), p. 28. Hereafter cited as This Sex/Ce sexe. 
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scrotum, the glans, the foreskin (if not removed) - to say nothing 
of the touching of the foreskin and the glans, the flow of blood and 
the stretching of skin, the passage from detumescence to 
tumescence and back.... 
But this is surely Luce Irigaray's point, that erecting the phallus as 
a unitary determinant then produces "the penis [as] being the only 
sexual organ {comme seul sexe) of recognized value" and women's 
sex organs as "never amount[ing] to anything but a clitoris-sex that 
is not comparable to the noble phallic organ, or a hole-envelope 
that serves to sheathe and massage the penis in intercourse". 6 
Men's sex organs are seen as singular through phallocentrism - `the 
penis'; and women's are seen only as an other which reflects this 
unit - the nothing-to-see, determined in a negative relationship to 
the one. As Elizabeth Grosz points out, "bodies are not conceived by 
Irigaray as biologically or anatomically given, inert, brute objects 
fixed by nature once and for all. She sees them as the bearers of 
meanings and social values, the products of social inscriptions, 
always inherently social. [.... ] Her emphasis on morphology in place 
of anatomy indicates that she has stepped from the register of 
nature into that of social signification". 7 This social, discursive, 
understanding of the term `morphology' supports Maggie Berg's 
removal of a determinant, indexical link from the relationship: 
It is important, however, to distinguish an indexical relation of language to the 
body, which Irigaray does not claim, from a morphological one. An indexical 
sign, as Silverman explains, is understood to be existentially connected to its 
referent, whereas a morphological or iconic sign merely draws attention to 
formal resemblances. If Irigaray criticizes the phallomorphism of discourse, 
she does not make any claims about which comes first, the penis or the 
phallus; in fact, she suggests that the focus on the penis in the construction of 
6 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 23/Ce sexe, p. 23. 
7 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 
1989), p. 112. 
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male sexuality is a consequence of values inscribed in discourse. 8 
A different morpho-logic might represent both sexes differently, 
and Luce Irigaray made it quite clear early on that this is not a 
matter simply of anatomy: "I think we must go back to the question 
not of the anatomy but of the morphology of female sex"; 9 a point 
she later reiterated: 
Going back to historically dated anatomico-physiological arguments is 
obviously out of the question, but we do have to question the empire of a 
morpho-logic, the imposition of formations which correspond to the 
requirements or desires of one sex as the norms of discourse and, in more 
general terms, of language {langue}. 
[.... ] Trying to find or find anew a possible imaginary for women 
through the movement that brings the lips into contact [.... ] does not imply a 
regressive retreat to the anatomical or to a concept of 'nature', nor is it a call 
to go back to genital norms - women have two lips several times over! It is 
more a question of breaking out of the autological and tautological circle of 
systems of representation and their discourse so as to allow women to speak 
their sex. 10 
A morpho-logic - logic which ensues from morphology - is 
imposing its formations of language. It is significant that Luce 
Irigaray stresses here a morpho-logic, signalling both that only one 
morpho-logic is in play at present, and that it is a logic of a 
morphology of singularity, sameness. Questioning this morphology 
does not mean retreating to anatomy, but breaking the tautology 
where only men's sex is spoken -a repetitive, mirroring, 
maintenance mimesis. 
A red herring: `essentialism' 
8 Maggie Berg, 'Luce Irigaray's "Contradictions": Poststructuralism and Feminism', Signs: Journal 
of Women in Culture and Society, 17.1 (1991), 50-70 (p. 54). 
9 Luce Irigaray, 'Women's Exile: Interview with Luce Irigaray', interview by Dianna Adlam and 
Couze Venn, trans. by Couze Venn, Ideology and Consciousness, 1 (1977), 62-76 (p. 64). 
10 Luce Irigaray, 'The Poverty of Psychoanalysis', Reader, pp. 96-97/Parier nest jamais neutre, pp. 
271-272. Translation modified. 
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If we understand the term 'morphology' as Luce Irigaray uses it as 
the site of a social and discursive relationship between body and 
language, then this should begin to disentangle what Naomi Schor 
has described as "the red flag (when it is not a red herring) of 
essentialism". " In referring back to the passage I quoted from 
Toril Moi at the start of this chapter, Elizabeth Grosz suggests that 
to call Luce Irigaray an essentialist is only possible if there is a 
misunderstanding of the term morphology: 
Moi articulates probably the most common objection to Irigaray's work. If 
morphology is reduced to biology, the charge of essentialism seems well 
justified. If men's biologically given bodies are isomorphic with the structure 
of dominant discourses, this becomes simply a 'fact of nature' that must be 
accepted, not a political move that can be countered. The reduction of 
morphology to biology occurs only on the crudest of misreadings and a wilful 
ignorance on the part of the critics. 12 
Elizabeth Grosz is right to refute the collapse of morphology into 
anatomy; she also evidently wishes to distance both Luce Irigaray 
and her own position as far as possible from any charge of 
essentialism. More recently, Tina Chanter has accounted for the 
charges of essentialism against Luce Irigaray by charting the 
history of the debate about esse ntialism (primarily in the USA) 
while also "exonerating" her from t hat charge. 13 But I wonder if the 
discussion of essentialism is not now both a little more complex 
than this, and a little less fraught? Even while Grosz and Chanter 
were doing their work, certain writers re-invested in or re- 
explored theories of essentialism: most prominently for feminist 
theory, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Diana Fuss. I shall briefly 
fish for the red herring. 
11 Naomi Schor, 'This Essentialism which is Not One: Coming to Grips with Irigaray', in The Essential 
Difference, ed. by Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 
40-62 (p. 53). 
12 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions, p. 113. 
13 Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros: Irigaray's Rewriting of the Philosophers (London: Routledge, 1995), 
pp. 21-46. 
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Diana Fuss indicates that the important question for critics "is not 
`is this text essentialist (and therefore "bad")? ' but rather `if this 
text is essentialist, what motivates its deployment? ' How does the 
sign `essence' circulate in various contemporary critical debates? 
Where, how, and why is it invoked? What are its political and 
textual effects? ". 14 She argues that the risk of essentialism is not 
necessarily one that has to be avoided at all costs. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak suggests that the volubility of the anti- 
essentialist argument is a symptom of displacement: "The critique 
of essentialism should not be seen as being critical in the 
colloquial, Anglo-American sense of being adversely inclined, but 
as a critique in the very strong European philosophical sense, that 
is to say, as an acknowledgement of its usefulness". 15 Spivak is not 
much interested in producing a theory of essentialism, but rather 
seeks to acknowledge and use what she calls a "strategic 
essentialism". The emphasis here is on producing strategies rather 
than on anxiety about whether or not a particular strategy is 
essentialist: 
I think the way in which the awareness of strategy works here is through a 
persistent critique. The critical moment does not come only at a certain stage 
when one sees one's effort, in terms of an essence that has been used for 
political mobilization, succeeding. [.... ] It seems to me that the awareness of 
strategy - the strategic use of an essence as a mobilizing slogan or 
masterword like woman or worker or the name of any nation that you would 
like - it seems to me that this critique has to be persistent all along the way, 
even when it seems that to remind oneself of it is counterproductive. 
Unfortunately, that crisis must be with us, otherwise that strategy freezes 
into something like what you call an essentialist position. 
[.... ] A strategy suits a situation; a strategy is not a theory. 16 
14 Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference, (London: Routledge, 1990), 
p. A. 
15 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'In a Word. Interview', interviewed by Ellen Rooney, in Naomi Schor 
and Elizabeth Weed, pp. 151-185 (p. 157). 
16 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ibid., pp. 153-154. 
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In some respects, this "persistent critique" is what we can see 
happening in Luce Irigaray's work. When she uses the term `woman' 
to refer to what I have read as `the representation, woman' then 
she is being essentialist in the bluntest sense, in that she is using 
the term in a practice of mimesis to expose its construction as an 
essentializing category within patriarchy. She mimeticizes 
essentialism. On the other hand, when she uses the term `woman' to 
refer to what has not yet become - the subjects, women - she is 
naming strategically a space of potentiality rather than a pre- 
ontological category. existing 
Diana Fuss suggests that to an extent such an act of naming can be 
an essentializing move. To announce oneself as anti-essentialist 
names a place for essentialism; and the most ardent anti- 
essentialist, in breaking supposed universals down into categories, 
can be by default in that hazy space between identity and essence 
as a result of the act of naming: 
The constructionist impulse to specify, rather than definitively counteracting 
essentialism, often simply redeploys it through the very strategy of 
historicization, rerouting and dispersing it through a number of micropolitical 
units or sub-categorical classifications, each presupposing its own unique 
interior composition or metaphysical core. 17 
This however appears to be that moment Gayatri Spivak identifies 
when the critique is no longer persistent, and the strategy 
freezes. 18 In Luce Irigaray's writings what we see in the 
potentiality of the subjects, women, is rather what Gayatri Spivak 
describes as "vigilance, what I call building for difference, rather 
than keeping ourselves clean by being whatever it is to be an anti- 
17 Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking, p. 20. 
18 See Hilary Robinson, 'Reframing Women', Circa Art Magazine, 72 (Summer 1995), 18-23, for a 
discussion of how supposedly 'essentialist' imagery has been used in feminist art practice, with some 
examples freezing into an essentialist position (in Judy Chicago's Dinner Party, for example), and others 
used as a strategic critique (works by Adrian Piper and Zoe Leonard). 
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essentialist". ' 9 
In many respects the debate about whether Luce Irigaray is or is 
not an essentialist is precisely Naomi Schor's red herring, a 
distraction from the work that her work is actually doing. Gayatri 
Spivak notes, "I like reading Irigaray, but I read her within the 
tradition of the French, foregrounding rhetoric. I see many of my 
students, who accuse her of being essentialist as she's talking 
about women, not reading in that way. [.... ] Why do we become 
essentialist readers when we read Irigaray? ". 20 I'm not sure that I 
read Luce Irigaray in a French rhetorical tradition; but I hope one 
point that emerges from this present study is the absolute 
necessity of attending closely to her deployment of words and 
terminology. 'Morphology' is crucial in this respect. If we recognize 
it as naming a place between body and language, and recognize that 
it is not anatomy, then we also have to acknowledge that careless, 
non-strategic (a-political) reading reduces it to anatomical 
determinism. This does not mean we should avoid the risk Luce 
Irigaray asks us to take, nor castigate her for taking that risk. For 
this reason I have declined to define (anti) essentialism, preferring 
to throw the red herring back into the water, and instead to discuss 
Luce Irigaray's use of morphology. 
Difference/differance 
In an article published in 1986, Margaret Whitford placed the 
19 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'In a Word', pp. 155. 
20 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ibid., p. 172. 
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empirical ("biological and social") in a relation of difference with 
the textual - "the `female', 'feminine' or `other', where 'female' 
stands metaphorically for the genuinely other in a relation of 
difference". 21 Leaving aside 'the genuinely other' as suggesting an 
authenticity which does not figure in Luce Irigaray's writing, there 
is another problem with this distinction. Maggie Berg's refusal of 
such a distinction is interesting: 
Far from being a trap, however, some sort of identification between 'woman' 
as a discursive construct and woman as a 'biological and social' entity is 
absolutely necessary and is central to Irigaray's work. Had Whitford 
recognized that masculine and feminine are in a relation of ' differance' rather 
than 'difference' in Irigaray's work, she would not, I maintain, also have made 
the misleading split between empirical and textual women. 
In a footnote Berg adds: 
'Differance' combines 'to differ' and 'to defer', in order to remind us that 
difference is not a consequence of identity but, rather, makes identity 
possible. 22 
`Differance' is a concept developed by Jacques Derrida. He defines 
the term as: 
the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing 
by means of which elements are related to each other. This spacing is the 
simultaneously active and passive [.... ] production of the intervals without 
which the 'full' terms would not signify, would not function. 23 
This spacing is both active and passive as it is the combination and 
confusion of differing and deferring. It is in this play that identity 
becomes possible, rather than identity leading to a recognition of 
difference. `Differance' is 
a structure and a movement no longer conceivable on the basis of the 
opposition presence/absence [.... ] Differences are the effects of 
transformations, and from this vantage the theme of differance is incompatible 
with the static, synchronic, taxonomic, ahistoric motifs in the concept of 
21 Margaret Whitford, 'Luce Irigaray and the Female Imaginary: Speaking as a Woman', Radical 
Philosophy, 43 (Summer 1986), 3-8 (p. 7). 
22 Maggie Berg, 'Luce Irigaray's "Contradictions"', p. 55. 
23 Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 
27. 
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structure. But it goes without saying that this motif is not the only one that 
defines structure, and that the production of differences, differance, is not 
astructural". 24 
An opposition of presence/absence (i. e. difference, or a master- 
discourse) would be a product of fixed structure, while the play of 
differance produces transformation and structure together. 
Differance is not produced by something beyond itself; it is 
necessary before any distinctions in seemingly circular 
relationships (for example, speech-language-speech) can be made. 25 
We can see here how an understanding of differance can support 
Luce Irigaray's notion of non-oppositionally gendered identity - 
intersubjectivity, the play of couples, sexuate subjectivity. We can 
also see how morphology, in the site where it is, a spacing between 
body and signification, can be an instance of differance at work 
(play) - both as a producer of gendered subjectivity, and indeed (in 
that very space between body and language, between empiricism 
and text, coming before any distinction between the two), 
productive of structure and transformation in that relationship. 
This is not disproved by the earlier discussion of man's morpho- 
logic as singular; a phallocentric morphology will produce 
structures of sameness while remaining within what is (as I 
indicated) only a morpho-logic. Luce Irigaray writes: 
Thus, for women, the issue is to learn to discover and inhabit a different kind 
of magnetism and the morphology of a sexualized body [.... ]. Whether as prime 
matter or as creation's reject, woman has yet to find her forms, yet to 
spread roots and bloom. She has yet to be born to her own growth, her own 
subjectivity. The female has yet to develop its own morphology. Forced into 
the maternal role, reduced to being a womb or a seductive mask { parure}, the 
female has served only as the means of conception, growth, birth, and rebirth 
24 Jacques Derrida, ibid., p. 27-28. 
25 Jacques Derrida, ibid., p. 28. 
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of forms for the other. 26 
In a phallocentric morpho-logic, defined as other of the same, 
women have been denied the play of differance that will give them 
access to becoming sexuate subjects; denied the play of differance 
which will be productive of an appropriate Symbolic syntax; denied 
this, because the differance made possible by women's morphology 
can not be recognised by a phallic economy. 
Through bringing women's morphology into play, phallic morpho- 
logic will have to shift: 
What this implies is that the female body is not to remain the object of men's 
discourse or their various arts but that it become what is at stake {devienne 
enjeu} in a female subjectivity experiencing and identifying itself. Such 
research attempts to suggest to women a morpho-logic that is appropriate to 
their bodies. It's aimed at the male subject, too, inviting him to redefine 
himself as a body with a view to exchanges between sexed subjects. 27 
Women's bodies will no longer be available as objects for men; no 
longer will women be other of men's Same. Once their subjectivity 
in/as differance with/from men's subjectivity is recognised, so 
too the necessity of inter-subject relationships will be recognised. 
This will be aided by the deployment of a morpho-logic appropriate 
to women: the morphology in play between women's bodies and 
their syntax in the Symbolic, productive of that appropriate syntax 
and of appropriate symbolic (cultural) representations of women's 
bodies. 
26 Luce Irigaray, 'The Three Genders', in Sexes and Genealogies (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993), pp. 167-181 (p. 180)/'Les trois genres', in Sexes et Parentes (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 
1987), pp. 181-196 (p. 194). 
27 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous: Toward a Culture of Difference, trans. by Alison Martin (London: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 59/Je, tu, nous: pour une culture de la difference (Paris: Grasset, 1990), p. 68. 
Translation modified. Hereafter cited as Je, Tu, Nous/Je, tu, nous. 
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The morpho-logic of the lips and of the mucous 
The terms that Luce Irigaray uses most often in order to mediate 
the play of women's morphology are those of 'the lips' and, 
increasingly through the writings of the 1980s, `mucus'. `The lips' 
as a term is inclusive of ambiguity, particularly in the French, 
where levres refers both to the lips of the mouth and to what 
speakers of English are more likely to call the labia of the vulva. 28 
Women's morphology produces a site for itself in this term: not the 
lips of the mouth, not the lips of the genitals, but at the same time 
both the lips of the mouth and the lips of the genitals: `the lips', as 
a term, is the site of a play between them. The lips are at least 
two in at least two ways: both in the play between the (not)mouth 
and (not)vulva, and also in the internal morpho-logic of such 
(non)references: 
The two lips are never one, nor strictly two. They are one and two 
simultaneously: where one identity ends and another begins is never clear. 
(The idea of `one lip' seems absurd! ) This image defies binary categories and 
forms of classification, being undecidable inside and outside, one and two, 
genital and oral. 29 
This morphological always-plural (i. e., which is not a one + one + 
one + .... ) is a point of 
distinction from phallomorphism, which 
counts in ones: 
We are luminous. Neither one nor two. I've never known how to count. Up to 
you. In their calculations we make two. Really, two? Doesn't that make you 
laugh? An odd sort of two. And yet not one. Especially not one. Let's leave one 
to them: their oneness, with its prerogatives, its domination, its solipsism: 
like the sun's. And the strange way they divide up their couples, with the other 
as the image of the one. Only an image. 30 
28 Jane Gallop, Thinking Through the Body, p. 98. 
29 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions, pp. 115-116. 
30 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 207/Ce sexe, pp. 206-207. 
197 
It is noticeable that Luce Irigaray does not produce a name for this 
morpho-logic of women. There is an unhappily conflicting use of 
the word `displace' in Elizabeth Grosz's and Maggie Berg's accounts 
of this. Berg says that "Irigaray eschews dogmatic statement, or 
'univocity', because she does not wish to displace Lacan's phallus 
with the lips, which would be a phallocentric strategy", 31 while 
Grosz suggests that "her purpose is to displace male models, 
rather than to accurately reflect [sic] what female sexuality really 
is. In other words, her writing always refers to other texts or 
discourses, not to a non-discursive or `real' corporeality, 
experience or pleasure. It [.... ] may produce a female body whose 
sexuality is lived in other, different terms than the limiting 
possibilities available to women in patriarchy". 32 But given the 
contexts, I think we can understand Berg's "displace" in the sense 
of `replace', and Grosz's "displace" in the sense of 'disrupt' or 
'dissolve', and in doing so recognize that Luce Irigaray is working 
with this morpho-logic in her writing. The lips' lack of one-ness 
means that they do not have a graspable, unitary form; to give this 
morphology a name would be to revert to phallomorphic practice, to 
place it in patriarchal limits. 
This lack of form is referred to frequently by Luce Irigaray. In an 
often quoted passage, as part of her accounting for phallocentric 
vision and phallomorphic Symbolic syntax being unable to see 
woman's sexuality, she describes the female genitals as lacking a 
form of their own: 
This organ which has nothing to show for itself also lacks a form of its own. 
And if woman takes pleasure {jouit} precisely from this incompleteness of 
31 Maggie Berg, 'Luce Irigaray's "Contradictions"', p. 68. 
32 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions, p. 117. 
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form which allows her organ to touch itself over and over again, indefinitely, 
by itself, that pleasure {jouissance} is denied by a civilization that privileges 
phallomorphism. The value granted to the only definable form excludes the one 
that is in play in female autoeroticism. The one of form, of the individual, of 
the (male) sexual organ, of the proper name, of the proper meaning ... 
supplants, while separating and dividing, that contact of at least two (lips) 
which keeps woman in touch with herself, but without any possibility of 
distinguishing what is touching from what is touched. 33 
This passage shows a constant slipping between the lips of the 
bodily vulva and the (not)vulva of women's morpho-logic - in fact, 
this gives us an understanding (reading) of the vulva through the 
means of such a morpho-logic. The words "jouissance", 
"phallomorphism", "definable", "meaning", and "at least two", 
remove it from the realm of the simply anatomical (while also 
providing plenty of confusion for those who understand 
`morphology' as a synonym for anatomy). The non-form qualities of 
the genitals is in play with the non-form qualities of women's 
morpho-logic: 
In the 'at least two' lips, the process of becoming form - and circle - is not 
only never complete or completable; it takes place (no ek-sistance) thanks to 
this non-completion: the lips, the outlines of the body reflect one another, and 
from this movement is born, self-perpetuates, self-develops, a formation of 
desire, an imaginary of the sexuate body which never detaches itself as 
form(s) from the matter which generates it. Form and matter - and even the 
distinction between the terms is foiled - beget one another endlessly, and no 
form can be extrapolated from the body-support that gives birth to it. 34 
So women's morpho-logic, in play between women's body and 
language, in a play of differance, is the place of the birth of the 
imaginary: women's morpho-logic, which has its own material 
practices, is the necessary precursor to the distinction of a 
Symbolic syntax appropriate to women (this point is crucial). And 
without this syntax, as we have seen, women remain in a state of 
immediacy, without access to their subjectivity, since 
33 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 26/Ce sexe, p. 26. 
34 Luce Irigaray, 'The Poverty of Psychoanalysis', pp. 97-98/Parier n'est jamais neutre, p. 273. 
Translation modified. 
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subjectivity is entwined with signification. Luce Irigaray 
expresses this threading very clearly in `When our lips speak 
together', in language which is not a `poetics of the body', not 
`ecriture feminine', but an attempt to write of and through the 
morpho-logic of women: the parler-femme, the witnessing woman: 
If we don't invent a language, if we don't find our body's language, it will have 
too few gestures to accompany our story. We shall tire of the same ones, and 
leave our desires in latency, unrealized. Sleep again, unsatisfied. And fall back 
upon the words of men - who for their part, have 'known' for a long time. But 
not our body. Seduced, attracted, fascinated, ecstatic with our becoming, we 
shall remain paralyzed. Deprived of our movements. Rigid, whereas we are 
made for endless change. Without jumps or falls necessary. And - without 
repetition. 
Keep on going, without getting out of breath. Your body is not the same 
today as yesterday. Your body remembers. There's no need for you to 
remember. To guard, to count, to capitalize yesterday in your head. Your 
memory? Your body speaks yesterday in what it wants today. If you think: 
yesterday I was, tomorrow I shall be, you are thinking: I have died a little. Be 
what you are becoming, without clinging to what you might have been, what 
you might yet be. Without ever being fixed. Let's leave decisiveness to the 
undecided. We have no need of the definitive. Our body, here and now, gives us 
an altogether different certainty. 35 
The "we", "you", and "I" through this essay should not be reduced 
to anatomy in either the generalised sense (reduction to the 
genitals and the mouth); but neither should they be 
anthropomorphicized (reduced to a quasi-narrative between two 
women). Instead, they can be seen as the play of the differance of a 
woman's morpho-logic: (not)lips, (not)vulva, form and matter 
endlessly begetting each other. This writing of and through the 
morpho-logic of women is the necessary precursor to such later 
works as Elemental Passions - "fragments from a woman's voyage 
as she goes in search of her identity in love"36 - which attempt to 
write (of) intersubjectivity through an appropriate syntax. 
35 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 214/Ce sexe, p. 213. Translation modified. 
36 Luce Irigaray, Elemental Passions, trans. by Joanne Collie and Judith Still (London: Athlone 
Press, 1992), p. 4 (from the Foreword not published in the French edition). 
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And the only way in which such a contemplation can come about - 
the only way to mediate what would otherwise be an immediate, 
distanceless proximity, the morpho-logic of two lips touching - is 
through the morpho-logic of mucus: 37 
Your skin and mine, yes. But mine goes on touching itself indefinitely, from the 
inside. Secreting a flow which brings the sides together. From which side does 
that liquid come? One or the other? Both? So which is one and which is other in 
that production? Neither? Yet it exists. Where does it come from? From both. 
It flows between. Not held or held back by a source. The source already rises 
from the two caressing. 38 
The possibility of realizing an intersubjectivity through the 
mucous is suggested here in Elemental Passions through an attempt 
to symbolize in writing. Luce Irigaray discusses the facets of the 
morphology of mucus and mucous membranes most fully in `The 
Limits of the Transference' and in An Ethics of Sexual Difference. 39 
A distanceless proximity can be dangerous for both sides: 
In the absence of the woman-mother's identity, the speech (parole) of the 
'daughters' is spoken as a mimetic gesture or flows into the mysterious desire 
of/for that Other woman. Verbal exchange therefore becomes impossible or 
useless. Everything takes place before speech intervenes. 
Mimetic appropriation by women is still the most terrible thing of all 
because it is practised without any feminine ideality or model. The absence of 
an ideal maternal and female figure {figure ideale) for women results in the 
fact that mime between women becomes the flaying of one woman by the 
other, the reduction of the skin and of the most mucous {muqueux) to forms 
{figures) into which they flow in order to exist, often quite unconsciously. 
They take the appearance of the other before there is any image, and may 
leave her their own, which they no longer want, for lack of a self- 
37 Once again there are some difficulties in translation, with confusion between the noun 
[mucus/mucus or mucositds] and the adjective [mucouslmuqueux or muqueuse], and the mucous 
membranes [(membrane) muqueuse]. I shall supply the original in each instance. 
38 Luce Irigaray, Elemental Passions, p. 15/Passions 616mentaires (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 
1982), p. 18. Hereafter cited as Elemental PassionsPassions Gldmentaires. 
39 In the later, and in other texts such as 'Questions to Emmanuel Levinas', she engages with the 
work of philosophers such as Levinas and Merleau-Ponty insofar as their work touches upon the 
borderlines of the subject and the ethics and possibilities of inter-subject relations. (She also engages in 
an implicit way with other European philosophers such as Sartre and Baumann. I would like to thank 
Griselda Pollock for indicating this to me. ) My aim here, however, is not to chart the history, impulse, or 
course of her engagement with these other philosophers - there are others, such as Tina Chanter in Ethics 
of Eros, who are more qualified to to so - but rather to sift through Luce Irigaray's writings on the mucous in 
order to understand their possible implications for the practices and criticism of art. 
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representation to venerate, contemplate, admire or even adore. 40 
In "this distanceless proximity between women [.... ], distanceless 
because no symbolic process allows us to account for it", 41 occurs 
a form of maintenance mimesis - but a maintenance of an identity 
which has no subjectivity, no ideal, no Symbolic syntax of its own. 
Instead, that mimesis strips away the possibilities of mediation 
and a syntax through maintaining a disregard of women's 
morphology. There is, I think, a deliberate ambiguity in Luce 
Irigaray's use of the word `figure' here: an ideal female model for 
women would require some form of configuration within a 
Symbolic syntax appropriate to women; the manner of gestural 
mimesis which is described here is the result of a proximity so 
unmediated that it does not recognize that the other is not that 
female ideal model and that it has no mediation, and instead 
displaces the site of the ideal through a mimesis of the 
representation, `woman'. In doing so the woman displaces the 
morphology of the mucous (flays it back, even) with a reduction to 
a form -a reassertion of phallomorphologic, "a gesture which 
involves a sort of capitalization of the mucous membrane, an 
exteriorization of what is most inner". 42 The possibility of (and 
possibilities ensuing from) a woman's morpho-logic are eclipsed by 
the fatal misrecognition of the phallomorphic form that is the 
representation, `woman'. 
40 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', trans. by David Macey, in The Irigaray Reader, 
ed. by Margaret Whitford (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 105-117 (pp. 110-111)/'La limit du transfert', In 
Parler n'est jamais neutre (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1985), pp. 293-304 (p. 299). Translation modified. 
Hereafter cited as 'The Limits of the Transference'/'La limit du transfert'. 
41 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', pp. 107/'La limit du transfert', pp. 
295-296. 
42 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 110/'La limit du transfert', p. 298. 
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To recognize the morphology of the mucus and realize its morpho- 
logic is thus a priority. Once again, Luce Irigaray promotes an 
understanding of bodily mucus which can be read into the morpho- 
logical: 
The mucous {le muqueux}, in fact, is experienced from within. In the pre-natal 
and loving night known by both sexes. But it is far more important in setting up 
the intimacy of bodily perception and its threshold for women. Does the mucous 
perhaps take the place of the soul for women? But of a soul that is never 
spoken? 43 
This idea that the mucous might take the place of the soul is 
potentially seductive, but there is a further complexity here. 
Indicating that the mucous itself has no permanence while being 
the "tissue" allowing the development of duration, Luce Irigaray 
wonders if the mucous is "the condition of possibility for the 
extension of time? ". If it is understood today as being this, she 
answers herself, this is: 
... only insofar as it is made available to and 
for a masculine subject that 
erects itself out of the mucous (/e muqueux}. And which believes it is based on 
substances, on something solid. All of which requires the mucous (le muqueux} 
to blur in its potency and its act (in its potentially autonomous 
hypokeimenon? 44) and to serve merely as a means for the elaboration of the 
substantial, the essential. 45 
So reading the mucous as taking the place of the soul which is not 
yet spoken for women, and as extension of time, could be 
compromised by phallocentric man's very different reading of it as 
his entry to the extension of time. To phallomorphologic, the 
mucous is matter in which man makes his entry to, literally, 
duration (from `dur', meaning `hard'): "a masculine subject that 
erects itself out of the mucous". 
43 Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. by Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill (London: 
Athlone Press, 1993), p. 109/t=thique de la difference sexuelle, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1984), p. 
107. Hereafter cited as Ethics/Ethique. 
44 Gr: that which underlies being; prime matter; the basis. 
45 Luce Irigaray, Ethics, pp. 109-110/Ethique, p. 107. 
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But just because phallomorphologic `gets off' on women's mucus it 
does not mean that the mucous is forever `lost' to women. Indeed, 
we have seen that the realization of the morpho-logic of the 
mucous is crucial for woman-woman relationships; it is also 
crucial for woman-man relationships and for a woman's 
relationship with herself - her self-mediation through an 
appropriate symbolization: 
However, it is possible that the mucous {le muqueux} corresponds to something 
that needs to be thought through today. For different reasons and imperatives: 
- any thinking about the female has to think (through) the mucous {dolt 
penser le muqueux}. 
- No thinking about sexual difference that would not be traditionally 
hierarchical is possible without thinking (of) the mucous (sans pensee du 
muqueux}. 
- In its extension, in its property of expansion, does the mucous {le 
muqueux} not correspond to what Heidegger designates as the crucial issue our 
generation has to think through? 46 
This last point refers us back to the opening paragraph of An 
Ethics: "sexual difference is one of the major philosophical issues, 
if not the issue, of our age. According to Heidegger, each age has 
one issue to think through, and one only. Sexual difference is 
probably the issue in our time which could be our 'salvation' if we 
thought it through". 47 The morphology of the mucous is that which 
mediates a woman to herself, and also mediates her, in her 
difference and specificity, to her lover. It is the mark of her sex, 
and it is the mark of mediation. The lips are, morphologically, a 
threshold; ajar, but touching; 48 not closed; not skin (surface 
closure), not flayed (internal made external), not a unitary form of 
flesh (non-mediating); but rather, mucous: the site of mediation. 
46 Luce Irigaray, Ethics, p. 110/Ethique, p. 107. Translation modified. 
47 Luce Irigaray, Ethics, p. 5/Ethique, p. 13. 
48 'i'entreouverture' (for example, Parier n'est jamais neutre, p. 300; Ethique de la difference 
sexuelle, p. 108) can read as 'the inter-enter-opening'. It is usually translated (rather unsatisfactorily) as 
open". 
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Margaret Whitford has speculated that "it will be of great interest 
to see what emerges from women's interpretive imaginations when 
the mucous starts to receive the same kind of attention as the two 
lips. It is not clear yet, for example, whether the mucous will be 
able to bear the weight of symbolic meaning that Irigaray attaches 
to it". 49 Through this article, Margaret Whitford refers to the 
mucous as bodily, suggesting that what is needed is "to symbolize 
the mucous". 50 I think that this is a slippage between the adjective 
and the noun, producing an over-literal reading of Luce Irigaray's 
use of the ajective "the mucous" {le muqueux}. Instead of 
symbolising mucus (the noun) as such, we need to recognize in it 
the play of 'differance', and its morphological patterns, and develop 
from that site morphologies of mediation and, contiguously, of 
another syntax in the Symbolic. As Luce Irigaray says, "of course 
no woman has the morphology of another". 51 To "symbolize the 
mucous" (being reductive in turn, this could collapse into inventing 
symbols of it) would be to take from it with a gesture which (as 
mentioned earlier) "turns the donor inside out before there is any 
gift-object and closes the path of the taker; a gesture which 
involves {geste oü se joue} a sort of capitalization of the mucous 
membrane {du muqueux}, an exteriorization of what is most 
inner", 52 and in so doing, revert to a phallomorphologic. However, 
recognizing its morphology involves relinquishing such control: 
"these mucous membranes {ces tissues muqueux} evade my 
49 Margaret Whitford, Irigaray's Body Symbolic', Hypatia, 6.3 (1991), 97-110 (p. 107). 
50 Margaret Whitford, ibid., p. 106. 
51 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 112/'La limit du transfert', p. 300. 
52 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 110/'La limit du transfert', p. 298. 
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mastery". 53 
What I discern and am trying to present here in my reading of the 
morphology of the mucous is a morphology which allows for both 
the relinquishing of control and the presence of the subject 
demanded by the intersubjectivity and attentiveness discussed in 
the last chapter. Recalling the flowering of the subject that was 
the Buddha's gaze upon the flower (one of many references to 
flowers which should not, I think, be misread as a patriarchal 
representation of femininity), Luce Irigaray evokes the potential of 
the mucous: "The flesh of the rose petal - sensation of the mucous 
{du muqueux} regenerated. Somewhere between blood, sap, and the 
not yet of efflorescence. Joyous mourning for the winter past. New 
baptism of springtime. Return to the possible of intimacy, its 
fecundity, and fecundation". 54 And this "return to the possible of 
intimacy" can be found in the way the mucous marks the limits of 
the subject as it performs a mediation between subjects. 
Articulating the limits between women is problematic: "the very 
openness {I'entreouverture} of their bodies, of their flesh, of their 
genitals {sexe} makes the question of boundaries difficult". 55 What 
is necessary, then, is a site of a `third term' -a site that is neither 
subject (and which will thus prevent each woman reducing the 
other to herself), but which is not abstract: what Luce Irigaray 
describes as a "sensible-transcendental -a female transcendental 
against which each women can measure herself rather than 
progressing only by taking the place of the mother, the other 
53 Luce Irigaray, Ethics, p. 170/Ethique, p. 159. 
54 Luce Irigaray, Ethics, p. 200/Ethique, p. 185. 
55 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 112/'La limit du transfert', p. 300. 
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woman or the man". 56 Throughout the discussion of how this may be 
achieved in the psychoanalytic transference between a woman 
analyst and a woman analysand, Luce Irigaray uses the morpho- 
logic of the mucous to provide an understanding of the processes: 
Within the transference, a certain limit, a certain threshhold is never crossed 
and always transgressed - the porosity of the mucous membranes {des 
muqueues}. [.... ] The mucous {le muqueux} never retouches itself carnally in 
the transference. 57 
With this morpho-logic in play, it is inevitable that "already- 
constructed theoretical language does not speak the mucous {ne dit 
pas le muqueux}". 58 Once again, it is the lack of an appropriate 
syntax in the Symbolic which can prove fatal for the two women 
attempting to achieve subjecthood and intersubjectivity through 
the psychoanalytic transference. As indicated above, Irigaray had 
previously outlined how "mime between women" without "an ideal 
maternal and female figure [.... ] becomes the flaying of one woman 
by the other, the reduction of the skin and of the most mucous to 
forms into which they flow in order to exist". 59 In the analytic 
scenario, with its already constructed theoretical language, the 
mucous: 
... remains a remainder, producing delirium, dereliction, wounds, sometimes 
exhaustion, mucous {muqueux} deployed in the journey that is an analysis, and 
which risks death if it is not resituated in its place. In that case, all thought 
becomes skin stripped from the other. 6° 
In order to allay this possibility, the two subjects have to produce 
a (non)object - the third term - between them: 
56 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 112/'La limit du transfert', p. 300. 
57 Luce Irigaray, The Limits of the Transference', p. 113/'La limit du transfert', p. 302. 
58 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 113/`La limit du transfert', p. 302. 
59 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 110-111/'La limit du transfert', p. 299. 
60 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 113/'La limit du transfert', p. 302. 
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How are they constantly to make greatest and smallest meet? And above all, 
move from one qualitative to another? A difficult energetistic question, 
especially when there is no object, no comparison between the two poles. They 
must become creations. Art objects? In that way two subjects can advene one 
to the other, and an alliance between the two becomes possible. 
This is not so much a problem of mastery as the question of a creation 
allowing participation in the jouissance of the object or its cocreation: a useful 
work because it marks, without destruction, the limits of energy, of the flesh 
and of the body, of desire and its possibilities. The creation or elaboration of 
the object becomes an architectonic of the body, of a life and a death that does 
not kill the other. 
This creation might be the only thing that could allow the resolution of 
the transference. 61 
Without the morpho-logic of the mucous in play in the analytical 
process, this resolution would be impossible. The object would 
otherwise remain the over-valued object of phallocentrism 
identified in the last chapter; possibly, if the fatal mimesis by one 
woman of the other has taken place, a symbolizing of the mucus in 
a phallocentric syntax. The `object' that is created, however, is 
something more like a fluidity of creation itself: the work of 
creating a subject is a co-creation in the analysis. This must start 
not from the premise that one woman is the subject and the other 
is her object (nor that the other is the object of the analysis); but 
that both are potentially subjects in a relationship of 
intersubjectivity: 
The third term in the transference becomes the limits not only of the skin but 
also of the mucous {du muqueux}, not only the walls, but also the experience of 
the most extraordinary intimacy: a communication or communion which 
respects the life of the other whilst still tasting the strangeness of his/her 
desire. Impossible to exhaust? The outer limits of interpretation, beyond which 
the risk of aggression {risque poldmique} is at its most implacable. 
And where one also discovers the perception of the possibility or 
necessity of calm. An interval between the two, a release from quantitative 
estimates, to allow the opening on to an encounter of a different, peaceful 
quality. A ground other than, the same as, that of the highest intensity? 
Access to this is essential if there is to be an other. 62 
61 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', pp. 112-113/La limit du transfert', p. 301. 
62 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', pp. 114-115/'La limit du transfert', p. 303. 
Translation modified. 
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In this way the transference takes place not as a pouring of one 
subject into the other, with the resultant anihilation of both, but 
as a relation of intersubjectivity: two subjects, women, retaining 
their boundaries, 63 relating through the play of the morpho-logic of 
the mucous. The morphology of the mucous - its (non)form, its 
other-translucency, its resistance to being mastered by either 
subject, its specificity to each woman, and its mediation of the 
woman to herself - provides a pattern for the morphology of the 
mediation between the women. The `object' to be created is this 
work: 
... it is only in an act that the mucous {le muqueux} perceives and loves itself 
without thesis, without position outside itself. The potency {/a puissance) 
achieves 'its' act which is never set in a finished piece of work. But which is 
always half open {entrouvert(e)}. Never amounts simply to {irreductible ä} 
consumption. To producing some child". 64 
Once the patterns of the morpho-logic of the mucous are 
recognized, they can be worked for elsewhere. I should like now to 
take this understanding of Luce Irigaray's writing of the mucous as 
being an exploration and use of the morpho-logic of the mucous, and 
look for its patterns in practices of art-making: how it might be 
discerned in the use of certain media. Further, I will explore how, 
as a result, those media may function as material through which 
mediation between subjects may take place. 
The morphology of the mucous: a possibility in the 
materiality of art practices? 
63 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 115/'La limit du transfert', p. 303. 
64 Luce Irigaray, Ethics, p. 1111Ethique, p. 108. 
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Architects are needed. Architects of beauty who fashion jouissance -a very 
subtle material. Letting it be and building with it, while respecting the approach 
{I'abord}, the threshold, the intensity. Urging it to unfold without a show of 
force. Only an accompaniment? It only unfolds itself from being unfolded. It is 
in touch with itself from being touched while touching itself. [.... ] 
Is the memory of touching always disguised by senses that forget 
where they come from? Creating distance through a mastery that constitutes 
the object as a monument built in place of the subject's disappearance. 65 
Various commentators have attempted to describe Luce Irigaray's 
use of the morphology of lips and the mucous within extant 
grammatical formations. Most of them fall short of the way in 
which she herself uses such a morpho-logic - as we have seen, 
"already-constructed theoretical language does not speak the 
mucous"66 - and thus also fall short of being ways in which we 
might think anew about practices of making art, and the languages 
we use through which we can develop an appropriate Symbolic 
syntax. For example, Margaret Whitford points out that "readers do 
not hesitate to use the term `metaphor' when they discuss 
Irigaray's work; some, but not all, realize that there is a problem 
here". 67 Whitford herself has fallen foul of these problems when, as 
we have seen, she suggests that what is needed is "to symbolize 
the mucous". 68 The problem here is in the use of the word 
"symbolize": Margaret Whitford appears to slide from using the 
term `symbolic' in its psychoanalytic meaning ('the Symbolic'), to 
using it as one might refer to symbols within symbolism. Thus she 
is able to refer to Luce Irigaray's "images of the body" such as the 
two lips and the mucous, and say "that what Irigaray has succeeded 
in doing [.... ] is to provide images of women's bodies which have 
65 Luce Irigaray, Ethics, pp. 214-215/Ethique, p. 197. 
66 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 113/'La limit du transfert', p. 302. 
67 Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray, p. 71. 
68 Margaret Whitford, Irigaray's Body Symbolic', p. 106. 
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become material for symbolic exchange between women, and which 
therefore have already in a limited domain and to a limited extent 
exceeded the parameters of patriarchal representations of 
women . "69 To me, this 
is a rather literary way of reading Luce 
Irigaray's writing, and one which comes perilously close to 
encouraging a reading which falls back into the capitalizing (to 
follow Luce Irigaray's usage of the term7O) of the verbal or visual 
metaphor. It also undermines her discussion of `the lips' and the 
mucous as an example of metonymy, rather than metaphor. 71 There 
is no doubt that this problem of Margaret Whitford's and of others 
could be seen as the crux of an interesting problem with Luce 
Irigaray's writing itself: how, at present, can we work 
simultaneously with and against the structures and tropes of the 
Symbolic currently provided by our culture? How does one produce 
the element of mediation - the third term, the gift-space/object, 
the appropriate syntax in the Symbolic - and its representations, 
without capitalising? How do we self-represent without 
reproducing (to ourselves or to others) the representation, 
`woman'? 
Diana Fuss also distinguishes between metonymy and metaphor in 
Luce Irigaray, suggesting that "the `two lips' operate as a metaphor 
69 Margaret Whitford, ibid., p. 98. 
70 Luce Irigaray, 'Limits of the Transference', p. 11 0/'La limit du transfert', p. 298. 
71 Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray, pp. 177-185. Jane Gallop has a similar problem: "Vulvomorphic 
logic, by newly metaphorizing the body, sets it free, if only momentarily. For as soon as the metaphor 
becomes a proper noun, we no longer have creation, we have paternity" (Thinking Through the Body, p. 96) 
- seeming not to realize the trap of producing the (highly reductive) term 'vulvomorphic logic' as a noun 
after a rather elegant disquisition on the problem. Maggie Berg notes this. However, after quoting Luce 
Irigaray on the need to ascertain whether "the motifs of 'self-touching' [.... ) might not imply a mode of 
exchange irreducible to any centering, any centrism" (This Sex, p. 79/Ce sexe, p. 76) and saying she 
does not wish to displace Lacan's phallus with the lips, which would be a phallocentric strategy" ('Luce 
Irigaray's Contradictions' p. 68), Berg supplies her own term of "lipeccentrism" (p. 69). This runs the 
danger of being defined by its otherness to the (phallic) centre. Their relation would require further teasing 
out before it could be used productively. 
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for metonymy". 72 This seems to me to be closer in structure to an 
understanding of what Luce Irigaray's writing is doing - what work 
her work is doing -- but still with the risk of retaining 
phallogocentric understandings and functions of the terms 
`metaphor' and `metonymy'. Metaphor has also been hugely dominant 
in the way we talk about art and art-making, even of radical 
practices. Mary Kelly, for example, has also explored the roles of 
metaphor and metonymy in making work: 
As I've emphasised before, when I speak about it, my way of working is a 
visualisation and a theorization simultaneously. [.... ] I work out the problems, 
or engage in the debates that I'm interested in partly as a visual means, and 
this is not very easy to describe. I'm sorry I have to resort to some kind of 
essentialism here, but how do you describe a feeling for certain materials, 
how do you make that translation? It's interesting to see how much the whole 
idea of metaphor is central to what causes visual pleasure. [.... ] If you're 
involved in a construction of meaning that's tying together with form and 
content; then, it's primarily the ideas that you're working with that are 
prompting you to take on the problems of different media. [.... ] 
Another feeling that's very common is that you're never satisfied. That places 
you within the axis of metonymy of desire, which is also very productive to 
examine in terms of who you really are desiring to speak to in the work. 73 
This is where I think we need to return to an understanding of the 
functioning of morphology, and of the morpho-logic of `the lips' and 
of the mucous: to attempt to locate a morphology which can 
account for "a visualisation and a theorization simultaneously [.... ] 
a construction of meaning that's tying together with form and 
content" (a mediation through materials - an enunciation which is 
legible and productive of discourse - in an appropriate Symbolic 
syntax). What we can see Luce Irigaray doing - practising - in her 
`parler femme' is not so much in a reductive sense `speaking as a 
72 Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking, p. 66. 
73 Mary Kelly in 'Mary Kelly and Griselda Pollock in Conversation', in Critical Feminism: Argument in 
the Disciplines, ed. by Kate Campbell (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992), pp. 182-216 (pp. 193, 
197). 
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woman'74 but rather speaking in the morpho-logic of `the lips' and 
the mucous. Thus, the task for us reading her work is not to 
distinguish between metaphor and metonymy, but to realize the 
play of differance between the language which is spoken and that 
which is said within that language (they may well be contiguous) 
and its morphology. This would then allow us to approach, develop, 
and be attentive to the motifs within that speech without 
capitalizing them as a result of our use of ('speaking' and `reading) 
the language, without returning them to metaphor or phallomorphic 
object. Luce Irigaray hints at this early in her work, commenting 
upon motifs such as `self-touching' within the work: 
But of course if these were only 'motifs' without any work on and/or with 
language, the discursive economy could remain intact. How, then, are we to 
try to redefine this language work that would leave space for the feminine? Let 
us say that every dichotomizing - and at the same time redoubling - break, 
including the one between enunciation and utterance, has to be disrupted. 
Nothing is ever to be posited that is not also reversed and caught up again in 
the supplementarity of this reversal. To put it another way: there would no 
longer be either a right side or a wrong side of discourse, or even of texts, but 
each passing from one to the other would make audible and comprehensible 
{pour faire `entendre'} even what resists the recto-verso structure that 
shores up common sense. If this is to be practiced for every meaning posited - 
for every word, utterance, sentence, but also of course for every phoneme, 
every letter - we need to proceed in such a way that linear reading is no 
longer possible: that is, the retroactive impact of the end of every word, 
utterance, or sentence upon its beginning must be taken into consideration in 
order to undo the power of its teleological effect, including its deferred action. 
That would hold good also for the opposition between structures of 
horizontality and verticality that are at work in language. 75 
The play of the morpho-logic (including its play through the media 
of the artwork) precede the distinction of the Symbolic syntax 
appropriate to women: the motifs and representations occurring 
74 When asked in an interview if "writing as a woman" (dcrire en tant que femme) was "valid" (valable) 
Luce Irigaray responded to that particular question as if it were a tautology: "I am a woman. I write with who 
I am. Why wouldn't that be valid, unless out of contempt for the value of women or from a denial of a culture 
in which the sexual is a significant subjective and objective dimension. ' Je, Tu, Nous, pp. 52-53/Je, tu, 
nous, p. 61. Later in the interview Irigaray queries the translation (from English to French) of the questions 
being put to her. In This Sex, "parler-femme" is translated as "speaking (as) woman". This Sex, p. 135. 
75 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 79-80/Ce sexe, pp. 76-77. 
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within it - that which we wish to say in it - cannot be anticipated 
in advance; nor can the degree of contiguity between the two. 
Continuous vigilance regarding the play of the morpho-logic in the 
structure of the Symbolic is required: in a constant multiple 
movement we have to work with and through the language (material 
and representations) to hand, back to its informative morpho-logic, 
and return again to language. (This reminds me again of Buddhism: 
in Zen translations of the I Ching the 18th hexagram is named 'work 
with what has been spoiled'. ) It indicates, moreover, the partial 
nature of this present text: it is a practice of writing, not a 
practice of making art. As such, it should not presume to tell 
artists what to do, but rather should be at that moment of re- 
engaging with the morphological structures informing artworks and 
the practices of making them and reading them. 
What is at stake here is the morpho-logic informing both our 
making of artworks, and how we represent the representational 
practices of art to ourselves. Lynda Nead has noted how, within 
writing on art: 
... the artistic subjectivity that 
is registered by the brushwork and surface is 
sexualized. Art criticism writes sex into descriptions of paint, surface and 
forms. The category of art does not permit a sexuality that is an obvious and 
provocative element, but a certain kind of phallocentric textuality can be 
articulated in the discussion of a painting's handling and style. The sexual, 
then, is distanced from the subject represented on the canvas and is 
reinscribed through the metaphorical language of connoisseurship. 76 
In recognizing the morpho-logic of the mucous and the lips, the 
whole approach of thinking through metaphor would need to be 
undone; the recognition and privileging of metaphoric elements 
before other elements would be opened for question. As with Luce 
Irigaray's work on vision, this does not mean that metaphor would 
76 Lynda Nead, The Female Nude: Art, Obscenity and Sexuality (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 58. 
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be expunged: rather, that its role in producing phallocentric 
representations be recognised, and the prior workings of a 
phallomorphologic be disrupted by its need to recognize a 
morphology of the mucous. This returns us to the materiality of art 
making, and to the problem of approaching a medium and working 
with it as that element of mediation - the third term, the gift- 
space/object of co-creation - in which enunciation in the 
appropriate syntax in the Symbolic is possible. Thus, 
`representational practices' in artworks are in an interdependent 
and discursive relationship with the practices and processes 
engaged with by the artist in her us e of media. The medium, 
therefore, must be recognized by the artist and the attentive 
audience as an element in a discourse productive of 
representations which remain without capitalising - if you like, 
one set of signifiers among others in artworks as non-capitalized 
objects. 
The medium recognized historically as the one privileged among art 
practices is paint. Griselda Pollock argues, moreover, that: "Since 
the late eighteenth century, and certainly since the beginning of 
this, the term ['painting'] has referred to the hegemonic cultural 
form which is constituted by the combination of a subject (the 
artist), an activity (the practice in the studio) and a web of 
symbolic meaning woven through that figure in that space by means 
of the economic investment in the commodity it produced". 77 In 
analyzing the critical structures of modernism which capitalize 
the medium, Paint, and the practice, Painting, as product of the 
Artist, Griselda Pollock writes of the signification of paint and the 
77 Griselda Pollock, 'Painting, Feminism, History', in Destabilizing Theory: Contemporary Feminist 
Debates, ed. by Michele Barrett and Anne Phillips (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 138-176 (p. 159). 
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act of painting within Greenbergian modernism: 
The purity of the visual signifier, seemingly emptied of all reference to a 
social or natural world, is still loaded with significance through its function as 
affirmation of its artistic subject. Abstract Expressionism is a celebration of 
the `expressivity' of a self which is not to be constrained by expressing 
anything in particular except the engagement of the artistic self with the 
processes and procedures of painting. Thus 'painting' is privileged in modernist 
discourse as the most ambitious and significant art form because of its 
combination of gesture and trace, which secure by metonymy the presence of 
the artist. These inscribe a subjectivity whose value is, by visual inference 
and cultural naming, masculinity. 78 
As Griselda Pollock's essay indicates, the moment of modernism 
and its structuring of `the Artist' has been massively disrupted by 
post-modernist and feminist critiques and practice. She names 
artists such as Barbara Kruger, Lubaina Himid, Martha Rosier, Jo 
Spence and Mona Hatoum whose "strategic practices [ensure that] 
their work is a site for a sustained analysis of the meanings of 
sexual difference authored by culture, across which `cultural body' 
they inscribe feminist readings"79 - practices which include 
disrupting the privilege accorded paint. 
It is interesting to note, however, that when it comes to painting, 
some feminist critiques have simply enacted a reversal upon the 
Greenbergian emptying of all meaning other than "the engagement 
of the artistic self with the processes and procedures of painting", 
and have instead emptied paintings by women of all meaning other 
than that discerned in their images. One example of this occurs in 
Peggy Phelan's Unmarked: The Politics of Performance, where a 
discussion of paintings by Mira Schor omits any engagement with 
the materiality of the work (other than to give their dimensions, 
configuration when hung, and the fact that some utilize rice paper) 
78 Griselda Pollock, ibid., p. 142. 
79 Griselda Pollock, ibid., p. 154. 
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in favour of a discussion of the overt representations of the 
imagery. 80 This is surprising, given both the subtitle of the book, 
and other discussions within it - for example, of representations in 
films by Yvonne Rainer as products of material and image in a 
dynamic relation. If Painting (as capitalized act) is left 
undisrupted by feminist theorizing in the culture, then not only 
will feminists who are painting remain marginal and their 
strategies reduced to ones of choice of medium, but also, crucially, 
any feminist interventions into the practices of painting will 
remain broadly illegible, even to other feminists. In some respects 
- both because of its historical signification, and because of some 
of its material potentialities - the practice of painting could prove 
a major testing ground for the possibilities of non-phallomorphic 
developments of an appropriate Symbolic syntax. It should be clear 
that I am not arguing for a return to formalism; as Griselda Pollock 
has stated: "Any return to formalism after these [feminist and 
socialist] critical developments in theorisation and historical 
analysis of modernism and its legacies will be to refetishise the 
form which has been shown itself to be an ideological 
representation of a far more complex process of change in the 
politics of representation". 81 It would be easy to capitalize mucus 
by capitalizing paint, understand `Paint' as a metaphor for mucus. 
Instead, I want to try to arrive at an understanding of painting as 
one site of mediation within the morpho-logic of the mucous. First, 
I would like to indicate one example of how the work of one woman 
has been brought into a state of semi-legibility, but no further, by 
the terminology of present feminist criticism. 
80 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 51-60. 
81 Griselda Pollock, 'Pollock on Greenberg', Art Monthly, 178 (1994), 14-18 (p. 18). 
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Laura Godfrey-Isaacs first came to prominence in 1990 when she 
received a Momart Fellowship at the Tate Gallery, Liverpool. At 
that time, and until 1992, she was working with oil paint, but 
subsequently she has worked with a variety of media including 
resin, plasticine, and expanded polyurethane. The properties of oil 
paint were pushed to the limit in her paintings, which ranged from 
one foot to over ten foot wide. Usually single colour - for example 
the Red Series (1991-1992) (plate 12) - the technical interest was 
in working with the contrasting liquidity and solidity of the paint, 
its qualities when skinning and drying, and when mixed with 
different oils and varnishes. This was extended in the series of 
small Padded Paintings (1993-1994) to the extent that the 
paintings would be built up with scrapings of dried paint and 
varnishes, layer upon layer, until they were inches thick. The 
related Alien Blobs (1994) were moved off canvas, and worked 
with resin, until the largest was 25"x15"x10". In the Monstrous 
series (1995), Laura Godfrey-Isaacs started making free-standing 
sculptural pieces, using similar techniques of pouring and layering, 
but on a large scale with polyurethane. The malleability of 
plasticine, clay and dough has been explored in series of small clay 
and dough sculptures (1995), and in the wall pieces called 
Plasticine Paintings (1995). 
Whatever the media, critics have located the signifiers of Laura 
Godfrey-Isaacs' work somewhere between its imagery and its 
material, and its significations in the realm of the body, its wet 
interior and its skin. They have been read as exploring qualities of 
their media in order to express interest in and metaphors for 
viscera and bodily fluids. Simon Watney writes: "Laura Godfrey- 
Isaacs is well known for the emphasis in her work on the liquidity 
Laura Godfrey-Isaacs 
details fromLumpish, Exposure, and Sensation 
All 1991. Oil on canvas 
Courtesy of the artist 
Plate 12 
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of paint, its viscous, tick-tacky, messy gooey qualities. [.... ] Obliged 
to think of the painted surface through metaphors of skin and flesh, 
Godfrey-Isaacs' work takes us to the other side of skin, to the 
clinically exposed insides of the organism - gleaming, wet, animal, 
and to most of us largely unrecognisable and incomprehensible". 82 
Much referred to, but little theorized, Laura Godfrey-Isaacs' work 
has been written about predominantly in two styles, even in 
gallery-generated texts intended to support and elucidate: either in 
a mock-transgressive voice, reminiscent of the advertising of 
cream-cakes to women ("naughty but nice"), or assuming that their 
engagement with feminist theory is transparent. Simon Watney 
falls into the former category, as does Rose Jennings. 83 Leah 
Karibian, in a conversation with the artist about the Padded 
Paintings, assumes the latter position, and tries to retrieve the 
works for formalist analysis: 
You seem to have taken a step out of the critical fold in which your practice 
was previously protected, or let's say supported. You've stepped away from 
certain well-established feminist narratives on the body into areas where 
those arguments are less applicable. In particular, I'm thinking about the way 
your new work openly flirts with the language of modernist formalism [.... ] 
The thrill for me is seeing a feminist artist play around with formal concerns - 
to enjoy them. It's been such a male preserve in the past, and a language that 
feminist practitioners have denied themselves - almost on moral grounds. 
Audiences have had to go without. But now you're in there, having a great 
time, altering formalism through informed practice. 84 
This is worrying for three reasons; firstly, that a one-time editor 
of Women Artists Magazine should say that the function of feminist 
criticism is to "protect" or "support", and then be content to allow 
that statement to be published unedited; secondly, for its partial 
82 Simon Watney, Laura Godfrey-Isaacs: Monstrous (London and Exeter: The Gallery and John 
Jones and Spacex Gallery, 1995), unpaginated. 
83 Simon Watney, ibid. Rose Jennings, Laura Godfrey-Isaacs: Slime (London: Sue Williams Gallery, 
1993). 
84 Leah Karibian, in Laura Godfrey-Isaacs: The Alien and the Domestic (Winchester: Winchester 
Gallery at Winchester School of Art, 1994), unpaginated. 
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reading of "feminist practice"; but thirdly, most pertinently here, 
because of the opening it provides for a return to formalism. 
Godfrey-Isaacs responds to Karibian: "I definitely stepped out of 
that practice which directly references the gendered body, and the 
culturally defined body". This opens a space for discussion of 
`indirect' references of such a body; but the opening is immediately 
closed by another participant in the discussion who, prompted by 
Karibian's comments, validates the work by comparing it with 
`masters' of Abstract Expressionism: "it's a Frank Auerbach or a 
Karel Appel painted with mashed up Baked Beans [.... ] I had this 
rather charming image of Auerbach larding on the beans in heroic 
fashion but which in fact was an image of a child playing with its 
food". 85 The dangers of positioning the work in such a discourse 
become clear: no matter how wittily it is phrased, we are left with 
a reading of the works of the woman artist (Laura Godfrey-Isaacs) 
as, "in fact", infantile, unintentional, simulations of work by the 
grand male figures of Abstract Expressionism. 
From the outset, Rosemary Betterton's An Intimate Distance: 
Women, Artists and the Body directs the reader to consider Laura 
Godfrey-Isaacs' work as key. 86 A detail of the painting Pink Skin 
(1992) wraps around the whole cover of the paperback, bleeding off 
the edges. Rosemary Betterton dedicates one passage of the book to 
the paintings of the early 1990s, and another to the resin and 
polyurethane works of the exhibitions The Alien and the Domestic 
(1993) and Monstrous (1994). While these passages do go some way 
towards providing a theoretical discourse for the works, they are 
85 Laura Godfrey-Isaacs and Stephen Johnston, in Laura Godfrey-Isaacs: The Alien and the 
Domestic. 
86 Rosemary Betterton: An Intimate Distance: Women, Artists and the Body (London: Routledge, 
1996). 
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caught by attempting to fit the them into a pre-existing 
theoretical structure which is not, ultimately, appropriate, but 
tangential to other structures suggested by the works. Having 
referred to the Alien Blobs series as "such fetish objects" as those 
found in a "bulim[ic] [.... ] fetish structure", 87 Betterton then gives 
the Padded Paintings a related context: "If the problem for 
daughters in separating from their mothers is represented in terms 
of a process of disavowal (I am not like her, but all the same), then 
this work functions in a similar way as a fetish which both alludes 
to and denies that loss". 88 This takes us some way; but the problem 
is indicated in that "if" and "then". If, on the other hand, the 
problem for daughters in separating from their mothers is not seen 
as caught in a phallocentric bind, requiring disavowal in a 
phallomorphic syntax but instead seen through a morphologic of the 
mucous, then these works can be read as attempts at mediation in 
an appropriate syntax. Form and matter can be read as begetting 
each other in a play of differance productive of syntax, rather than 
form being read through a phallomorphic syntax as metaphor or 
fetish. The project they speak of is then read not as one of 
providing a fetish to stand in for the relationship with the mother, 
but of providing the gift-space/object which ensures its 
continuation through constructing the means of its mediation. The 
works can then be read also as more productive of the "intimate 
distance" of Betterton's title. It is perhaps indicative of the 
complexity of the problems facing critics and theorists that when 
Rosemary Betterton touches upon the paintings such as Pink Skin 
she does so in the context of opposing "painting `femininity"' to 
"painting women". She describes them as "explor[ing] the 
87 Rosemary Betterton, ibid., pp. 151-2. 
88 Rosemary Betterton, ibid., p. 153. 
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metaphorical and literal equivalencies between the feminine body 
and the surface and textures of oil paint". 89 When critiques (like 
those of all the writers cited on Godfrey-Isaacs' work) are built 
upon structures of metaphoric narrative between media and 
signification, then they will not survive the artist's radical shift 
of media. Laura Godfrey-Isaacs' most recent work is made from 
knitting. Much of the material used in them - knitted sheets, 
squares, and pillows - was made collaboratively by the artist, her 
mother, and other earlier generations of women in her family, 
during her pregnancy and the early life of her first child. 90 No 
longer possible to read as narratives of sexual metaphor, they 
would add to my argument to read her work as the site of a 
mediation of, rather than a fetish for, a relationship. 
As indicated above, Griselda Pollock has laid out the problematic of 
the intersection of modernist painting and feminist practice, 
preparing the ground for further analysis. Two recent articles by 
other women have begun to address the materiality of paint (and in 
one work discussed, plaster) in a manner that works at undoing 
phallomorphic understandings of paint and of writing about 
paintings. Instead, they suggest new possibilities for women 
engaging with the practice of painting, either as subjects who 
paint or as subjects attending to paintings. Joan Key's 'Unfold: 
imprecations of obscenity in the fold'91 attends to an experience 
the writer had of seeing Rachel Whiteread's Untitled (Airbed) 
89 Rosemary Betterton, ibid., p. 96. She also describes them as "parodying [.... ] femininity [and] 
close to a strategy at work in Irigaray's writing, that is the idea of mimicry or mimesis". As the implication 
here is of a maintnenance mimesis with no possibility of a productive mimesis, this would again Indicate a 
possible approach, only to leave it closed. 
90 Conversation with Laura Godfrey-Isaacs in her London studio, summer 1997. 
91 Joan Key, 'Unfold: Imprecations of Obscenity in the Fold', in Other Than Identity: The Subject, 
Politics, and Art, ed. by Juliet Steyn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 185-197. 
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(1992) and Bridget Riley's Arrest 11 (1965) exhibited together, the 
only two artworks in a gallery space. Alison Rowley's `On viewing 
three paintings by Jenny Saville: rethinking a feminist practice of 
painting'92 also takes as its starting point (as the title suggests) a 
gallery experience. I was struck by the way in which both these 
articles (each written by a painter) attended to the experience of 
being in the same space as the art works and to the presence, 
substance, and make-up of the works they were discussing. Both 
writers attend to the particular medium of paint or plaster as if 
they were sites through which Irigarayan mediation is occurring 
(although neither writer theorises the media in this way); both 
attend through sight - seeing the works - "which is after all, the 
only place where a painting can be experienced by the viewer"; 93 
but both are acutely aware of the significance of touch in producing 
what they see: "a highly tactile sensation, not only the desire to 
press, but a response to that pressure, to be pressed back: a 
sensation that hints of desire and relation in excess of the 
contemplative utility of art". 94 
Rachel Whiteread's Untitled (Airbed) (plate 13) is a plaster-cast of 
the space above an inflated airbed. Bridget Riley's Arrest 11 (plate 
14) is an acrylic on canvas painting of black, grey and white wavy 
lines. Joan Key tells us that the curator had no reasons for 
exhibiting the two works together other than superficial 
resemblance; he considers them to be utterly different 
historically, intentionally, and conceptually. She says that "this 
92 Alison Rowley, 'On Viewing Three Paintings by Jenny Saville: Rethinking a Feminist Practice of 
Painting', in Generations and Geographies in the Visual Arts: Feminist Readings, ed. by Griselda Pollock 
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 88-109. 
93 Alison Rowley, ibid., p. 97. 
94 Joan Key, 'Unfold', p. 194. 
- ýie 
".. or 
Rachel Whiteread 
Untitled (Airbed) 
1992. Plaster and polystyrene, 22 x 120 x 194 cm 
Courtesy Anthony D'Offay Gallery, London 
Plate 13 
Bridget Riley 
Arrest 11 
1965. Acrylic on linen, 76.75" x 75" 
Courtesy Karsten Schubert Gallery, London 
Plate 14 
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gives rise to unease about irresponsibility: if they are together 
because they just happen to look good/get on together, that 
suggests an excess of `pleasure' over reason or `function', and not 
the appropriate workings of 'judgement'. [.... ] Aesthetic suspicions 
are aroused". 95 A space of dialogue is created between the two 
works, uncluttered by any gallery interpretation other than a label 
for each work with the artist's name, a title and date: "a space is 
created for intense study of traces, residues, minute details, in 
suspension of awareness of the indications that would permit 
judgement. "96 In this space there is room to contemplate surface, 
fluidity, skin, absence, closure, openness, masking. In Joan Key's 
description of the two works there is a betrayal of conflicting 
morphological structures. In the work by Whiteread: 
... the plaster retains its pristine self, straight from the mould. It is not 
modified with the touch of handiwork, but displays the unquestionable 
authenticity of time and imitation that inheres to the mechanics of casting. This 
permeates the work and reproduces intimately the surface of inflated fabric 
and its internal structural dynamic. The sense of liquid origins in the slight 
signs of pouring and bubbling transforms these physical references. They also 
refer to the lost container/matrix that leaves the positive form of the bed in 
negative and mentions an underside/undesired that had been uppermost as the 
plaster coagulated, but now forms the base, the hidden sign of the fragmented 
nature of the casting process. 97 
This work does not claim authenticity by indexing the artist 
through her gestural trace. Rather, any claim to authenticity rests 
in its indexing of the technical process of its making. In particular, 
the once-liquid state of its material (plaster), and the flexible, 
nature of its matrix (the air-bed). 
Brigit Riley's painting is in contrast to this: 
Riley's paint is flat: it's original fluidity may be residually referenced in the 
95 Joan Key, ibid., p. 197. 
96 Joan Key, ibid., p. 196. 
97 Joan Key, ibid., p. 186. 
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flowing pattern of the drawing, but now it lies in a fine layer across the 
picture in an even continuous film, its own texture subordinated to a plastic 
ideal of perfectly smooth consistency. Phenomenal painterly content is totally 
rationalized into a predetermined scheme: the flawless surface seems to have 
arrived through automatic procedures. Paint is literally a skin, divided by 
sharply delineated streams of black/grey/white. The closure of their edges is 
absolute: not a layering but a suffocating continuity in the surface. The 
perfection of the skin reveals and reproduces the hidden structure of the 
underlying support, a surprising reference to cloth, evenly woven, stretched 
but elastic, subject to pressure: an estimated depth of movement paralleled in 
the imaginary depth of the undulation of the painted pattern. The image, in the 
design of a wave pattern, suggests continuity, duration and distance. However, 
Riley's pattern is cut at a random edge, and brought up close by its unvarying 
ratio. Like the patterning of textile or wallpaper, it implies the function of a 
cover or a blanket/obliteration. 98 
Knowledge of the original fluidity of its materials (paint; canvas) 
is supressed. Any trace of the gesture of the artist's hand is 
removed to provide a perfect closure: the smooth, flat skin of the 
paint surface. The canvas is stretched taught; its trace in the 
finished painting seems incidental to the artist' s intention, but 
proves crucial. Ra ther than index its fluidity of material or of 
process, the work instead has fluidity simulated within it, in the 
image it carries. 
Alongside the differences between the works are another set of 
qualities which, if not exactly `similarities', do, nonetheless, 
resonate between the two works. Both employ what was originally 
a fluid medium which has, in particular ways, coagulated to form a 
pristine surface. Both artists employ techniques which supress any 
signatures in mark-making, but both use techniques which make, the 
works instantly recognisable as being by that particular artist. 
Both works contain imagery of waves - the painting in the pattern 
painted, the sculpture in the undulations of the bed. "Both works 
suggest themselves as whole, while, unsettlingly, they turn out to 
98 Joan Key, ibid., p. 187. 
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be fragments; both have an area of unseen content that us 
powerfully present yet invisible". 99 
The morphology informing each begins to differentiate them, and to 
form their differing significance in the Symbolic. The painting has 
a surface which is closed, suffocating, described in a manner which 
suggests that it was produced with a maintenance mimesis of a 
phallomorphologic. The sculpture is more ambiguous, asserting its 
presence through processes of reversals - the bed and its absence; 
authentic presence with no visible trace of the artist; apparent 
solidity displaying originating fluidity, and so forth. More 
ambiguous still is the `reserve' of each work, that which is always 
already there during any configuration of the works as being 
informed by a phallomorphologic: the potential presence of a 
morpho-logic of the mucous. In both works this can be found in 
cloth and the artist's touching of cloth through the once-fluid 
medium of paint or plaster. Joan Key does not use this terminology 
at all, but her description of the works allows for such a reading: 
Both the Whiteread and the Riley share a reference to the potentially mobile 
surface of cloth. In both the sculpture and the painting this reference seem to 
have the status of an incidental detail, but it imposes on their form with 
unexpected force, since in both, the image of the cloth is embedded in another 
surface (plaster or paint) to the point where it nearly disappears. 100 
This "incidental detail", if one cares to look for it, can be 
perceived as a determining detail for the attentive audience of the 
two works. Even though the flow of plaster and paint is stilled 
(closed), the memory of it is carried in the material of the plaster 
as (to use terminology from an earlier chapter) an hysterical 
reserve, and in the material of the differently tinted paint as 
99 Joan Key, ibid., p. 187. 
100 Joan Key, ibid., p. 191. 
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masquerade, parure: 
The residual image of the cloth resonates with the patterning of waves, 
informing and intensifying the sensation of surface movement. However, the 
fluidity of plaster and paint make their own reference to waves, which inflect 
the movement of the cloth with a different mathematical ratio. The surfaces 
ripple, part of the illusion of the painting and the structure of the sculpture; 
but these reticulations are immediately contradicted in the stretching of the 
canvas and in the reversal of the casting. The potential fold in the surface is 
immediately flattened, its recess revealed, and yet the hidden aspect of the 
fold remains permanently present as an imagined possibility. 101 
There is another element in this: the encountering of the two works 
by an attentive audience. The way Joan Key has written her essay is 
through a series of folds; episodic, it does not demand a linear 
reading, and indeed (with the exception of the initial paragraph) 
encourages both circular and non-linear reading, each episode 
touching upon others. While not formless, it does not have an 
academic form. What is of particular interest in this context is 
what Joan Key discerns not only within each work, but in the third 
term they create between them, the work they do together, traces 
of which they each, in their particular ways, bring individually to 
the encounter: 
This is a continuous folding and unfolding that is out of the spectator's control: 
a simultaneous display of two positions, so that there is a perpetual relay 
between two opposed visual messages. This process puts the content of the 
fold on display, returning its hidden nature to a surface which cannot settle 
into place and immediately hides it again. This refusal to keep still leaves the 
spectator with literally 'nothing to hold on to', deflecting the spectator's gaze 
through the permanent defeat of closure to a surface that seems always on the 
verge of opening up, an unconscious movement of logarithms and numbers, not 
to be controlled by conscious design. 102 
In this we can discern a non-phallomorphic logic at play between 
the materiality of the artworks and their imagery - and between 
the artworks and Joan Key. Nowhere does she capitalize the fold: 
though she does tell an amusing anecdote (courtesy of Joan Copjec) 
101 Joan Key, ibid., pp. 191-192. 
102 Joan Key, ibid., p. 192. 
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which suggests how a phallomorphologic might do so. The tale of 
psychiatrist, Gaetan de Clerambault, could be interpreted as on the 
one hand an instance of hysteroscopy, and on the other, a castrating 
refusal to see. Gaetan de Clerambault ran, at the Ecole des Beaux 
Arts, a course on drapery and folds which was peremptorily closed 
down by the authorities: "the recoil they felt it necessary to make, 
in order to disassociate themselves from that very concern with 
FOLDing, demonstrated the degree of their embarrassment. It was 
important to mark not just disapproval, but the stronger emotion of 
disgust, a visceral revulsion". 103 It is in Joan Key's discernment of 
the never-completed, never-completable folding and unfolding of 
cloth in the reserve of the two works and in the work they make 
together that the phallomorphic "scandal" of their interaction can 
be found: a morpho-logic of `the lips' and of the mucous. 
Alison Rowley's essay allows us to concentrate more closely upon 
the manner in which the handling of the material substance of paint 
and the configuration of imagery in paint touch upon each other. Her 
shifting of terminology from "formal" qualities to "technical" 
procedures104 would seem initially to hold the two apart; but in 
fact the term `formal' insists that issues arising from the 
relationship between the image on the canvas and anything which 
lies beyond the canvas be discarded in favour of abstract 
discussions of, for example, `composition'. Distinguishing technical 
procedures from configuration of imagery (and by extension, 
matters of representation) allows us to attend anew to their 
touching upon each other. 
103 Joan Key, ibid., p. 192-193. 
104 Alison Rowley, 'On Viewing Three Paintings by Jenny Saville', p. 92. 
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As with Joan Key's essay, Alison Rowley's contains a memorable 
passage of writing which is more than descriptive of the artwork 
under discussion - Jenny Saville's Plan (plate 15). Because it is not 
only pertinent to the discussion of the morphology of the 
relationship between the audience and the artwork, but also 
suggestive of how this morpho-logic may be signified through the 
writings of the art critic or theorist, I will quote the paragraph in 
full: 
At my height of 5'7" if I stand at painting distance from the canvas (by the 
size of the marks this is closer than arm's length as these are manipulations of 
the brush by fingers and wrist, not swings from the shoulder), I have in my 
focused vision a group of oblongish marks of flesh tones modulated to simulate 
the play of light over a smooth but slightly uneven surface. Into this surface 
break some small brownish black curved marks of raised paint which I can 
imagine as have been made by gently laying a fine, long-haired brush loaded 
with colour onto the surface of the canvas and quickly lifting it off again. The 
memory from my own experience of manipulating paint, of the controlled 
combination of amount of paint, weight of hand, movement of fingers needed to 
execute marks like these is very pleasurable. At this distance from the canvas 
I'm lost in the memory of the tactile pleasures of paint application. And 
literally lost in the space of the canvas with nothing to locate myself, I cannot 
see any whole shapes or the edges of the canvas. How does this area of painted 
marks relate to those on the rest of the canvas, and to construct what? To find 
out, I have to pull a good way back from touching distance before I have the 
whole canvas within my field of vision and can see that what the marks make 
is where the pubic hair peters out into the smooth skin of the stomach. But at 
this distance my memories are of another order, in another register: they are 
memories of other images of women without clothes, from other paintings and 
photographs with which I begin to compare Plan. By moving back to hold the 
whole canvas within my view so that I can see how the marks coalesce into the 
bounded shape I look for as standing for the human figure in the conventions of 
western painting, I have to forfeit the tactile pleasure of an imaginary 
application of marks to the surface of Plan, the memory of my own body in 
contact with a canvas. But I can move in and back again at will. 105 
Sight, informed by knowledge and bodily memory of touch making 
what is seen; movement between proximity and distance; 
identification with the woman painter; identification of a body 
sexed female in representation; these are experienced as moments 
of pleasure. I detect a hint of a more ambivalent consideration of 
105 Alison Rowley, ibid., p. 92. 
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Jenny Saville 
Plan 
1993. Oil on canvas, 274.5 cm x 213.5 cm 
Courtesy the Saatchi Gallery, London 
Plate 15 
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the representation in relation with other representations in the 
memory. 
In a long and complexly layered essay, Alison Rowley compares 
Jenny Saville's technical choices (in particular, handling of paint, 
viscosity of paint, size of canvas, and figure-ground scale) with 
those of Helen Frankenthaler and Dorothea Tanning. This is done 
against a background of identifying an unacknowledged use in Jenny 
Saville's Branded (1993) of a representational device which Alison 
Rowley recognises from Jo Spence's Exiled (n. d. ); of analysis of 
Saville as middle class, differentiating her from Jo Spence and 
Alison Rowley as working class; and of an analysis of the context 
into which Jenny Saville's work was placed, and how she was 
represented by newspaper critics at the time of her 1994 Saatchi 
Collection exhibition (in a nutshell: compared with Lucien Freud, 
with any feminist intent at best acknowledged and then ignored). 
Kaja Silverman's theory of the negative Oedipus complex is used: 
"in this formulation we might find our place as daughters without 
the destruction, the replacement of the mother as the condition"; 
and Saville's work praised for "intuiting" just such an area "in 
paintings like Plan and Interfacing, with their space of both 
eroticism (her need to paint areas of flesh in close-up) and 
identification (her retention of the recognizable female body)". 
However, Saville is deemed to do this in "close alignment in 
technical terms with all that is associated with the devaluation of 
the feminine". 106 Colour and (interestingly, in relation to Joan Key's 
article) "sensitivity to the quality of canvas as material ground"107 
are noted as spatial devices in Frankenthaler's work, and as being 
106 Alison Rowley, ibid., p. 99. 
107 Alison Rowley, ibid., p. 102. 
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under-utilized in Saville's. Alison Rowley quotes Hubert Damisch 
on the image in a painting being characterized "by a surplus of 
substance, from which would come its weight, its charge, its title 
of painting, and which would produce, under that title, an effect of 
pleasure specific to it". 108 This leads to an identification of a 
problem with Saville's work: her "reliance on paint to simulate 
flesh produces, like all simulations, a sure, disappointing and 
wearying foregrounding of its falling short of that which it 
attempts to simulate. This is surplus paint, and highly 
unpleasurable". 109 
In Alison Rowley's essay Lucien Freud's work is evoked as highly 
problematic, but not given the close reading afforded Saville, 
Frankenthaler, Tanning or Spence. While this could be greeted with 
relief, its absence means that certain possibilities in Jenny 
Saville's painting could be missed. I am trying to create from 
memory an imagined space for an encounter between works by the 
two. What I find is a number of instructive differences between the 
two, both at the level of technical procedures and of configuration 
of imagery. Few of Freud's paintings are as large as many of Jenny 
Saville's; the figures imaged in them are not only thus relatively 
smaller, but also the relation of the scale of the figures to the size 
of the canvas is usually more conventional: they `fit' into the 
picture. In terms of figure-ground relation, they are more bounded. 
Their object-like status is increased by the view-points most 
often used by Freud, higher than the seated or lying person, and at a 
distance from a standing person. In Jenny Saville's work we 
frequently are given a view point of the figures whereby we are 
108 Hubert Damisch, quoted by Alison Rowley, ibid., p. 103. 
109 Alison Rowley, ibid., p. 106. 
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looking up at them, and from a position of closeness. Thus we are 
invited into an intimate relation with their flesh, both by the scale 
of the figures (and the potential `loss' of the boundaries that 
Alison Rowley suggests) and by the way the scale of the figures 
butts up against the size of the canvas: they fill and exceed the 
field of vision in the painting, thus provoking memory of a 
necessary closeness in order to make sense of the image. Even 
when we are at a distance from the canvas, beyond touching 
distance, the memory is of being within touching distance: a 
memory indicated by Luce Irigaray as crucial to intersubjectivity: 
The memory of touching? The most insistent and the most difficult to enter 
into memory. The one that entails returning to dues whose beginning and end 
cannot be recovered. 
Memory of the flesh, where that which has not yet been written is 
inscribed, laid down? That which has no discourse to wrap itself in? That 
which has not yet been born into language? That which has a place, has taken 
place, but has not language. The felt, which expresses itself for the first time. 
Declares itself to the other in silence. 
One must remember this and hope that the other remembers. 110 
It would be hard to reproduce in front of a Lucien Freud painting the 
`loss' of mastery of the figure that Alison Rowley described when 
close to the Jenny Saville painting, or the "memory of flesh [.... ] not 
yet [.... ] born into language" evoked by Luce Irigaray. Freud's paint 
work (particularly in his painting of skin) may look creamy from 
any distance, but it is also usually shiny, with a hard, repulsing 
surface, giving us phallomorphic closure and rigidity in the shiny 
paint surface. In his painting of limbs and bodies, large brush 
strokes (though usually small on the face) while `moulded' in 
effect, often appear to work against the architecture of skin, 
muscle and bone. It is an activity which displays a fear or hatred 
of, or revulsion from, flesh, and which certainly resists 
110 Luce Irigaray, Ethics, p. 215/Ethique, pp. 197-198. Translation modified. 
1 
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intersubjectivity or any mediation of the other's subjectivity. In 
that close-up activity of painting, I extrapolate Lucien Freud 
interrogating his models visually, delineating the object on canvas 
- the over-production of the object at the expense of subjectivity 
identified in the last chapter. As Luce Irigaray asks, "is the 
memory of touching always disguised by senses that forget where 
they come from? Creating distance through a mastery that 
constitutes the object as a monument built in place of the 
subject's disappearance". 111 
Jenny Saville's paint work, memorably described by Alison Rowley 
in the passage quoted above, differs. Her paint has a matt, but not 
`dry', surface; her brush is not large, nor are her brush strokes; and 
in relation to the scale of the figures imaged, both brush and 
strokes could be considered very small. When close up to the 
canvas, she is not delineating the object; its borders are not in her 
visual control. She is, through a series of touches, building the 
image. From Alison Rowley's account, we can imagine the patience 
with which she does this, "urging it to unfold without a show of 
force". 112 There is also, as Rowley indicates, an identification 
between Jenny Saville and the body she is painting, whether as self 
portrait or not: the image of the woman she paints can thus never 
fully be her object. 
While I agree that simulation of flesh is problematic and can easily 
fall back into a maintenance mimesis, I think something else is 
happening here, something akin to love, which is important not to 
miss. Alison Rowley quotes Jenny Saville as saying "I'm not 
111 Luce Irigaray, Ethics, pp. 214-2151Ethique, p. 197. 
112 Luce Irigaray, Ethics, pp. 214-215/Ethique, p. 197. 
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painting disgusting, big women. I'm painting women who've been 
made to think they're big and disgusting, who imagine their thighs 
go on forever.... I haven't had liposuction myself but I did fall for 
that body wrap thing where they promise four inches off or your 
money back" (my italics) and wonders "Does Saville, then, worry 
about her own size? ". 113 But Saville's comment was in the past 
tense, not the present: I read her act in painting as she does as a 
gesture of attending to the interrelation of subjectivity and body, 
and of restoring touch to sight, through the mediation of paint. 
Rather than being "surplus paint, and highly unpleasurable" or using 
paint as a "modelling material" in simulating flesh (more likely to 
be found in a Freud painting), Jenny Saville is restoring beauty to 
that which has been regarded as surplus substance114 by returning 
through the imaging of that body and that subjectivity; making a 
gift-space/object necessary for intersubjectivity and for 
mediation between women. Once again, there is a non-phallic 
morpho-logic at play between the technical applying of the paint 
and the deferral between the surplus substance of the paint and the 
surplus substance of the image, which pivots upon the qualities 
that Jenny Saville has required of the paint and the countless 
touchings. 
What these two articles achieve is to alert us not only to practices 
of using the materiality of fluid media as artists, but also 
practices of attending to the implications of this materiality as an 
audience. Luce Irigaray wrote in an early work "now if we examine 
the properties of fluids, we note that this 'real' may well include, 
113 Alison Rowley, 'On Viewing Three Paintings by Jenny Saville', p. 95. 
114 "For the anorectic, there is always excess matter deposited over the surface, the form of the 
body. The goal is to get rid of that surplus and to reveal the essential, core self - to get back to the original 
boundaries". Lynda Nead, The Female Nude, pp. 10-11. 
234 
and in large measure, a physical reality that continues to resist 
adequate symbolization and/or that signifies the powerlessness of 
logic to incorporate in its writing all the characteristic features 
of nature". 115 As we have seen, this has developed into the 
suggestion that we need to think through the mucous - not only to 
`think it through' as a political and theoretical necessity, but also 
to `think through it' as a means of achieving an appropriate syntax 
in the Symbolic and the possibility of mediation in intersubjective 
relationships. Joan Key and Alison Rowley evoke what we could 
refer to as the hysterical reserve of the Rachel Whiteread 
sculpture, the parure of the Bridget Riley painting, and the 
touching-upon within Jenny Saville's painting. Further, we can read 
the two writers as alerting us to a particular morpho-logic at play 
and beginning to be productive of its Symbolic syntax. It is a 
morpho-logic which is discernable in the differance between the 
technologies selected and the imagery produced; in the traces 
(implicated in this differance) of the material fluidity of cloth and 
of the plaster and paint; and in the gaps between the three art 
works and the two essays. It is discernable also through 
attempting to develop a practice of thinking through it: attending 
to the possibility of mediation through the morphology of the 
mucous and `the lips'. 
115 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 106-107/Ce sexe, p. 105. 
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Chapter 6 
Retraversing `gesture'. 
Louise Bourgeois's series of installational sculptures of the late 
1980s and the 1990s - the Cells - provide an opportunity to rethink 
the concept of 'gesture' as it is used with reference to modern and 
contemporary art. In this chapter, I will propose that it is possible 
to read Louise Bourgeois's Cells and Luce Irigaray's discussion of 
gesture (particularly as found in her paper 'Gesture in 
Psychoanalysis') in a dynamic relationship with each other; and 
that doing so produces not only an enriched understanding of each, 
but also new possibilities for reading gesture embodied in the 
artwork. Gesture can be used as a way of thinking about the 
relation between the psychic subject, the sexed subject, and a 
practice. This enables, moreover, a critique of some current trends 
in writing on Louise Bourgeois which have produced reductive, 
psychobiographical readings which displace the work with an 
`authenticating narrative' of the artist and her life-story. 
Louise Bourgeois: Cells 
For the 45th Venice Biennale (1993) the USA selected the French- 
born artist Louise Bourgeois as their representative. An exhibition 
was mounted in the US pavilion consisting of 13 sculptures, dating 
1 Luce Irigaray, 'Gesture in Psychoanalysis' in Sexes and Genealogies (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 89-104/'Le geste en psychanalyse', in Sexes et 
Parentes (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1987), pp. 103-118. Hereafter cited as 'Gesture'/ 
To geste' 
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from 1984-1993. Four of these were large works each given the 
title Cell, with further individual titling supplied in brackets: Cell 
(Eyes and Mirrors) (1989-1993); Cell (Choisy) (1990-1993); Cell 
(Glass Spheres and Hands) (1990-1993) (plate 16); and Cell (Arch 
of Hysteria) (1992-1993). The catalogue for an expanded version of 
the exhibition held at the Brooklyn Museum in 1994 also included 
Cell 11 (1991); Cell Ill (1991) (plate 17); Cell IV (1991) (plate 18); 
Cell (You Better Grow Up) (1993) (plate 19); Cell (Three White 
Marble Spheres) (1993) (plate 20). Also documented in the Brooklyn 
catalogue are Cell 1 (1991); Cell V (1991); and the related Precious 
Liquids (1992). Anything between 3'8" and 14' wide and between 7' 
and 12' high, the sheer bulk and number of these works, produced 
when the artist was in her late 70s and early 80s, speak of the 
importance to her of this development in her work. 
The Cells are best described as creations of interior spaces. They 
are bounded by `walls', made from old warehouse window frames, 
with some of the glass still in place, from steel grilles, from sheet 
metal, old doors, wooden planking. In the `walls' are door- or 
window-type entrances through which the audience can sometimes 
walk, or sometimes only look. Contained within the walls, various 
elements, found or made by the artist, are placed in juxtaposition. 
The objects inside vary widely: old furniture, mirrors, and objects 
seemingly scavenged from waste sites - an industrial saw, bottles, 
a desk-guillotine. There are glass spheres and phials, and marble 
sculptures with a mix of rough-hewn stone and highly polished, 
smooth, exact finish. The details fascinate, yet none seems 
superfluous. The spaces pull the gaze into and around them; the 
'walls' both cage and house their contents. 
Louise Bourgeois 
Cell (Glass Spheres and Hands) 
1990-1993. Mixed media, 86" x 86" x 83" 
Collection of the Artist, courtesy Robert Miller Gallery 
Photograph from Louise Bourgeois: The Locus of Memory, ed. by Joanna Ekman (New 
York: Abrams, 1994) 
Plate 16 
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Louise Bourgeois 
Cell 111 
1991. Mixed media, 111" x 130.5" x 165" 
Ydessa Hendeles Art Foundation, Toronto 
Photograph from Louise Bourgeois: The Locus of Memory, ed. by Joanna Ekman (New 
York: Abrams, 1994) 
Plate 17 
Louise Bourgeois 
Cell IV 
1991. Mixed media, 82" x 84" x 84" 
Collection of Ginny Williams, Denver 
Photograph from Louise Bourgeois: The Locus of Memory, ed. by Joanna Ekman (New 
York: Abrams, 1994) 
Plate 18 
Louise Bourgeois 
Cell (You Better Grow Up) 
1993. Mixed media, 83" x 82" x 83.5" 
Collection of the artist; courtesy Robert Miller Gallery 
Photograph from Louise Bourgeois: The Locus of Memory, ed. by Joanna Ekman (New 
York: Abrams, 1994) 
Plate 19 
Louise Bourgeois 
Cell (Three White Marble Spheres) 
1993. Mixed media, 84" x 84" x 84" 
Collection of the artist; courtesy Robert Miller Gallery 
Photograph from Louise Bourgeois: The Locus of Memory, ed. by Joanna Ekman (New 
York: Abrams, 1994) 
Plate 20 
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Richard Serra is quoted in the Brooklyn catalogue: "the meaning [of 
the works] evades me: discursive analysis, conceptual terms fail. 
All tracking leads to dead ends. Imposition of formal logic and 
conjectures of academic language do not resolve the content". 2 The 
Cells do not fit into any categories of art, even the broadest: they 
resist terms of figuration or abstraction, modernism or post- 
modernism. When encountering them in the cool rooms of the US 
pavilion in Venice, out of the mid-summer heat, my desire was not 
to "resolve the content", to fix, to know, and thus control through 
completion, but to spend time with, to dialogue, to question and be 
questioned by, to negotiate, to return. But I was wanting the 
language with which to do this. It required some learning. 
Present critical analysis of Louise Bourgeois's work 
It is difficult to find a framework vivid enough to incorporate Louise 
Bourgeois's sculpture. Attempts to bring a coolly evolutionary or art- 
historical order to her work, or to see it in the context of one art group or 
another, have proved more or less irrelevant. [... ] Rarely has an abstract art 
been so directly and honestly informed by its maker's psyche. 3 
So wrote Lucy Lippard in 1975. Over twenty years later the same is 
still the case. The growing number of articles and essays written 
about Louise Bourgeois during the last ten years confirm this 
continuing search for frameworks within which her work can be 
discussed, tested, and come to terms with. Feminist art criticism 
has, however, during this time equipped us with the tools to re- 
2 Richard Serra, in Louise Bourgeois: Locus of Memory, Works 1982-1993, ed. by 
Joanna Ekman (New York: Abrams, 1994), p. 80. 
3 Lucy Lippard, 'Louise Bourgeois From the Inside Out', Artforum, 13.7 (March 1975), 
26-33 (p. 27). 
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evaluate Louis Bourgeois's position in a gendered historical and 
cultural context. As she matured as an artist she was a wife and 
mother in the New York of the 1940s and 1950s. Her exclusion from 
formal art historical narratives of that period can now be 
understood in the context of the positioning accorded actual women 
and the concept of femininity within modernism in general, and 
Surrealism and Abstract Expressionism in particular. The more 
recent use of psychoanalytical theory has produced particular 
readings of her work, and feminist use of psychoanalytic models 
has given us the tools to analyze the constructions of `femininity', 
`madness' and `genius', and to re-assess the work of women artists 
like Bourgeois without inappropriately valorising a concept of 
`madness'. 
These feminist, art historical, and psychoanalytic readings of 
Louise Bourgeois's works have been both notably diverse and 
partial. While the commentators have not had violent arguments 
with each other, their lack of unity is striking. Thus one writer 
will account for Bourgeois's work within expressionism; another 
will call it formalist. One writer will focus on its materials; 
another find the artist's life story at the centre of their analysis. 
One will describe it as symptomatic of a dysfunctional family 
background; another, as symptomatic of Bourgeois's involvement 
with Surrealism. 4 And so on and so forth. The one thing that the 
writers do all seem to agree upon is that the work is somehow 
4 See, for example, respectively: William Rubin, 'Some Reflections Prompted by the 
Recent Work of Louise Bourgeois', Art International (April 1969), 17-20; Carter Ratcliff, 
'Louise Bourgeois', Art International, 22.7 (November 1978), 26-27; Alain Kirili, 'The 
Passion for Sculpture: Conversation with Louise Bourgeois', Arts Magazine, 63 (March 
1989), pp. 69-75; Deborah Wye, 'Louise Bourgeois: One and Others', in Louise Bourgeois, ed. 
by Deborah Wye (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1982), pp. 13-33; Donald Kuspit, 
'Louise Bourgeois: Where Angels Fear to Tread', ArtForum (March 1987), 115-120; Harald 
Szeemann, 'The Fount of Youth: Gober la Bourgeoisie! ', Parkett, 27 (1991), pp. 74-76. 
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something to do with the body and with sex - though whether it is 
descriptive, symbolic, metaphorical, representational or evocative 
in its relation to the body is not something about which there 
seems to be any consensus. Similar ambivalence emerges about the 
work's sexual content - extending to lack of clarity about whether 
this content is a produced in the work's relationship to the body of 
the artist, to the bodies of the critics, or to a construct of gender. 
The cumulative effect of reading the extant literature on Bourgeois 
is that in the discussions of her work, the terms `body' and `sex' 
are not problematized, as if in and of themselves these words can 
be universally understood and experienced, and provide a definitive 
bench-mark. 
Since the early 1980s, criticism has constructed, theorized, and 
made famous a `Louise Bourgeois' who makes work stemming from 
her feelings about her father. Robert Storr has written, describing 
conversations he had with Bourgeois: 
It was while preparing a slide show autobiography for her 1982 MoMA 
exhibition [... ] that she first told in full the story of her father and the 
mistress, which has since become myth of origin for much of her work. 
Enlightening in many respects, in others this story has restricted the 
interpretation of what she has done to narrowly personal or archetypically 
Freudian sources. 5 
In our eagerness to hear another version of the Freudian `family 
romance's - in this case, a charming, philandering, autocratic and 
5 Robert Storr, 'The Discreet Charm of Louise Bourgeois', Tate, The Art Magazine, 6 
(Summer 1995), 24-31 (p. 29). 
6 This term is used by Freud to describe the child's interpretation and justificatory 
stories of his or her parent's behaviour, often including the 'relegation' of a biological parent 
into a hated step-parent. It Is worth noting that Freud comments "But here the influence of 
sex is already in evidence, for a boy is far more inclined to feel hostile impulses towards his 
father than towards his mother and has a far more intense desire to get free from him than 
from her. In this respect the imagination of girls is apt to show itself much weaker". Freud 
then discusses "the child... he", and structures appropriate to boys. 'Family Romances', The 
Penguin Freud Library VII: On Sexuality, trans. by James Strachey (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1991), pp. 221-225 (p. 222). 
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ultimately intolerable father, whose mistress is not only the 
daughter's nanny and governess, but is also moved by the father for 
a number of years into the marital home - it becomes easy to focus 
on the daughter-to-father emotion; the anger, the desolation of the 
daughter, the young Louise Bourgeois. It becomes manifest in the 
work. Indeed, at times, it is explicitly of great importance. 
Bourgeois herself helps us focus on this through her own words, 
providing a moving, at times devastating account of her 
autobiography - "My father betrayed me by not being what he was 
supposed to be... It is just a matter of rules of the game, and in a 
family the rules of the game are such that a minimum of 
conformity is expected". 7 "My father provoked in me a continual 
loss of self-esteem". 8 She has also stated that when her mother 
died, her father ridiculed her grief. 9 
But this dysfunctional father/daughter relationship has functioned 
as a `suitable' subject for critical voyeurism. Among the 
commentators on Louise Bourgeois, Julie Nicoletta has written: 
The story of this affair [... ] has taken on the aura of myth. No one interested in 
Bourgeois's work has looked beyond this Freudian idea of a traumatized 
childhood to see what other factors may have inspired Bourgeois. 1O 
In her discussion of Bourgeois's `Femmes-Maisons' series Nicoletta 
opts to follow a Lacanian model - which may or may not be a way 
out of this particular family romance. In the literature on Louise 
7 Louise Bourgeois, quoted by Christiane Meyer-Thoss, Louise Bourgeois: 
Konstructionen für den Freien Fall/Designing for Free Fall (Zurich: Amman, 1992), p. 182. 
8 Louise Bourgeios, quoted by Christiane Meyer-Thoss, ibid., p. 187. 
9 Deborah Wye, 'The Drama of the Self: Louise Bourgeois as Printmaker, in The Prints 
of Louise Bourgeois, ed. by Doborah Wye and Carol Smith (New York: The Museum of Modern 
Art, 1994), pp. 10-32 (p. 180). 
10 Julie Nicoletta, 'Louise Bourgeois's Femmes-Maisons: Confronting Lacan', Women's 
Art Journal (Fall/Winter, 1992-3), 21-26 (p. 21). 
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Bourgeois it is the lack of discussion of her relationship with her 
mother that becomes apparent. For instance, Mira Schor has 
written: 
[Bourgeois's] insistence on the source of her work residing in psychological 
wounds inflicted on her by her father contravenes any formal theories of art 
and yet embodies the Oedipal crisis that psycholinguistic theory interprets as 
the entrance of human beings into the Symbolic Order of the Father. Bourgeois 
obsessively returns the critical audience of her work to its motivating source 
- the murderous rage of a betrayed daughter. Her admission to the symbolic 
order has been warped by her father's open affair with her governess. 11 
She then continues the paragraph by suggesting that "[Bourgeois's] 
link back to the Imaginary (completeness of relation to the Mother) 
is damaged by her mother's presumed complicity" - but she does 
not follow this thread further. Donald Kuspit, however, does 
develop an argument about the importance of Bourgeois's mother: 
Bourgeois' entanglement with her mother, not her father, is becoming clear as 
the inner content of her work. She has filled the void of mother/artist in spirit 
as well as substance, an Oedipus replacing the mother instead of the father, a 
sphinx whose secret is that a story about a relationship to a father is really a 
story about a relationship to a mother. 12 
This is the conclusion, rather than the starting point, of his 
article, and is a theme which has not been taken up by anyone else. 
Maybe a girl's relation with her mother is seen as having less 
potential for scandal and tragedy, less glamour, and less scope for 
critical voyeurism; or maybe it is a relationship which remains 
largely unvalued because, as Luce Irigaray argues, it is unseen in 
women's gestures: "But, since [women's] gestures are is often 
paralyzed, or part of the masquerade, in effect, they are often 
difficult to `read'. Except for what resists or subsists `beyond'. In 
11 Mira Schor, 'From Liberation to Lack', Heresies, 6.4 (1989), 15-21 (p. 20). 
12 Donald Kuspit, 'Louise Bourgeois: Where Angels Fear to Tread', Artforum (March 
1987), 115-121 (p. 121). 
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suffering, but also in women's laughter. "13 
Louise Bourgeois herself, however, gives us plenty of prompting to 
take her relationship with her mother seriously. To give just three 
examples: 
These titles are informative. 'Blind Vigils' is like 'Blind leading the Blind'. 
Blindness came from the blush I experienced at the side of the people around 
me, everybody. As I say, my father was promiscuous. I had to be blind to the 
mistress who lived with us. I had to be blind to the pain of my mother. 14 
When I was afraid of my mother dying, a challenge I could not meet, the 
warding off of her death, not to let her disappear, I made a vow. I swore to 
myself, if my mother survived that morning I would give up sex. 15 
The material was there taking all that room and bothering me, bothering me by 
its aggressive presence. And somehow the idea of the mother came to me, This 
is the way my mother impressed me, as very powerful, very silent, very 
judging, and controlling the whole studio. And naturally this piece became my 
mother. At that point, I had my subject. I was going to express what I felt 
toward her... First I cut off her head, and I slit her throat ... And after weeks 
and weeks of work, I thought, if this is the way I saw my mother, then she did 
not like me. How could she possibly like me if I treat her that way? At that 
point something turned around. I could not stand the idea that she wouldn't like 
me. I couldn't live if I thought that she didn't like me. The fact that I had pushed 
her around, cut off her head, had nothing to do with it. What you do to a person 
has nothing to do with what you expect the person to feel toward you... Now at 
the end I became very, very depressed, terribly terribly depressed. ' 6 
I find it interesting that Bourgeois's comments have surfaced in 
recent years, and I would like to link them to a strand in her work 
which, although it can be traced back, has also emerged in a 
particularly notable manner over the past decade in the Cell works 
and other related pieces. In these we can find Bourgeois's 
13 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. by Catherine Porter with Carolyn 
Burke (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 134/Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un (Paris: 
Les Editions de Minuit, 1977), p. 132. Hereafter cited as This Sex/Ce sexe. 
14 Alain Kirili, 'The Passion for Sculpture: A Conversation with Louise Bourgeois', Arts 
Magazine (March 1989), 69-75 (p. 71). 
15 Louise Bourgeois, quoted by Christiane Meyer-Thoss, Designing for Free Fall, p. 187. 
16 Mignon Nixon, 'Bad Enough Mother', October, 71 (Winter 1995), 71-92 (p. 87). In 
this essay Nixon offers a Kleinian reading of certain works by Bourgeois and other artists. 
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embodiment, through particular manipulation of space through 
materials, of an earlier interest (manifested in a more 
straightforwardly representational manner) in the spiral and 
circling movement. We also find a blurring of subject/object 
relations: the Cells are not easily containable 'art objects' as such, 
and neither are the `objects' comprising them clear in their object 
status to either the attentive audience or to Louise Bourgeois 
herself. However, in order to make any tracing between Bourgeois's 
work and her comments on her mother, it is necessary to 
problematize the 'Freudian family romance' provided in the present 
critical analysis. Constructing this `romance' through the father- 
daughter relationship alone is clearly insufficient for the structure 
of the Bourgeois household from little Louise's viewpoint. It is 
arguable whether the Oedipal son/mother relation can simply be 
reversed to `fit' a daughter/father relation; and it is apparent that 
the relationship of little Louise with the displaced Mme. Bourgeois 
is crucial. Freud himself wrote of the reaction of a little boy, 
Ernst, to the trauma of missing his mother; 17 a story problematized 
by Luce Irigaray in `Gesture in Psychoanalysis'. 
Reading gestural process: between psychoanalysis and 
artworks. 
In `Gesture in Psychoanalysis' Luce Irigaray explores two sites of 
gesture from her experience of the psychoanalytic scenario: the 
gestures which are particular to that scenario, and gestures which 
17 Sigmund Freud, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', in The Penguin Freud Library XI: On 
Metapshychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis, trans. by James Strachey (Harmonds- 
worth: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 269-338. 
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originate beyond it, but which she has uncovered within it. She 
begins her paper with a long discussion of the gender-specific 
experiences and significations of the classic analytic scenario as 
read through gesture. This is a scenario where gesture is 
ostensibly repressed and neutered in favour of speech: "The patient 
is held still so that his or her speech can be reconstituted in 
another way. I mean this in the broadest sense, to include gestures. 
Obviously this not a question of teaching the subject a new code, 
doctrine, etc., but of helping him or her to structure a new house of 
language". 18 Luce Irigaray exposes the gestures involved in 
arranging the scene that are as dramatic as any. The patient lies 
down. The analyst sits behind, out of sight. In the scene as it was 
developed by Freud, these gestures are decidedly not neutral in 
their implications - the laying down of a person, usually a woman, 
in the presence of a man who assumes a position sitting where he 
will be unseen by her. This has the effect of both disrupting social 
etiquette, and betraying a socially gendered norm of power and 
voyeurism by confirming phallocular patterns: he will be able to 
see that she does not have it. Luce Irigaray wonders if this is 
generally considered to be neutral or neuter in part because the 
analysand is reduced to "childedness {I'enfantinage}" - `child' being 
neuter in Freud's language, German: 
This seems to me to be a very weak argument! It is also tragic, in the sense in 
which Hegel talks about the tragic in the constitution of the ethical order, 
tragic in the sense of the great tragedies that mark the beginning of our 
sociocultural order. Even the child or already the child is considered to be 
neuter or neutered before he or she begins to speak! What a loss of freedom in 
the imaginary, the symbolic, the gesturall19 
18 Luce Irigaray, 'Gesture', p. 93/'Le geste', p. 107. Translation modified. 
19 Luce Irigaray, 'Gesture', p. 94/'Le geste', p. 108. Translation modified. 
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Luce Irigaray's subsequent discussion of gestures from beyond the 
analytic scenario (but discussed within it) is then reflected back 
upon this initial discussion to re-enforce, from other viewpoints, 
her original contention that the analytic scenario is a gendered 
experience readable through body language. In This Sex Luce 
Irigaray had already stated in relation to a "feminine syntax {une 
syntaxe du feminin}" that "I think the place where it or she could 
best be deciphered is in the gestural code {gestualite} of women's 
bodies". 20 Much of Irigaray's argument in `Gesture in 
Psychoanalysis' derives from her exploration and understanding of 
the girl/mother relation, of the specificity of the girl's relation to 
the absence of her mother, and in particular from her insight into 
the ways in which the little girl comes to terms with her 
traumatic experiencing of her mother's absence. Most pertinently, 
Luce Irigaray indicates how this is mediated through the syntax of 
the girl's gestural codes. I wish to argue that the gestural 
practices Irigaray has located in this process of the little girl may 
also be discovered resonating within a strand of Louise Bourgeois's 
practice, cumulating in the Cell series and related works - thus 
opening a space of suggestive inter-readings. 
In her questioning of the neutral status of "the child", Luce 
Irigaray refers to Freud's observations of the gestural play of his 
grandson, Ernst. Freud interpreted Ernst's play with a cotton reel 
and string, says Irigaray, as "an action designed to master"21 the 
absence of his (Ernst's) mother. He did this by repeatedly throwing 
the reel away, then retrieving it with the string, accompanying this 
20 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 134/Ce sexe, p. 132. 
21 Luce Irigaray, 'Gesture', p. 96/'Le geste', p. 110. 
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with noises interpreted as `fort' and `da' - `away' and `here'. Luce 
Irigaray stresses that Ernst is a boy, and nowhere does Freud 
question the gender specificity of the event, nor does he suggest 
that a girl might act in the same way. 22 The response s of girls to 
the absence of their mothers, therefore, merit some separate 
attention. 
Luce Irigaray states that the child in the story must have been a 
boy: 
My hypothesis is that it couldn't have been a girl. Why? A girl does not make 
the same gestures when her mother goes away. She does not play with a string 
(un fil) and a reel symbolizing her mother, because her mother is of the same 
sex as she is and cannot have the object status of a reel. The mother is of the 
same subjective identity as she is. 23 
Here, the deliberate play on the word "fiI', the plural of which 
("fils") also means "son", reminds the reader to consider again the 
`double syntax' of the Symbolic and the morpho-logic informing 
both the gestures of little Ernst and Freud's reading of them. The 
little girl doesn't have to create her mother as 'other of her same' 
and as her object in order to understand her relationship to origin 
or to attain her subjectivity. She will not have to accommodate 
difference as well as loss. Luce Irigaray indicates three significant 
reactions from a little girl: 
1) When she misses her mother, she throws herself down on the ground in 
distress, she is lost, she loses the power and the will to live, she neither 
speaks nor eats, totally anorexic. 24 
22 "He was a boy. It is important to be faithful to the text. Not every substitution Is 
possible, especially when sexual difference is involved. In Freud's text, then, the child is a 
boy. And Freud never wrote that it might have been a girl". 'Gesture', p. 97/'Le geste', p. 
111. Irigaray also discusses the story of little Ernst in an earlier lecture reprinted in the 
same volume of essays: 'Belief Itself', in Sexes and Genealogies, pp. 23-53/'La croyance 
meme', in Sexes et parentes, pp. 35-65. 
23 Luce Irigaray, 'Gesture', p. 97/'Le geste', pp. 111-112. Translation modified. 
24 Luce Irigaray, 'Gesture', p. 97/'Le geste', pp. 112. 
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As the little girl and her mother are "of the same subjective 
identity", when they are parted, the little girl has lost a 
transcendental model for that subjectivity, unlike the little boy, 
who has to come to a realization of himself (or achieve a sense of 
his subjectivity in separation) as differing from that of his mother. 
Thus the little boy may try to `master' his mother's absence by 
symbolising her as an object. The little girl, however, - who has no 
reason to think of her mother in terms of subjective difference, 25 
and who has therefore lost part of 'her' subjectivity - is bereaved. 
She begins to show symptoms of hysteria. Elsewhere, Luce Irigaray 
has made this link between the hysteric and her loss of her mother: 
Even in her paralysis, the hysteric exhibits a potential for gestures and 
desires.... A movement of revolt and refusal, a desire for/of the living mother 
who would be more than a reproductive body in the pay of the polis, a living, 
loving, woman. It is because they [those in progressive circles] want neither 
to see nor hear that movement that they so despise the hysteric. 26 
This moment of desire for her mother is an aspect of the hysteric's 
reserve, "a revolutionary potential in hysteria". 
A second reaction of a girl missing her mother could be that 
2) She plays with a doll, lavishing maternal affection on a quasi subject, which 
allows her to organize a kind of symbolic space; playing with dolls is not 
simply a game girls are forced to play, it also signifies a difference in 
subjective status in the separation from the mother. For them, the mother is a 
subject that cannot easily be reduced to an object, and a doll is not an object in 
the way that a reel, a toy car, a gun, etc., are objects and tools used for 
symbolization. 27 
This suggestively aids our understanding of the ways some women 
approach the making of their art works. The possibilities lie in 
reading the girl's organization of "a kind of symbolic space", the 
25 I would like to thank Griselda Pollock for this insight. 
26 Luce Irigaray, 'Women-Mothers, the Silent Substratum of the Social Order', trans. 
by David Macey, in The Irigaray Reader, ed. by Margaret Whitford (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1991), pp. 47-48. 
27 Luce Irigaray, 'Gesture', p. 97/'Le geste', p. 112. Translation modified. 
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"subjective status" of the relationship which leads to play, and the 
fact that the thing played with "is not an object" in the way that 
the boy's toys are. The doll is not in an `either/or' relation to 
objecthood, and cannot be a non-object or even a (non)object, so we 
can instead use the terminology of the last chapter, and refer to it 
as a non-capitalized object for the little girl who is playing with 
it. This also echoes the earlier discussion (in `The Visual: 2') of the 
need for women to develop the gift-space/object as a means of 
mediating their subjectivity to themselves and to others. In this 
image of the little girl and her doll, Luce Irigaray is offering an 
approach where process can be stressed without process in and of 
itself being the meaning; where the importance of the art object as 
object is fundamentally compromised; and with it the notion of 
mastery, in favour of an understanding of the art work as an non- 
capitalized space/object of mediation for the subject. 28 It is an 
insight Luce Irigaray gained from psychoanalyzing women, 
concerning a practice which is pivotal in the engendering of an 
`appropriate' femininity in girls (Luce Irigaray acknowledges the 
social coercion of play: "not simply a game girls are forced to 
play"), but which also reflects and makes manifest the girl's 
psychic accommodation of the absence of her mother through 
gestural codes in body and imaginative space. As the little girl 
plays with the doll, she gains comfort; through repetition, the play 
gains signification, producing signifiers of the little girl's 
subjective identity and the means of possible mediation. 
Thus through the structure in Luce Irigaray's argument we can 
28 It is noticeable that the concept of the fetishizing of the art object and the 
construction of 'mastery' and 'genius', both mainstays of masculinist mainstream art 
discourses, have repeatedly come under fire from various feminist analyses. See for example 
the cumulative work of writers such as Lucy Lippard and Griselda Pollock. 
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propose for the subjects, women, a potential relation to the art 
works they make that is both gendered and yet variable among 
women. It is a relation which could be manifested materially in 
particular practices. The practices of play (their processes and 
effects) are embedded in and understandable through social 
practices. Thus the embodiment of such practices of play in art 
practices may well be discernible, but it is by no means inevitable. 
This is a reading which might, therefore, be appropriate for 
practices of some women which sit uneasily in current discourses 
of the art object, yet it is a reading which also resists any 
simplistic collapse back into an essentialist discourse. It is an 
insight, moreover, through which we can begin to account for the 
desire of many women artists to work with representations of the 
female body or `bodiliness', if you like; an understanding which 
would refute charges of narcissism, and instead attend to the gift- 
space/object, a non-capitalized symbolization which is of the 
same subjective identity as the artist. 29 
Luce Irigaray proposes that a third way in which girls cope with 
the absence of the mother is through dance, and in particular a 
whirling or spinning dance: 
3) She dances and thus makes for herself a vital subjective space open to the 
cosmic maternal world, to the gods, to the present other. This dance is also a 
way to create for herself a territory of her own in relation to the mother. 30 
Luce Irigaray here provides the resource for suggestive readings of 
gesture from which to read Louise Bourgeois's bodily practice in 
creating the space of the Cell works. Gesture can be read as 
29 Artists as diverse as Louise Bourgeois, Leonora Carrington, Genevieve Cadieux, 
Helen Chadwick, Mona Hatoum, Laura Godfrey Isaacs, Jana Sterbak could be discussed in this 
context. 
30 Luce Irigaray, 'Gesture', p. 981'Le geste', p. 112. Translation modified. 
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encoded movement in space. Not only do the gestures of Louise 
Bourgeois thus mark out her imaginitive space through her working 
practices and processes, but also those gestures are evoked in the 
deployment of materials - the gift-space/object's mediation of the 
subject. The assertion of "a vital subjective space" - creativity in 
the face of loss and pain - is something that the African-American 
sculptor Martin Puryear has recognised in Louise Bourgeois's 
approach: "Ultimately she's a survivor. Her work is a tool of 
survival, a means of putting the pain out and dealing with it. Louise 
Bourgeois is a person who talks about pain, but her stance is not at 
all the stance of a victim". 31 Richard Serra emphasises the element 
of mediation in the gestures: "The source of pain, the core of the 
anxiety remains indecipherable, and yet these sculptures trigger in 
me the memory of personal experiences I'd rather forget. Her 
subjectivity forces me to deal with my own". 32 These comments 
amplify one made by Louise Bourgeois about a figure in one of the 
Cells: "It's a circle going round and round. Pain can begin at any 
point and turn in either direction. Each Cell deals with fear. Fear is 
pain. Often it is not perceived as pain, because it is always 
disguising itself. [.... ] She creates her own world and is very 
happy". 33 
Luce Irigaray concentrates on the gestures of the little girl's 
dance: 
Among women, the relationship to sameness and to the mother is not mastered 
by the fort-da. The mother always remains too familiar and too close. In a 
way, the daughter has her mother under her skin, secreted in the dampness of 
the mucous membranes (des muqueuses), in the most intimate of intimacies, in 
31 Martin Puryear, 'Louise Bourgeois', Sculpture (September-October 1994), p. 35. 
32 Richard Serra, in Louise Bourgeois: Locus of Memory, p. 80. 
33 Louise Bourgeois, quoted by Christian Leigh, 'The Earrings of Madame B. ', in Louise 
Bourgeois: The Locus of Memory, pp. 51-69 (p. 61). 
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the mystery of her relationship to gestation, to birth, and to her sexual 
identity. Furthermore, the basic sexual movement of the female is linked more 
to gyration than to the gestures of throwing and pulling back of little Ernst. The 
girl then tries to reproduce around and within her an energetic circular 
movement that protects her from dereliction, immediate breaking into, 
depression, loss of self. Spinning round is also, but in my opinion secondarily, 
a way of attracting {seduire}. The girl describes a circle while calling and 
refusing access to her territory. She plays with this gestural territory and its 
limit. There is no object here, in the strict meaning of the word, no other that 
has had to be introjected or incorporated. On the contrary, girls and women 
often set up a defensive territory that can then become creative, especially in 
analysis. 34 
Here, Luce Irigaray opens an analytic site through which we can 
account for some performative aspects of women's art practices - 
actual making and doing, gestures in the studio, the physical 
negotiation of the work by artist and viewer alike. 
It is important at this point not to collapse the term `performative' 
back solely into the category of `performance art' as it might be 
commonly understood in a visual art context, though it is of course 
useful in analyzing such practices. An understanding of a woman 
performance artist "calling and refusing access to her territory", a 
territory she has described with her body, could well begin to 
account for the resistant position many women performers feel 
themselves to be in with regard to the male gaze. 35 However, it is 
more productive to remember that the performativity of the 
gesture of the little girl, as Luce Irigaray describes it, has a 
function: the production of subjectivity in the face of the 
34 Luce Irigaray, 'Gesture', p. 981'Le geste', p. 112. Translation modified. 
35 For example, Carolee Schneemann wrote very early on in the 'second wave' of the 
women's movement that in the absence of further discourse she had been labelled as "an 
image, but not an Image-Maker, creating my own self-image", and that "the life of the body 
is more variously expressive than a sex-negative society can admit. I didn't stand naked in 
front of 300 people because I wanted to be fucked, but because my sex and work were 
harmoniously experienced I could have the audacity, or courage, to show the body as a source 
of varying emotive Power". Carolee Schneemann, Cdzanne, She Was a Great Painter (1968), 
quoted in Lucy Lippard, 'The Pains and Pleasures of Rebirth: European and American Women's 
Body Art', The Pink Glass Swan: Selected Feminist Essays on Art (New York: The New Press, 
1990), pp. 99-113 (p. 103). 
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traumatic absence of her mother - who is of the same subjective 
identity. The gestural process of the spinning dance is a struggle 
for a life, one of signification. The subjectivity of the little girl is 
developed through her performativity, including that of bodily 
gestures which can develop signification in the Symbolic. Feminist 
cultural theory has concentrated much energy upon analyzing how 
both the body and image of woman is structured as object of the 
(male) gaze; 36 and feminist art practice across different media37 
has often incorporated an exposure of, or resistance to, a 
voyeuristic and phallocentric gaze at the image of a woman, and 
attempted to construct non-phallocentric ways of looking at 
women. In "calling and refusing access to her territory", the stress 
is on the creation and assertion of the territory: her subjectivity 
as signified in an appropriate Symbolic syntax that involves the 
spatialisation of female subjectivity and its desire for and 
distance from the mother. The work of Jo Spence is just one 
example: not only is such resistance and reconstruction visible in 
her photographic work, but she has also charted her struggle 
towards it in her writings. 38 
36 This can be found in strands of feminism as diverse as, on the one hand, the anti- 
pornography movement, in its activist form and in texts like Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: 
Men Possessing Women (London: The Women's Press, 1981); and on the other hand, 
psychoanalytic film theory, particularly the line of enquiry engendered by the highly 
influential paper by Laura Mulvey, 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', Screen, 16.3 
(1975), 6-18. 
37 The performing of gesture in making art works, and the trace or embodiment of 
gestural perfomance in art works, is not restricted to particular media. 
38 Jo Spence has written about combatting dominant structures of the gaze In relation to 
her performative processess of making work, and the gaze of the audience upon the image of a 
woman. For example "The female gaze was always foregrounded in work with Rosy [Martin, 
co-worker in phototherapy sessions] [.... ]. Once I had worked through some of my material 
with Rosy on adolescence, specifically using NLP techniques of 'part work' and 'reframing' 
and felt the safety of her acceptance in a non-critical way of what I presented to camera, it 
became easy to move backwards into reinhabiting scenarios of my so-called oral, anal and 
gential and 'mirror' phases for the camera. This is something which I would find unthinkable 
with a male photographer/therapist". Jo Spence, 'The Politics of Transformation', in 
Cultural Sniping: The Art of Transgression (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 147-155 (pp. 154 
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We can find this performativity in Louise Bourgeois's practice too, 
both in the Cells, and in her dealings with possible audiences. In a 
television programme made largely in her studio about her and her 
work, Louise Bourgeois, not only aware of the camera and the 
interviewer, but behaving in particular ways because of them, 
frequently disrupts any easy access they may presume they have to 
her. 39 She circles around the studio; at one point she stops speaking 
and holds up a mirror to the interviewer; at another, also not 
speaking, she holds up a large sign between herself and the camera 
which reads "NO TRESPASSING"; she throws things on the floor 
between herself and the camera; she uses a noisy bandsaw and for 
several uncomfortable seconds ignores the requests of the 
interviewer that it be turned off so he can continue questioning 
her. One reading of the film is that she has been patronised as an 
eccentric 'little old lady' who borders on hysteria (true to 
stereotypical representations of women, these images of her are 
supplied by a male interviewer and production team, and she is 
contextualized by male 'experts' in emotional, ahistorical terms). 
Another reading is provoked by the discovery in the last third of 
the film that the contract read out by Louise Bourgeois at the 
start, confirming that final approval of any representations of her 
or her work will rest with her, was in fact not accepted by the 
film-makers. Surrounded by male authority figures, with no 
apparent 'mother' figures (whether 'good' or 'bad'), Louise 
155). "Much of the previous work has been described as in 'bad taste, 'unsuitable for 
galleries', 'revolting', 'ugly', 'narcissistic', and 'obsessive': pejorative and dismissive 
words, presumable spoken because of the thwarted expectations of the viewer/critic who 
might prefer to continue to consume the female body, or to dwell only in fantasies of 
idealization of self and others, rather than be encouraged to ask critical questions. " Jo 
Spence, 'The Daughter's Gaze: Blaming, Shaming, Renaming and Letting Go', Cultural Sniping, 
pp. 196-201 (p. 198). 
39 'Louise Bourgeois', Arena (BBC2), 6 August 1994. 
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Bourgeois is refused the means of controlling the images and words 
which will represent her subjectivity to the TV audience. In her 
gestural performance we can recall Luce Irigaray's account of the 
little girl who is "calling and refusing access to her territory". It 
is a phrase which is echoed by Christian Leigh, who says of the 
Cells: "the magic of the work resides in its ability to keep us out 
while drawing us in". 40 
The way we understand the word `gesture' is also crucial. Luce 
Irigaray associates it with the idea of being in some way 
performed (whether that performance is the reason for the 
gesture's being, or whether the performance of the gesture is 
considered pragmatic, or a means to an end). This is a specific 
usage through which we can asses the gestures of women artists in 
their studios, certain gestural structures they build into their 
work, their approach to the spaces in which their work is made 
public, and the manner in which it is made public. In short, it 
suggests a space for analysis of what, where, and how the 
performative gestures of women artists are in their practices. As I 
resisted above a reductive reading of 'the performative' as 
performance art, so too `gestural' should be read as literally `of the 
gesture' in the manner in which Luce Irigaray charts the gestures 
of lying or sitting in the analytic scenario, and not reduced to its 
usage in art criticism in relation to, for instance, Abstract 
Expressionism. This particular distinction is crucial, given the 
naming and over-determination of a particular form of gesture 
within the area of visual art discourse, and how it is redolent of 
40 Christian Leigh, 'The Earrings of Madame B. ', p. 61. 
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patriarchy, modernism, and genius. 41 
Griselda Pollock has analyzed Abstract Expressionism as: 
... a form of painting that specifically staged a kind of primal gesturing, an intentionally informal relation between the body of the painter and the things 
with which the painter works to create a trace of being in that body by its 
movements in space - both literal and mapped on canvas. If, at a certain level, 
abstract painting took to its logical conclusion, as Greenberg argued, the 
fundamentals of the activity - paint, a surface, and, add from Rosenberg, an 
active, but also acting painter - we have the gesture as the articulating sign of 
that process we call subjectivity. 42 
This identifies the role of gesture granted by Abstract 
Expressionism. However, it is the morphological structure through 
which these moments in the process relate to each other which 
differentiates their manifestation in Abstract Expressionism and 
their potentialities if understood through Luce Irigaray's work. 
Griselda Pollock again: 
Abstract Expressionism [.... ] reduced reference to a world, however stylized 
or oblique, and substituted these vivid, metonymic traces of the 'body of the 
painter' epitomized by 'the gesture'. [Jackson] Pollock's practice was 
critically valorized in different ways, all of which celebrate, however 
subtextually, a colonizing masculine mastery. [.... ] Abstract Expressionism is 
a celebration of the 'expressivity' of a self which is not to be constrained by 
expressing anything in particular except the engagement of the artistic self 
with the processes and procedures of painting. Thus 'painting' is privileged in 
modernist discourse as the most ambitious and significant art form because of 
its combination of gesture and trace, which secure by metonymy the presence 
of the artist. These inscribe a subjectivity whose value is, by visual inference 
and cultural naming, masculinity. 43 
Here Griselda Pollock exposes the phallic morphologic at work 
within the critical discourses of Abstract Expressionism. A clear 
41 See Mary Kelly, 'Reviewing Modernist Criticism', Screen, 22.3 (1981), 41-62, for 
a discussion of the economic investment in reading the gestural trace as authenticating 
signature indicating both the presence and the commodification of the artist-subject. I would 
like to thank Griselda Pollock for reminding me of this. 
42 Griselda Pollock, 'Killing Men and Dying Women', in Fred Orton and Griselda Pollock, 
Avant-Gardes and Partisans Reviewed (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 
pp. 221-294 (p. 256). 
43 Griselda Pollock, 'Painting, Feminism, History', In Destabilizing Theory: 
Contemporary Feminist Debates, ed. by Michble Barrett and Anne Phillips (Cambridge: Polity, 
1992), pp. 138-176 (p. 142). 
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hierarchy of practices is set up by these discourses. A concept of 
`painting' is the most privileged by them, and is constructed as a 
metonymic trace of the artist, who is then valorised for his 
mastery of the medium. Thus, readings are produced wherein the 
medium does nothing but get mastered. This mastery by a (male) 
subject is all it mediates, and indeed is read as the artist's `I am'. 
The gestural traces in the medium are capitalized by these 
discourses; the finished paintings are capitalized; the artist is 
capitalized for (as Luce Irigaray might put it) "creating distance 
through a mastery that constitutes the object as a monument built 
in place of the subject's disappearance. "44 Luce Irigaray describes 
a different process of entering language for girls: 
Girls do not enter language in the same ways as boys. [.... ] They enter language 
by producing a space, a path, a river, a dance and rhythm, a song.... Girls 
describe a space around themselves rather than displacing a substitute object 
from one place to another or into various places. 45 
Any approach to painting as mediation in a process of 
intersubjectivity -a co-creation of a signification through 
gestural practices between a subject artist and a subject attentive 
audience - would not be recognised by the phallic morphologic 
which informs the critical structures of Abstract Expressionism. 46 
If the loss of the mother leads girls to a distinct relation with the 
thing that signifies the mother in her absence, covering or 
displacing the fear of her loss; if it leads them to particular 
44 Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. by Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. 
Gill (London: Athlone Press, 1993), pp. 214-215/Ethique do la Difference Sexuelle, (Paris: 
Les Editions de Minuit, 1984), p. 197. 
45 Luce Irigaray, 'Gesture', p. 99/'Le geste', p. 113. 
46 As we have seen in an earlier chapter in a comparison between intersubjectivity and 
a phallomorphologic, "to work at beauty is at least as much a matter of working at gestures 
as they relate to space and to other people as it is a matter of gazing, usually in anxiety, at 
one's mirror". Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', in Sexes and Genealogies, pp. 55-72 (p. 
65)/'Femmes divines', in Sexes et parentes, pp. 67-85 (p. 78). 
257 
delineation and definition of space - space which is both a 
defensive space which speaks of the experience of loss, and a 
display at the same time; and if this is articulated through 
gestures which are gendered, sexualized even, an enunciation which 
invests in process rather than object through which to construct 
its syntax - then I think we have a set of concepts which can 
facilitate a developing analysis of aspects of Louise Bourgeois's 
practice. We have to return to Bourgeois's relation to her mother. 
Louise Bourgeois's gestures in the Cells. 
Coming to terms with the trauma of her mother's loss is part of 
the structure of separation for the little girl. In `Gesture in 
Psychoanalysis', Irigaray is not referring to particularly notable or 
extreme case studies; rather she is attending to the a structure of 
inevitable separation. Louise Bourgeois would have experienced 
such loss. But for the little Louise the trauma of losing her mother 
would have been drawn out: Madame Bourgeois was displaced from 
her position as mother within the family as a result of her 
husband's introduction of his mistress into the house. She no longer 
had a structural position in her family which was clear and 
comprehensible to little Louise. There was also no longer clarity in 
the structural 'mother'/daughter relationship, as the mistress was 
also tutor to the girl, in loco parentis in more ways than one. 
Madame Bourgeois was still physically present; but her position as 
mother was displaced; the nature of her presence spoke of her loss 
of position of 'mother'. It is this removal, this loss, that caused 
such pain, anger and anxiety in her daughter. The anger is expressed 
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towards her father for doing what he did; and towards her mother 
for not being all she should have been. It is notable that in this 
story the father's position as patriarch of the family remains 
intact: in this respect he was still structurally what he should 
have been, although personally flawed and unethical in his 
relationships with these three women. 
Louise Bourgeois has frequently referred to her life history as the 
cause of her impulse to work. For example, Deborah Wye quotes her 
as saying of some earlier works that they "had nothing to do with 
sculpture, they meant physical presences. That was an attempt at 
not only re-creating the past, but controlling it". 47 Drawing upon 
the insights offered by Luce Irigaray, I would like to argue that the 
past decade, during which Louise Bourgeois has been articulating in 
interviews the intensities and complexities of her feelings 
towards her mother, has also been the period in which she has 
articulated this relationship through her work. If we identify a 
correspondent morpho-logic informing the gestural practices of the 
little girl traumatised by the loss of her mother, and the gestural 
practices embodied in Louise Bourgeois's Cells, then we an open a 
space of mediation between the two which can suggestively enrich 
our readings of both. 
Luce Irigaray indicated that the girl missing her mother will 
(amongst other things) or ganize a symbolic space around herself. 
She produces a territory through gestures of spinning, sexuate, 
gender specific circular movement. This performs three main 
functions for the girl: it protects her from abandonment, 
47 Deborah Wye, 'Louise Bourgeois: One and Others' in Louise Bourgeois, ed. by Deborah 
Wye (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1982), pp. 13-34 (p. 19). 
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depression, attack, loss of self; it attracts; it refuses access. It is 
also a process in which there is no clear object - no capitalized 
object - produced by the subject. The little girl also plays with 
objects which are of the same subjective identity as herself, and 
which therefore remain uncapitalized in the significatory syntax 
constructed through that play. These are precisely the processes I 
think Louise Bourgeois has performed in making the Cell pieces. 
Referred to by critics as "installations", 48 these are, however, 
unusual for installation work as they delineate a self-determined, 
architectural, material description of the artist's own psychic 
space, rather than the artist making manifest their psychic (or 
intellectual or what ever) space within the architectural terms 
provided in a pre-existing space. The mapping and embodying of 
space performed by Louise Bourgeois is thus autonomous to a 
degree not usually found in installation artworks, which tend to be 
architecturally reactive. The role of the work in protecting the 
artist from her childhood abandonment and loss of self is apparent 
from her own statements. Little in the work is reducible to object- 
status; things in the works are never treated in a manner where 
they can be identified as symbolic objects, but retain an 
ambivalent status. Thus, for instance, marble 'sculptures' such as 
that of the hands on the table in Cell (Glass Spheres and Hands) 
(plate 16) and that of the ear in Cell l/l (plate 17), referring in both 
their material and its working to a well-established tradition of 
object-making, are placed in space or juxtaposed with other 
materials or things (respectively in these instances, old chairs and 
stools, and old taps and a table guillotine) in a manner clearly 
compromising that tradition. Likewise, 'found objects' in the works 
48 For example, Stuart Morgan, 'Louise Bourgeois', in Rites of Passage (London: Tate 
Gallery, 1996), pp. 54-57 (p. 56). 
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are not placed to emphasize their surreal nature or their usage as 
universal symbols, nor to encourage a reading of them as fetish 
objects; rather they are used as visual material through which an 
idiosyncratic narrative is being articulated; non-capitalized 
objects, with which we have to work to create meaning. As Terrie 
Sultan has written, "one of the defining characteristics of 
Bourgeois's work [is] the great care the artist takes to ensure that 
as viewers we are left to make our own attachments to her 
forms". 49 We have to read the spaces between, as with the picture- 
puzzles mentioned above in Chapter 3: "pictographs in which the 
hunter and hunted, and their dramatic relationships, are to be 
discovered between the branches, made out from between the trees. 
From the spaces between the figures, or stand-in figures. Spaces 
that organize the scene, blanks that sub-tend the scene's 
structuration and that will yet not be read as such. Or not read at 
all? Not seen at all? Never in truth represented or representable, 
though this is not to say that the have no effect upon the present 
scenography". 50 Viewers are attracted in to the Cells, but at the 
same time kept at bay through Louise Bourgeois's delineation of 
this, her signifying space. She does this sometimes literally, by 
making us peer in, while refusing us clear physical or visual 
access; sometimes she does this through her imagery and the 
"spaces that organize the scene", with what can be for the viewer 
a baffling lack of didacticism for such precisely selected or made 
things and such rigorously articulated space. 
49 Terrie Sultan, 'Redefining the terms of engagement', in Louise Bourgeois: The Locus 
of Memory, pp. 28-50 (p. 38). 
50 Luce Irigaray, Speculum Of The Other Woman, trans. by Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985), pp. 137-138/Speculum do 1'autre femme (Paris: Les Editions de 
Minuit, 1974), p. 171. 
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But this struggle with legibility is the moment at which an 
engagement with a gestural syntax as articulated through a 
morphologic appropriate to women can begin to provide us with a 
site of difference through which to read the work and construct 
critical discourses around it. The significance of the dimensions of 
the Cells provide one instance for this discourse of difference. 
There is here an engagement with what Luce Irigaray calls 
"gestural territory and its limits", and a spatial relationship to 
the human body. Their generic title, Cells, recalls on the one hand 
cells both of incarceration and of contemplation, with their 
connotations of spatial relation to body size; and on the other hand, 
evocations of body cells, and implications of literal incorporation 
of experience. Louise Bourgeois has said "since the fears of the 
past were connected with the functions of the body, they reappear 
through the body". 51 She does indeed produce in these works "a 
space, a path, a river, a dance and rhythm, a song". One can almost 
imagine her performing the dance that Luce Irigaray has identified, 
circling or spinning around, arms outstretched, to find the 
dimensions that are appropriate for each piece - dimensions which 
will thus vary from piece to piece. The gestural territory will 
exceed the immediate dimensions of the static body. 52 The artist- 
subject reaches, turns, steps and twists to establish the 
appropriate space/object relation, delimitation and articulation 
through a material signifying practice. As established above, 
Louise Bourgeois marks out her imaginitive space through her 
working practices and processes, as well as those gestures being 
51 Louise Bourgeois, quoted by Christiane Meyer-Thoss, Designing for Free Fall, p. 195. 
52 One of my own remembered pleasures of girlish spinning games (twisting, spinning, 
cartwheeling, swinging, etc. ) is that of provoking the heady moment when the more decorous 
limits of the static body and the formally-sanctioned gesture (such as the single cartwheel) 
were exceeded, and the limits of subjective control tested. 
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evoked in the deployment of materials: hence the articulation of 
space with signifying `objects'. The Cells (their limits, materials, 
spaces, and `objects') can thus be read as a gift-space/object 
mediation by the subject of a process of difference between the 
little girl and the mature woman. 
Louise Bourgeois has made many comments about the signification 
in her work of spiralling, in a manner which resonates with Luce 
Irigaray's notion of spinning - for instance: 
There are a lot of spirals... but they are not automatic. The spiral is a 
vacuum... It represents something... the void, the anxiety void, the void of 
anxiety. 53 
and: 
The spiral is an attempt at controlling the chaos. It has two directions. Where 
do you place yourself, at the periphery or at the vortex? Beginning at the 
outside is the fear of losing control; the winding in is a tightening, a 
retreating, a compacting to the point of disappearance. Beginning at the center 
is affirmation, the move outward is a representation of giving, and giving up 
control; of trust, positive energy, of life itself. 54 
and: 
The spiral is the beginning of movement in space. As opposed to the rigidity of 
the monolith, the subject is exploring space. 55 
The spiral and the spinning figure can be found as a theme in many 
works earlier than the Cells. There it is in sculptures such as the 
Spiral Women of the late 1940s and early 1950s (plate 21); Life 
Flower / (1960); Spiral/Summer (1960); and Spiral Woman (1984) 
(plate 22). This last has a slate disc of some three foot wide 
placed on the floor; hanging above it, at about head height, 
suspended on a wire and able to turn, is a small bronze of a female 
53 Louise Bourgeois, quoted by Christiane Meyer-Thoss, ibid., pp. 72-73. 
54 Louise Bourgeois, quoted by Christiane Meyer-Thoss, ibid., p. 179. 
55 Louise Bourgeois, quoted by Alain Kirili, 'The Passion for Sculpture', p. 74. 
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figure. Her torso and head are surrounded by a thick coil of bronze; 
her limbs 
, are positioned as 
if she were twirling round. In the terms 
of this discussion this appears to be a transitional work, 
somewhere between on the one hand the earlier projection onto 
materials of what it is to spin and spiral, as in the earlier, more 
literal, Spiral Women; and on the other hand, in the subsequent Cell 
works, a creation of a symbolic space through the gestural 
manipulation of materials, producing a site of mediation for that 
spinning, its causes and indeed its comforts and pleasures. 
Robert Storr has looked back to what he calls "the whirling dervish 
figure" in plate 4 of Bourgeois's print sequence He Disappeared into 
Complete Silence (1947): 
When she [Bourgeois] comes round it is never to close the circle but to re- 
inscribe its course with a new emphasis, widening or narrowing its scope as 
she proceeds [.... ] The animating force of her formal language and a self 
portrait, that figure is the direct spatial expression of an insatiable need. She 
is the spiral-woman, seeking but never finding the absolute core of her being, 
always advancing even when she seems to be retracing her steps, always 
restless because she has not reached her outer limits. Nothing in the psychic or 
aesthetic economy of Bourgeois's obsessions has altered these terms. 56 
But Storr, for all his acute perception in his essay, also forgoes 
any account of Louise Bourgeois's relation to her mother, despite 
mentioning both her father and his mistress. In this he also 
demonstrates the effect of this lack, by suggesting that the artist 
is "seeking but never finding the absolute core of her being". In 
missing the mother, and the little girl's loss the mother, the void 
is, rather, in the centre of his discussion of Bourgeois: a void that 
represents in a phallocentric structure "the horror of nothing to 
see". 57 His discourse around Bourgeois is struggling with the limits 
56 Robert Storr, 'The Discreet Charm of Louise Bourgeois', p. 31. 
57 Luce Irigaray, This Sex, p. 26/Ce sexe, p. 25. 
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of phallomorphic logic 
are unable to make 
difference, the syntax 
this particular site of 
the mother of the we 
self-representation: 
and its syntax, and therefore his comments 
that imaginative leap into reading, across 
appropriate to women as it is embodied in 
enunciation. What is missed, then, is that 
, man is central to her morphologic and her 
Woman always speaks with the mother, man speaks in her absence. This with 
her obviously takes different shapes and it must seek to place speech between, 
not to remain in an indissociable fusion, with the women woven together. This 
with has to try to become a with self. Mother and daughter turn around each 
other, they go up and down while encircling themselves but they also delineate 
the two entities that they are: in the lips, the hands, the eyes. 
The girl-subject does not exert mastery, except perhaps in her silence, 
her becoming, her overflowing. The girl-subject does not have objects as the 
boy does. It splits into two in a different way and the object or the goal is to 
reunite the two by a gesture, to touch both perhaps so the birth is repeated, so 
that no unconsidered regression occurs, so that the self is kept whole or, 
sometime, upright. Women to not try to master the other but to give birth to 
themselves. 58 
Mediation between mother and daughter, two subjects of the same 
subjective identity, and mediation of the woman to her self, will 
spring from the same morphologic, and are necessary to produce 
intersubjectivity and avoid the reduction of the one into the other. 
If we accept the importance of the morphology of the 
mother/daughter relationship, and the birth of the subjects, 
women, through an appropriate syntax, we can assess in Louise 
Bourgeois's Cells a signification which otherwise remains 
unacknowledged. In so doing, we also test the structures of gesture 
proposed by Luce Irigaray. Each woman's work augments the 
legibility of the other's. 
58 Luce Irigaray, 'Gesture', p. 99/'Le geste', pp. 113-114. 
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Chapter 7 
Becoming women: woman to woman 
genealogies. ' 
At present, argues Luce Irigaray, "we are still not born women. '2 
We have not attained our full subjectivity, or found our syntax in 
the Symbolic; we struggle to achieve the creation of objects of 
mediation between ourselves. We have not become women because 
we have no horizon corresponding to our morphology, nor do we 
have our genealogies. Women's genealogies (which I understand as 
the culture in an appropriate syntax passed from woman to woman 
through the generations) have been utterly disrupted by patriarchal 
social, sexual, legal, cultural, and religious structures; we have no 
sense of our potential for divinity according to our morphologics, 
no appropriate transcendental, no universal which allows us an 
horizon towards which we can move. We see that this structure 
grants our mothers no respect, and without an horizon of 
possibilities leading us to do otherwise, we reproduce those 
structures. Mother to daughter, in a state of immediacy, we are not 
in position to become the subjects, women. 
In this chapter I will follow through Luce Irigaray's analysis of the 
structures necessary to allow us to become women and to re- 
assert woman-to-woman genealogies. This includes the need for an 
1I would like to thank Professor Robert Welch, Director, and Dr. Anne McCartney, of The Centre for 
Irish Literature and Bibliography, University of Ulster, for reading sections of this chapter. 
2 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', in Sexes and Genealogies (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), pp. 55-72 (p. 66)/'Femmes divines', Sexes et Parentes (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1987), pp. 
67-85 (p. 78). 
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appropriate horizon of possibilities in the ideal realm of the 
spiritual: a divine, a transcendent and a universal sufficient to 
allow those born female to become women. I will do this through 
discussing women's genealogies in relation to a particular cultural, 
historical and political site. An initial discussion of 
representations of women in Irish myth and religion will outline 
how iconic representations of women in Ireland produce the 
function of the representation, `woman', as being a cypher of 
nation, while reducing actual women, politically and empirically, 
to mothers. I will then identify a `reserve' in Hiberno-English - the 
English language as spoken in Ireland - which, I argue, allows 
politicized women artists to retraverse one site of their 
exploitation in order to assert and mediate women's genealogies. 
The representation `woman' in Irish visual culture. 
It is often said that there are two traditions, or two cultures in Ireland. There 
are not. There are scores of traditions, maybe hundreds, all making up a 
diverse and rich culture. All equally valid. All part of making up what we are. 
Urban and rural. Small town and hill village. Fishing port and island. Inner city 
and farming community. Gaeltacht and Gallteacht. Labourer and artisan. Visual, 
literary and oral. Feminist. Song and dance. Orange and green. Hurling and 
rugby. Football and handball. Pagan and Christian. Protestant and Catholic. 
North and south. East and west. The midlands. These traditions and all that they 
represent do not conflict. They are part of the diversity of Irishness 3 
When I first read this statement of Gerry Adams' I was 
immediately reminded of a passage by T. J. Clark used by Griselda 
Pollock as the epigraph to her 1983 article, 'Women, art and 
ideology': "It ought to be clear by now that I'm not interested in the 
3 Gerry Adams, "S 6 an rud 6, cultar, nä an meid a dheanann se (Culture Is what Culture Does)', In 
Distant Relations/Cercanias Distantes/Clann I gCein: Chicano, Irish, Mexican Art and Critical Writing, ed. 
by Trisha Ziff (Santa Monica: Smart Art Press, 1995), pp. 228-233 (p. 228). 'Gaeltacht': an Irish-speaking 
area; 'Gallteacht': an English-speaking area. 
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social history of art as part of a cheerful diversification of the 
subject, taking its place alongside other varieties - formalist, 
'modernist', sub-Freudian, filmic, feminist, 'radical', all of them 
hot-foot in pursuit of the new. For diversification, read 
disintegration". 4 In her article, Pollock exposes Clark's attempt to 
depoliticise feminism by reducing it to one of a number of "mere 
novelties, reflecting fashions in relevant but distinct disciplines". 5 
To do this, Pollock demonstrates how, far from being content with 
an "unthreatening and additive feminism" which liberal art history 
can allow "a marginal place at its conferences and in the pages of 
its journals", instead "a central task for feminist art historians is 
[... ] to critique art history itself, not just as a way of writing about 
the art of the past, but as an institutionalised ideological 
practice". 6 
Gerry Adams also reduces `feminism' to an emblem of diversity. 
Tellingly, by standing the term alone among other terms which he 
pairs in differing degrees of antagonism, he also constructs 
`feminism' as uniquely removed from any sense of discourse, 
context, difference or engagement. While he rightly indicates later 
that the term "two traditions" is "incorrectly and often 
deliberately misused to describe what are in fact two different and 
conflicting political allegiances"7 - the `traditions' of 
Protestantism and Catholicism used as euphemisms for unionism 
and nationalism - his construct of `feminism' is left as one of his 
4 TJ Clark, 'On the Condition of Artistic Creation', The Times Literary Supplement, May 24,1974, 
562. Quoted in Griselda Pollock, 'Women, Art and Ideology: Questions for Feminist Art Historians' (1983), 
in Visibly Female: Feminism and Art Today, ed. by Hilary Robinson (London: Camden Press, 1987), pp. 
203-221 (p. 203). 
5 Griselda Pollock, ibid., p. 204. 
6 Griselda Pollock, ibid., p. 207. 
7 Gerry Adams, "S 6 an rud 6, cultar, nä an meid a dhdanann s8', p. 229. 
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number of traditions co-existing in happy diversity: they "and all 
that they represent do not conflict". Many feminists in Ireland 
would disagree, and have a construct of 'feminism' which, as a 
political practice, is able to engage fundamentally and sometimes 
conflictingly with the structures of each of the traditions listed by 
Adams, and many others not listed by him. If I may paraphrase 
Griselda Pollock, a central task for feminists in Ireland (including 
artists and art historians) is to critique the concept `Irish woman', 
not just as a way of writing about the lives of actual women, but 
as an institutionalised ideological practice of representation in 
and of the culture. Irish culture has a complex history of relating 
representations of women to those of nationality and nation, and 
the Republic was founded with a Constitution which has 
conservative notions of womanhood written into it. Since the early 
1980s, however, the number of Irish women emerging as powerful 
artists has been exceptional. Before attending to work by some of 
these artists, I would like to explore the debates about the 
intertwining of nation and the representation, `woman' in Ireland. 
Many, contemporary writers on Irish culture indicate the entwining 
of representations of identity and the Irish nation, and both of 
these with `woman'. Gerardine Meaney writes that: 
in Ireland, sexual identity and national identity are mutually dependent. The 
images of suffering Mother Ireland and the self-sacrificing Irish mother are 
difficult to separate. Both serve to obliterate the reality of women's lives. 
Both seek to perpetuate an image of Woman far from the experience, 
expectations and ideals of contemporary women. 8 
The iconic and multi-faceted figure of Mother Ireland, and the 
social ideal of the self-sacrificing mother both set reductive 
8 Gerardine Meaney, 'Sex and Nation: Women in Irish Culture and Politics', In Irish Women's 
Studies Reader, ed. by Ailbhe Smyth (Dublin: Attic Press, 1993), pp. 230-244 (p. 230). 
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limits on any horizon of possibilities for each other and for actual 
women. The effects of this for women's access to the Symbolic and 
to language has been much discussed by women poets in particular. 
The poet Eavan Boland, commenting on C19th poetry in Ireland, 
writes: 
Within a poetry inflected by its national tradition, women had often been 
double-exposed, like a flawed photograph, over the image and identity of the 
nation. The nationalization of the feminine, the feminization of the national, had 
become a powerful and customary inscription on the poetry of that very 
nineteenth-century Ireland. 9 
Mythical figures such as Cathleen Ni Houlihan, Mother Ireland, and 
the Sean Bhean Bhocht (the vulnerable virgin, the protecting mother 
- who in fact encompasses all the others - and, literally, the Poor 
Old Woman) were all used as representational tropes of Ireland, 
both land and nation, in Irish art and writing. 10 These were still 
very much live images in the 1970s when Northern Irish poet 
Seamus Heaney was able to describe the conflict there as "between 
the cults and devotees of a god and a goddess": the goddess, Mother 
Ireland in her various guises, ranged against "a new male cult 
whose founding fathers were Cromwell, William of Orange and 
Edward Carson"" - or another version of the mythical, a-historical 
female against the `rational', historical male, and an extreme proof 
of Marina Warner's analysis of public representations of women 
being usually mythic or allegorical, while those of men are of 
9 Eavan Boland, Object Lessons: The Life of the Woman and the Poet in Our Time (New York: 
Norton, 1995), p. 196. 
10 There is not the space here to explore the multiple configurations of 'Mother Ireland' and her 
sisters. The most substantial source on the subject is Belinda Loftus, Mirrors: William l/l and Mother 
Ireland (Dundrum: Picture Press, 1990). See also a review of the book which adds further complexities, 
Joan Fowler, 'King Billy and Mother Ireland in Mirrors', The Oxford Art Journal, 14.2 (1991), 104.107. A 
discussion of the perpetuation of the triple configuration into contemporary literature can be found In 
Elizabeth Butler Cullingford, '"Thinking of Her ... as ... 
Ireland": Yeats, Pearse and Heaney', Textual 
Practice, 4.1 (1990), 1-21. 
11 Seamus Heaney, quoted by Edna Longley, From Cathleen to Anorexia: The Breakdown of 
Irelands (Dublin: Attic Press, 1990), p. 18. 
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historical figures. 12 Heaney's poems of the period often extend the 
metaphor of Mother Ireland into one of the land of Ireland as woman 
- either mother, beloved, or rape victim. In his acclaimed volume 
North, 13 published after a particularly vicious three year period in 
Northern Ireland, we find, for example, in 'Kinship' a bog is an 
"Insatiable bride" and "Our mother ground / is sour with the blood 
/ of her faithful, / they lie gargling / in her sacred heart". `Ocean's 
love' opens: "Speaking broad Devonshire, / Ralegh has backed the 
maid to a tree / As Ireland is backed to England / And drives inland 
/ Till all her strands are breathless". 
The painter Rita Duffy, a Catholic woman from Northern Ireland, 
disrupts the binary oppositions of male/female, 
Catholic/Protestant, and British/Irish as they are found in the 
poem `Act of Union'. Through this work Seamus Heaney plays on the 
sexual-political pun of the title, and speaks as the various male 
occupiers of the land. The second stanza reads: 
And I am still imperially 
Male, leaving you with the pain, 
The rending process in the colony, 
The battering ram, the boom burst from within. 
The act sprouted an obstinate fifth column 
Whose stance is growing unilateral. 
His heart beneath your heart is a wardrum 
Mustering force. His parasitical 
And ignorant little fists already 
Beat at your borders and I know they're cocked 
At me across the water. No treaty 
I forsee will salve completely your tracked 
And stretchmarked body, the big pain 
that leaves you raw, like opened ground, again. 
Rita Duffy's painting Territory (1996) (plate 23) consists of 15 
panels, each 24"x30". On each one paint is layered and sanded. Upon 
12 Marina Warner, Monuments and Maidens: The Allegory of the Female Form (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1985), particularly pp. 18-37. 
13 Seamus Heaney, North (London: Faber and Faber, 1975). 
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Rita Duffy 
Territory 
1996. Pigment and graphite on gesso boards, 15 panels each 24" x 30" 
Courtesy the artist 
Plate 23 
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the top layer is drawn in graphite a detailed map, like an aerial 
photograph, of the 15 so-called `peacelines' in Belfast - walls built 
to keep separate particular areas of Catholic and Protestant 
working class housing, understood as flashpoints of Loyalist and 
Republican violence. Over these images Rita Duffy has stencilled 
the words "his heart beneath your heart / is a wardrum / and 
ignorant little fists already beat at your / borders / your tracked 
and stretchmarked body / the big pain". In this mimetic process (in 
Irigarayan terms) she retraverses a site of exploitation, looking at 
this particular representation of `woman' for sites of another 
syntax. Eschewing the voice "imperially male", disrupting the 
sonnet rhythm and rhyme, and dissecting the poem, Rita Duffy 
mimeticizes the words so their signification shifts to become 
more evocative of a woman's experience of pregnancy. Shorn of the 
explicit links between land and female body, rape and colonisation, 
and the now too-easy opposition between occupier and occupied, 
the words are left in an indirect, tense relation with the images. 
Neither is sufficient as metaphor for the other. Although the border 
of the woman's body will be crossed by the birthing baby, it is not 
clear in the drawings to whom the borders, fragmented inside the 
broader territory of Belfast, belong. Spaces of identity in the 
triangle British/Protestant/Catholic are disrupted, and with them 
any possibility of identification - Army/Loyalist/Republican or 
English/ Ulster-Scots/Irish in one realm, and female/Irish/land or 
male/ British/rapist in the other. 
Referring to Mother Ireland, Richard Kearney asks if the 
development of "such idealized imagos of womanhood might be 
related to the social stereotypes of the Irish woman as pure virgin 
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or son-obsessed mother? "14 and relates it to Ireland's history. The 
early Irish church, in which women played an important role, 
shifted 
to a more puritanical religion which idealized women as other-worldly 
creatures of sublime innocence. And it its perhaps no accident that this shift 
coincided in some measure with the colonization of Ireland. Since the women of 
colonized Ireland had become, in James Connolly's words, the "slaves of 
slaves", they were, in a socio-political sense at least, the perfect candidates 
for compensatory elevation in the order of mystique. The cult of virginity 
undoubtedly corroborated this process of sublimation. Woman became as 
sexually intangible as the ideal of national sovereignty became politically 
intangible. 15 
Mary Condren charts the shift from matrilineal to patrilineal 
religious structures in Ireland. 16 The shift from the `Age of Brigit' 
('She who created without spouse') to the `Age of Mary' ('the Virgin 
who created without sin'17) through the C12th and C13th marked a 
shift in the delineation of femininity. Brigit was at various times a 
triple goddess, a virgin mother, or a lawmaker, who had been 
assimilated into Christianity as a virgin saint. 18 In Ireland, 
baptisms were performed with milk, following Brigit's own 
baptism in milk and nourishment with the milk of a sacred cow. 
This was prohibited in the C12th; 19 along with clerical marriage. 
An increasingly large number of churches or monasteries were 
14 Richard Kearney, Postnationalist Ireland: Politics, Culture, Philosophy (London: Routledge, 
1997), p. 118. This echoes Nuala Ni Dhomhnaill in an article which does for American configurations of 
Irish women's genealogies what Christine Delphy has done for American configurations of 'French 
feminism': "The more the Virgin is revered as a spotless and shining example, the more ordinary human 
women are made to feel guilty for not being simultaneously virginal and motherly (forget the biological 
impossibility), masochistic and above all producers of suicidal sons. (Well, He was, wasn't He? )". 'What 
Foremothers? ', Poetry Ireland Review, 36 (1993), 18-31 (pp. 30-31). This evokes a configuration of 
'woman' within Irish Republicanism: "Women are venerated only to be marginalized as producers of sons 
for slaughter, ungrudgingly offering men to death for the cause". Elizabeth Butler Carlingford, '"Thinking of 
Her... as... Ireland': Yeats, Pearse and Heaney', Textual Practice, 4.1 (1990), 1-21 (p. 16). 
15 Richard Kearney, Postnationalist Ireland, pp. 118-119. 
16 Mary Condren, The Serpent and the Goddess: Women, Religion and Power in Celtic Ireland (New 
York: HarperCollins, 1989). 
17 Epithets quoted by Mary Condren, ibid., p. 160. 
18 Mary Condren, ibid., p. 55. 
19 Mary Condren, ibid., p. 177. 
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dedicated to The Virgin Mary through the C12th, although none had 
been so dedicated in Ireland before 1100.20 In the following 
centuries, the discourse of the Church concerning women, and in 
particular the nature of women's bodies, shifted: "in the public and 
symbolic realm, under the mantle of Mary, women would be placed 
on a pedestal and idealized. But in the private realm (where it 
counted), women would remain under the shadow of Eve, symbols of 
evil and gateways to destruction". 21 The cult of Mary was promoted 
specifically among women, "but with men firmly in control of the 
image making or dogmatic world, the image to which women would 
relate was essentially a male construct. [.... ]. Mary's image 
emphasized the radical disjuncture between the sacred and the 
sexual, [.... ] essentially compensatory, atoning for the loss of social 
status on the part of women. Mary's image was reactionary in that, 
denied the possibility of effective action, she could only react". 22 
Such constructs in the Catholic religion in Ireland were not only 
re-enforced by the increasingly patriarchal structures of the 
Catholic reformation, but by colonization: in Irish culture "the 
links with the Roman Catholic church provided the only symbolic 
force the Irish had against the might of the British Empire. [.... ] 
Irish Catholicism became the vehicle of Irish nationalism, a 
position that it retains in Irish minds even today". 23 
The cultural and political re-alignments experienced in a post- 
colonial situation produce shifts in gender roles which have been 
analyzed. Gerardine Meaney has drawn upon the work of Indian 
20 Mary Condren, ibid., pp. 160-161. 
21 Mary Condren, ibid., p. 143. 
22 Mary Condren, ibid., p. 171. 
23 Mary Condren, ibid., p. 184. 
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political philosopher Ashis Nandy, who explores a pattern of gender 
roles in colonised and post-colonial cultures. Meaney writes that: 
A history of colonisation is a history of feminisation. [.... ] Nandy points out 
that the subject people, in rebelling and claiming independence and sovereignty, 
aspire to a traditionally masculine role of power. The result is that colonised 
peoples, often long after colonisation itself has ended, tend to observe or 
impose strictly differentiated gender roles in order to assert the masculinity 
and right to power of the (male) subjects. [.... ] It is not difficult to trace this 
process at work in the sexual conservatism and political stagnation of post- 
independence Ireland. Anxiety about one's fitness for a (masculine) role of 
authority, deriving from a history of defeat or helplessness, is assuaged by 
the assumption of sexual dominance. 24 
This "sexual conservatism" in the present Republic of Ireland is 
written into the founding Constitution of the State. 25 The 
Constitution states amongst other things that "in particular, the 
State recognises that by her life within the home, woman [sic] 
gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot 
be achieved. The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that 
mothers shall not be obliged by necessity to engage in labour to the 
neglect of their duties in the home". Molly Mullin adds that "the 
language of the Constitution illustrates, once again, the importance 
of struggles over definition. Not only does the Constitution assume 
the right to define `Family', but it also assumes that `woman' can 
be used interchangeably with 'mother', and that both are 
automatically associated with domesticity". 26 Molly Mullin also 
highlights a reduction of women to mothers in the everyday culture 
of the Republic, "where the press consistently follows the mention 
24 Gerardine Meaney, 'Sex and nation', p. 233. 
25 The control over women's sexuality in the Republic has been absolute: not only have divorce and 
abortion been illegal, but they are also anti-Constitutional. This is why there have had to be referenda 
about changing such laws: the Dail (parliament) cannot alter the Constitution without a referendum. The 
constitutional stance on divorce was altered by a referendum in 1996, but by a majority of under I%. 
26 Molly Mullin, 'Representations of History, Irish Feminism, and the Politics of Difference', Feminist 
Studies, 17.1 (1991), 29-50 (p. 42). 
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of a woman's name with 'mother of x number of children'". 27 It is 
this reduction of women to mothers which accounts for the surface 
paradox of Lia Mills's identification of "the dominant iconography 
and rhetoric of the Republic, whose symbolism idealises women 
while its policies, on the whole, ignore us": 28 the Constitution 
idealises a representation, `woman' (particularly in its 
construction of her relation to motherhood) while ignoring the 
autonomy and subjectivity of actual women. 29 
This analysis of the superimposition of the feminine on Irish 
national imagery outlined above30 has been problematized by Edna 
Langley, a critic based in Belfast. Langley argues that such 
analyses depend upon a view of Irish identity which is at one and 
the same time partial and totalising. 31 From the time of partition 
in 1921, and emphasised first by the establishing of the Republic 
and then by the conflict in the North, Irish Nationalism and 
Republicanism has differed on either side of the border in its 
27 Molly Mullin, ibid., p. 37. 
28 Lia Mills, '"I won't go Back to It": Irish Women Poets and the Iconic Feminine', Feminist Review, 50 
(1995), 69-88 (p. 69). 
29 Indicating the large numbers of Irish women who had travelled - and still do travel - to England for 
safe abortions, Gerardine Meaney reflects upon the effect of the Republic's reduction of women to 
mothers for the 1992 referendum on abortion (the Eighth Amendment): "The extent to which women only 
exist as a function of their maternity in the dominant ideology of Southern Ireland became apparent during 
the referendum [.... ]. The only real effect of the Eighth Amendment has been to compromise any general or 
'human' constitutional rights which might give precedent to the woman's rights as an Individual over 
function as a mother. " She suggests that the presence of women in the so-called 'pro-life' movement is 
complex in Ireland: "Such women seek to perpetuate the idealised virgin/mother figure of woman so that 
they can be that figure. Such identification offers women one of the few roles of power available to them In 
patriarchy. " Gerardine Meaney, 'Sex and Nation', pp. 230,231. 
30 - which is remarkably consistent across recent cultural analyses - Luke Gibbons perhaps being 
the dissident. He suggests cultures feminized by colonialism create what he calls "an alternative 
'feminized' public space (imagined as the nation) against the official patriarchal order of the state" - I. e. the 
allegorical female form - which in fact works to "turn the colonial stereotype against itself". Ultimately, his 
argument is unconvincing. While he does admit that such allegorical female figures may "in some sense 
mask patriarchal power on the part of the colonial administration", he offers no analysis of their cause or 
effect in the colonised or post-colonial culture and on the women or men living within it. Luke Gibbons, 
Transformations in Irish Culture (Cork: Cork University Press, 1996), p. 131. 
31 Edna Longley, From Cathleen to Anorexia. 
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political strategies and imagery. Furthermore, within the North 
itself the representations of identity, religion, mythology, and 
femininity differ across the Catholic/Protestant divide. Edna 
Longley also questions the ethics of the re-investment in the 
mythic female imagery of Ireland by contemporary Northern 
Nationalism (such images appear frequently in the political murals 
in Nationalist areas) (plate 24): 
To characterize Irish Nationalism (only constructed in the nineteenth century) 
as archetypally female both gives it mythic pedigree and exonerates it from 
aggressive and oppressive intent. Its patriarchal elements also disappear. [.... ] 
While Virgin-Ireland gets raped and pitied, Mother Ireland translates 
pity into a call to arms and vengeance. She resembles the white-feather- 
bestowing 'Little Mother' in First-World-War recruiting. [.... ] Is there not 
collusion between all feminine-Nationalist images, between Queen Maeve and 
Mother Ireland, between the feminine-pathetic and the feminine-heroic? 32 
There is a suggestion here that the imagery of such figures in the 
North could simply reproduce patriarchal political structures - in 
the manner of some of the goddess images discussed in an earlier 
chapter - unless they are very carefully rethought. The paradox is 
that it should be easier for Catholic women south of the border to 
interrogate the relationships between identity, imagery, and the 
production and signification of such imagery - as it has proved, for 
example, with interrogations of the Catholic Church: women in the 
Republic can criticize the Church and still be secure in their Irish 
identity, whereas in the North such questioning might make 
vulnerable a woman's perceived identity and political allegiances, 
opening them to question in her community. 
Visual artists who are women from either side of the border have 
not re-invested in these images as much as have writers, or the 
painters of political murals. Artists in the Republic in particular 
32 Edna Longley, ibid., pp. 18-19. 
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Republican murals showing historical male figures (those killed by the English after the 
Easter Uprising, and a hunger striker) and mythical female figures representing aspects 
of Ireland 
n. d. Short Strand (top) and the Ardoyne (bottom), Belfast 
Photograph 1996 by the author 
Plate 24 
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have shown more interest in the sheela-na-gig figures - 
Romanesque carvings of female figures exposing their genitals 
(plate 25). These would appear to have more potential, as they are 
at present `empty' images: it is not known who made them, what 
they represent conceptually or spiritually, what the name 
originally meant, nor how they functioned or were used. 33 There is 
not even (and this seems extraordinary given Ireland's wealth of 
written and oral story telling) any oral tradition about them which 
can supply clues. Unlike the Mother Ireland figures, they have no 
perceptible patriarchal overlay. They are not sexual fantasy 
figures. They are not mother figures or nurturers: their breasts are 
either not depicted or only in a sketchy fashion. Despite this, some 
have mis-read them as "primitive fertility symbols"34 or even 
more wildly as "the mother-goddess [.... ] of fertility in Celtic 
mythology", 35 once again reducing a female image to an image of 
mothering. They are also open to re-representation through 
maintenance mimesis of timeless and a-historic symbols of mythic 
womanliness. 36 However, in their installation Sounding the Depths 
at the Irish Museum of Modern Art in 1992 the artists Pauline 
Cummins and Louise Walsh produced a reconfiguration or echo of 
33 Eamonn P. Kelly, Sheela-na-Gigs: Origins and Functions (Dublin: Country House In association 
with The National Museum of Ireland, 1996). 
34 Un-named Dublin woman quoted by Molly Mullin, 'Representations of History', p. 31. 
35 Wanda Balzano, 'Irishness - Feminist and Post-Colonial', in The Post-Colonial Question: Common 
Skies, Divided Horizons, ed. by lain Chambers and Lidia Curti (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 92-97 (p. 
95). This is just one of a number of errors in a very poorly written essay. For an Interesting examination of a 
contemporary re-presentation of the sheela-na-gig image and the meanings that accrued from It, see Molly 
Mullin; and for my analysis of the problematic curation of a recent exhibition of sheela-na-gig carvings, see 
Hilary Robinson, 'Within the Pale in from: Beyond the Pale: The Curation of 'Femininity' In an Exhibition 
Season at the Irish Museum of Modern Art', Journal of Gender Studies, 6.3 (1997), 255-267. 
36 See, for example, the work by Carmel Benson which was (unfortunately) selected to illustrate Lia 
Mills, "'I won't go Back to It": Irish Women Poets and the Iconic Feminine'. Mills mentions briefly a 
treatment of the sheela-na-gig in a volume of poems produced by a collective of women poets as "going 
beyond the merely national to something older, deeper, more primitive" (p. 76). This is clearly a problematic 
project in the context of discussing the critique offered by poets such as Eavan Boland, Nuala NI 
Dhomhnaill and Mary Dorcey, and I read Mill's brevity as an example of an academic feminist's lack of 
appetite for lengthy, negative criticism of a strand of non-academic, separatist feminism. 
Sheela-na-gig (Co. Cavan) 
nd. Stone 
National Museum of Ireland, Dublin. Photograph courtesy Irish Museum of Modern Art, 
Dublin 
Plate 25 
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the sheela-na-gig which has a more productive signification (plate 
26). The main section of the installation was a darkened room with 
black walls. Focused spot-lighting illuminated a series of large 
photographs. The images had been made by projecting onto each of 
the artists' naked bodies slides of mouths, then photographing the 
result. Thus the images were of the bodies of mature women which 
were inscribed with and incorporated a means of enunciation. Some 
women to whom I spoke on the night of the private view found it 
challenging, or even frightening, to be in a situation which, they 
felt, expected them to identify with images representing the 
possibility of inhabiting a body deeply sexed and the site of 
enunciation. The work represents a vision where a syntax and 
morphology issuing from the body is possible. It also represents 
the memory of the sheela-na-gigs as a dynamic, developing, and 
culturally appropriate indicator of a transcendent female 
genealogy. The artists have therefore produced a site where 
cultural memory, female genealogy, and the horizons of latent 
possibility cohere through a process which recalls Griselda 
Pollock's term "inscriptions in the feminine": 
I use it to avoid all the fallacies of expressionism and intentionalism associated 
with notions of self-conscious authorship. [.... ] According to one major 
twentieth century theory, psychoanalysis, we are not fully known or even 
knowable to ourselves. Split between conscious and unconscious levels, 
structured by histories and the desire they foster that culture and language 
repress, what we make, paint, write or film is only partially framed by our 
own purposes and known tactics. 'Inscriptions' brings us closer to a kind of 
analytical reading of symptoms - pressures and signs from the other scene, 
the other registers of meaning, the scripts of desire 37 
37 Griselda Pollock, 'Preface', Generations and Geographies in the Visual Arts: Feminist Readings 
(London: Routledge. 1996). po xii-xx (p. xvi) 
Pauline Cummins and Louise Walsh 
Sounding the Depths (detail) 
1992. Cibachrome, video and sound installation 
Irish Museum of Modern Art, Dublin. Photograph courtesy of the artists 
Plate 26 
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Rethinking the divine. the transcendental. and the 
universal. 
Achieving an appropriate subjectivity for women, rather than the 
sensibility assigned us by the patriarchy, is a point of political 
struggle: 
I am a sexed ontological or ontic being {un etre ou un etant}, hence assigned to 
a gender, to a generic identity, one which I am not necessarily in/through my 
sensible immediacy. And so to be born a girl in a male-dominated culture is not 
necessarily to be born with a sensibility appropriate to my gender. No doubt 
female physiology is present but not identity, which remains to be constructed. 
Of course, there is no question of its being constructed in repudiation of one's 
physiology. It is a matter of demanding a culture, of wanting and elaborating a 
spirituality, a subjectivity and an alterity appropriate to this gender: the 
female. It's not as Simone de Beauvoir said: one is not born, but rather 
becomes, a woman (through culture), but rather: I am born a woman, but I 
must still become this woman that I am by nature. 38 
Being born physically female does not determine sensibility: girls 
are assigned an identity through the culture, one deemed 
appropriate because of their "physiology". It is precisely because 
identity is produced through a play of differance within cultural 
assignations to "physiology" that it can be shifted. This is true of 
both men and women; and it spreads the realm of the political, and 
of political responsibility, into the site of consciousness. 
Attending to the socio-political has to be informed by attention to 
the subjective-political: 
The task of making the transition from the singular to the universal thus 
remains for each person in his or her own unique singularity [.... ]. Each woman 
will, therefore, be for herself woman in the process of becoming [.... ]. In other 
words, being born a woman requires a culture particular to this sex and this 
gender, which it is important for the woman to realize without renouncing her 
natural identity. She should not comply with a model of identity imposed upon 
her by anyone, neither her parents, her lover, her children, the State, religion 
or culture in general. That does not mean she can lapse into capriciousness, 
dispersion, the multiplicity of her desires, or a loss of identity. She should, 
38 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You: Sketch of a Possible Felicity In History, trans. by Alison Martin 
(London: Routledge, 1996), p. 1071J'aime b toi: esquise dune f6licit6 dans lhistoire (Paris: Grasset), p. 
168. 
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quite the contrary, gather herself within herself in order to accomplish her 
gender's perfection for herself, for the man she loves, for her children, but 
equally for civil society, for the world of culture, for a definition of the 
universal corresponding to reality. 39 
Here, Luce Irigaray is arguing for an ethical relation between each 
woman's attention to her conscious being (her self-knowledge) and 
her attentive intersubjective relations, including the most broadly 
social. There does appear to be a potential confusion between Luce 
Irigaray's use of the terms "identity" and "subjectivity" in these 
sections of / Love to You. I do not consider her understanding of 
`subjectivity' to have shifted here, but 'identity' should be 
differentiated from it: I read it as referring to those traits within 
a subject which would mark him or her as behaving in a manner 
appropriately (for example) `manly' or `womanly' for a culture; 
traits of which the subject is or can become conscious and upon 
which he or she can `work': "gather herself within herself in order 
to accomplish her gender's perfection for herself". Luce lrigaray's 
argument for a radical practice of psychoanalysis would form one 
strategy of doing this work. But only if political work is 
undertaken on identity appropriate to gender can individuals 
achieve their subjectivity, and so allow the other gender to begin 
to recognize the limits of their own gender and subjectivity. 
Thus, self-consciousness has its role in developing subjectivity: 
It would be a matter of setting into motion a passive and retroactive 
intentionality: to become aware of being a woman or a man, and wanting to 
become one. It is by recognizing this that I am able to bring my intentions In 
line with my reality. Thus there is no longer any simple projection or natural 
immediacy; rather my intentions are regulated by who I am. Intention is 
subsequently located in a context devoid of necessary phantasies and without 
an imposed origin. It is moved or determined by a project but does not have to 
be phantasmatic, imaginary or invented. My project is regulated on the basis 
39 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You, p. 27/J'aime ä to!, p. 53. 
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of my natural identity. The intention is to assure its cultivation so that I may 
become who I am. Equally, it is to spiritualize my nature in order to create 
with the other. 4° 
The "natural identity" here is an identity appropriate to one's 
gender, and echoes the passage quoted above: "I am born a woman, 
but I must still become this woman that I am by nature". 41 The 
terminology is problematic because it is another example of Luce 
Irigaray re-entering a "site of exploitation" in order to wrest it 
away from a phallocentric syntax. "Natural identity" is not one 
suited to bolstering the identity of another gender according to its 
partial and exclusive configuration of the world, nor is it an 
essential identity, as we might most commonly and colloquially 
use the term 'nature' in our culture. Rather, it is the site of 
potentiality appropriate to each gender, and, therefore, a site of 
resistance to current configurations of gender - which are in 
themselves a disruption to possible appropriate realisations of the 
gendered self. Luce Irigaray defines her use of the term "passive" 
in this context as a matter "not of pure receptivity but of a 
movement of growth that never ultimately estranges itself from 
corporeal existence in a natural milieu"; something which is more 
a matter of fidelity to self than submission to the other. 42 Fidelity 
to one's gendered identity will produce a gendered spirituality -a 
gendered transcendental - and thus provide a site for ethical 
intersubjective relations. This is what is "natural", Luce Irigaray 
argues. In order to achieve this `natural' it is thus necessary to 
establish positive discursive relationships through woman-to- 
woman genealogies - particularly the mother-daughter relation - 
40 Luce Irigaray, / Love To You, p. 391J'aime ä toi, pp. 71-72. 
41 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You, p. 1071Jaime ä toi, p. 168. 
42 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You, p. 381J'aime ä toi, p. 71. 
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and a female divine: "However, insofar as a respect for the identity 
and dignity of women is concerned, two bridges must be 
established or re-established. One is the bridge consisting of the 
mother-daughter relation; the other is that of feminine identity. It 
is impossible to ask a woman to be holy, absolved of blame, as long 
as she is unable to recognize the potential holiness of her own 
mother". 43 
Following the earlier discussion, we can understand these 
relationships as only practicable when they , are faithful to 
women's morphologic. It has been long recognised by feminism that 
even at the most publicly social level (for example, in most 
Western cultures, in the passing down of family names) mother- 
daughter relations have been utterly disrupted by patriarchy; but 
the potentially positive impact of configurations of the divine upon 
this has not always been appreciated. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
has indicated this in a way which has particular interest for the 
discussion of cultural representations in Ireland: 
Given the connection between secularism and imperialism, there is almost no 
way of getting to alternative general voices except through religion. And if one 
does not look at religion as mechanisms of producing the ethical subject, one 
gets various kinds of 'fundamentalism'. Workers in cultural politics and its 
connections to a new ethical philosophy have to be interested in religion in the 
production of ethical subjects. There is much room for feminist work here 
because western feminists have not so far been aware of religion as a cultural 
instrument rather than a mark of cultural difference. 44 
While many women have rejected dominant religions because of 
their patriarchal structures and their misogyny, feminist spiritual 
or theological movements have often been regarded as a bit of an 
43 Luce Irigaray, 'Equal to Whom? ', in The Essential Difference, ed. by Naomi Schor and Elizabeth 
Weed (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 63-81 (p. 77). 
44 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Politics of Translation', in Destabilizing Theory: Contemporary 
Feminist Debates, ed. by Michele Barratt and Anne Phillips (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 177-200 
(p. 192). 
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embarrassment, or the potential for a dynamic importance of 
spirituality for women has been ignored, simply not discussed. As 
we have seen in an earlier chapter, some feminist configurations of 
a goddess can re-assert phallomorphic logic; and it is clear that 
this is counterproductive in the development of subjectivity by 
women. Patriarchal notions of the divine (Luce Irigaray is talking 
mainly about the dominant Western religion, Christianity, though 
the argument could be extended into some other religions) are far 
from appropriate for women: 
Man has sought out a unique male God. He has created God out of his gender... 
He scarcely sets limits within Him and between Him: he is father, son, spirit. 
Man has not allowed himself to be defined by another gender: the female. His 
unique God corresponds to the human race {genre humain), which we know is 
not neuter or neutral {neutre} from the point of view of the difference of the 
sexes. 45 
It is the morphologic of men-amongst-themselves, of the Same, 
which has left female sexuality without its spirituality, "without 
representation in terms of the divine"46 because this masculine 
morphologic "denies transcendence in the feminine. Everything that 
is of the feminine gender is thus less valued in this logic because 
it lacks any possible dimension of transcendence. [.... ] It is this that 
makes a spiritual relationship between the sexes an 
impossibility". 47 Without this sense of the divine and of 
transcendence, women can only repeat the representations of 
themselves constructed by a phallo-morphologic. 48 As elsewhere in 
Luce Irigaray's thinking, a notion of surface equality is spurious: 
"A theology of women's liberation establishes as its priority not 
45 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', pp. 61-621'Femmes divines', p. 74. Translation modified. 
46 Luce Irigaray, 'Questions to Emmanuel Levinas', in The Irigaray Reader, ed. by Margaret Whitford 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 178-189 (p. 178). 
47 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 671Jaime i toi, p. 115. 
48 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', pp. 62 and 64/'Femmes divines', pp. 74 and 76. 
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equal access to the priesthood, but rather an equal share in the 
divine. This means that what I see as a manifestation of sexual 
liberation is God made a couple: man and woman and not simply God 
made man". 49 
For a believer, the notion that God is purely a product of man's 
morphologic could be problematic: God would then be seen to be 
"the space of an empty sign", 50 a mere mirror-construct made by 
man, and therefore all belief would have to be suspended. Another 
problem could be that this God could be understood as something 
approaching flesh made God, rather than (in part) God made flesh - 
which would be an heretical interpretation. We have already seen 
that Luce Irigaray warns us against regressing to a deification of 
"siren goddesses" and hierarchies which repeat old patterns and 
structures. 51 In this understanding of God as "God made a couple: 
man and woman and not simply God made man" resides an answer. 
God has been represented by man in his (man's) own image, 
according to the same morphologic that has produced the 
representation `woman'. But if God is understood as couple and 
neither as The One, nor as the 'bisexual', two-in-one God of equal- 
rights feminism which reasserts, at the end of the day, a singular, 
phallomorphic God (so, to put it another way, if God is understood 
as He-She or She-He, rather than He or She or S/He), then believers 
might be able to find a structure flexible enough to allow for 
different morphologics as are appropriate for them as gendered 
subjects; a structure `god' which pre-exists man and woman and 
49 Luce Irigaray, 'Equal to Whom? ', p. 74. 
50 Serene Jones, 'Divining Women: Irigaray and Feminist Theologies', Yale French Studies, 87 
(1995), 42-67 (p. 65). 
51 Luce Irigaray, 'Divine Women', p. 60PFemmes divines', pp. 72-73. 
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their syntaxes of representation. 
If a woman is to become woman (to achieve her subjectivity) and 
thus be born into a knowledge of her limits and of intersubjective 
relationships, she must have a sense of a transcendent which can 
be recognised through the structures of her morphology. 
Intersubjective relationships depend upon the irreducibility of the 
other subject: 
you are irreducible to me, just as I am to you. We may not be substituted for 
one another. You are transcendent to me, inaccessible in a way [.... ]. Between 
us there is always transcendence, not as an abstraction or a construct, a 
fabrication of the same grounding its origin or measuring its development, but 
as the resistance of a concrete and ideational reality: I will never be you, 
either in body or in thought. 52 
This transcendental is experienced in difference between one 
subject and another, not only in difference between the genders: 
"Two qualitative differences need to be discovered, to be related - 
one which takes place in sexual difference, and one that can be 
lived in sympathy between women. [.... ] Each sex should be 
considered in relation to its corresponding ideal, its 
transcendental". 53 This is what Luce Irigaray terms a "sensible 
transcendental", 54 that is, a transcendental which (as it is 
informed by appropriate morphologies) resolves any patriarchal 
split between the material body and the spiritually ideal. The ideal 
for each sex, in the sensible transcendental, corresponds to its 
morphologic and thus relates in part to the material body; and the 
morphologic of the material body can be recognised in the ideal to 
52 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, pp. 103-104/J'aime ä toi, pp. 161-162. 
53 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', trans. by David Macey, In The IrlgarayReader, 
pp. 105-117 (p. 106)/'La limit du transfert', in Parier nest jamais neutre (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 
1985), pp. 293-304 (p. 294). 
54 Luce Irigaray, 'The Limits of the Transference', p. 112/'La limit du transfert', p. 300, and 
elsewhere. 
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which that subject can aspire: 
Transcendence is thus no longer ecstasy, leaving the self behind toward an 
inaccessible total-other, beyond sensibility, beyond the earth. It is respect for 
the other whom I will never be, who is transcendent to me and to whom I am 
transcendent. Neither simple nature nor common spirit beyond nature, this 
transcendence exists in the difference of body and culture that continues to 
nourish our energy, its movement, its generation and its creation. Our energy 
is thence no longer channelled, sublimated, or paralyzed in a movement 
towards a beyond I-me, or you, or we. It is the movement and transformation 
that limits the empire of my ego, of the power of you, or of the community and 
its already established values. It remains in me, enstasy rather than ecstasy, 
but ready to meet with the other, particularly through language, without 
sacrificing sensibility. 55 
If Luce Irigaray's configuration of the transcendental insists upon 
the material real for each gender -a transcendent which is at one 
with the morphologic of the subject - then the same initial 
analysis informs her configuration of the universal. She critiques 
the movements which demand equality (rather than her politics of 
respect for difference) as resulting from the same morphologic as 
do our present structures of the universal - equality meaning 
sameness and thus ultimately (particularly in the case of gender) 
death: "the demand for equality for all, between all men and all 
women, is indeed faithful to our secular metaphysical ideal, an 
ideal aimed at universality, totality, the absolute, and essence by 
reducing distinctions and dissimilarities". 56 Phallomorphologic, in 
producing a concept of equality as singularity, totalising 
universality, and sameness, has produced something which (to pick 
up an earlier point) goes against nature. Neither nature nor its 
content are universal - not even its basic elements, such as air: 
"air itself varies in terms of density, heat, etc., and is not, 
therefore, universal matter as such even though without it there 
55 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, pp. 104-105/Jaime i toi, pp. 163-164. 
56 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You, p. 99/J'aime i toi, p. 155. 
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can be no universal". 57 Sexual difference is the constant reminder 
of the impossibility of a singular universal: 
The natural is at least two: male and female. All the speculation about 
overcoming the natural in the universal forgets that nature is not one. In order 
to go beyond - assuming this is necessary - we should make reality the point of 
departure: it is two (a two containing in turn secondary differences: 
smaller/larger, younger/older, for instance). The universal has been thought 
as one, thought on the basis of one. But this one does not exist. 58 
Some notion of non-sigularity, limit and irreducibility therefore 
exists throughout the living world, to the extent that sexual 
difference itself is the only globally appropriate content for the 
concept of the universal: 
Without doubt, the most appropriate content for the universal Is sexual 
difference. Indeed, this content is both real and universal. Sexual difference is 
an immediate natural given and it is a real and irreducible component of the 
universal. m 
Other differences for the subject, including racial difference, will 
be recognised and confronted after sexual difference. Mostly, the 
little girl or little boy will produce their gendered identity through 
a recognition of sexual difference before they produce a racial 
identity through recognition of racial difference. 6° 
In this way we can see that the universal is paradoxically not one 
but, as is the divine, at least two; and that it is related to a 
redefined `natural' which, as indicated above, is the potential for 
an order respecting difference: 
The fact remains that we are men and women. And that this constitutes a living 
57 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You, p. 371J'aime ä tol, pp. 68-69. 
58 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You, p. 351J'aime a toi, p. 65. 
59 Luce Irigaray, t Love To You, p. 471Jaime ä toi, p. 84. 
60 Luce Irigaray's comments on race could prove contentious. As is frequent in her work, this 
analysis results from consideration of a 'usual' experience, and would certainly hold true for infants born 
into mixed-sex families (or similar social structures) as a member of the dominant race in a predominantly 
mono-racial society, no matter what that race is. It may also hold true for infants born into mixed sex 
families in minority racial communities. However, other situations (such as being born into a single-sex 
family in a racially diverse community for example) could well produce different chronologies. 
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universal. It is a universal related to our real person, to his or her needs, 
abilities and desires. The particularity of this universal is that it is divided 
into two. Thus, respecting the difference between woman and man is itself 
culture. It goes beyond natural immediacy. If man and woman respect each 
other as those two halves of the universe that they represent, then by 
recognizing the other they overcome their immediate instincts and drives. 61 
Through this natural universal of sexual difference a sexuate 
culture can be developed; and across its nature of difference 
irreducible to one we have to establish ethical mediation. 
Mediation, therefore, can be seen as a secondary characteristic of 
the universal: "language is the tool of the universal. Yet it is not 
the universal. Anything associated with nature is immediately 
universal; that which passes through articulation is only mediately 
universal". 62 Mediation, as we have already seen, is sexuate. 
What this means for the individual sexuate person, man or woman, 
is that there is a morphological relationship between their 
particularity and the universal -a second seemingly paradoxical 
element of this understanding of universality: 
With generic identity, there is no longer an opposition between particular and 
universal in the sense that the universal is already within me and does not 
have to be constructed outside of me. Of course, I am still subject to a 
historical particularity. But no longer is there any contradiction between the 
singularity of that history and a{ un} neuter(? ) universal produced by a (une) 
culture, a {un} spirit. That tension is resolved within the horizon of belonging 
to a universal as generic identity. I no longer have any reason to estrange 
myself from myself so as to meet up with the absolute in a for-itself existing 
outside of me. Rather, I have to fulfil myself as what and who I am: a woman. 
This woman I am has to realize the female as universal in the self and for the 
self as far as she is able during the period of History in which she finds herself 
and given the familial, cultural, or political contingencies she has to 
overcome. 63 
Particularity, the universal, mediation, the divine, the natural, and 
61 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You, pp. 50-51/J'aime ä to!, p. 84. 
62 Luce Irigaray, 'he Female Gender', in Sexes and Genealogies, pp. 105-123 (pp. 111.112)l'Le 
genre feminin', in Sexes et parentds, pp. 119-138 (p. 127). 
63 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You, pp. 144-145/Jaime .6 to!, pp. 225-226. 
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the transcendental, once they are (re)thought through a sexuate 
morphology, can be understood as being in harmony with and for our 
gender, and as elements through which we can achieve our gendered 
subjectivity. They would no longer be, as they are in our present 
configuration of them, riven with splits and exclusions. What we 
would see now in a patriarchal culture as paradoxes could be 
understood as coherent in a different morpho-logic. 
Mother-daughter genealogies. 
Patriarchy has disrupted mother-daughter relationships through an 
act of matricide. As patriarchy reduces women to their 
relationship to motherhood (reducing them to mothers, or as sub- 
categories, potential mothers or non-mothers), the mother-woman 
is erased in favour of the mother-reproducer (of the male): 
our culture is built on a matricide: the matricide of the mother/lover - not of 
the woman as reproducer but of the woman as a lover, as a creator who has a 
specific desire and who fights for her desire. One sees this matricide at the 
beginning of our culture; our culture has been founded on it. When the fathers 
took power, they had already annihilated the mother. This can be seen in 
mythology, in Greek tragedy. 64 
If women are reduced to mothers from their status as women in 
order to `fit' the identity the patriarchal culture provides for them, 
then this has a devastating effect upon mother to daughter 
genealogies. We have seen above how, if a daughter cannot imagine 
her mother partaking of the divine, then she will have no divine of 
her own. There will be no horizon for her on *which is situated an 
ideal feminine. But as well as this, in the site of a particular 
64 Luce Irigaray, 'Luce Irigaray: Paris, Summer 1980', interview by Elaine Hoffman Barauch and 
Lucienne Serrano, in Women Analyze Women in France, England and the United States, ed. by Elaine 
Hoffman Barauch and Lucienne Serrano (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), pp. 147-164 (p. 156). 
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relationship between a mother and a daughter, "given the 
exploitation that she submits to on the part of her father/husband, 
given her exclusion from social and creative activity, [a mother] 
reproduces the oppression to which she is subject". 65 Luce Irigaray 
has confirmed this through analysis of mother-daughter 
conversations: 
Unfortunately, the mother does not show [.... ] intersubjective respect for her 
daughter. [.... ] The elder [woman] seems to repeat to the younger what has 
been forced upon her as a woman. A dominant male culture has intervened 
between mother and daughter and broken off a loving and symbolic exchange. 
The position of the man relative to the object has separated the two women 
subjects. The message between them has become the imperative of an action to 
be accomplished and not a question that allows the other to speak. 66 
The antidote to this, the strategic response for disrupting the 
disruption of this relationship, is twofold. Initially the strategy 
would be of attending to the subjectivity of the mother: "If the 
mother is the alienator, it is because she has no identity as a 
woman. [.... ] The mother has to find her identity as a woman and 
from that point, she would be able to give an identity to her 
daughter". 67 Finding her identity as a woman would involve a 
further strategic move: the development of an appropriate Symbolic 
syntax, and with it, the establishment of objects of mediation and 
intersubjectivity: "If one were to succeed in creating again a good 
relationship between mother and daughter, women would no longer 
subordinate themselves. There would be a feminine identity and 
women would not submit themselves to what is called the exchange 
of women among men". 68 A key element of the patriarchy would be 
65 Luce Irigaray, 'Luce Irigaray: Paris, Summer 1980', p. 156. 
66 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You, pp. 130-131/J'aime A toi, pp. 203-204. Translation modified. 
67 Luce Irigaray, 'Luce Irigaray: Paris, Summer 1980', p. 157. 
68 Luce Irigaray, 'Luce Irigaray: Paris, Summer 1980', pp. 157-158. 
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effectively unpicked, not through head-on collision, but through 
establishing respectful and amorous relationships between women: 
a potentially revolutionary move: 
In a sense we need to say goodbye to maternal omnipotence (the last refuge) 
and establish a woman-to-woman relationship of reciprocity with our mothers, 
in which they might possibly also feel themselves to be our daughters. In a 
word, liberate ourselves along with our mothers. That is an indispensable 
precondition for our emancipation from the authority of fathers. In our 
societies, the mother/daughter, daughter/mother relationship constitutes a 
highly explosive nucleus. Thinking it, and changing it, is equivalent to shaking 
the foundations of the patriarchal order. 69 
Daughters need to identify with their mothers as women in an 
intersubjective relationship as a result of recognising their same 
subjective identity. Only then is it possible to establish objects of 
communication between the two which perform the presently 
tricky task of not reducing either subject to object-status in the 
eyes of the other. 7° Again, there is a potentially revolutionary 
effect here, this time in language, which would impact upon both 
genders: "But if mothers could be women, there would be a whole 
mode of a relationship of desiring speech between daughter and 
mother, son and mother, and it would, I think completely rework 
the language {langue) that is now spoken". 71 An indication of how 
this might develop can be gleaned from attending to the present 
words of little girls in conversation with their mothers, as 
uncovered in Luce Irigaray's work on language: 
And so, in the words, whether real or imaginary, that the little girl addresses 
to her mother, there are always two persons speaking to one another and they 
are represented as doing something together. Rarely is there an object 
circulating between them, except an object of communication. 72 
69 Luce Irigaray, 'Women-Mothers, the Silent Substratum of the Social Order', trans. by David 
Macey, in The Irigaray Reader (pp. 47-52), p. 50. 
70 Luce Irigaray, Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution, trans. by Karin Montin 
(London: Athlone Press, 1994), pp. 18-20/Le temps de la difference: pour une revolution pacifique (Paris: 
Le Livre de Poche/Librairie Generale Frangaise, 1989), pp. 36-38. 
71 Luce Irigaray, Women-Mothers', p. 52. 
72 Luce Irigaray, I Love To You, p. 130/J'aime a toi, p. 203. 
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The daughter's words to the mother may represent the most highly evolved 
and most ethical models of language, in the sense that they respect the 
intersubjective relationship between the two women, express reality, make 
correct use of linguistic codes and are qualitatively rich. 73 
At this point it might be instructive to reflect once more upon Luce 
Irigaray's suggestions (which could be read as being peremptory or 
propagandist74) about displaying images of mother-daughter 
couples. These are found in three passages, two in Thinking the 
Difference and the other in Je, Tu, Nous; books which have a more 
polemic tone than much of her other work. The first two concern 
the public environment: 
To anyone who cares about social justice today, I suggest putting up posters in 
all public places with beautiful pictures {belles images) representing (figurant) 
the mother-daughter couple - the couple that bears witness of a very 
particular relationship to nature and culture. Such representations are missing 
from all civil and religious sites. This is a cultural injustice that is easy to 
remedy. There will be no wars, no dead, no wounded. This can be done before 
any reform of language, which will be a much longer process. This cultural 
restitution will begin to redress women's individual and collective loss of 
identity. It will cure them of some ills, including distress, but also rivalry, and 
destructive aggressiveness. It will help them move from the private sphere to 
the public, from their family to the society in which they live. 
[.... J 
Putting up images - photographs, paintings, sculptures, etc., not 
advertisements - of mother-daughter couples in all public places today would 
show respect for the social order. The social order is not made up of mothers 
and sons, as patriarchal culture represents it. 75 
The image of the mother-daughter couple is represented here as a 
matter of social justice, of redressing and re-addressing a social 
order, and with recollection of the relation to nature outlined 
above. Irigaray's suggestion of placing such images in public is 
73 Luce Irigaray, Thinking the Difference, p. 111/Le temps de la difference, p. 122. 
74 Christine Battersby, 'Just Jamming: Irigaray, Painting and Psychoanalysis', in New Feminist Art 
Criticism: Critical Strategies, ed. by Katy Deepwell (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 
128-137 (p. 131). 
75 Luce Irigaray, Thinking the Difference, pp. 9-10,12/Le temps de la difference, pp. 27-28,30. 
Translation modified. 
293 
verging on the propagandist, but for the fact that her aim is not so 
much didactic as healing. Images can be extraordinarily effective: 
advertising campaigns, for example, can change people's habits of 
eating or dressing in a relatively short time; while changes to 
linguistic habits can take not only years but decades to achieve. 
The problem is that the visual, as well as verbal, signifiers need 
careful attention - something of which Luce Irigaray seems not 
fully aware. 76 
Similar problems occur in the second passage, published a year 
later. This attends more to the family and domestic space, rather 
than the public space: 
In all homes and all public places, attractive {belles} images (not involving 
advertising) of the mother-daughter couple should be displayed. It's very 
damaging for girls always to be faced with representations of mother-son, 
especially in the religious dimension. I'd suggest to all Christian women, for 
example, that they place an image depicting Mary and her mother Anne in the 
communal rooms of their homes, in their daughter's rooms, and in their own 
rooms. There are sculptures and easily reproducible paintings of them 
available. I'd also advise them to display photographs of themselves with their 
daughter(s), or maybe with their mother. They could also have photographs of 
the triangle: mother, father, daughter. The point of these representations is to 
give girls a valid representation of their genealogy, an essential condition for 
the constitution of their identity. 77 
This also presents problems of an apparent disregard for the 
morphologic which may be at play in the visual language of an 
image. The other major problem here is a surprising lack of 
interrogation of Christianity. However, if we read this in the light 
of its presentation in her most polemical book as one of a number 
of "practical suggestions for the development of mother-daughter 
76 We have seen earlier, in the discussion of 'goddess' representations, that images which share a 
number of compositional and representational characteristics and a pro-woman aim, can nonetheless be 
productive of very different meanings and even fluently reproduce phallic languages of representation. 
77 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous: Toward a Culture of Difference, trans. by Alison Martin (London: 
Routledge, 1993), pp. 47-48/Je, tu, nous: pour une culture de la difference (Paris: Grasset, 1990), pp. 53- 
54. Translation modified. Hereafter cited as Je, Tu, Nous/Je, tu, nous. 
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relationships"78 (it is one of six) and understand it as a short-term 
strategy which is amplified by other strategic actions, then it can 
make more sense. 
It can also make more sense when considered in relation to an 
earlier passage in the same book, describing an encounter Luce 
Irigaray had with one work of art: 
In May 1984, after a conference at the Venice-Mestre Women's Center 
entitled Divine Women, I went to visit the island of Torcello. In the museum 
there is a statue of a women in the position of Mary, Jesus's mother, sitting 
presenting the child who sits on her knee, facing those who look at them. I was 
admiring this beautiful wooden sculpture when I noticed that this Jesus was a 
girl! That had an effect on me, which was perceptual, mentally significant, and 
of jubilation. I felt freed from the tensions of that cultural truth-imperative 
which is also practiced in art: a virgin-mother woman and her son depicted as 
the models of redemption we should believe in. Standing before this statue 
representing Mary and her mother, Anne, I felt returned calmly and joyously 
into my body, my affections, and my woman's history. I was facing an 
aesthetic and ethical figure that I need to be able to live without contempt for 
my incarnation, for that of my mother and other women. 79 
This was certainly a profound experience. The sculpture itself 
(which was still there in the tiny museum on Torcello in the 
summer of 1997, when I saw it) is indeed beautiful (plate 27). 
About 4' high, wall-mounted, it dates from the C15th and is now a 
little battered. If one did not look closely it would be easy to 
assume it was of Mary and Jesus. There is a light and open quality 
given to the features of both woman and girl, and despite the 
relatively formal composition, an affectionate gesture passes from 
mother to daughter. With similar faces and postures, the daughter 
encompassed but not swamped by her mother's body, they look out 
on the world together with pleasure. Luce Irigaray does not analyze 
these elements, but had the sculpture been comprised of elements 
which jarred with a positive reading of the mother-daughter 
78 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous, p. 47/Je, tu, nous, p. 53. 
79 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous, p. 25/Je, tu, nous, pp. 25-26. Translation modified. 
Santa Maria e Santa'Anna 
C1 5th. Oil on wood, c. 48" high. 
Museo dell'Estuario, Torcello, Venice 
Plate 27 
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relationship, then the experience of seeing it must have been 
different. As it is, it is significant that Luce Irigaray is able to 
contemplate the sculpture in its own terms as a representation of 
a divine mother-daughter couple, and not through any re-mediation 
through the patriarchal structures of the Church. This image, while 
produced from a Christian story, has nonetheless provided for an 
experience of the transcendental and the divine - provided an 
horizon of possibilities - which can aid a woman in fulfilling her 
subjectivity. 
"The mother"/"my mother" in Hiberno-English: a cultural 
reserve? 
I would now like to discuss one specific aspect of the linguistic 
and conceptual context within which women in Ireland are working. 
The Irish use of English (or `Hiberno-English') provides for a clear 
space of reserve from the patriarchal representation of woman in 
its interchangeable use of the nominative rather than the personal 
possessive when referring to a particular mother. This would be 
recognised throughout the island, but is more prevalent 
geographically in the South (possibly accompanying the difference 
between northern and north-eastern accents and the southern and 
western accents). For instance, when a little girl got lost in a large 
shop, I heard the question asked "where is the mother? " rather 
than "where is her mother? ". Likewise, talking about a woman 
going to a celebration, a comment was "she took the mother with 
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her", rather than "she took her mother". 80 This usage of the 
nominative mother - "the mother" - is positive, precise and 
particular as it can be interchangeably used instead of the personal 
possessive - "my mother", "his or her mother". Thus are drawn 
together three separate concepts: a transcendent concept of a 
mother; the person of an individual woman; and the role which that 
woman has in a particular relationship. This is a use of the English 
language which allows for a shift in understanding of the concept 
`mother', and which can reinforce women's genealogies by providing 
an horizon. It also leads to a necessary revaluing of what might 
constitute essentialist representations in that context, as it is a 
site for rethinking "the mother" where the universal can 
constantly be drawn across to the particular or personal, and vice 
versa, and where a female transcendent in harmony with the real 
can be experienced. This is the "generic identity" described by Luce 
Irigaray, in which 
there is no longer an opposition between particular and universal in the sense 
that the universal is already within me and does not have to be constructed 
outside of me. Of course, I am still subject to a historical particularity. But no 
longer is there any contradiction between the singularity of that history and a 
neuter(? ) universal produced by a culture, a spirit. That tension is resolved 
within the horizon of belonging to a universal as generic identity. 81 
For Irish women artists searching for appropriate visual syntax, 
this is a reserve in the spoken language which allows for 
morphological shifts and changes to be made towards establishing 
intersubjective relations between the mother-daughter couple; a 
80 The closest that English usage of the English language gets to this Is in the use of `the wife" (as 
in "don't tell the wife" or "the wife's on the phone for you"); but this is specific to male usage, and Indicates 
in varying degrees disparagement, fear, or loathing. "The wife" becomes a figure against whom men are 
pitted, and she is invoked in the search for male bonding. There may be similar constructions to the Irish In 
local dialects in Britain, but in distinction from this, the Irish is notable for its cross-class, cross-region, 
and non-dialect-specific occurrence. 
81 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 144/J'aime i toi, p. 225. 
297 
reserve of the representation, `woman', in its particularity in Irish 
culture. It is a reserve where language can be retraversed as a 
result of politicization, rather than left as a site for hysterical 
mimetism; a space where a woman can "ceaselessly measure 
herself against her beginning and her sexuate determination, beget 
anew the maternal within her, give birth within herself to mother 
and daughter in a never-completed progression". 82 Moreover, it is a 
reserve in the particular representational system for development 
of an imagery of the universal as mediation between women. This 
is an unusual space (as Luce Irigaray points out, in general "our 
discourse is incapable of rethinking a universal as mediation and 
not as truth resulting from arbitrary forms"83), not only where the 
English language is spoken, but within other European languages 
also. The concept does not occur in the Irish language (Irish gaelic), 
and native speakers and translators of Irish to whom I have spoken 
are unable to account for the shift. 84 It is only possible to 
speculate here on the relation between the suppression of Irish, the 
suppression of Irish culture, the development of representational 
tropes such as `Mother Ireland', and this structure in Hiberno- 
English. Certainly the women's movement in Ireland has an ability 
to cross class and party political differences in a manner which is 
a revelation to British feminists 
Approaches to figuration and representation of women's bodies 
have developed among Irish women artists in a manner which is 
quite distinct from that seen in Britain, Europe or the USA. One 
82 Luce Irigaray, 'Limits of the Transference', p. 109/'La limit du transfert', p. 297. 
83 Luce Irigaray, 'The Universal as Mediation', in Sexes and Genealogies, pp. 125-149 (p. 
128)/'L'universel comme mediation', in Sexes et Parentds, pp. 139-164 (pp. 142-143). 
84 I would like to thank in particular Fiach Mac Conghail, Director, Project Arts Centre, Dublin, and 
Caoimhfn Mac Giolla Leith, University College, Dublin, for advice on this matter. 
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factor in this is the position of modernism, which, with its 
discourse of the universal as ultimate singular truth, is the culture 
of the colonisers, not of the colonised or the post-colonial. Ireland 
is a post-colonial state, and as such has a tangential relationship 
to modernist culture. 85 This, I would like to suggest, has further 
allowed for the development of a feminism and a related women's 
culture of representation and difference distinct from those 
developed in England and the USA. But further, the Hiberno-English 
construction of "the mother" gives space for criticism, 
development, change. This is the conceptual and representational 
space where many Irish women choose to work. It is against this 
background, I would argue, that the successes and failures of many 
Irish women artists should be measured. Anglophone feminist art 
criticism has found the work made in this space hard to 
acknowledge: 86 I have heard non-Irish feminists dismiss Irish 
women's work as "essentialist". This is in itself an essentializing 
and racist judgement, as it ignores the specificities of Irish 
cultural history. In using the term 'essentialist' as if essentialism 
were universal not only in its structures but also In its effects and 
symptoms, such a judgement is often spoken from within a 
construction of 'Irishness' (sometimes couched In 'positive', 
85 This has produced some interesting anomalies: two of literature's key modernists, Samuel 
Beckett and James Joyce, lived in self-imposed exile from their Irish home; and In Irish visual art tho 
absence of the modernist, masculinist avant garde left space for a woman painter raised In the Unionist 
Anglo-Irish ascendency, Mainie Jellett, to become the major proponent of modomist painting In Ireland. 
For a response to a contesting of Ireland's post-colonial identity, see Luke Gibbons, Transformations In 
Irish Culture pp. 174-176. 
86 In all the books on my shelves charting a broad range of feminist art practices thoro are just throo 
books with any mention of work by Irish women: Lynda Nead, The Female Nude: Art, Obsconlty and 
Sexuality (London: Routledge, 1992) discusses work by Mary Duffy, pp. 77-78; Jo Anna Isaak, Feminism 
and Contemporary Art: The Revolutionary Power of Women's Laughter (London: Routlodgo, 1996), 
discusses work by Kathy Prendergast (pp. 165-171) and mentions Dorothy Cross (p. 165); and my own 
'Border Crossings: Womanliness, Body, Representation', In New Feminist Art Criticism: Critical Strateglos, 
ed. by Katy Deepwell (Manchester. Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 138-146, mentions briefly 
Mary Duffy (p. 114), Anne Tallentire (p. 115-6) and a Pauline Cummins/Louiso Walsh collaboration (pp. 
142-3). 
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romantic terms) as already primitive, wild, spiritual and close to 
nature. Add retrograde notions of 'femininity' to this, and the 
colonialist trap for Irish women would be complete. But if Irish 
women are starting from a place of difference (differences of 
history, of culture, of politics, even - as I have demonstrated - 
subtle and crucial differences of language and concepts of 
womanliness), and if they are prompted by the women's movement 
to enter the reserve of representation that can be found in this 
usage of the term 'the mother', then Irish women artists may begin 
to produce representations of women's genealogies and objects of 
inter-subject mediation as a result of their exploration of 
appropriate strategies to deal with that position of difference. 
This will have little to do with embracing or maintaining a 
fundamentally essentialist position according to English or USA 
criteria. 87 I would like to discuss two very different artworks In 
light of this. My aim here is not to claim that these works embody 
aspects of Luce Irigaray's thinking, but rather to indicate the ways 
in which they can be read as disrupting the present discourses 
structuring the representation, 'woman', in Ireland 
Louise Walsh's Monument to the low paid women workers (1993) 
(plate 28) mimeticizes monumental or commemorative public 
sculpture. In the tradition of western civic sculpture, the piece is 
made of cast bronze and stands in a busy city street. Unusually, the 
two sculpted figures do not stand on a plinth but on the ground, 
87 It is interesting that the attacks on Luce Irigaray's'essentialism' have come primarily from critics 
in the USA, where a need to counter reductive or racist Identity politics may mean that somo forms of 
difference - including European differences - are not recognised. See for example Christine Dolphy, 'Tho 
Invention of French Feminism: an Essential Move', Yale French Studios, 87 (1995), pp. 190-221, for an 
analysis of 'New French Feminism' as a designation which has meaning only In Anglo-American acadomla, 
and none In France. Toril Mol, 'Feminism, Postmodernism, and Style: Recent Feminist Criticism In the 
United States', Cultural Critique, 1 (1988), 3-22, and Gayatrl Chakravorty Spivak, 'Fronch Feminism In an 
International Frame', In In Other Worlds: Essays In Cultural Politics (London: Routlodgo, 1988), pp. 134- 
153 both map out differences between developments In feminist theory in difforont goographical locations. 
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Louise Walsh 
Monument to the Low-Paid Women Workers 
1993. Bronze, 84" high 
Photograph by the author 
Plate 28 
300 
although they are slightly larger than life-size. Also unusually, 
they are female: a mature woman and her younger, adult daughter. 
The city is Belfast: in common with most nineteenth century 
industrial western cities its public sculptures show figures of 
historical men and allegorical women. In one respect this sculpture 
is not unusual, as its figures are not representative of individual 
women. Instead it seeks to make visible a class or categorisation 
of women - the low-paid women workers of the title - and the 
contexts of their lives. Each figure is sculpted in a realistic 
fashion, augmented by objects which make up their lives - for 
instance the older woman has a shopping basket for a belly; the 
younger has a typewriter. Their bodies literally carry the traces of 
their working lives: the accoutrements of low paid and unpaid 
female labour such as scrubbing brushes help form a shoulder here, 
a breast or an arm there. Additionally, inscribed upon them are the 
facts and statistics of work for these women - listings of the 
lowest-paid jobs, traditionally women's occupations; the rates of 
pay for particular jobs; and so on. But in order to read these, to 
know the circumstances of life for these women, you have to get 
close, become intimately acquainted with them, as the type is 
small. It becomes a wider political analysis in a public place: only 
those who care enough to get close will ever know. Although the 
work represents the two women situated within a patriarchal 
economic structure, it does not show them as victims. The older 
woman is standing tall, physically solid, head held upright and a 
look of confidence - some might see it as challenge - on her 
handsome face. The daughter is slighter; her head and body turn a 
little towards her mother, as if seeking reassurance in her 
strength. The sculpture is not expressionistic in any way; the 
figures have not been given theatrical emotive gestures. Instead, 
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the gestures are everyday ones, eloquent of a quiet dignity and a 
clear affectionate bond between the two women. 
Among men in the Belfast art world, feelings about the work appear 
ambivalent: it cannot be easily assimilated into the usual terms of 
the modernist/post-modernist debate. It does not aspire 
conceptually or formally to `the universal' as it is understood 
within that debate, but primarily functions as a mediation of 
female experience and the politics of gender, rather than the 
preferred political content for work in Belfast, the so-called 
`troubles'. However, it is also clear from anecdotal and verbal 
evidence that the sculpture is held in high esteem by women in 
Belfast across class and political or sectarian categories: "my 
mother always touches them as she goes for the bus", one woman 
said to me, "and she's always so `proper' in public! ". In women's 
positive responses we can begin to see an empathy with Luce 
Irigaray's own anecdotal telling (as mentioned earlier) of her 
reaction to seeing a sculpture of Anne and Mary: "I felt returned 
calmly and joyously into my body, my emotions, and my history as a 
woman". 88 
It was this experience that confirmed for Luce Irigaray the 
importance of positive representations of mother and daughter 
couples and led her to urge for the placing of such works in public 
and domestic settings. Part of this is the adaption of extant 
traditions of representation; for her, living in a Catholic country, 
this includes images of Mary and Anne. In the Republic of Ireland 
(some 95% Catholic) representations of Mary are embedded in the 
88 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous, p. 25/Je, tu, nous, p. 26. Translation modified. 
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broader culture to an extent that they are not in Northern Ireland, 
which is 38% Catholic, and has its Protestant churches dominated 
by an iconoclastic Presbyterianism. In Belfast, a city utterly 
divided in its housing, schooling, employment and national 
allegiances, and riven by decades of what can be best described as 
low-grade civil war, where the only thing the two sides seem to 
agree on is their need to control women's bodies and their anti- 
abortion stance, 89 the public political message to women has often 
appeared to be that sexual politics are a containable side issue, and 
political organization between women has been restricted to non- 
aligned women or to the Peace Movement. 90 In such a context, 
Walsh's sculpture has enormous potential as a channel of mediation 
for Belfast women. 
In the spring of 1996 the Irish Museum of Modern Art hosted the 
touring exhibition Distant Relations: A Dialogue Among Chicano, 
Irish and Mexican Artists. Curated by the American Tricia Ziff, and 
predicated upon a supposed rapport between Ireland and Mexico as 
Catholic countries dominated by Protestant neighbours, the 
exhibition was generally criticized in Ireland for its reductive 
notions of Irishness and Irish national identity. However, some 
individual works were eloquent of a more interesting complexity, 
89 This was expressed by a speaker from the floor at one of a number of public meetings and 
lectures in Belfast given by African-American activist Angela Davies in 1996. The rest of the audience 
clearly signalled agreement. 
90 One prominent Republican woman told me that since the 1970s women could not be accepted 
within the organised women's movement in the North as feminists unless they supported the Peace 
Movement thus relinquishing struggle for national or cultural identity. This contrasts strongly with at least 
one strand of the British women's movement. The special 'Irish issue' of Spare Rib (August 1989) 
eulogised women in the Northern Republican movement such as those in Sinn Fein, while Ignoring the 
peace movement, Northern protestant women, and Southern feminists. In the mid-1990s the situation In 
the North has changed slightly, with the founding in 1996 of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition. This Is 
a political party which is inclusive of women from both Republican and Loyalist backgrounds, as well as 
Unionist, Nationalist and non-aligned backgrounds. It is also cross-class. In May 1996 representatives 
were elected to the Northern Ireland Forum and the Peace Talks. It develops consensus positions on all 
aspects of policy, including 'the constitutional question'. 
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and as each artist's work was curated in separate rooms it was 
possible to give each one particular attention. Fran Hegarty 
exhibited the final version of a video installation which had 
previously been exhibited in differing forms: Turas (Journey) 
(1991-1995) (plate 29). In a room to itself, Turas had two main 
elements. Down the middle of the floor were a series of light boxes 
with images of the surface of a river. This led to the far wall, on 
which was projected a video. A sequence of seven scenes were 
shown on a loop. On the left of the image sits an older woman, 
facing the camera; on the right, in profile, a woman approaching 
middle age. Each scene starts with a close up of the hands of the 
younger woman touching the elder in a gesture which speak of the 
possibility of communication from elder to younger: fingers 
touching the place of the elder woman's voice box; fingers touching 
a book in her hands; and so on. The camera pulls back to hold both 
women in frame; then finally the younger woman stands and leaves. 
We hear a voice speaking haltingly in Irish: "An dtig leat cuidiü 
liom Gaeilge a labhairt aris? ". The voice changes to that of an older 
woman saying "Thiocfaidh liom cuidiü teat Gaeilge a labhairt, 
cinnte". In the final sequence she collects the book from the elder 
woman's hands and leaves with it. Then the whole set of scenes 
repeat. The Irish cannot be exactly translated into English, but 
would be understood as "Do you [think / believe / feel] you could 
[give / teach] me Irish again? " and "I do [think / believe / feel] that 
I could [give / teach] you Irish, surely". 
It is possible to read a morphological relationship between the 
representations in this work and the Hiberno-English structuring of 
`the mother'. I recognize the younger woman as the artist, and know 
the elder to be her mother; it is their voices on the tape. This is 
Frances Hegarty 
Turas (Journey) 
1990-1995. Video still 
Courtesy of the Artist 
Plate 29 
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privileged information, not available to the majority who see the 
work; I mention it not to add 'authenticity' to any narrative reading 
into the work, but rather to demonstrate the morphological 
structures at different levels of it. In a letter the artist told me 
"you wouldn't believe the consternation it all caused back in Teelin 
when I phoned some friends for the correct spelling. I was passed 
from house to house all week with no one agreeing on any word [.... ] 
The meaning of the words in brackets is more in the emphasis of 
the spoken maternal voice than its written form". 91 Governmental 
rationalizing of spelling (replacing certain letter combinations 
with accents) and centralizing of Irish language teaching, combined 
with highly localized accents, word and sentence structure, ensure 
a tension between the mother's speech and its abstraction into 
writing. Her certainty that her speech can be transmitted is not 
shared by the daughter, and died with her. 92 The answer for the 
daughter is in the gift-object of the old book from which the 
mother read, and which remains a mediation of the mothertongue: a 
chance for its legibility, rather than unmediated authenticity. 
Maintenance mimesis is not possible; but what is at stake is the 
possible trauma of total loss of mothertongue. The video sequences 
do have inscribed in them traces of histories particular to the 
artist and her family, but which are also common on the Irish west 
coast: traces of emigration, dispersal of culture and of language, 
shifting of culture through the diaspora, and the impossibility of 
return to any `authenticity'; all granted extra poignancy through the 
death of an individual, and with her the death of particular usage of 
91 Fran Hegarty, letter to the author, 4 February 1998. 
92 On a personal note, the last time I met my mother-in-law before she died she offered to teach me 
her mothertongue - she was a Scots-Gaelic speaker from Skye - although her son had been brought up to 
speak only English so he could 'better himself'. The certaintly that it can be transmitted unchanged is 
almost unbearably poignant. 
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Irish, and the end of possible mediation in a particular syntax 
between mother and daughter. The mother and daughter speak not 
just of their relationship, nor just of Fran Hegarty's trauma at the 
loss of her language, and their different historical processes, but 
of that possibility of mediation between them. Through repeated 
gestures of touching-upon and leaving, touching-upon and leaving, 
the daughter is struggling to realize the transcendent genealogy as 
mediated through her mothertongue, and thus the possibility of her 
own becoming. Fran Hegarty has written of Turas: 
This [.... ] is where the Mothervoice offers itself as an alternative, a 
repository of knowledge and a fund of cultural energy with which to resist the 
effects of displacement. In Turas, the daughter's relationship the Mothertongue 
is not only gendered but predicated on a genealogical link with the maternal 
body. There is also an analogy between the separation from the mother and the 
emigrant's trauma of lost access to both language and the physical landscape. 93 
Through retraversing the Hiberno-English site of `the mother' Fran 
Hegarty has produced a morphologically coherent space in which to 
speak of her mother, of her own history of being mothered, and 
finally of the loss and possibility of a transcendent genealogy. 
Turas speaks of the struggle to retrieve this loss through 
productive mimesis, and thus to become a woman. 
93 Fran Hegarty, in Distant Relations, ed. by Trisha Ziff, p. 119. 
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Conclusion. 
But one apparently negative predicate still remains to [God]: that of 
invisibility. We keep invisible too, to a large extent, our sexual relation, our 
carnal act, especially through the mediation of woman. What birth takes place, 
is yet to come, between these two poles of invisibility? How can we discover 
and interpret its traces in discourse? How can we remodel existing languages 
{langages} so as to give place to a sexuate culture? That is what is at stake in 
my researches. l 
The "becoming" in the title of this thesis can now be read in three 
ways: the 'becoming' qualities of the patriarchal masquerade, 
femininity; the aim of becoming subjec ts, women, shedding our 
being the representation, `woman'; and the ongoing unfolding of 
being in a state of becoming as those subjects - becoming (as) 
beauty. 
There are a number of things that Luce Irigaray does not offer to 
women involved with art practice. She writes very little about 
visual art, and even less does she write about what art made by 
women might look like - either in its overall aesthetic, or its 
materiality, or its overt imagery. To do so would be to offer a form 
of security, but a false security: it would be to set a fixity to that 
which has not yet developed its porousness, nor recognised the 
sites of its limits. The parler-femme and the witnessing-woman, 
enunciations in a syntax appropriate to women and through a 
morphologic which respects women's "natural" and spiritual 
ontology, are as yet hardly realized. Luce Irigaray's work is of 
1 Luce Irigaray, 'The Three Genres', trans. by David Macey, in The Irigaray Reader, 
ed. by Margaret Whitford (Oxford: Blackwells, 1991), pp. 140-153 (p. 152)/'Les trois 
genres', in Sexes et Parentes (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1987), pp. 181-196 (pp. 195- 
196). Translation modified. 
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strategic use for creative practices in the analysis of how we 
might move from where we are now in the spheres of the political, 
the philosophical, and the performative, towards bringing this 
morphologic and its syntax in the Symbolic into being. 
These strategic possibilities emerge primarily because of Luce 
Irigaray's active practice of productive mimesis - as an anti- 
patriarchal position, rather than a binary oppositional, separatist, 
or equal rights form of feminism. Her practice of mimesis (drawing 
together textual practices, civil rights, and the empirical woman) 
in tandem with her practice within an appropriate morphologic (a 
structural relationship between the-enunciation and the sexuate 
subject) provide patterns for art practices as a set of discourses 
(including its interrelation with criticism), rather than producing 
models for such practices. In particular, the attempt to engage 
with a productive mimesis and to develop an appropriate 
morphologic can make us aware of places of resistance - reserves 
- in extant syntaxes. In doing so, we can recognize that we, as the 
subjects, women, are always elsewhere from the patriarchal site 
of the representation, `woman', and we can identify the sites we 
have to re-traverse in order to expose their blind spots and in order 
to signify women in the Symbolic. 
What Luce Irigaray provides us with, then, is a number of 
strategies, both pragmatic and philosophical, through which we can 
work as theoreticians and practitioners. These start from a 
recognition of the limits of the present Symbolic structures, in 
order to begin the development of appropriate syntaxes. This will 
inevitably involve a repossessing of images and a refiguration of 
our sexuate subjectivity, rather than a trust in the abstract: `The 
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fact that this sort of language barely exists greatly restricts 
women's space for subjective freedom. It's possible to start to 
create it with everyday language'. 2 Crucially, it will develop 
discourses of representational economies which recognize sexuate 
subjectivity - economies which are, therefore, intersubjective, 
aware of the subject's limits and of differance rather than 
difference between the Same and its other. 
This requires attention to be paid to the manner of mediation - its 
function in terms of subject-subject relations: in short, how 
artworks mediate between artist and audience. If women have 
existed in a state of immediacy with other subjects (if they have 
had no appropriate Symbolic for mediation) then one task - and this 
is a particular problem for artists - is to produce objects of 
mediation: gift space/objects, the third term, which allow for 
mediated, intersubjective relation. These are not the capitalized 
objects of phallocentric discourse (familiar in the present 
mainstream art world), a discourse which closes down 
intersubjectivity by reducing the other subject to object status, to 
mirror status, to being nothing but the other of the same. Present 
phallocentric discourse, in capitalizing art objects, does not 
require of them any more than the one-way mediation of the self of 
the artist. Mediation in intersubjectivity requests a two-way 
responsibility: it requires attentiveness from the subject audience. 
This suggests that there may be anti-patriarchal structures of 
looking at art, including gallery practices and the pre-writing 
aspects of criticism. 
2 Luce Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous: Toward a Culture of Difference (London: Routledge, 
1993), p. 49/Je, tu, nous: pour une culture de la difference (Paris: Grasset, 1990), p. 56. 
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Finally, while Luce Irigaray's writing does not tell artists what to 
say through their practice, it is clear that none of the above will be 
able to be worked upon without some concomitant - 
morphologically appropriate - sense of the transcendent and thus 
of the spiritual or divine and of women's genealogies. Here, Luce 
Irigaray offers particular suggestions of representational 
practices: but they are pragmatically strategic, rooted in the 
knowledge of what is possible while working through the Symbolic 
presently available to us. They are concerned with creating gift 
space/objects which mediate between women (including in 
domestic spaces and between mothers and daughters), which do not 
perform a maintenance mimesis of patriarchal languages, and 
particularly not of the representation, `women' within those 
languages; which respect women as subjects, not reducing them to 
objects or to mothers; which recognize the subject's limits and her 
transcendental. 
The question to be asked at this point is: What is to be done now? 
Given the above findings, what are the tasks for feminists 
concerned with progressing the theories of art, whether as artists 
or as writers? Most pressing, I would say, is the need to identify 
where Luce Irigaray's analysis can be most productively juxtaposed 
with current feminist theories of art so they can, in Gayatri 
Spivak's dynamic term, "critically `interrupt' each other, bring 
each other to crisis, in order to serve their constituencies", 3 in 
order not only to make legible artworks of the past, but also in 
order to provide spaces of discourse capable of providing a 
3 Gayatri Spivak, 'A Literary Representation of the Subaltern: A Woman's Text from 
the Third World', in In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics, (London: Routledge, 1988), 
pp. 241-268 (p. 241). She was specifically referring to the historian and the teacher of 
literature, but this is a useful model for productive interdisciplinary engagement. 
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background against which artists can work in the future. I would 
like to conclude by outlining briefly how this might happen. 
In two important recent essays, Griselda Pollock outlines the 
histories of feminist theories of and in Art History, and identifies 
areas of possible development and tasks for feminist critical 
practices. 4 These practices are ones which work antagonistically 
towards the present curatorial impulse of Art History, with its 
categorization according to dates and styles, and instead looks for 
differently structured "spaces of femininity": 
Yet the meanings of works produced by women will only become vivid to us 
when we can articulate what is particular to them, what makes them different 
from the existing norms, and when we define signifying temporalities quite 
other than those of styles, movements, avant-garde innovations and so forth. 
We are searching for ways to acknowledge the 'spaces of femininity' and its 
subjective temporalities in the rhythms of women's lived experience within 
and against the hierarchies of sexual difference as that is configured in 
complex social formations of class, race and sexuality. 5 
These "spaces of femininity" are far from being the masquerading 
`femininity' of Freudian terminology. Griselda Pollock identifies 
`the feminine' as being a radical rupture of patriarchy, and denies 
the binary oppositional position of being the other of phallocentric 
man's same: "feminism has needed to develop forms of analysis 
that can confront the difference of women as other than what is 
other to this masculine order while exposing the sexual politics of 
dominant discourses and institutions". 6 In order for the spaces of 
femininity to be legible as sites of mediation, we need to search 
4 Griselda Pollock, 'The Politics of Theory: Generations and Geographies In Feminist 
Theory and the Histories of Art Histories', in Generations and Geographies in the Visual Arts: 
Feminist Readings, ed. by Griselda Pollock (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 3-21; 'Inscriptions 
in the Feminine', in Inside the Visible: An Elliptical Traverse of 20th Century Art, In, Of, and 
From the Feminine, ed. by M. Catherine de Zegher (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 
67-87. 
5 Griselda Pollock, 'The Politics of Theory', p. 8. 
6 Griselda Pollock, 'Inscriptions in the Feminine', p. 71. 
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for, and develop, what Griselda Pollock calls (drawing upon Mary 
Kelly's writing of the 1970s) "inscriptions in the feminine": 
The phrase, "inscriptions in the feminine, " has an archaeological ring to it. As 
if deciphering an ancient culture whose language is lost while its strange 
monuments remain to puzzle and provoke our curiosity, we must assume that 
we do not yet know what is being traced upon the surface of culture by artists 
speaking in, from, or of the feminine. A feminist reading for the inscriptions of 
the feminine means listening for the traces of a subjectivity formed in the 
feminine within and in conflict with a phallocentric system. Beyond that, it 
implies figuring out what working from that place, however unconsciously, 
might be producing, as yet unarticulated, unrepresented, unsignified, 
unrecognized.? 
Already we can begin to find a structural (if not terminological) 
rapport between Griselda Pollock's analysis of the present moment, 
and that of Luce Irigaray. In the notion of "the spaces of 
femininity" and "artists speaking in, from, or of the feminine" 
there are echoes of the morphology appropriate to women as a site 
of mediation and productive of an appropriate syntax. There are 
echoes too of sites of Irigarayan `reserve' as sites for re-entering 
as strategies of resistance and rupture. 
This indicates one of the present points of tension: terminology. As 
of yet, although there may be areas of rapport between Luce 
Irigaray's work and Griselda Pollock's theorizing of the discourses 
of art, the use of terminology is far from agreed. In the short term 
this might be a problem, as differences of terminology 
(particularly across cultures and languages) can mean even further 
lack of legibility. In the longer term, however, this might prove 
more healthy: painstaking negotiation over terminology avoids the 
capitalization of phrases, their reduction into mere translation (or 
maintenance mimesis) of extant terminology, their collapse into 
containable quasi-objects rather than dynamic processes aiding 
7 Griselda Pollock, ibid., p. 74. 
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women becoming subjects. I am thinking here of terms such as 
'difference' being mis-understood as `other', and thus maintaining a 
phallic norm; or a `feminine space' collapsing into celebration of 
the masquerade of femininity in Freudian terms; or the way in 
which 'ecriture feminine' was dismissable as somehow both 
essentialist and something to do with surface style. 8 For 
theoreticians to keep the spaces of terminology open through 
continual processes of resistance and open discourse can only 
rebuff assumptions and misreadings, and eventually do what is 
most difficult: help shift embedded ways of thinking. Such terms 
(including, of course, the ones I have identified in this thesis) may 
stretch structures of thinking and mark sites of intervention, but 
for them to become art-critical shorthand for style would be to 
miss the point. Neither the discussion of Griselda Pollock, nor the 
implications of that of Luce Irigaray, indicate a prescription of 
style or of media. However, as we have seen, for an artist 
unthinkingly to mimic technical means (including style of use of 
media, composition, imagery, gesture, etc. ) can undermine 
absolutely any assumed feminist voice in the artwork. As Toril Moi 
says in criticizing Jane Gallop on styles of writing: 
Jane Gallop is right to claim that to take up a style is to take up a position, but 
she is wrong to recommend a single stylistic move as uniquely feminist, just 
as she is wrong to assume that style can be analyzed without regard to 
contents and the specific historical space where it makes its intervention. 9 
Griselda Pollock outlines the theoretical work of artist and 
8 These seem crude examples; but the crudities of studio Fine Art courses (a site to 
which I am committed) is often a bottom line for the (mis)interpretation of theoretical work. I 
am thinking for example of students such as the one who, after reading critiques of Derrida 
for his final year essay, announced to a colleague that he wished to write his essay "in a 
stream of consciousness style". 
9 Toril Moi, 'Feminism, Postmodernism, and Style: Recent Feminist Criticism In the 
United States', Cultural Critique, 1 (1988), 3-22 (p. 22). 
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psychoanalyst Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger and describes how it 
offers a potential articulation of the `feminine': 
Lichtenberg Ettinger theorizes a way to imagine the Symbolic expanded to 
contain more than one symbol - more than one "signifier of signifiers" for 
subjectivity. Neither replacing nor merely supplementing the phallus, itself the 
signifier for subjectivity based on the opposition of on/off, absence/presence, 
and all related binaries of assimilation versus rejection, she proposes the 
matrix, a symbol of coexisting and coemerging part-subjectivities that holds 
special promise for women, for whom this aspect has particular and profound 
resonance in allowing elements of their feminine but invisible bodily specificity 
and the fantasies to which it gives rise to filter into signification. 10 
Once again, there are structural resonances between aspects of 
this and aspects of Luce Irigaray's thought. Bracha Lichtenberg 
Ettinger goes further than Luce Irigaray in proposing "more than 
one symbol". Irigaray proposes the "double syntax" and syntactical 
signification, produced through an appropriate morphology, while 
Lichtenberg Ettinger proposes the `matrix' as a neutral term 
(alongside reasserting the phallus as a neutral term) productive of 
a space which relates to Irigaray's `morphologic' in allowing 
mediation or a `filtering' of subjectivity into signification. 
The significance of an artist producing this work is of course 
profound, not least because of the very real knowledge she would 
have of the struggle to produce significations in the realm of the 
visual as well as through verbal language. " Griselda Pollock 
indicates the questions for art theory (including that produced by 
artists through their work) provoked by Bracha Lichtenberg 
Ettinger's writing: 
Licthenberg Ettinger's suggestion that there may be more than one symbol (the 
one being the phallus that forces us to think of sex as the One and its Other, 
and thus in fact always and only as the One) opens up art criticism to ask: 
What is involved in a nonphallic, matrixial reading of an artistic text? What 
10 Griselda Pollock, 'Inscriptions in the Feminine', p. 79. 
11 This is not to deny the obvious: that we all work with visual significations of gesture, 
clothing, etc., but rather to stress the particularities of producing artworks as signifiers. 
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would be a matrixial exhibition? The matrix reveals the sexual difference at 
work in our forms of knowledge, interpretation, and curatorship and once 
acknowledged will change the politics of selection, viewing, and response. 12 
These questions can find a correlation in some that I have been 
attempting to ask in this thesis: What is a morphologically 
appropriate, nonphallic, reading of an artwork? If there is more 
than one syntax in the Symbolic, how does that syntax become 
legible? What are the processes of reading nonphallically, 
intersubjectively? How, ultimately, can we shift the deeply 
phallocentric present discourses of the artworld? While Luce 
Irigaray's 'morphologic' and `double syntax', Griselda Pollock's 
`spaces of femininity', and Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger's `matrix' 
do not map exactly upon one another, it is in what I detect to be a 
fruitful tension between these terms that I feel the grounds for 
most optimism. It is here that I think we have the most likely 
space for the realization, in the possibilities of their art, the 
becoming beauty of the subjects, women. 
12 Griselda Pollock, 'Inscriptions in the Feminine', p. 81. 
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